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**Washington Army National Guard
Strategic Plan
FY2020 - FY2030**



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1. Introduction.

The Washington Army National Guard (WAARNG) Strategic Plan is a plan to achieve the WAARNG goals for organizational change over the next 10 years. The purpose of this document is to provide a point of aim for the organization. This document outlines the desired strategic “Ends” of the organization in support of our Mission and general “Ways” to pursue them. The strategic plan’s primary inputs are: National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy, National Military Strategy, Director of the Army National Guard (DARNG) Vision and Strategy, Guard 4.0, The Army Strategy, and the Washington Military Department (WMD) Strategy. While informed by National Defense Strategy, this Strategic Plan refers to the Business and Organizational Strategy of the WAARNG. It takes many elements from civilian strategic organizational change endeavors.

The Mission of the WAARNG is:

The WAARNG delivers Combat-Ready forces ISO Federal Missions. On Order provides prepared teams to Civil Authorities to protect the lives, rights, and property of our communities.

The WAARNG Vision – our future **End State** – is as follows:

By 2030, the WAARNG’s reputation and readiness are trusted and valued by our Soldiers, our community, the Army and our elected officials allowing us to benefit from new opportunities. We are regionally aligned within Washington State to maximize mission command, with a force structure optimized for strategic opportunities. We capitalize on our unique differences, becoming an organization of choice for our Soldiers and Civilians and is a key influencer of the strategic direction of the National Guard.

The WAARNG of 2030 is committed to our **Organizational Values**:

Soldier First is what you do. We are **Soldiers First**, and must be competent in our individual Soldier requirements and skills. As our touchstone, this requires the belief in individual readiness and the connection of each Soldier to the powerful tradition of service in the U.S. Army and our National Guard. **Soldier First** requires a steadfast commitment to Army Values, standards, and toughness.

Soldier Centric is what the organization does. Everything we do as Command Teams, Staffs, or Leaders must be framed by the critical question, “What does this mean to the Soldier and his or her Family?” Everything from planning to execution is through the lens of the Soldier. When we get this right, we will build trust.

Brilliance in the Basics is our approach to training. We train tough, ethical, and professionally competent Soldiers. We identify and prioritize the basic tasks we choose to execute and then master them.

Leader Development. We train **Leadership** at echelon. We develop leaders by trusting and empowering them to execute consequential missions. We instill authority, ownership, and decision making back at all echelons down to the lowest level possible. Diversity in leadership strengthens our Guard. Developing leaders includes ensuring the value of fair competition for key assignments, opportunities, and promotions.

Disciplined Initiative within Intent. We enable this by communicating precisely **through** echelon and by building **mutual trust & shared understanding** of Commander's Intent. This forms the foundation of **Mission Command**, which enables us to accomplish all missions and capitalize on emerging opportunities.

Build Winning Units. Our units are built with Guardsmen who are **Soldiers First**, and their units have such a powerful Army identity that Soldiers are **proud to serve** here. Winning units are technically, tactically, and operationally proficient while remaining ready to execute our **mission**. Winning is measured with science by performance in key metrics and assessed in art by the command.

The foundation of our behavior is **One Chain of Command**. This command acknowledges the importance of authorities at all echelons of command, regardless of duty status. Our decisions, actions, or policies promote unity between our fulltime Soldiers and our traditional Soldiers. **One Chain of Command** maximizes the strength of our Guard.

2. The Strategic Environment.

“All organizations start with WHY, but only the great ones keep their WHY clear year after year.”

– Simon Sinek, Author of Start with Why.

a. Why a Strategic Plan.

We want to win, and winning requires a deliberate plan.

Strategy is primarily concerned with connecting **ends** to **ways** and **means**. This strategic document, which lays out ends and ways; with the addition of the Army Campaign Plan, outlining our prioritized ways and means, constitutes the overall strategy for the Washington Army National Guard.

Ends are objectives or desired outcomes for a given strategy. The terms “endstate” and “goals” are synonymous with **ends**. **Ways** are the actions, methods, or processes executed to achieve the **ends**. **Means** are the resources required to execute **ways**. **Means** include manpower, time, and financial resources. As **means** are inherently finite, prioritization of these resources toward **ends** is required.

The Strategic Plan is a living document, and is meant to outline the **ends** and **ways** of the WAARNG strategy. It is reviewed annually or when conditions warrant revision. Strategy is assessed through quantifiable metrics to determine effectiveness and shape future revisions. This assessment takes place through monthly and yearly review of metrics by the core strategy team.

The out-product of these assessments is revision to the Strategic Plan and generation of the Army Campaign Plan (ACP), which prioritizes **ends** and highlights **ways** for a 3-5 year window. The execution of this strategy is then operationalized and connected to specific **means** via the yearly Base Operations Order (BOO).

