

# Catastrophic Incident Annex (CIA)

## Appendix 2: Executive Summary

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### Purpose

This Appendix serves as an aid for decision makers and executive leadership following the occurrence of a catastrophic disaster. This resource is intended to present the most critical information contained within other portions of the Catastrophic Incident Annex (CIA) for quick reference and introduction of relevant topics. This appendix also contains resources for facilitating decision making and understanding the actions that will occur throughout statewide emergency operations.

#### Important topics within this document:

- Important Considerations and Assumptions for Leadership (CSZ Incident-Specific)
- Strategic Goals and Objectives
- FEMA Lines of Effort
- Statewide Operational Coordination
- PACE Communications
- State and Federal Staging Areas
- Senior Leadership Briefs

#### Tools and Job Aids (attachments)

- UCG Checklist and Decision Matrix
- Policy Group Checklist
- Community Lifeline Reporting
- EEI Spreadsheet
- ESF Checklists
- SEOC Section Checklists

### Situation Overview

#### General

The following planning assumptions and response considerations involve selections from the primary<sup>1</sup> and supporting core capabilities referenced in each Tab of CIA. Each of these Tabs goes into greater detail than is covered in this appendix.

#### Important Considerations and Assumptions for Leadership

- Federal assistance is immediately needed as the initial response to a catastrophic incident is beyond the capability of the State of Washington.

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<sup>1</sup> The Public Health, Healthcare, and EMS; and Fatality Management have not yet been planned for, so no information is presented in this document for those core capabilities. The Infrastructure Systems core capability has only addressed a few of its components in planning (primarily water infrastructure).

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- There will be a Governor's Proclamation of a State of Emergency and a Presidential Major Disaster Declaration.
- Catastrophic incidents may limit or prevent response personnel from initialing filling roles within the SEOC.
- There will be limited to no capability for supporting out-of-region resources and staff; temporary billeting will be required immediately post-event for responders.
- A viable resource allocation and adjudication system must be immediately in place to get the maximum benefit of limited critical resources.
- There will be multi-state and multi-regional demands for the same national resources.
- Early in a catastrophic incident, critical resources will be “pushed” directly into the impacted areas via a coordinated state and federal response.
- Resources requests can be expected to exceed all available sources and will include those resources that the state does not have access to or typically utilizes in a response.
- Some physical communications infrastructure may fail or become destroyed during the incident and disable one or more methods of communication
- Some communication infrastructure sites are in difficult to reach locations and require special transportation capabilities to access to repair or refuel.

### Roadways and Bridges

- Some road systems may be impassable due to damage or secondary effects (e.g., landslides, liquefaction, subsidence, hazardous materials, flooding, etc.).
- Assessments are required for all transportation infrastructure in affected areas.
  - The extent of damage and debris limit access to conduct assessments and repair.
  - Assessment resources for transportation infrastructure will be insufficient, requiring prioritization of this resource type.
  - Transportation impacts and limitations will delay situational assessment and early attempts to move resources.
- Local capabilities are likely inadequate to repair transportation infrastructure.
  - Any resources brought in to assist response operations will need to be self-sufficient.
  - Repairs may require that some locations be repaired first to access other locations.
  - Significant repairs and replacements to transportation infrastructure will take months and years rather than days and weeks.
  - Some bridges may require specialized resources to repair which are unavailable.

### Airports, Maritime, and Rail

- Seaports, airports, and rail do not have the resources for 24-hour operations.

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- Airports are largely limited to those that can accommodate large aircraft, have sustained minor damage, have useable and repairable connections to the ground transportation systems, and have the capacity for multiple large aircraft to be on the ground at one time.
  - Airport functionality is dependent on wraparound services (e.g., power, water, sanitation, fuel, and communications).
  - Helicopters may be needed to meet the transportation needs of isolated communities where landing areas are too small for fixed-wing aircraft.
    - Helicopters carry fewer supplies, are slower, and have a shorter range.
  - Small airports may be able to support helicopter operations.
  - Commodities may pile up at airport landing zones if shortages in supply movement capabilities occur.
- Seaports are at risk to sustain major or complete damage.
  - Maritime resource movement may be unavailable to many locations due to damage to ports, debris in the water, and changes to underwater topography.
- Ferries are critical links between the east side of Puget Sound, to the Kitsap and Olympic Peninsulas, and the San Juan Islands.
- If key rail bridges in Seattle, Tacoma, Vancouver, and Portland sustain significant damage, then rail transportation is not possible along the I-5 corridor or spurs to the west.
  - The majority of rail facilities (train stations, dispatch facilities, and fuel facilities) are along the I-5 corridor and are on liquefiable soils.
  - Rail lines coming from the east may be significantly impacted by landslides.

### Mass Care

- There will not be enough trained shelter staff to support all operations.
  - Shelter staff will be disaster victims themselves and will require the same services and resources as those in the shelters.
  - Ad hoc and impromptu shelters will be established and will need to be identified.
- Pre-designated mass care sites may suffer damage and require repairs before being utilized.
  - Major aftershocks may result in the need for additional building inspections or re-inspections before a facility can be used or continue operations
  - Not all designated shelter facilities are retrofitted or have emergency backup power.
  - Depending upon the number and condition of shelters in the impacted area, damage to infrastructure, access to communication and life-sustaining resources and services and other factors, there will be a need to evacuate disaster survivors to host jurisdictions.
  - Within heavily impacted areas, there may not be officially managed shelter facilities if life sustaining resources cannot access the locations.
  - Some sheltering locations (official and ad-hoc) which were ADA compliant, may not be compliant after sustaining damage from an incident.

