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WASHINGTON NATIONAL GUARD

PAMPHLET



**THE OFFICIAL HISTORY
OF
THE WASHINGTON NATIONAL GUARD
VOLUME 7
WASHINGTON NATIONAL GUARD
IN POST WORLD WAR II**

**HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DEPARTMENT
STATE OF WASHINGTON
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
CAMP MURRAY, TACOMA, WASHINGTON 98430**

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INTRODUCTION TO VOLUME 7, HISTORY OF THE WASHINGTON NATIONAL GUARD
BY
MAJOR GENERAL HOWARD SAMUEL McGEE, THE ADJUTANT GENERAL

Volume 7 of the History of the Washington National Guard covers the Washington National Guard in the Post World War II period, which includes the conflict in Korea. This conflict has been categorized as a "police action", not a war, therefore little has been published by the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army or by individuals. However, the material available to our historian is believed to be of such importance as to justify its publication in this volume of our official history.

While Washington National Guard units did not actually serve in Korea during this "police action", our Air National Guard and certain artillery units were inducted into service to replace like regular air and army units withdrawn for service in Korea. However, many Washington men participated in the action as did the 2nd and 3rd Infantry Divisions, both of which had been stationed at Fort Lewis and other Washington military installations. These divisions, attached to the Eighth U. S. Army, took a very active part in this struggle. Some 361 men from Washington serving with the Army and Air Force units were either killed in action, died of wounds, missing in action, etc.

Other important historical events during this period emerge from the Occupation of Germany, Japan and Korea, which created the so-called "Cold War" both in Germany and Korea which led to the so-called "Zones of Occupation" which are still in existence after some 15 to 20 years. History is still being recorded on both of these "fronts."

Colonel Field, our author, served as Executive Secretary of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, later expanded to the State-Army-Navy-Air Force Coordinating Committee which drew up the occupation plans and directives for both Germany and Japan. Prior to his relief from this assignment he wrote a brief history of this Committee, some of which is now unclassified and has been used in the appropriate Chapters of this Volume.

HOWARD S. McGEE
Major General, Wash ARNG
The Adjutant General

MAJOR GENERAL HOWARD SAMUEL McGEE

Howard S. McGee was born in Port Townsend, Washington on October 4th, 1915. He attended the University of Washington from 1935 to 1940. While at the University he was enrolled in the ROTC program and subsequently commissioned as Second Lieutenant, Coast Artillery Corps, Officers Reserve Corps on 15 March 1940.

In May 1941 he entered active Federal service with the 19th CA Regiment as a Battery Officer and later served as Battery Commander. He was promoted to First Lieutenant in February 1942 and to Captain in November 1942. He was re-assigned in May of 1943 to the 3rd Battalion, 215th Coast Artillery Regiment stationed at Fort Greely, Alaska and served as S-3 and Battalion Executive Officer. In 1944 he became Executive Officer of the 347th AAA Battalion stationed at Fort Belvoir, Virginia. Later he served as Company Commander and Battalion Executive Officer of the 1286th Engineer Combat Battalion at Camp Rucker, Alabama. In the latter part of 1944 he transferred overseas with his unit and served in England and Germany. He was promoted to Major in December of 1945 and released from Active Duty in February 1946.

Reappointed Major, Corps of Engineers, ORC, in September 1946, he assumed command of the 399th Engineer Combat Battalion. In October of 1947 he was appointed Major, CAC, in the Washington National Guard and was assigned as S-3 of the 205th AAA Group. He was subsequently reassigned as Battalion Commander, 240th AAA Battalion in October 1949 and promoted to Lieutenant Colonel in May 1950.

In April 1954 he transferred to the 205th AAA Group as Group Commander and was promoted to Colonel in November 1954. Upon reorganization of the Washington National Guard in April 1959, he was assigned as Executive Officer, 115th Artillery Brigade (AD). In June 1961 he was transferred to the 41st Infantry Division and assigned as Division Artillery Commander. On 14 November 1961, he was promoted to Brigadier General of the Line.

Upon conversion of the 41st Infantry Division to the ROAD concept in March 1963, he was assigned as Assistant Division Commander. General McGee served in that assignment until 16 June 1965 when he was detailed as The Adjutant General, State of Washington, and was appointed Major General on 1 July 1965.