The proponent for the Strategic Plan is the G5. The proponent for the Army Campaign Plan is the G5 supported by the G3 (G35). The proponent for the Base Operations Order and the Commander’s Training Guidance is the G3 (G35/G33). The CG approves the overall WAARNG strategy. A specific timeline for these products is included in section four. How all these products fit together sequenced to time is highlighted in Figure 1 (below).




Figure 1 – The “Assembly Line” of WAARNG Strategic Planning products

Strategic planning is one corner of the Army’s Integrated Management System (IMS) alongside Organizational Assessment (OA), Continuous Process Improvement (CPI),

and Performance Management (PM). In this context, strategic planning refers to achieving organizational change through business transformation.

b. Past Operational Environment (POE).

“By traveling into the past, I enhance my grasp of the present.”

— General Jim Mattis, Central Washington University Graduate and Tri-cities resident.
Author of Call Sign Chaos: Learning to Lead

The Washington Army National Guard (WAARNG) is formed of Citizen Soldiers and civilians who volunteer to serve our State and Nation. For nearly two centuries, these brave men and women, who are inherently connected to both the original Militia and to the U.S. Army, have distinguished themselves in combat for the United States and in selfless service to the great citizens of Washington State.

For the last 18 years the Washington Army National Guard has been involved in Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) supporting the Global War on Terror (GWOT). This required enduring deployment of National Guard forces to augment Active Duty in support of National Security needs. Simultaneously, increases in natural disasters and homeland security threats have heightened the need for the WAARNG to conduct domestic operations in support of our State.

Throughout this period, the WAARNG has seen unprecedented changes in force structure, training, and utilization. These changes include a transformation of the loss of the 66th Theater Aviation Command, Transformation of the 1-303 AR to 1-303 CAV, establishment of the 56th IO as an MSC, and the 81st Brigade from an Armored Brigade Combat Team to a Stryker Brigade Combat Team. These changes placed significant strain on the strategic reserve model requiring a level of professionalism and commitment beyond designed expectations.

c. Current Operational Environment (COE).

The Army continues to transition from utilizing the National Guard as a “strategic reserve” to an “operational reserve.” The concept of an operational reserve, in which Reserve forces participate routinely in ongoing military missions, is distinct from an earlier view in which the National Guard was seen mainly as a “strategic reserve” whose primary role was augmentation and reinforcement of Active forces during a major contingency; an event that was anticipated to occur at best once in a lifetime. The National Guard transition is often referred to as “Guard 4.0” which also encompasses changes to the Sustained Readiness Model (SRM, currently shifting to Unit Readiness Cycle or URC), training schedules, and deployment availability. As GWOT ends, the expectation that the National Guard will return to a steady state of limited activation is no longer valid.

The needs of an operational reserve place considerable strain on the triad of Soldier welfare, family support, and employer commitment (Figure 2). These changes as outlined in DA EXORD 002-16 and NGB DP 58.3, place considerable readiness

strain to provide a force able to deploy more rapidly than in previous generations. This creates a requirement for enhanced personnel and training readiness requiring a greater commitment of time and energy by our Soldiers. Based on URC/SRM, some units may require commitment beyond the statutory 48 Unit Training Assembly (UTA) periods and 15 days of Annual Training (AT) per year (commonly referred to as one weekend a month, two weeks a year). This strain is felt more acutely by the traditional (MDAY) Soldiers in the WAARNG.




Figure 2 – Triad of Soldier Welfare (MDAY Soldiers)

Concurrently COVID-19 and its associated impacts on the economic and political realms are creating intense pressure on achieving readiness goals. Not since the eruption of Mt. St. Helens in 1980 has domestic operational support been more vital for the Citizens of the State of Washington. Simultaneously, demand for support of collective training requirements and overseas missions has increased with many of our Soldiers and Units scheduled for significant Combat Training Center (CTC) and overseas rotations.

The impacts of these requirements have been significant on the force. End strength has trended downward over 11 years resulting in a net loss of 850 assigned Soldiers and a 2020 year-end gap of 550 vacancies.

d. Future Operational Environment (FOE).

Over the next five years, the WAARNG will deploy and exercise more Soldiers than in any time since the beginning of the Global War on Terrorism. Our requirements in USINDOPACOM (United States Indo-Pacific Command) continue to rise. Domestic operational requirements are increasing annually. Participation in exercises is also on

the rise, with the WAARNG scheduled to execute a national level Vigilant Guard, and potentially participating in Defender Pacific and Defender Europe exercises.

The Future Operating Environment for the WAARNG's Federal Missions are defined by numerous changes. In accordance with National Defense Strategy, these changes include a training focus shift from Counter-Insurgency (COIN) to Large Scale Combat Operations (LSCO) across multiple domains, a re-alignment from the Central Command (CENTCOM) Area of Responsibility (AOR) to the US Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM) AOR concurrent with a Division re-alignment led by National Guard Bureau, and force structure rebalancing to meet the demands of Multi-Domain Operations (MDO) as a component of the Operational Reserve of the Army's Total Force.