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- Some shelter locations may or may not have backup generator capabilities.
- Fires or aftershocks may require the relocation of shelters that become threatened.
- Disaster survivors may self-relocate or shelter-in-place rather than stay in shelters.
  - Disaster survivors may not seek shelter in buildings after a catastrophic earthquake.
  - Mass care services will need to be provided to survivors relocating to host jurisdictions.
  - Those who have Sheltered in Place at home, may need additional care/resources.
    - These resources will run out at various times after a disaster.
    - There is the potential for those sheltering in place to have unmet needs that will need to be addressed.
  - Impacted populations may choose to stay on or close to their properties by camping in parks, RVs, or trucks located in parking lots and other open spaces
    - They will require sanitation, feeding, and medical support.
- Assistance from outside the impacted area will take time to organize and mobilize, leaving only internal community resources available for response.
- The inability to get messages to the public about mass care resources and services; and communication between response stakeholders will decrease the ability for the state to perform mass care
- There will be areas that, due to a loss of some or all of the community lifelines, mass care operations will be unable to be performed due to issues surrounding survivor and responder safety, and/or inaccessibility.
  - Disaster survivors arriving at mass care sites may present with minor injuries, pre-existing chronic or contagious diseases, or other medical conditions that require evaluation and treatment, isolation or quarantine, or referral.

### Feeding, Hydration, and Bulk Distribution

- Mass care service providers will be challenged to acquire and receive food to serve shelter populations and to prepare it without continuous coordination and support. Additional challenges include:
  - Meeting diverse cultural and dietary needs (e.g., food allergens, medically-required limitations<sup>2</sup>, vegetarian/vegan, halal, kosher) of the affected population
  - Providing appropriate feeding for service animals and household pets.
- Disruption of water, power, communications, transportation and other critical infrastructure sectors will impact people's ability to move to sheltering locations and receive or go to goods and services.

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<sup>2</sup> Among others, this may include such restrictions as low sodium and low fat. This may also include those who are unable to eat or drink by mouth and require Total Parenteral Nutrition (TPN).

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- Resources to support household pets and service and assistance animals in the impacted area will be insufficient.
- The scarcity of appropriate vehicles to provide mass care services will limit the delivery of life-sustaining services.

### Water

- The resources available post-incident may be insufficient to concurrently provide services and restore systems.
  - Water utility personnel will likely not be available in sufficient numbers to operate, maintain, repair, and restore water systems for the first few weeks.
  - There may be insufficient resources to accomplish incident objectives due to resource competition with other response activities.
- A water provider's service area is likely not consistent with jurisdictional boundaries
  - A coordinated response involving water services may require the coordination of many different providers for a single community
- Water systems in dense urban settings may be out of water within 24 hours if significant damage is experienced to the infrastructure.
- Populations may need to be moved to areas where water infrastructure is functioning or have water services.
  - Some impacted individuals, given no alternatives, will use potentially contaminated source water.
- Damage assessments can take a week to occur.
- Water reservoirs may be quickly depleted following an incident that damage the system.
- The period between water quality testing and laboratory testing may take several days.
- Water utilities may be able to operate 2-4 weeks with treatment chemicals on hand.
- Water infrastructure (utility operators) will require the functioning of other services to maintain operations, provide additional services (community collection points), and repair and restore damaged systems.
  - The ability to repair or restore water systems and/or provide water services is directly correlated to the condition of the transportation system.

### Wastewater

- Inoperable pumps at a wastewater utility can lead to sewage overflows that damage the environment, wastewater treatment technologies and threaten public health.
- There exists the potential for a higher risk of disease and illness without a working wastewater system.

### Energy

- Except for some agency specific uses, the State of Washington does not own or operate any significant energy supply facilities, nor is it involved in any wholesale or retail energy transactions or businesses.

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- Bulk fuel deliveries will require significant coordination to move throughout the regions
- Fuel Points of Distribution (F-POD) may be implemented to facilitate deliveries within local jurisdictions
- Initial system safe shutdowns (breakers tripping due to shorts) may cause statewide blackouts that could impact transmission throughout the region
- Generators will be required to provide energy to critical facilities and require short and long-term prioritization of fuel distribution
- Restoration of fuel refinery operations will require both water and electricity (to include replacement of components)
- Fuel stations with generators are limited and consumers may not be able to easily access gasoline for evacuation or refueling small generators<sup>3</sup>
- Fuel demand for response and recovery efforts will increase significantly and be a high priority for the first weeks and months of a catastrophic incident.

### Information and Communications Technology

- Movable and deployable resources capable of establishing and providing immediate communications infrastructure using ICT will be necessary to facilitate a response in which communications has become disrupted.
- Collaboration with the Private Sector will be required to bring in temporary resources which can establish necessary communications.

### Communications

- Operational communications hub relay damage reduces regional communications capabilities.
- Many tower-based systems fail or otherwise are unavailable post-incident due to misalignment, tower collapse (full or partial), interconnectivity failure, loss of redundant systems, power failures, loss of fuel supplies, or overutilization.
- There is limited availability of crews who can assess communications facilities.

### Safety and Security

- Correctional facilities in the shake zone sustain significant damage and may require evacuation.
- The demand for law enforcement services will be higher after the incident than before and will continue to rise as panic and frustration increase in the population.

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<sup>3</sup> There should also be secondary considerations made for impacts to payment systems as many individuals rely on electronic payment, which may be inoperable.