MILITARY EDUCATION:

ROTC, University of Washington, 1940, AAA Cadre School, Camp Davis, North Carolina, 1943; Engineer Training Course (AGF), Fort Belvoir, Virginia, 1944; Special Weapons and Guided Missile Course, Fort Bliss, Texas, 1955; Associate Command & General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 1956; Special Information Course for Reserve Component Officers, USASGSC, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 1959; Senior Officers Preventive Maintenance Course, Fort Knox, Kentucky, 1960; Asilomar National Strategy Seminar, Pacific Grove, California, 1960; CBR Weapons Orientation Course, Dugway Proving Grounds, Dugway, Utah, 1961; USASGS Officer Refresher Course, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 1961; Division Artillery Staff Officer Refresher Course, Fort Sill, Oklahoma, 1962 and 1963; C&GS Officer Refresher Course, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 1963; Infantry Field Grade Officer Refresher Course, Fort Benning, Georgia, 1963; C&GS Officer Refresher Course (Combat Division), Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 1964 and 1965.

DECORATIONS AND AWARDS:

American Defense Service Medal, American Campaign Medal, Asiatic-Pacific Campaign Medal, European-African-Middle Eastern Campaign Medal, WW-II Victory Medal, and Armed Forces Reserve Medal with 10-year device.

VOLUME 7

WASHINGTON NATIONAL GUARD IN POST WORLD WAR II PERIOD

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VOLUME 7

WASHINGTON NATIONAL GUARD IN POST WORLD WAR PERIOD CHAPTER I

WASHINGTON STATE GUARD IN WORLD WAR II

It may be recalled in Volume 6, Chapter III, that following the muster in of all Washington National Guard units, the 4th and 5th Washington Volunteer Infantry Regiments of the State Guard were organized. Also that some 51 Reserve Companies were activated.

The 4th and 5th Regiments of State Guard were organized into the First Washington Infantry Brigade, with Headquarters at Camp Murray, Washington. This Brigade was commanded by Brigadier General Walter J. DeLong, The Adjutant General, with Colonel George W. McKenzie, Executive Officer; Colonel Joseph H. Smith, Judge Advocate; Major George H. Nelson, Supply Officer; Major James H. McGee, Personnel and Training Officer; and Major Edward S. Wimberley, State Guard Property Officer. Colonel McKenzie also commanded the Fourth Washington Volunteer Infantry Regiment, with Lt. Colonel William F. Stone as his Executive Officer, and Majors Nelson and McGee his supply and plans and training officers, respectively. The 5th Washington Volunteer Regiment, also with its Headquarters at Camp Murray, was commanded by Colonel Lester M. Kauffman. His staff was composed of Colonel Frederick M. Lash, Colonel Joseph H. Smith and Captains Wilbur C. Pettibone and Richard Swift. Other elements of these regiments were stationed as follows:

4th Infantry Regiment

Headquarters and Service Company, Major Wilbur E. Roberts, Comdg., Tacoma
Hq & Hq Company, 1st Battalion, Major George E. Drew, Comdg., Seattle
Company A, Captain Donald E. Gillogly, Comdg., Seattle
Company B, Captain Norman F. Mitchell, Comdg., Seattle
Company C, Captain Merritt J. Kleppser, Comdg., Seattle
Company D, Captain Carl H. Wittig, Comdg., Seattle
Hq & Hq Company, 2nd Battalion, Major John H. Potter, Comdg., Tacoma
Company E, Captain Harold V. Davies, Comdg., Tacoma
Company F, Captain Lloyd L. Sell Jr., Comdg., Tacoma
Company G, Captain Merrill W. Bennett, Comdg., Tacoma
Company H, Captain Leo F. Williams, Comdg., Port Angeles
Hq & Hq Company, 3rd Battalion, Major George G. Stephens, Comdg., Olympia
Company I, Captain Robert J. Delonge, Comdg., Olympia
Company K, Captain Joseph H. Vanucie, Comdg., Aberdeen
Company L, Captain Walter E. Mills, Comdg., Centralia
Company M, Captain Albert Winckworth, Comdg., Kelso