At the State level, the WAARNG focuses on strengthening our State Partnership Program relationships in USINDOPACOM, readiness to respond to a seismic event in the Cascadia Subduction Zone, while remaining postured for other emergent Domestic Operations which require a National Guard response.

3. Commanding General's Intent.

The WAARNG becomes deliberate in planning, processes, and actions to instill organizational values and meet Federal and domestic mission requirements, while enhancing internal and external reputation, providing stability for Soldiers, Families, and employers, maximizing strength, reducing threats, seizing beneficial opportunities, and building trust.

4. Strategic Approach.

The WAARNG's central challenge is how to prioritize resources to remain ready while modernizing and preparing for a different future to achieve the **WAARNG Endstate** (See Figure 4). The WAARNG Strategy establishes four lines of effort (LOE) with specific objectives to affect organizational change by 2030 or earlier. These lines of effort are **End Strength, Winning Units, Trust with Partners, and Modernization and Transformation.**

The prioritization of LOEs and connection to resources (means) occurs in the Army Campaign Plan (ACP) and is operationalized in the yearly Base Operations Order (BOO). The WAARNG Strategy requires steadfast commitment from every Leader at all echelons.

a. Battle Rhythm/Process Flow.

Strategic planning is a process that is cyclical and deliberate. To this end, there are several time-sequenced events that require staff and leader input to shape changes to the plan. This process also provides a feedback to Joint Staff domestic operations planning to help shape future Army plans. The yearly battle rhythm for the WAARNG strategic plan staff actions is:




Figure 3 – The Strategic Planning Battle Rhythm

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b. Planning Events. Specific events for staff planning are outlined in the following table:

| When | Event | What | Who | Input | Output |
|-----------------------------|---|--|---|--|---|
| October of FY | Strat Plan Review / Assessment Phase | Detailed review of MOP/MOE of current (FY+9) strategic plan. Review of WAARNG FY+9 End State. | Lead: G5, Members: G5 Strategic planning core team, G5 Data/Metrics team, CoS. | Key Performance Indicators from SMS | Information Brief; Strategic Plan Assessment |
| 3-4th Week of October of FY | Strategic Planning Workshop | Information Brief of Assessment and Planning Guidance for Campaign Plan | Lead: G5, Members: Directorates, CG, G5 Core and Metrics Teams | Strategic Plan assessment comments, CoS input | Changes to Strategic Plan (If needed) and Army Campaign Planning Priorities |
| November of FY | Army Campaign Plan Development Phase | Assessment and development of the FY+4 Campaign Plan. Connection of Strategic Plan Ends to Ways and Means. | Lead: G5, Members: Directorates, G5 Core and Metrics Teams, | Strategic Planning Workshop out products | Revised Army Campaign Plan Information Brief |
| 3rd Week of November of FY | ACP Information Brief | Brief of the assessment and planning considerations for FY+4 Campaign Plan | Lead: G5, For: CG, Attendees: Directorates, Strategic Planning Core Team, Data/Metrics Team, MSC leadership | Revised Army Campaign Plan Information Brief, Stakeholder Feedback | CG's Guidance to Army Campaign Plan |
| December of FY | Base Operations Order Development Phase | Translating priorities from Army Campaign Plan to Base Operations Order for FY+1 | Lead: G3, Members: Directorates, CoS, MSC leadership | CG's Guidance to Army Campaign Plan | Information Brief on Base Operations Order for FY+1 |
| 1-2nd Week of January of FY | Base Operations Order Information Brief | Brief of the Assessment of the Campaign Plan Priorities and Connection to Base Operations Order | Lead: G3, For: CG, Members: Directorates, CoS | Army Campaign Plan Priorities, Strategic Planning metrics review | CG's Guidance to Base Operations Order for FY+1 |
| Jan-Apr of FY | ATMC UTP process for FY+1 | Army Training Management Conference to develop unit training plans IAW FM 7-0 | Lead: G3, Members: Unit Commanders | Army Campaign Plan, Base Operations Order WARNO | Unit Training Plans |

5. Strategic Lines of Effort.




Figure 4 – The WAARNG Lines of Effort (Current as of FY2020)

a. LOE 1: End Strength.

“The Soldier is the Army. No army is better than its Soldiers.”
- General George Patton

Definition: End Strength is the number of assigned Soldiers compared to our Force Structure Allowance (FSA). End strength is a barometer of the morale and esprit-de-corps of the organization.

Why end strength matters: End Strength is strategic currency. Civilian organizations’ agility comes from their profitability, the Army’s agility comes from its strength and retention.

High end strength allows the WAARNG to take high payoff risks and reinvest in the organization. End strength is influence at the national level. Influence shapes our future opportunities through force structure, mission assignments, and facilities investment.

LOE 1 End State: The WAARNG surpasses end strength to FSA by 01 OCT 2023, and is postured for continued strength growth beyond FSA in out-years.