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### Concept of Operations

#### General

At the occurrence of catastrophic incident, the SEOC will be activated at Level 1 Full Activation. Should it become necessary to involve the assistance of federal resources following a disaster declaration, a method of coordination may need to be established to facilitate response operations spanning a large geographical area. When the determination is made to establish geographic branches and divisions to coordinate statewide efforts alongside federal efforts, then this plan will be in effect.

#### Strategic Goals and Objectives

##### Life Safety

##### **Priority Routes**

1. Identify the routes critical for response including routes to hospitals, emergency services, mass care shelters, CPODs, staging area, and points of entry including connections to adjacent communities, the states “Seismic Lifeline Routes” and air and water ports.
2. Coordinate the deployment of resources that can assist local jurisdictions with assessment and inspection of transportation infrastructure needed for response operations.
3. Coordinate debris clearance from priority routes needed for response operations.
4. Align routes used to move resources with Priority Route planning.

##### **Priority Activities<sup>4</sup>**

5. Provide assistance with local and Tribal sheltering needs through available state resources and facilities.
6. Provide assistance with feeding and hydration for local and Tribal needs through procurable resources<sup>5</sup>.
7. Provide assistance with the bulk distribution of disaster supplies to impacted communities through existing government programs and services.
8. Facilitate the movement of mass care resources from donated, procured, and federal sources into local and Tribal staging areas.

##### **Water Services**

9. Provide sufficient and sustained support for water services to meet life-sustainment incident objectives.

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<sup>4</sup> Priority Activities should emphasize those activities and locations which are along state and local Priority Routes.

<sup>5</sup> The state does not maintain these resources and would have to procure resources using contracts and private vendors to support impacted communities.

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### Water Systems

10. Assist local jurisdictions with the prioritization of water system restoration by those critical consumers who are needed to respond to and stabilize the incident.
11. Identify local jurisdiction resource needs for system restoration and assist to the extent possible under legal guidelines for providing resources to public and private entities.

### Vertical Integration

12. Response operations involving some or all of the jurisdictions and Tribal partners in the state will require an extraordinary level of coordination. This coordination will require the vertical integration of all levels of government to effectively respond and stabilize from the results of a catastrophic incident.
13. Communicate with all levels of government during a catastrophic incident to effectively gain situational awareness through assessment and reporting.
14. Establish sufficient communication to enable timely and coordinated assistance to local jurisdictions.
15. Establish a shared situational awareness and understanding of the communications operating environment.
16. Integrate state-owned and private sector communications equipment with local jurisdictional communications systems to facilitate interoperable communications between the state and local response resources.

### Horizontal Integration

17. Communicate key findings which directly threaten or affect life safety and sustainment across agencies and partners to inform overall response efforts and identify potential policy decisions.
18. Establish or reestablish communication systems between state agencies, private sector entities, critical infrastructure sectors, and other responding organizations to facilitate operational coordination.

### Information Analysis

19. Facilitate a rapid assessment capability immediately following an incident and determine life-threatening situations and imminent hazards.
20. Facilitate the collection of information and other activities such as predictive modeling, remote sensing, and reconnaissance.

### Evacuation

21. Provide resource support for local evacuations from heavily impacted areas and other areas which threaten life safety.

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### Incident Stabilization

#### **Situational Awareness**

22. Assess the condition of the transportation network starting with priority routes and situational requirements.
23. Determine resource shortfalls.
24. Determine effects to the Community Lifelines due to impacted transportation infrastructure.
25. Monitor shelter conditions across all activated shelters.
26. Monitor and assess sheltering shortfalls for capacity, personnel, equipment, supplies, accessibility, and specialty needs.
27. Continuously assess sheltering needs, food and hydration availability, and bulk distribution through local and Tribal situation reports, the shelter manager or the regional shelter manager/supervisor.
28. Monitor supply chain deficiencies for mass care resources (as reported by local and Tribal jurisdictions, vendors involved in state procurement, and federal logistics support).

#### **Water Services**

29. Sustain water resource assistance to protect life and safety of the Whole Community.

#### **Water Systems**

30. Assist local jurisdictions with mutual aid resource requests to restore the functionality of community systems.
31. Assist local jurisdictions with meeting approved water quality standards.
32. Assist local jurisdictions by addressing environmental impacts degrading water source impacts.

#### **Direction, Control, and Coordination**

33. Facilitate a coordinated response that encompasses federal, state, Tribes, local jurisdictions, the private sector and private non-profits through identified strategies and objectives.
34. Sustain the collection, analysis, and dissemination of essential elements of [assessment] information which support decision makers situational assessment to guide incident direction, control, and coordination.
35. Coordinate operational communications response planning among whole community partners.
36. Provide State Emergency Operations Center responders with mission-critical communications systems.
37. Monitor for communications support requests aimed at providing support for essential services.
38. Identify infrastructure barriers preventing the reestablishment or sustainment of communications systems and functionality.

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39. Establish primary, alternate, contingent, and emergency (PACE) backup communications capabilities and share the status of an agency's capabilities with partner organizations.

### State Staging Areas

40. Establish and sustain State Staging Areas.
41. Establish connections with Federal Staging Areas and Local Staging Areas.

### Resource Requests

42. Establish prioritization methodology for the distribution of limited and scarce resources.
43. Identify supply chain disruptions for requested resources.

### PACE Communications

Operational Communication plays a direct role in the successful outcome of a response to a catastrophic incident. When communications are not interoperable, are degraded, or unavailable, the ability to perform operational coordination is greatly hindered.

An organization's PACE or their Primary, Alternate, Contingent, and Emergency communication systems or methodologies are essential to the continuity of operations during a catastrophic response. It is necessary for local, state, federal, Tribal, critical infrastructure, and private sector and business organizations to develop a robust communications continuity plan.