5th Infantry Regiment

Hq & Hq Company, 1st Battalion, Major Raymond H. Weir, Comdg., Spokane
Company A, Captain Albert L. Steel, Comdg., Spokane
Company B, Captain Francis W. Richardson, Comdg., Spokane
Company C, Captain William O. Druffel, Comdg., Pullman
Company D, Captain Carl G. Frank, Comdg., Walla Walla
Hq & Hq Company, 2nd Battalion, Captain James C. Gillilan, Comdg., Yakima
Company E, Captain Garry J. Dewolf, Comdg., Wenatchee
Company F, Major Charles F. Binger, Comdg., Coulee Dam

5th Infantry Regiment (Cont'd)

Company H, Captain Peter A. Thome, Jr., Comdg., Yakima

Hq & Hq Company, 3rd Battalion, Major James F. Adams, Comdg., Bellingham

Company I, Captain Ralph L. Hilton, Comdg., Bellingham

Company K, Captain William E. Cameron, Comdg., Mount Vernon

Company L, Captain Karl L. Shannon, Comdg., Everett

Company M, Captain Thomas E. Dobbs, Comdg., Snohomish

Prior to the cessation of hostilities in Germany and Japan and pending the return of Washington National Guardsmen, The Adjutant General, in reorganizing the State Guard, determined that while, under Federal Statutory Law, the State Guard stood disbanded upon their return, he felt that the State Guard should be reorganized and continued in State service until the Washington National Guard actually was re-formed. Two factors contributed to his decision to reorganize the State Guard as a more compact organization at reduced strength:

First: The greatly improved military situation on all fronts had operated to remove the threat of possible enemy invasion.

Second: The appropriation for payment of Armory Drill Pay was predicated on a force of approximately two thousand, instead of the original force of four thousand regarded as necessary for the missions assigned the State Guard during the early days of the emergency. Accordingly, the reorganization was based upon the following General Orders:

GENERAL ORDERS NO. 4, dated 20 March 1945:

"1. In accordance with provisions of the recently enacted State Law providing Armory Drill Pay for personnel of the Washington State Guard, the enlisted strength of Rifle Companies of that organization is reduced from the present authorized strength of 146 to 100 noncommissioned officers, privates first class and privates, effective 1 April 1945."

"2. This reduction will result in the elimination of one rifle platoon from each company, which will hereafter consist of a headquarters platoon and two rifle platoons organized as indicated in the annex to this General Order.

"3. Each unit commander will issue a Company Order as of date of 31 March 1945 transferring to the inactive reserve, effective 1 April 1945, all enlisted men in excess of one hundred carried on their strength returns for March 1945. Non-commissioned officers and privates first class in excess of the numbers and grades authorized in the accompanying Tables of Organization may either be transferred, or reduced in grade without prejudice, as they may elect.

* * * * *

In the meantime, on 6 March 1945, Major General Maurice Thompson relieved Brigadier General Walter J. DeLong as Adjutant General of the State of Washington. General DeLong had relieved General Thompson on 15 May 1941 when General Thompson was transferred to the Inactive List.

Brigadier General Walter J. DeLong was born in Angelo, Wisconsin on 24 March 1898 and began his service in the Washington National Guard on 17 April 1921 when he was appointed a First Lieutenant of Infantry. He was federally recognized as a Captain, Infantry, on 16 March 1925; Major,

Infantry on 4 June 1930; Lt. Colonel, Infantry on 19 January 1939. He was inducted into Active Federal Service with the Washington National Guard on 16 March 1940. He served as The Adjutant General and head of the Washington Selective Service from 15 May 1941 until 6 March 1945.

Following the reorganization directed by General Orders No. 4 of 20 March 1945, General Orders No. 5, dated 31 May 1945 disbanded the Reserve Companies. On 15 September 1945, General Orders No. 9 reorganized the 4th and 5th regiments into six (6) Separate Battalions of Infantry and were continued in service until early 1947 when it was deactivated, except for a small staff which were retained to command and instruct a State Guard Cadet Corps.

On 25 February 1947, General Thompson was succeeded by Brigadier General Ensley M. Llewellyn.