Definitions:
1.1 Recruiting. The number of new Soldiers assessed into the WAARNG in a given year.
1.2 Retention. The percentage of Soldiers who are eligible to ETS in a given year who elect to extend.
1.3 Personnel Stability. The number of changes in a given year impacting the stability of the family and personal life of our Soldiers (i.e. PCS, transfers, etc).

1.1 Recruit. Potential Ways: We will maintain our increased recruiting posture, novel recruiting methods, and continue to develop incentives for successful recruiting.

Objective Goal: Recruiting is in excess of assigned mission each year.

1.2 Retain. Potential Ways: We will actively seek to improve command climates, reduce administrative misfires (pay, benefits, etc.), and target Soldiers at risk for retention failure.

Objective Goal: Retain Soldiers above the national average.

1.3 Personnel Stability. Potential Ways: Provide a stable and predictable environment for Soldiers, Families, employers, and the greater community. We will build stability wherever possible, in promotion management, transfers, and professional military education.

Objective Goal: Soldiers generally are able to plan for at least the next three years of their military career. Personnel stability drives retention.

b. LOE 2: Winning Units.

“Winning is not a sometime thing...it's an all the time thing. You don't win once in a while...you don't do the right thing once in a while...you do them right all the time. Winning is a habit.”

- Vince Lombardi, former Head Coach of Green Bay Packers

Definition: Winning units are technically, tactically, and cognitively proficient and ready to execute our mission. Their leaders and members are experts in their craft.

Why winning units matter: This is a competitive sport and we are in competition with other states, components, and services to be the organization of choice for our Soldiers, Stakeholders, State, and Nation. Winning feels good, and teams that win become addicted to winning. They seek victory when victory seems impossible.

Winning units know what to do and why they do it. They understand their basic technical skills, but also are students of the profession of arms. Winning units win on the home front, during training, and on the battlefield. Winning doesn't happen by chance; it is a deliberate process which marries the science of professional development, collective training, and healthy competition with the art of leadership (see figure 5).




Figure 5 - Leader Development (Adapted from Daniel Kahneman's Thinking Fast and Slow)

LOE 2 Endstate: WAARNG units are built with National Guard Soldiers who are individually ready, connected to service, and have a strong desire to win. Our units have a powerful identity; Soldiers are proud to serve in our organization. Units are prepared to execute Federal and State missions.

2.1 Operational Stability. Potential Ways: Provide a stable and predictable environment for Command teams, Staffs, and units to conduct effective operational training activities. Unit training plans (UTP) are based off published campaign plan. Planning at all levels should include predictive analysis with full consideration of the impacts caused by last minute changes.

Objective Goal: Unit operational and personnel requirements are synchronized and phased to be mutually supportive to enable predictability and safeguard essential training activities.

Definitions:
2.1 Operational Stability. Amount of deviation from established operational (mobilization or training) plans.
2.2 Competition. Combination of standardized unit metrics, events, and scorecards to determine superiority internal and external to the organization.

2.2 Competition. Potential Ways: Facilitate healthy competition among WAARNG units through individual and collective competitive events, publicly communicated dashboards/scoreboards related to readiness and retention. WAARNG competes at a National Level.

Objective Goal: The WAARNG and its subordinate units compete internally and externally to improve the organization.

Definitions:
2.3 Leader Development. Combination of professional military education, mentorship, and key development/ broadening assignments.
2.4 Soldier Development. Combination of individual and group training and assessment to create ready Soldiers.
2.5 Collective Proficiency. The assessed (Objective-T or equivalent) ability of a unit or formation to complete their missions.

2.3 Leader Development. Potential Ways: Develop programs to educate and mentor leaders to maximize their potential and positively impact the organization. Develop a branch and career management program that incorporates our diverse population. Prepare leaders to exercise mission command through echelon to win.

Objective Goal: Leaders are physically and mentally proficient. Leaders have a sense of pride and ownership in the organization and can generate broad commitment.

2.4 Soldier Development. Potential Ways: Develop proficient warfighters at echelon. Proficiency in the Soldier Manual of Common Tasks (SMCT), Individual Personal, medical, physical, and mental readiness. Mastery of the technical portion of the profession of Arms through tough and relevant training events to increase individual Soldier capabilities. **Soldier First!**

Objective Goal: Soldiers are physically and mentally prepared to execute the WAARNG's missions when called.

2.5 Collective Proficiency. Potential Ways: Train units collectively to win. Meet Unit Readiness Cycle (URC, formerly SRM) requirements by unit type and mobilization window. Use Objective-T models (or equivalent) and metrics to develop training plans.

Objective Goal: Units slated to mobilize or go on CTC rotations are trained and proficient from the individual to collective level.

c. LOE 3: Trust with Partners.

“In this age, I don't care how tactically or operationally brilliant you are: if you cannot create harmony - even vicious harmony - on the battlefield based on trust across service lines, across coalition and national lines, and across civilian/military lines, you need to go home, because your leadership is obsolete.”

-General James Mattis, Author of Call Sign Chaos.