Figure 1 - PACE Communications Process

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### Alert & Warning Center

The Alert and Warning Center (A&WC) within the State Emergency Operations Center has direct contact with the regional, city, county PSAPs for Washington. Communication through the Alert and Warning Center about the status of a jurisdictions communication systems and what method they are communicating with will be essential for mission response.

### Local Integration into PACE

One of the challenges in changing from one communication method to another is getting other responders the information about which mode is being used. If your organization is utilizing the primary system, yet another organization has already moved down their PACE and is utilizing their contingent or emergency system, communication interoperability becomes a key priority. For example, response communications will need to consider how a local jurisdiction will notify the SEOC that they are now utilizing their Alternate, Contingent, or Emergency communication system and concurrently, how the SEOC will notify all local jurisdictions that they are utilizing their Alternate, Contingent, or Emergency form of communication.

It is essential that each EOC monitor redundant means of communication following an incident with likely communications impacts, as use of the Alternate, Contingency, and Emergency methods is likely to occur without warning.

### Public Safety Answering Points

Public Safety Answering Points (PSAPs) are the gateways for access to emergency services for the public. PSAP operators are also often the first link that emergency management may have to the incident that is occurring in their community.

In the event of loss of communication between the local emergency operations center and the state emergency operations center, the Public Safety Answer Points could become a relay for the PACE communications to link local and state EOCs. It will be essential for the SEOC to



Figure 2: If first responders are the eyes to the incidents happening on the scene of an incident, or disaster, Public Safety Answering Points (PSAPs) are the ears. These Emergency Communication Centers gather the on-scene reports by residents, responders, and by-standers and relay that information to appropriate responders and the Local Emergency Operations Center if warranted.

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know how a local jurisdiction is communicating so that incident response can be supported.

### **State and Federal Staging Areas**

Logistics operations are not limited to the Logistics Section of the SEOC as resource coordination and movement can occur within any section and from other state agencies and departments deploying resources in accordance with their own plans and procedures that do not necessarily require the coordination or support of the SEOC.

Some jurisdictions rely on very few routes to maintain connection with the overall state transportation system, and following a disaster that breaks this connection, alternative methods of moving lifesaving and sustain resources will have to be employed until those connections are available.

Many resources which may be requested during a catastrophic incident could be out of the ability of the state and local jurisdictions to procure. Resources in high demand and in short supply will continually present themselves from the early response activities all the way through Recovery operations. It will be essential for those operating within the sphere of logistics at all levels to be aware of these resources before and throughout the incident in order to conserve available resources and to also not rely on a request to be immediately filled. While the preferred method is for resource requests to request a capability rather than an exact resource, this practice will be even more important during periods of resource deficiencies as resource may have to be adapted from the original or typical uses to fit the need of the incident.

### **Priority Routes**

Incidents which cause widespread and significant damage to the transportation system will necessitate the prioritization of both local and state routes to facilitate a timely response with limited resources in a time sensitive environment. Response operations conducted by the state should utilize the Priority Routes that have been established during pre-incident planning to move resources.

### **State (SSA)**

State Staging Areas are pre-determined locations (airports) across the state that are capable of receiving, storing, and moving resources to impacted areas. SSA's are vulnerable to the same impacts as the surroundings areas, and damage to the transportation system or airport facilities (to include key infrastructure) can limit or prevent some locations from being utilized. SSAs located in or near an impacted area can be expected to require additional work to be performed to make it useable, such as:

- Enabling access from the SSA to transportation networks

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- Repairing onsite infrastructure (power, communications, runways, etc.)
- Moving resources to the site to establish and sustain operations
  - Notably, to include transportation resources to move outgoing resources when transportation impacts may limit the ability of large vehicles to move into and around the area

To increase the efficiency of operations, increase coordination, and reduce the delay in the transfer of federal resources to state control, whenever possible SSA's are co-located with Federal Staging Areas (FSA). Although neither party is obligated to do so, co-location provides the opportunity to share site equipment, infrastructure, and personnel during peak activity periods.

### *Establishing New State Staging Areas*

Site selection begins by evaluating potential sites against established criteria. In order to maintain flexibility in logistics operations in Washington State, there are no minimum and maximum requirements for SSAs and any site is usable if it can support the response. The primary attribute that reflects maximum capacity for a staging area is the road network around the site. If staging area traffic interferes with local or emergency response traffic on a continuing basis, there will be consideration for opening additional sites. Site visits are necessary to assess the actual or potential for use of identified sites.

### *State Staging Area Activation Process*

The authority for opening a SSA lies with the SEOC and UCG. Once approved, the SEOC Logistics Section coordinates activation and operation of the staging area site. Under ideal conditions, the state would require 24-hours to establish and implement the initial capability for the disaster resource movement process. The SEOC Logistics Section Chief (LSC) determines the need for one or more staging areas and selects the best potential site(s) based on the location, size of the site versus anticipated resource quantities, population of the affected area, the condition of local infrastructure, and transportation corridors for material traveling in and out of the site(s). If a site has not been prescreened and designated, then coordination with the Department of Enterprise Services (DES) must be initiated to contract a location. Once selection is finalized, the Local Emergency Management Agency (LEMA) is notified of the pending SSA activation. A catastrophic disaster is likely to require more than one SSA.

### **Federal (FSA and APOD)**

Several sites around the state have been designated either as Federal Staging Areas or Aerial Points of Debarkation for a CSZ incident. These locations are notable because they:

- Have the capability to receive large aircrafts and capacity to have multiple aircraft on the ground at any given time

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- Have the capacity to store large amounts of commodity resources (FSA ONLY)
- Are located near major transportation corridors
- Are located near an SSA

Aerial Points of Debarkation are only intended to be delivery points of resources and are not intended to stage resources. Resources delivered to APODs will be moved to FSAs or SSAs.