General Thompson was born in Crawfordsville, Montgomery County, Indiana on August 27, 1878 and moved to Seattle with his parents in 1889. He enlisted in Company B, 1st Washington Volunteer Infantry in 1898 for the Spanish American War, but was rejected at the time of muster in of the regiment due to the fact that he was underweight. However he immediately reenlisted in Company B, 2nd Regiment of the Washington National Guard and served as Private, Corporal, Sergeant and First Sergeant until 29 May 1901 when he was discharged to accept appointment as First Lieutenant of Infantry, Washington National Guard. By 1 May 1914 he had risen to the rank of Major and was appointed The Adjutant General, with rank of Brigadier General. He served in this capacity continuously until 7 March 1918 when he was mustered into US service as a Major, Adjutant Generals Department. Following his release from Federal service he was appointed Acting Adjutant General of the Washington National Guard with rank of Brigadier General on 27 December 1919. He was detailed The Adjutant General on 7 June 1941. He served in this capacity until he was transferred to the State Reserve on 15 May 1941. Following his reappointment on 1945 he was appointed Major General and was retired in that grade in 1947. He died on 3 November 1954.

Brigadier General Ensley M. Llewellyn began his National Guard career by enlisting in Troop B, 58th Machine Gun Squadron in Tacoma. This unit was formerly Troop "B" and later became Headquarters Troop of the 24th Cavalry Division. He was appointed 1st Sergeant on 4 June 1927 and Second Lieutenant of Cavalry on 13 March 1929; First Lieutenant on 26 June 1935; Captain on 6 November 1939; Major on 1 February 1942 and to Lieutenant Colonel on 1 October 1943. He served as The Adjutant General until 8 July 1949.

CHAPTER II

REORGANIZATION OF THE WASHINGTON NATIONAL GUARD IN 1946-47

With the end of World War II, the National Guard was completely demobilized as its members were separated from Federal service and returned direct to civilian life. For a short period of time, there actually was no National Guard. However, planning for the National Guard's role in the postwar military establishment went forward under the following premise, which was stated in the biennial report of the Chief of Staff of the United States Army (1 July 1943 to 30 June 1945): "Of the citizen-army, the National Guard is in the first-category of importance. It must be healthy and strong, ready to take its place in the first line of defense in the first weeks of an emergency, and not dependent upon a year or more of training before it can be conditioned to take the field against a trained enemy".

On 13 October 1945, the Secretary of War approved a Report made by the Special General Staff Committee relating to the post-war National Guard. The Committee, composed of Regular Army, National Guard and Organized Reserve Corps members prepared this study as a basis for the post-war reorganization of the National Guard and Reserve of the Army. The following extracts are quoted below, to indicate the general provisions upon which the reorganization of the National Guard was to be made:

SECTION I DEFINITION

1. National Guard. The National Guard of the United States will be an integral part and a first line reserve component of the post-war military establishment. The National Guard of the States and Territories will continue to exist in the post-war military establishment. All Federally recognized units and elements of the National Guard of the several States, Territories, and the District of Columbia together will constitute the National Guard of the United States.

* * * * *

SECTION II MISSION

1. Mission of the National Guard of the United States.

To provide a reserve component of the Army of the United States, capable of immediate expansion to war strength, able to furnish units fit for service anywhere in the world, trained and equipped:

a. To defend critical areas of the United States against land, seaborne, or airborne invasion.

b. To assist in covering the mobilization and concentration of the remainder of the reserve forces.

c. To participate by units in all types of operations, including the offensive, either in the United States or overseas.

2. Mission of the Nation Guard of the several States.

To provide sufficient organizations in each State so trained and equipped as to enable them to function efficiently at existing strength in the protection of life and property and the preservation of peace, order and public safety, under competent orders of the State authorities.

SECTION III
STRENGTH, COMPOSITION, ORGANIZATION AND DISIRIBUTION

1. Strength.

The strength of the National Guard will be the maximum which the States can recruit and maintain as a satisfactory standard. The initial procurement objective will be not less than 425,000 enlisted; this objective to be subsequently increased as circumstances warrant.

2. Composition.

a. The organization and units allotted to the several states will be those which are required for the accomplishment of the mission of the National Guard and when taken together with the units of the Regular Army and the Organized Reserve Corps will insure an over-all balanced force within the Army of the United States.

b. Within the total allotment, organizations of the proper type will be allotted to each State to enable it to accomplish the State mission.

c. Mounted or horse drawn units will not be maintained. The hiring of mounts in limited numbers, for use in small elements of reconnaissance units during field training will not be prohibited.