Why trust matters: Nobody wins alone; we need partners. The success of the Washington Army National Guard means the success of the State. As much as our society needs us in times of crisis, we need the Families, employers, and leaders of Washington State at all times. We need strong partners who understand our unique capabilities and our shortfalls who can advocate for us in society and in the family.

Definition: Trust is the relationship between an organization and its internal and external stakeholders; It is characterized by mutual respect, cooperation, and responsibility for the achievement of mutual goals.

Partnership requires mutual trust. It must be nourished if it is to thrive. We must build trust with our Soldiers, our communities, and our external partners through our actions. Actions that are not aligned with our words break trust. When partners ask hard things of us, we build trust by winning and consistently producing positive results. We become trusted partners when we succeed in meeting their needs. In turn, they help us meet ours. We must also trust ourselves by behaving in a manner worthy of trust, and in accordance with our **Organizational Values**.

LOE 3 Endstate: WAARNG is trusted by Families, employers, communities, the Governor, elected officials, NGB, and the Department of the Army. The WAARNG is viewed by our internal and external stakeholders as a value-added partner. These partnerships enable future opportunities.

Definitions:

3.1 Communication. Improve systems and methods for reaching Soldiers at all echelons of the WAARNG.

3.2 External Engagement. Formal and informal communication activities between the WAARNG and its stakeholders, including Washington State, NGB, DA, COCOMs, and others.

3.3 Internal Engagement. Formal and informal communication activities between the organization and its members and constituents.

3.1 Communication. Potential Ways: Communicate up and down through echelon via a comprehensive system of information distribution utilizing traditional and emergent media in order to reach target audiences.

Objective Goal: Improve communication methodologies and systems to enable rapid and accurate shared understanding.

3.2 External Engagement. Potential Ways: Positively influence external actors to become stakeholders that support WAARNG priorities and objectives. Increase engagement with NGB. Increase engagement with local media through PAO to positively shape perception of the WAARNG. Interface with local leadership in our communities including employers, chambers of commerce, military and civic oriented organizations (E.g., WDVA, WSMTRC, VFW, NGAW, NGAUS, Civil Air Patrol, JROTC, SF Association, Order of St. George/St. Barbara) and recognize their support.

Objective Goal: WAARNG Leaders and Soldiers actively and routinely engage with external actors at echelon to create new stakeholders for the WAARNG.

3.3 Internal Engagement. Potential Ways: Develop strong commitment to and from our Soldiers, full-time employees, Families, and communities enabling life-long commitment to WAARNG service. Include family programs in planning processes to utilize Soldier and Family advocacy program resources effectively to understand, resource, and address concerns from our internal stakeholders and maximize diversity. Use sensing sessions, town halls, and social media engagement to identify trends. Communicate intent at echelon via regular and timely correspondence. Generate feedback loops with internal stakeholders to facilitate dialogue.

Objective Goal: WAARNG actively and routinely engages with internal stakeholders to reinforce trust and build commitment.

d. LOE 4: Modernization and Transformation.

“Organizations exist to make people's strengths effective and their weaknesses irrelevant. And this is the work of effective leaders.”

- Frances Hesselbein, Author of Hesselbein on Leadership

Definition: A deliberate change to adapt systems, infrastructure, ideas, and methods in order to meet future opportunities and needs.

Why modernization and transformation matter: Winning teams are agile and flexible. The profession of arms has never been more complex than it is today. Simple things are hard. Advances in technology, reduction in manpower, and increased requirements make executing this profession difficult.

Change is hard and necessary. To adapt our systems to meet the needs of our partners, Soldiers, and Nation requires deliberate effort and internal reflection on how we do business. It requires sustained action toward gaining efficiencies and shifting towards data-driven, performance-based results balanced with experienced leadership. We ask this of our Soldiers; we must ask it of our staffs and processes.

Definitions:

4.1 Mission Command and Infrastructure. The systems and facilities that enable operations.

4.2 Equip. Organizational and individual equipment as defined by Modular Table of Organizational Equipment (MTOE) and Common Table of Allowances (CTA).

4.3 Reform. The ongoing review and assessment of the WAARNG business practices.

World-class teams have world-class facilities and support systems. We will innovate, adapt, and build decision spaces to exploit opportunity and establish streamlined **Soldier Centric** processes. We must posture ourselves to develop the agility to turn threats into opportunities.

LOE 4 Endstate: The WAARNG improves business processes, stations and equips Soldiers, allocates time, money, and manpower for our greatest priorities to empower subordinate Commanders to lead. The WAARNG is postured to capitalize on changing force capability requirements.

4.1 Mission Command System and Infrastructure. Potential Ways: Provide modern facilities, systems, and tailored force structure to enable operations. Take a deliberate staffing approach to stationing. Utilize available systems to gain efficiencies, including robotic process automation and big data analytics.

Objective Goal: Operations are enhanced by modernized facilities and systems.