The establishment of a federal site would require an initial assessment of the location to determine its feasibility and functionality. For sites not already included in planning efforts, FEMA would work through the General Services Administration (GSA) to look for and contract with any other suitable location as dictated by the event.

### Logistics Nodes<sup>6</sup>

WA Locations	Node Function
Grant County International Airport	Incident Support Base
Ephrata Municipal Airport	Incident Support Base
Joint Base Lewis McChord (JBLM)	Federal Staging Area
William R. Fairchild International Airport	Federal Staging Area
Bellingham International Airport	Aerial Point of Debarkation
Paine Field Airport	Aerial Point of Debarkation
Sanderson Field	Aerial Point of Debarkation
Fairchild AFB	Aerial Point of Debarkation
Tri Cities Airport	Aerial Point of Debarkation
Clark County Fairgrounds	State Staging Area
Paine Field Airport	State Staging Area
William R. Fairchild International Airport	State Staging Area
Bellingham International Airport	State Staging Area
Sanderson Field	State Staging Area
Olympia Regional Airport	State Staging Area
Bowerman Airport	State Staging Area
Southwest Washington Regional Airport	State Staging Area
Bremerton National Airport	State Staging Area
Arlington Municipal Airport	State Staging Area

<sup>6</sup> The information in the following sections directly reference the FEMA Region 10 CSZ Earthquake and Tsunami Response Plan.




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
### Staging Area Locations



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### Organization



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### Direction, Control, and Coordination

#### General

Regardless of where it is physically located, the Washington State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC) remains the statewide central coordination point for receiving incident-related information and requesting federal or state resources during catastrophic incidents impacting Washington State.

#### Statewide Operational Coordination

The following structures depict how the Washington Emergency Management Division, the Washington National Guard, Tribal partners, and FEMA Region 10 integrate operations into a common and shared organizational structure in order to respond to a catastrophic incident. Utilizing the existing structure of the 9 Homeland Security Regions, statewide operations are divided into 9 Branches. Preferably, joint operations will consist of an:

- Local Emergency Management
- Tribal Representative
- SEOC Representative
- National Guard GTF Commander
- FEMA Branch Director




Figure 3 - Coordination Structure for Federal-State-Tribal-Local Response

Each HLS Region will employ a Multi-Agency Coordination Group (MACG) to effectively manage resource requests coming in and out of the region and share situational awareness. This MACG is not intended to replace or supplant a jurisdiction's authority or ability to directly coordinate

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with the state. This structure offers the best course of action to manage large scale incidents that will require coordination, similar and competing resources, and personnel shortfalls. Each HLS Region shall determine how its own MACG operates according to their respective response plans.

### Horizontal Integration

#### **Joint EMD, NG, and FEMA Geographic Operations**

Response operations involving some or all of the jurisdictions and Tribal partners in the state will require an extraordinary level of coordination. This coordination will require the vertical integration of all levels of government to effectively respond and stabilize from the results of a catastrophic incident.

### Vertical Integration

#### **FEMA Lines of Effort (LOE)**

A Line of Effort (LOE) is a focused area of critical action that is required for stabilizing or restoring a specific Community Lifeline. LOEs are activities that a state or tribe can ask FEMA to support to fill their capability gaps in managing an incident. The table below identifies LOEs listed with FEMA Region 10's CSZ Earthquake and Tsunami Plan.

Line of Effort	Purpose
Airfield Opening	Provide federal assistance to open major and secondary airfields impacted by the event.
Commodities Distribution	Coordinate support for the distribution of resources at appropriate sites (State Staging Areas [SSAs], points of distribution [PODs], etc.)
Damage Assessment	State or tribal governments request joint Preliminary Damage Assessments (PDAs).
Debris Removal	Provide federal assistance to support clearance, removal, and disposal of debris that impacts the emergency response and community functionality.
Emergency Repairs or Augmentation to Infrastructure	Provide federal assistance for the temporary support of eligible critical facilities that are degraded and where alternative sites are insufficient.
Emergency Route Clearance	Provide federal assistance for immediate clearance of routes and access points to prioritized logistical nodes supporting ground routes and impacted communities.
Evacuation, Reception, Re-Entry, and Return	Assist individuals in need of general evacuation support in departing the disaster area through whole-of-government coordination.

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Fatality Management	Provide decedent remains recovery, processing, and temporary storage as well as victim identification and counseling to the bereaved.
Hazardous Waste	Provide federal assistance to oil or HAZMAT discharges or releases that pose a threat to human health, safety, or the environment.
Healthcare Systems Support	Provide federal assistance to support healthcare systems that are unable to provide patient services.
Housing Solutions	Provide temporary housing solutions to eligible survivors.
Mass Care – Food and Water	Support food and water operations for the impacted populations.
Medical Transportation	Provide federal assistance for the support of Emergency Medical Services (EMS) transport.
Natural and Cultural Resource Protection and Restoration	Ensure compliance with pertinent laws, regulations, and executive orders.
Operational Communications	Establish interoperable communications among federal, SLTT, and private sector partners while reestablishing public information and warning infrastructure.
Port Opening	Provide federal assistance to support the repair and restoration of critical ports.
Private Sector Coordination	Provide federal assistance in support of private sector operations; help infrastructure owners and operators, businesses, and their government partners coordinate cross-sector operations.
Public Information and Warning	Share coordinated, timely, precise, and actionable information with survivors and partners.
Resource Staging	Coordinate support for the sourcing and staging of federal resources at Federal Staging Areas (FSAs) and Incident Support Bases (ISBs).
Responder Security and Protection	Provide temporary federal support to ensure the safety and security of federal responders.
Restoration of Public Infrastructure	Provide federal assistance to support the repair and restoration of critical infrastructure.
Search and Rescue	Provide federal assistance to support search and rescue (SAR) operations.
Sheltering Operations	Support sheltering operations for impacted populations.
Temporary Emergency Power	Implement temporary emergency power generation to support mission-essential operations and critical facilities.