3. Organization.

a. In the reorganization of the post-war National Guard the pride and traditions of old organizations will be utilized as far as practicable. The following principles will govern the type of units to be organized:

(1) First priority will be given to divisions and air units of an appropriate type. The maximum number of divisions which the States can maintain will be organized. The initial objective for divisions will be not less than 18.

(2) Second priority will be given to infantry regimental combat teams.

(3) Third priority will be given to anti-aircraft artillery and signal aircraft warning units with the objective of providing the greater practicable amount of anti-aircraft protection to key industrial centers.

(4) Fourth priority will be given to non-divisional combat units of the type used generally to reinforce divisions.

(5) Units of other types needed to facilitate training or provide a better balance to the National Guard as a whole may be organized.

b. Except for purposes of combined training, organizations larger than a division will not be organized wholly within the reserve components.

c. Whenever two or more separate battalions or similar units are allotted to a single State, an appropriate commander and headquarters will be included.

d. Units will be organized under applicable Regular Army Tables of Organization; provided that exceptions may be made with the approval of the Secretary of War.

e. The Inactive National Guard, officers and enlisted men, will be eliminated.

f. Units up to and including regiments will be wholly within a single State, where brigades or divisions of necessity are allocated to two or more States, brigade or divisional elements will be allocated so as to furnish a balanced combat team (or teams) to each State. The headquarters of such brigades or divisions may be withdrawn and reallocated within the States concerned by the Secretary of War.

g. Units of the National Guard will be maintained at sufficient strength to enable them to carry out the mission assigned. For planning purposes, this strength will be computed at 80% of enlisted strength and full strength in officers and warrant officers, based on appropriate tables of organization. Initial strength required for Federal recognition will be as prescribed by the Secretary of War.

4 Distribution.

a. The strength of the National Guard within the individual States, will be based on the ratio of males, age 18 to 35, residing in the State, to the total population of the country in that age bracket. Some flexibility in interpretation of this principle will be allowed so that when a State is unable to absorb its allotment the excess may be taken by another.

b. Organizations requiring technically trained personnel will be allocated to States where such technically trained personnel is available.

* * * * *

Subsequently the original procurement objective of 425,000 enlisted men was raised to 682,000 officers and enlisted men and based upon the distribution factor, the Chief of the National Guard Bureau, under date of 8 February 1946, advised this State that a strength of 12,238 officers and enlisted men had been allotted. Subsequent modification changed such allotment to consist of the organizations, enumerated below which were accepted by the State of Washington, subject to the conditions that there would be some form of military training or method of securing recruits other than the pre-war voluntary enlistment method; that adequate state funds, supplemented by Federal funds, were appropriated by the State Legislature and Congress to provide for the organization, quartering of personnel, and storage and maintenance of equipment issued to the proposed units; and that the Federal Government provides necessary airfields, quartering facilities and adequate assistance for necessary maintenance thereof.

In the meantime, pursuant to Public Law 253, 80th Congress, 1st Session, which was approved by The Congress of the United States on July 26, 1947, The Department of the Air Force was created. This same act established the War Department as the Department of the Army. The Department of the Air Force began to function officially on 18 September 1947, when Secretary of Defense, James Forrestal, was sworn into office as Secretary of Defense. The Honorable W. Stuart Symington served as the first Secretary of the Air Force. Previously he had served as Assistant Secretary of War for Air.

Prior to 1941, the National Guard had only 19 observation squadrons. These squadrons were generally division aviation, and corresponded almost exactly in number to the infantry divisions throughout the United States. Thus the 41st Observation Squadron was assigned to the 41st Infantry Division located in Oregon and Washington. Just prior to war, the National Guard was authorized to organize 10 additional squadrons, and some were in progress or organizing when war was declared. A total of 29 squadrons were organized at that time which included O-38 and O-47 type airplanes, 800 officers, 4,000 enlisted men and a total of 400 planes.

On 1 April 1948 the Air National Guard had two thirds of the fighter planes available to the Air Defense Command of the United States Air Force in the event of an attack by an enemy nation.