4.2 Equip. Potential Ways: Provide Soldiers with the equipment that most enables mission success. Align fieldings and equipment procurement to mission requirements and the Unit Readiness Cycle (URC). Outfit Soldiers and Units to build uniformity and pride. Deliver weapons, combat vehicles, sustainment systems, and equipment that Soldiers need when they need it.

Objective Goal: Soldiers and Units have the best equipment for their missions.

4.3 Reform. Potential Ways: Use the Integrated Management System at echelon (Figure 6) to adapt business practices to meet the needs of our Soldiers, units, and Families through continuous process improvement and organizational assessment. Aggressively review existing policies to flatten bureaucracy, understand processes, and gain efficiencies utilizing process improvement models (Business Process Re-engineering, Lean Six Sigma, Baldrige Organizational Assessment, or new tools as they become available.)

Objective Goal: Processes are efficient and effective, generally free of administrative misfires. Staff processes are self-reflective in nature through constant assessment and review. The WAARNG is recognized for Integrated Management System Excellence at the “Excellent” level by 2024.



Figure 6 – The Integrated Management System (AR 5-1).

6. Way Ahead.

Strategy is not an immediate process; it requires steadfast commitment at all echelons of the WAARNG to generate a “current” of change. The key facilitator of the Commanding General’s Strategy is the G5 using the Army’s Integrated Management System (figure 6).

The integrated management system is a cyclical, deliberate system which allows the G5 to facilitate sustained organizational change. It’s composed of four major elements: Strategic Planning, Performance Management, Continuous Process Improvement, and Organizational Assessment. These major elements are tied to the G5’s internal Lines of Effort to sequence resources across time and space to achieve the business transformation required to enable the Commanding General’s vision.




Figure 7 – G5 Lines of Effort

a. Strategic Planning.

The Strategic Planning Line of Effort is concerned with the creation Strategic Plan and Campaign Plan documents. The process of creating these documents is deliberate, following a specific schedule of review and input (see figure 3 and its associated table).

Outside of specified review periods, the Strategic Planning Core Committee is responsible for the day-to-day maintenance of the Strategic Plan through regular meetings. Outside of the Strategic Planning Development or Assessment windows, the strategic planning core group meets quarterly to review relevant metrics and assessment products produced by the Performance Management and Organizational Assessment committees.

The Strategic Planning Core Committee is composed of 6-8 Warrant Officers and Officers selected by the Chief of Staff. The G5 is the primary facilitator.

b. Performance Management.

The performance management line of effort is concerned mostly with the ongoing monitoring of progress toward the WAARNG Lines of Effort. This progress is monitored by metrics, key performance indicators (KPIs), and external evaluation criteria (hereafter “metrics”). Metrics are displayed using Strategic Management System to flatten communication at echelon. The performance management committee meets quarterly to review metrics and determine their appropriateness to specific WAARNG lines of effort. The performance management committee selects the Authoritative Data Source (ADS) for all metrics.

An additional sub-committee, the Data Management Board, meets monthly to review and input data from approved ADS into the Strategic Management System. The Data Management Board is appointed by the Performance Management Committee.

The Performance Management Committee consists of all primary staff deputies. The Deputy G5 is the primary facilitator for the Performance Management Committee.

c. Continuous Process Improvement.

The Continuous Process Improvement line of effort is concerned with the selection, management, and review of continuous process improvement projects. Using Lean Six Sigma, Business Process Re-engineering, Agile/Scrum, and Project Management Professional (PMP) toolkits and frameworks allow the CPI Line of Effort to make sustained improvements in WAARNG Business Processes. The CPI Committee recommends projects nominated by units or directorates to the Chief of Staff and assigns Green Belt qualified Soldiers to these projects. Additionally, the CPI committee reviews progress of these projects and makes recommendations as needed. The CPI Committee meets monthly.

The CPI Committee consists of mostly Senior NCOs and Warrant Officers selected by the Chief of Staff. The Deputy G5 is the primary facilitator of the Continuous Process Improvement Committee.

d. Organizational Assessment.

The Organizational Assessment Line of Effort is concerned primarily with Baldrige Organizational Assessment, After Action Reviews, and sensing sessions. Using information gathered from various sources, the Organizational Assessment committee provides enterprise-wide identification of strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats. Additionally, the Organizational Assessment committee validates the WAARNG’s behaviors are consistent with its stated organizational values. The organizational assessment committee meets annually and conducts sensing biannually.

The Organizational Assessment committee consists primarily of MDAY Soldiers at all ranks selected by the Chief of Staff. The G5 is the primary facilitator of the Organizational Assessment committee.




Figure 8 – G5 Lines of Effort Crosswalk

e. Fitting It Together.

During 2020, the WAARNG was stressed in an unprecedented way, with a global pandemic, civil unrest, and wildfires all occurring simultaneously, resulting in the first full activation of the organization since the 1980s. This also exposed many opportunities for

improving how the organization conducts business. One example, which also highlights the use of the Integrated Management System, is how the organization conducts pay processes.