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### Information Collection, Analysis, & Dissemination

As a supporting core capability, Operational Coordination does not play the same role in Community Lifeline reporting as a primary core capability. The EEIs presented within this Tab are those elements which influence the primaries or assist with operational organization and incident response.




Figure 4 - Information Collection and Dissemination

### Information Collection & Analysis

#### Community Lifeline Reporting

During a catastrophic incident, stabilizing Community Lifelines is vital and can represent an extraordinarily difficult challenge due to the dependencies that exist across impacted lifelines. Communities cannot meet these challenges solely by scaling up existing plans as capabilities and response capacities have become impacted. Impacts to these lifelines should be used in determining the focus areas that strategic goals will address.



A lifeline enables the continuous operation of **critical government** and **business functions** and is essential to **human health** and **safety** or **economic security**.

Figure 5 - FEMA Community Lifelines

Core capabilities are the means to ensuring a successful response and a clear path is established to implement a transition to recovery. Making core capabilities and Community Lifelines a focus of incident management and catastrophic incident response provides response

# Catastrophic Incident Annex (CIA)

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organizations and decision makers with a situation overview of the impacted segments of society and provides for targeted approaches to stabilize and re-establish services.




Figure 6 - Implementation of operational planning into incident management

### Information Dissemination

#### Senior Leadership Briefs

By implementing the Community Lifelines during response, the Senior Leadership Briefing (SLB) format for communicating Community Lifeline status can be utilized. This format can be used to effectively communicate the conditions and needs of the response and anticipated timelines associated with ongoing activities. This format can be effective in communicating macro conditions in the response that require policy modifications or implementation; redirection and reassignment of state-owned resources; and can be used to inform the media. Tier I Disaster Summaries consist of the following:

- Executive Summary
- Significant impacts, limiting factors, and actions to address lifeline services
- Reported only at the Lifeline level (no subcomponents)

The strategies and incident objectives which results from using this product provides the details needed for response personnel to address incident impacts and achieve lifeline stabilization.

The process asks four fundamental questions:

1. How do we move from the current state to lifeline stabilization?
2. What problems must be overcome to move from the current state to lifeline stabilization?
3. What state assistance have local jurisdictions, Tribal partners, and critical infrastructure asked for and what assistance could they ask for in the future?



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4. What are the resource shortfalls or limiting factors that could prevent the achievement of lifeline stabilization?

### Tier I Reporting

Tier I of the SLB includes executive-level summary information summarizing the situation, lifeline status, and critical impacts, actions, and limiting factors for the lifeline. The disaster summary provides the most pertinent information in the early stages of the response.

The lifeline statuses are based on actual impacts during that operational period and on the perspective of the disaster survivors within impacted areas. The status is not a reflection of capabilities, but rather to determine whether there are disruptions to the delivery of lifeline services to disaster survivors and where the response is in providing those services. Lifeline condition, in turn, is based on the underlying components and is informed by situational awareness reports, impact assessments, and conversing with partners across public, private, and non-profit sectors.

Additional products that may be included are:

- Incident impact maps
- Updated information on incident management teams (IMT), SEOC representative, and Washington National Guard deployment locations
- EOC statuses
- Emergency/disaster declarations

During an incident, the federal coordinating officer (FCO) and state coordinating officer (SCO)/tribal coordinating officer (TCO) collaborate to make a final determination on the status of each lifeline and component. Decision makers rely on reviewing situational awareness reports, impact assessments, and input from conversations among federal, state, Tribal, local, private sector, and non-profit and community partners to inform lifeline and component status determinations. This is a collaborative and iterative process, focusing on impacted communities and disaster survivors.

### Tier 1: Disaster Summary

Tier 1 of the SLB includes executive-level information summarizing the situation, lifeline condition, and critical impacts, actions, and limiting factors for the lifeline.

Disaster Summary: Includes the most pertinent information in each stage of response.

Lifeline Assessment: Assessing and reporting on lifeline conditions is recommended by Situation Unit and validated by leadership.

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**Lifeline Condition:** Is based on the underlying components, and is informed by situational awareness reports, impact assessments, and conversing with partners across public, private, and non-profit sectors.

**Additional Products may Include:** Incident impact maps; updated information on incident management teams (IMT), SEOC representative, and Washington National Guard deployment locations; EOC statuses; and Emergency/disaster declarations.

**Senior Leadership Brief**  
**Hurricane Dorian**  
**September 4, 2019 6:00 p.m. EDT**

**Current Situation** At 5:00 p.m. EDT, Dorian was 130 miles south of Charleston, SC, strengthening slightly, with maximum sustained winds of 110 mph. Hurricane-force winds extended outward up to 70 miles from the center and tropical-storm-force winds extended outward up to 195 miles. Dorian was moving NNW at 5 mph. Due to the increase in Dorian's size, flooding could extend inland from the coast. (J06A Update, Sept 4, 2019 5:30 p.m. EDT)

Summary Overview Community lifelines remain stabilized across all affected states. The State, Tribe, and FEMA, and non-governmental partners are well positioned and are maneuvering resources to respond to potential impacts as conditions allow. Coordination will focus on quickly employing staged assets to meet operational demands as they arise, with a particular focus on gaining access to critical public health and safety facilities and isolated communities. (F and S), preparing emergency communications, and coordinating air/land/water search and rescue missions.