A later troop basis provided for 514 units, to be subdivided into 27 groups and 84 squadrons, with necessary service units. Seventy-two of the 84 squadrons were to be fighter squadrons, and 12 were to be light bombardment squadrons. The fighter squadrons in 1948 were equipped with F-47 Thunderbolts and F-51 Mustangs. Five squadrons in 1948 began the transition to jet-propelled F-80 Shooting Stars. The light bombardment squadrons were flying the standard B-26 Invader type plane.

As of 31 December 1948, 469 units of the 514 allotted units of the Air National Guard had received Federal recognition. Thus the Air National Guard anticipated 84 squadrons, as compared with 29 observer squadrons before World War II; 58,000 men, as compared with the original 4,800; and 3,000 planes, as compared with prewar strength of only 400.

The mission of the Air National Guard is to provide a reserve component of the Air Force capable of rapid expansion to war strength, able to furnish air units fit for immediate service anywhere in the world, which together with the Regular Air Force, will provide an M-day Air Force capable of the proper conduct of air defense, air offense, and joint action with surface forces. First-line of defense of the United States includes the Air National Guard.

NATIONAL GUARD TROOPS ALLOTTED TO THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
31 OCTOBER 1946

GROUND

	<u>STRENGTH</u>
41st Infantry Division (in part) as follows:	
41st Infantry Division Headquarters (in part)	46
41st Infantry Division Special Troops (in part)	19
41st Infantry Division Headquarters Company	91
41st Military Police Company	141
41st Quartermaster Company	151
41st Signal Company	251
741st Ordnance Maintenance Company	123
161st Infantry Regiment	2,996
41st Infantry Artillery, Hq & Hq Btry	115
146th Field Artillery Battalion (155mm How)	446
167th Field Artillery Battalion (105mm How)	439
116th Medical Battalion	382
41st Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron (mech)	134
41st Infantry Division Band	58
115th AAA Brigade, Hq. & Hq. Battery	67
115th AAA Operations Detachment	34
205th AAA Group, Hq & Hq Battery	61
236th AAA Group, Hq & Hq Battery	61
770th AAA Battalion, SM, Type A	511
420th AAA Battalion, SM, Type A	511
700th AAA Battalion. SP	571
530th AAA Battalion, SM	637
240th AAA Battalion, SL, Type C	652
2895th Engineer SL Maintenance Team, Mobile	3
403rd Signal Radar Maintenance Unit, Type F	4
404th Signal Radar Maintenance Unit, Type F	4
405th Signal Radar Maintenance Unit, Type C	4
248th Coast Artillery Group, Hq & Hq Battery	67
524th Coast Artillery Battalion, Hq & Hq Battery	58
525th Coast Artillery Battalion, Hq & Hq Battery	58
916th Coast Artillery Battery 16-inch)	129
964th Coast Artillery Battery (6-inch)	101
965th Coast Artillery Battery (6-inch)	101
874th Coast Artillery Battery (90-mm AMTB)	93
875th Coast Artillery Battery (90-mm AMTB)	93
803rd Tank Battalion	607
652nd Armored Field Artillery Battalion	421
565th Field Artillery Battalion (155 Gun SP)	437
66th Field Artillery Group, Hq & Hq Battery	83
4292nd Quartermaster Salvage & Repair Company	161
TOTAL GROUND FORCES	10,921

AIR NATIONAL GUARD:

60th Wing Headquarters	205
160th Aircraft Control and Warning Group Hq.	62
141st Aircraft Control Squadron	259
143rd Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron	405

110th AAF Communications Squadron	88
110th Radar Calibration Detachment	35
110th Signal Company, Light Construction	102
116th Fighter Squadron, SE	133
Utility Flight	35
Detachment B, 242nd Air Service Gp (Fighter)	177
116th Weather Station (Type A)	8
60th Wing Band	29
Total Air Force:	
	1,538