A concerned NCO brought the extent of the pay issues to the attention of the Chief of Staff and Commanding General. These leaders determined the current process was complex and had not been reviewed in numerous years. While the traditional response to these problems would have been to increase manning to resolve the backlog of pay issues, the Commanding General elected instead to stand up a “Tiger Team” of administrative professionals to resolve the issues, but also a CPI team to assess the process through a **Soldier Centric** and **Brilliant in the Basics** lens.


This is ongoing at the time of preparing this document, but the current intent is that the CPI team conducts a review of the pay process, which cuts through numerous directorates and departments, including individual units, G1, G3, MILPAY, etc. While each individual unit or directorate has assessed and improved their process, there had not been a holistic process review conducted. The CPI team briefs the Chief of Staff twice during the CPI stages, once to provide an information brief on how the current process works, and later to provide a decision brief with recommended improvements. The CPI team provides suggested metrics to verify success, which are given to the Performance Management (PM) Committee to monitor in monthly Data Management Boards.

Future opportunities for projects are highlighted in Organizational Assessments (see figures 6, 7, and 8), and policy changes are included in the Strategic Plan, Campaign Plan, and Base Operations Order as required (See figures 1 and 3).

By taking a holistic, systems based approach to change, this document instills organizational values and end states and turns them into actions.

7. Proponency.

The proponent for this action is the Office of Strategic Plans, G5. Any changes, recommendations or revisions to this product are sent to the G5 distribution list at nq.wa.waarnq.list.g5@mail.mil.



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Appendix 1. Glossary.

Army Business Council. The ABC is the governance forum by which the Army integrates business functions, manages the ERP system federation, frames the target environment, and strengthens investment management through annual portfolio review.

Army Business Management Strategy. The ABMS governs the business operations of the Army. Business operations are those activities that enable the Army to execute its 10 USC functions to organize, man, train, equip, and sustain forces for the conduct of prompt and sustained operations. The ABMS supersedes the Business Systems Information Technology (BSIT) Strategy, the BSIT Implementation Plan and BMA portions of the 2012 Army Campaign Plan. The ABMS serves as the business systems architecture and transition plan required by the National Defense Authorization Act of 2009. The ABMS provides implementation direction to Army Major Objectives 9–1 (Improve Business Processes) and 9–3 (Optimize Army Business Systems Portfolio). The ABMS presents the overarching strategy for the Army’s approach to business system investment and management through the FYD.

Army Business System. A business-oriented information system, other than a national security system, operated by, for, or on behalf of the Department of the Army, including financial systems, mixed systems, financial data feeder systems, and IT and information assurance infrastructure, used to support business operational activities, such as acquisition, financial management, logistics, strategic planning and budgeting, installations and environment, and human resources management. 10 USC 2222 dictates these business actions.

Authoritative Data Sources. A source of data or information that is recognized by a specified HQDA authority to be valid or trusted because it is considered to be highly reliable or accurate or is from an official publication or reference.

Baldrige Criteria for Performance Excellence. The Baldrige Criteria employs a systems perspective to align goals across organizations, focusing on core values. The core values are leadership, strategic planning, customer focus, measurement analysis and knowledge management, workforce focus, operations focus, and results. (AR 5-1)

Baselining. The method of baselining is a measurement, calculation, or location used as a basis for comparison of a specific snapshot in time. Generally, baselining is the act of measuring and rating the performance of a business process against the chosen target. Baselines calculate from standard definitions and formulas across the enterprise to ensure, when used for benchmarking, that organizations performance outcome comparisons are transparent and relevant to the selected peer. (AR 5-1)

Benchmarking. Benchmarking is the process of comparing an organization's business processes and performance metrics to industry or other Federal agency best practices. Dimensions typically measured are quality, time, and cost. In the process of benchmarking, leadership identifies the best-performing organizations where similar processes exist and then compares organizational results and processes to those studied best practices. (AR 5-1)

Business Process Re-engineering. A logical methodology for assessing process weaknesses, identifying gaps, and implementing opportunities to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of processes. At the enterprise level, BPR focuses upon cross-organization functions within E2E architectures. At the organizational level, BPR focuses upon sub-processes within E2E architectures and upon continuous process improvement of selected functions. (AR 5-1)

Constraint. In the context of planning, a requirement placed on the command by a higher command that dictates an action, thus restricting freedom of action. See also limitation; restraint. (JP 5-0)

Global Campaign Plan. Primary means by which the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff or designated combatant commander arranges for unity of effort and purpose and through which they guide the planning, integration, and coordination of joint operations across combatant command areas of responsibility and functional responsibilities. Also called GCP. (JP 5-0)

Global Force Management. Processes that align force assignment, apportionment, and allocation methodologies in support of strategic guidance. Also called GFM. (JP 3-35)

Integrated Management System. The IMS captures the totality of Army decision-making and creates assessment mechanisms employing the SMS. The IMS enables Army leadership to make resource-informed decisions that provide our Nation with a trained and ready force at best value. The IMS assigns responsibility and focuses effort, provides direction and a means to monitor execution of the Army Strategic Plan, ensures synchronization of resources, and defines progress as a basis for resource allocation.