**Declaration:** The following states have received Emergency Declarations for Public Assistance (PA) Category B, limited to Direct Federal Assistance (DFA): NC EM-5423, GA EM-5422, SC EM-5421, Seminole Tribe of Florida (STOF), EM-5420, and FL EM-5419. (FEMA Update, Sept 4, 2019 10:00 p.m. EDT)

**Lifelines: Impacts and Actions**

Category	State	Impact/Action
Safety and Security	ALL	Continuity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) completed Infrastructure of Concern (IOC) sets for GA and SC, finalizing for NC and VA September 4 (J04 Update Briefing, Sept 4, 2019 4:00 p.m. EDT)
	ALL	Incident Management Team (IMT) Law Enforcement Team stationed in Orlando overseeing operations in FL, GA, NC, and SC (J02 Update, Sept 4, 2019 10:00 a.m. EDT)
	NC	Mandatory Evacuations in 5 counties (1-5); all voluntary evacuations lifted (Region IV Update, Sept 4, 2019 4:00 p.m. EDT)
	NC	Urban Search and Rescue (US&R) pivoting from FL to Region III and other areas in Region IV; focus on fire safety response, boat teams, and water rescues (Op Brief, September 4, 2019 12:30 p.m. EDT)
	NC	9 Law Enforcement Quick Response Teams (QRTs) supporting US&R and DMAT (Disaster Medical Assistance Team) missions (J02 Update, Sept 4, 2019 3:12 p.m. EDT)
	NC	4 Law Enforcement QRTs to support GA US&R teams (J02 Update, Sept 4, 2019 3:37 p.m. EDT)
	NC	ESP 13 Incident Command Post (ICP) operational in Charlotte; 2 QRTs currently deployed to NC to support US&R and DMAT missions (J02 Update, Sept 4, 2019 12:30 p.m. EDT)
	NC	Mandatory Evacuations in 41-3 counties; Voluntary Evacuations in 9 (4) counties (NC EM, Sept 4, 2019 2:15 p.m. EDT)
	NC	2 QRTs assigned to support US&R teams (J02 Update, Sept 4, 2019 3:12 p.m. EDT)
	FL	5 strike teams deployed to check status of 43 Seminole tribal members living off Seminole reservations; 1 shelter open until members' status confirmed (NADOC Update, Sept 4, 2019 4:00 p.m. EDT)
	FL	Big Horn and Ft. Pierce Reservations completed all rapid needs assessments, inspections, and wellness checks (NADOC Update, Sept 4, 2019 11:00 a.m. EDT)
	FL	Salvation Army prepositioned 164-pallets of water, 50,000 take-out packages, 50,000 1-gallon, 26 pallets of MREs, 13 canisters, and 2 food kitchens on standby (J02 Update, Sept 4, 2019 12:40 p.m. EDT)

**Food, Water, Shelter**

ALL	110 shelters open (population 7,196) includes 50 (+40) co-located pet friendly shelters (pet population 176); 15 special needs shelters (376); 5 stand-alone pet shelters (6) open (Open Shelter Summary, September 4, 2019 11:00 a.m. EDT)
ALL	13 shelters open (population 1,631) (Open Shelter Summary, Sept 4, 2019 11:00 a.m. EDT)
ALL	Mega Shelter open in Durham (capacity 1,500) (J02 Update, Sept 4, 2019 3:47 a.m. EDT)
ALL	16 shelters open (population 603) (Open Shelter Summary, Sept 4, 2019 11:00 a.m. EDT)

**Health and Medical**

ALL	8X Open (stand-alone) site for pharmacies activated in FL, GA, NC and SC (J02 Report, Sept 4, 2019 8:00 p.m. EDT)
ALL	Mobile pharmacy resources staged and ready to move into impacted areas (NADOC Update, September 4, 2019 2:00 p.m. EDT)
ALL	100 ground ambulances and 49 paramedics under state control supporting medical evacuations; 10 air ambulances under federal control (released by state) (Op Brief, Sept 4, 2019 11:00 a.m. EDT)
ALL	Hospital Evacuations: (In Progress 0, Completed 8, Planning 0); Nursing Home Evacuations: (In Progress 1, Completed 18, Planning 2) (J02 Update, Sept 4, 2019 2:00 p.m. EDT)
ALL	Hospital Evacuations: (In Progress 0, Completed 9); Nursing Home Evacuations: (In Progress 0, Completed 21) (J02 Update, Sept 4, 2019 11:24 a.m. EDT)
ALL	No facility impacts and no evacuations ongoing (J02 Update, September 4, 2019 12:26 a.m. EDT)
ALL	78 ground ambulances and 8 paramedics supporting medical evacuations (J02 Update, Sept 4, 2019 11:00 a.m. EDT)
ALL	Governor ordered mandatory medical evacuation; 9 of 12 hospitals received a waiver and sheltering in place; 4 hospitals evacuated; 18 nursing homes evacuated; 1 in progress (J02 Update, Sept 4, 2019 8:00 a.m. EDT)