GRAND TOTAL12, 539

Prior to World War II, the organization of the 41st Infantry Division was split between Idaho, Montana, Oregon, Washington and Wyoming and the preliminary plans for the post-war reorganization of the Division provided it to be split between the States of Idaho, Oregon and Washington, but in order that the State of Oregon might reorganize two infantry regiments of the Division, which entered the World War from that State, adjustments were effected between the States of Idaho and Oregon and by the Chief, National Guard Bureau, so that the final allotment of 41st Division troops now provides for their organization between the States of Oregon and Washington. This allotment of the Division between the two States required an agreement between the States of Oregon and Washington as to the allotment of the Division Commander and personnel, of Division Headquarters, including officers and enlisted. After several conferences and communications between the Adjutants General of Oregon and Washington an agreement in the premises was entered into and approved by the Chief, National Guard Bureau. This agreement provided, among other things, for the rotation of certain staff personnel coincident with the rotation of the Division Commander. Initially, it was agreed that the allotment of the Division Commander would go to the State of Oregon, but only on the condition that such position would be filled by Brigadier General Thomas E. Rilea, formerly Assistant Division, Commander; that the allotment of these two positions would be rotated between the States of Oregon and Washington every four years, but if General Rilea was not able to qualify for Federal recognition as Division Commander, then the position would at once revert to the State of Washington and the Assistant Div. Cmdr. to the State of Oregon. On August 2, 1946, The Adjutant General, State of Oregon advised the Chief, National Guard Bureau and The Adjutant General, State of Washington, that, as General Rilea had been released from active Federal service by reason of physical disability incurred in line of duty, he would not be able to qualify physically for Federal recognition as Commanding General, 41st Infantry Division and the position of Division Commander was accordingly allotted to the State of Washington and the position of Assistant Division Commander was allotted to the State of Oregon pursuant to instructions from the Chief of the National Guard Bureau, dated 6 September 1946.

The proposed post-war National Guard as shown above was approximately three (3) times the strength of the Washington National Guard as organized just prior to World War II, and due to changes in Tables of Organization and Equipment as well as changes in types of units, its complete activation required many changes in the then existing Armory facilities.

The procurement of personnel for the proposed expansion of the Washington National Guard was rendered rather difficult due to restrictions placed on procurement, maintenance of efficiency, promotion, etc. Initially only those war-time officers who had clearly demonstrated their qualifications by actual performance were to be assigned. When this field was exhausted then the restrictions were to be lowered in order to bring the National Guard to authorized strength. However, approved War Department policies on age-in-grade limitations for National Guard officers were maintained as follows:

ASSIGNMENT	GRADE					
	<u>2nd Lt</u>	<u>1st Lt</u>	<u>Capt</u>	<u>Major</u>	<u>Lt Col</u>	<u>Col</u>
State Headquarters	40	43	46	51	55	60
Air Units	31	36	41	44	47	49
Other than Air Units	30	35	42	47	52	55

These age limits prevented most State Guard Officers, as well, as many over-age officers with distinguished war records, from being eligible to participate in the post-war reorganization program. Similarly, age and active service requirements for enlisted men were established as follows:

AGE	MINIMUM ACTIVE ARMY SERVICE
35, under 36	3 months
36, under 37	1 year
37, under 38	2 years
38, under 39	3 years
39, under 40	4 years
40, and over	5 years

In addition to the restrictions on age and active duty service which were not required before the war, the physical standards for both officers and enlisted men were raised, which also rendered the task of raising some 12,000 officers and men more difficult.

The re-organization of the Post World War II Washington National Guard personnel-wise, also increased equipment and provided for an increase in full-time employees. Prior to World War II, only a small number of employees were authorized for care of equipment and these were paid almost entirely from State funds. The monthly roster of employees for the Military Department for the period 1 November 1938 to 1 November 1940 averaged about 65. These employees were distributed between the Administrative offices, State Arsenal, Shops and Grounds at Camp Murray, and the eighteen Armories throughout the State.

The initial authorization by the War Department in 1946 was for 126 employees alone, plus 56 employees paid by the State of Washington. By 1947, Federal employment had risen to 167 and as of 1 November 1948 totaled 354. Value of Military Supplies and Equipment was estimated at \$15,000,000.00. By 1950 it had an estimated value of \$85,000,000.00, which included the costs of trucks, tanks and self-propelled artillery, jet-type airplanes, liaison type airplanes, radar equipment, electrical equipment and approximately 45,000 other items of equipment.

During the period 1950-52, approximately \$4,000,000.00 was expended by the United States Property and Fiscal Officer for construction, repairs and utilities, pay of civilian employees, operations expenses, transportation, fuels and lubricants, maintenance and repair, travel, field training, schools, armory drills, training aids, staff training assemblies, week-end outdoor training and other miscellaneous items. During the same period, some 17,500 vehicles, artillery pieces, small arms, signal equipment, and other miscellaneous items were processed through the Maintenance Shops at Camp Murray.