Lean Six Sigma. LSS is a disciplined, data-driven approach and methodology for eliminating defects (driving toward six standard deviations between the mean and the nearest specification limit) in any process. The Army's LSS program maintains a cadre of continuous improvement practitioners who can sustain the Army's ability to execute enterprise-level and local LSS projects. (AR 5-1)

Limitation. An action required or prohibited by higher authority, such as a constraint or a restraint, and other restrictions that limit the commander's freedom of action, such as diplomatic agreements, rules of engagement, political and economic conditions in affected countries, and host nation issues. See also constraint; restraint. (JP 5-0)

Line of Effort. In the context of planning, using the purpose (cause and effect) to focus efforts toward establishing operational and strategic conditions by linking multiple tasks and missions. Also called LOE. (JP 5-0)

Line of Operation. A line that defines the interior or exterior orientation of the force in relation to the enemy or that connects actions on nodes and/or decisive points related in time and space to an objective(s). Also called LOO. (JP 5-0)

Metric. Indicators that measure progress compared to an established standard and can be analyzed to assess progress towards achieving desired outcomes (AR 5-1)

National Military Strategy. A document approved by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for distributing and applying military power to attain national security strategy and Defense Strategic Guidance objectives. Also called NMS. See also national security strategy; strategy; theater strategy. (JP 1-0)

National Security Strategy. A document approved by the President of the United States for developing, applying, and coordinating the instruments of national power to achieve objectives that contribute to national security. Also called NSS. See also national military strategy; strategy; theater strategy. (JP 1-0)

Operation. 1. A sequence of tactical actions with a common purpose or unifying theme. (JP 1) 2. A military action or the carrying out of a strategic, operational, tactical, service, training, or administrative military mission. (JP 3-0)

Operational Approach. A broad description of the mission, operational concepts, tasks, and actions required to accomplish the mission. (JP 5-0)

Operational Art. The cognitive approach by commanders and staffs—supported by their skill, knowledge, experience, creativity, and judgment—to develop strategies, campaigns, and operations to organize and employ military forces by integrating ends, ways, and means. (JP 3-0)

Operational Design. The conception and construction of the framework that underpins a campaign or operation plan or order. See also campaign; major operation. (JP 5-0)

Operational Environment. A composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander. Also called OE. (JP 3-0)

Readiness. The ability of military forces to fight and meet the demands of assigned missions. See also national military strategy. (JP 1-0)

Risk Assessment. The identification and assessment of hazards (first two steps of risk management process). Also called RA. (JP 3-07.2)

Risk Management. The process to identify, assess, and control risks and make decisions that balance risk cost with mission benefits. Also called RM. (JP 3-0)

Strategic Direction. The strategy and intent of the President, Secretary of Defense, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in pursuit of national interests. (JP 5-0)

Strategic Estimate. The broad range of strategic factors that influence the commander's understanding of the operational environment and the determination of missions, objectives, and courses of action. See also estimate. (JP 5-0)

Strategic Guidance. The written products by which the President, Secretary of Defense, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff provide strategic direction. (JP 5-0)

Strategic Intelligence. Intelligence required for the formation of policy and military plans at national and international levels. See also intelligence; operational intelligence; tactical intelligence. (JP 2-01.2)

Strategic Level of War. The level of warfare at which a nation, often as a member of a group of nations, determines national or multinational (alliance or coalition) strategic security objectives and guidance, then develops and uses national resources to achieve those objectives. See also operational level of warfare; tactical level of warfare. (JP 3-0)

Strategic Mobility. The capability to deploy and sustain military forces worldwide in support of national strategy. (JP 4-01)

Strategy. A prudent idea or set of ideas for employing the instruments of national power in a synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve theater, national, and/or multinational objectives. (JP 3-0). Business (Civilian) Strategy is the conscious choice to be clear about an organization's direction in relation to what is happening in the dynamic environment and to better position for proactively responding to a changing environment; drives internal cultural change. (Strategic Planning for Dummies).

Theater Strategy. An overarching construct outlining a combatant commander's vision for integrating and synchronizing military activities and operations with the other instruments of national power to achieve national strategic objectives. See also national military strategy; national security strategy; strategy. (JP 3-0)

System. An organized assembly of resources and procedures united and regulated by interaction or interdependence to accomplish a set of specific functions. Within the context of the Army Enterprise Architecture, systems are people, machines, and methods organized to accomplish a set of specific functions; provide a capability or satisfy a stated need or objective; or produce, use, transform, or exchange information. For the purpose of reporting to the Army Information Technology Registry, the terms "application" and "system" are used synonymously — a discrete set of information resources organized for the collection, processing, maintenance, use, sharing, dissemination or disposition of information (that is, the application of IT). (AR 5-1)

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