**Energy**

ALL	FL, GA, NC, and SC nuclear power plants operating at 99% capacity (J02 Update, Sept 4, 2019 12:02 a.m. EDT)
ALL	GA, SC, NC electric utilities pre-positioned approximately 20,000 personnel and resources to respond to potential electric infrastructure system disruption and damage (J02 Update, Sept 4, 2019 10:45 p.m. EDT)
ALL	Actual power outages: 9,104 (-2,459) customers (J02 Update, Sept 4, 2019 2:32 p.m. EDT)
GA	10B Warner-Robbins AFB staging 71 fuel trucks (J02 Update, Sept 4, 2019 3:34 p.m. EDT)
GA	10B MCLB Albany staging 104 generators; 34 scheduled delivery on Sept 4 and Sept 5 (J02 Update, Sept 4, 2019 3:04 p.m. EDT)
GA	Actual power outages: 9,101 (+4,609) customers (J02 Update, Sept 4, 2019 3:32 p.m. EDT)
GA	USACE Tallahassee Temporary Emergency Power (TTEP) coordinating movement of 142 DLA generators to MCLB-Albany 10B, 22 generators on hand (J02 Update, Sept 4, 2019 4:43 a.m. EDT)
GA	1 NRC Region II liaison officer deploying to NC EOC (NRC Status Update, Sept 3, 2019 8:00 a.m. EDT)
GA	Projected power outages: 957,586 (-17,295) (J02 Update, Sept 4, 2019 2:32 p.m. EDT)
NC	Communications Sector partners report no limiting factors or gaps (NADOC Update, Sept 4, 2019 2:30 p.m. EDT)
NC	3rd DRS update for 34 affected counties in FL reporting normal 99.9% cell and cable coverage (J02 Update, Sept 4, 2019 1:24 p.m. EDT)
NC	Nothing significant to report
SC	Nothing significant to report
VA	Nothing significant to report

**Communications**

ALL	Private Sector supply chains secured with additional capacity in southeast US; prepared to resume commercial commodity flows post storm, limiting impacts to transportation infrastructure (NADOC Update, September 4, 2019 2:32 p.m. EDT)
ALL	As of 2:00 p.m. EDT, 8 (7) airport closures across potentially impacted area (J02 Update, Sept 4, 2019 4:00 p.m. EDT)
ALL	Port Closures: Fort Pierce Inlet, West Palm Beach, Homestead, Jacksonville, Port open with Restrictions; Port Canaveral (J02 Update, Sept 4, 2019 3:42 p.m. EDT)
ALL	Port Status: Wilmington and Morehead City closed (J02 Update, Sept 4, 2019 3:42 p.m. EDT)
ALL	Port Status: Charleston closed (J02 Update, Sept 4, 2019 11:30 a.m. EDT)
ALL	Charleston AFB/International Airport closed (J02 Update, Sept 4, 2019 12:00 p.m. EDT)
ALL	Nothing significant to report
GA	Nothing significant to report
NC	Nothing significant to report
SC	Nothing significant to report
VA	Nothing significant to report

**Transportation**

ALL	Nothing significant to report
GA	Nothing significant to report
NC	Nothing significant to report
SC	Nothing significant to report
VA	Nothing significant to report

**Hazardous Materials**

ALL	Nothing significant to report
GA	Nothing significant to report
NC	Nothing significant to report
SC	Nothing significant to report
VA	Nothing significant to report

**Key Updates**

FEMA HQ: NRCC remains at Level 1, 24/7; FEMA Acting Administrator signed Surge Capacity Memo (J02 Brief, Sept 4, 2019 12:30 p.m. EDT)

FEMA Region IV: NRCC remains at Level 1, 24/7; LNOs deployed to FL, GA, NC, SC EOCs; Tribal LNO deployed to STDF; 1 Hurricane Liaison Team (HLT) member deployed to National Hurricane Center in FL (J02 Brief, Sept 4, 2019 10:00 a.m. EDT)

FEMA Region III: NRCC Level 6, stay shift only at 8:00 a.m. EDT; Sept 3, 2019 8:30 a.m. EDT)

IMAT: Region III IMAT-3 redeployed from WV to VA EOC; National IMAT 5 and Region IV IMAT-1 to FL EOC; Region IV IMAT-2 to GA EOC; Region VII IMAT to SC EOC; Region VIII IMAT to NC EOC (Region IV Update, Sept 2, 2019 4:00 p.m. EDT)

EMACs: 31 (-1) active missions; 779 (-1) personnel deployed (J04 Update, Sept 4, 2019 12:00 p.m. EDT)

DOD: Defense Coordinating Element (DCE) Teams and Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers (EPLOs) deployed to Region IV NRCC, FL, NC, SC, and VA EOCs; NAINORTH VA, Homestead AFB, FL, North Auxiliary Field, SC, Warner Robins AFB, GA, and Maxwell AFB, AL (J02 Update, Sept 4, 8:34 a.m. EDT)

Status of EOCs: FL at Level 1 (full activation); GA at Level 1 (full activation); MS Level 2 (monitoring); NC at Level 1 (full activation); SC as ORCDN 1 (full activation); STOF at Level 1 (full activation); VA EOC (partial activation); Region IV Update, Sept 3, 2019 2:32 p.m. EDT)

STDF: Fort Pierce Reservation shelter closed; Brighton Reservation shelter opened to accommodate STDF evacuees (Tribal Liaison Update, Sept 4, 2019 12:30 p.m. EDT)

Figure 7 - Example of a SLB Tier 1 Report

# Catastrophic Incident Annex (CIA)

## Appendix 2: Executive Summary

### Attachments

[Attachment 1: UCG & Policy Group Checklist](#)

[Attachment 2: Community Lifeline Reporting](#)

[Attachment 3: EEI Spreadsheet](#)

[Attachment 4: ESF & SEOC Section Checklists](#)

DRAFT