WASHINGTON NATIONAL GUARD IN THE GREAT FLOOD OF 1948

Because of its wide basin, the Columbia River and its tributaries have for centuries caused heavy floods on both sides of their channels. The winter of 1861-62 was, according to past histories, the hardest and most disastrous of record in Oregon and Washington. It began with heavy rains in the valleys in November. About the last of November, though the rains continued unabated in violence, the weather became very warm, so that the snows on the mountains melted away almost overnight and poured their floods down into the valleys through every creek and gorge and hollow in roaring rivers. The result was the great valleys were inundated. The Willamette and other rivers became like the Columbia and the Columbia like the sea. Many mills and manufactories were washed away. Farms on the bottom lands were cleared of buildings, fences, stock, everything. To add to the calamity of the winter, about Christmas, an unprecedented snow came down covering the country from one to three feet deep. This remained on the ground for one or two months. In a country like the Northwest where the farmer had made little provision for the feed of his stock this was as bad as had been the preceding flood. When March came in, hundreds were in poverty, who a quarter of a year before were in comfort and even in affluence. Never up to that time, and never since (written in 1893) has such a winter fallen in the Northwest. When the foregoing was written, little did the author know that terrible floods would plague Washington, Oregon and Idaho for years to come, or at least until man found, a way to harness the rivers which cause the floods.

In more recent times such floods as that which occurred in Washington and Idaho in December 1933, the Kelso flood of June, 1933, the Bonner's Ferry Flood of June-July, 1933 and the Heppner, Oregon flood of May, 1934 have continued to plague those residents who reside in the path of the Columbia or its tributaries. The last serious floods of this century occurred in Vanport, Washington in 1947 and the great floods which occurred along the Snake and Columbia Rivers in 1948.

On 28 May 1948, based upon instructions from the Governor, the Adjutant General of the Washington National Guard, Brigadier General Ensley M. Llewellyn alerted all units of the Washington National Guard to be ready to move to the areas threatened by the flood. One of these units was Company F, 161st Infantry, commanded by Capt. Richard D. True, and stationed at Ellensburg. The following report of Captain True, reproduced in its entirety below, provides a good account of the seriousness of the impending floods:

Ellensburg, Washington
10 June 1948

Dear General Llewellyn:

I would like to take this means of reporting to you the activities of my company during the recent flood emergency in this area. As you know, the reports about the flood sounded bad enough on Friday, the 28th of May, to cause me to call you and advise you of the situation. Upon your advice I then assembled the company on a voluntary basis, having a turn out of 20 men by noon. I arranged for quarters at the YMCA, procured beds from a nearby farm labor group camp, and asked a Mrs. Ralph Phillips, mother of one of the enlisted men, to arrange some sort of a mess facility for us. In doing this she cooperated with the local radio station, calling for volunteer donations of prepared dishes and help in serving and cleaning up. She had admirable response from the town and excellent meals were available to us at all times.

Shortly after assembling we were called upon by Sheriff's officers, with whom we were working to assist in taking a family out of a house that had been overrun by the rapidly rising water. I took Sergeant Benny Jarrett and his section in a 2-1/2 ton truck and followed the officers to the place where, with Sergeant Jarrett driving we waded the truck about 200 yards through three feet of water, to the house. Removing three children, two dogs and a supply of bedding and clothing, we came out shortly before the water became too deep.

At 0500 Saturday we were notified by city police officers that a boat was badly needed at the city wells, some five miles west of town. One was procured from the fire department and rushed out to the wells where it was used to salvage a pump from the main pump house. The area was being washed over by fast moving water that was pouring through a broken dike.

At the request of the Sheriff's office I had the State Patrol office radio their Tacoma office to procure from National Guard Headquarters six SCR 536's and relay them to the highway patrol cars to us as quickly as possible. They cooperated to the fullest and had the sets here by 1600 hours, and they were put into immediate use.

About 0800 Corporal Joe W. Snyder and Private Howard A. Shaw with their section were sent to Thrall, about seven miles south of town, where the highway was under water. Corporal Snyder, in the boat, spent the day working hard to save a lot of beehives from being washed away and managed to save several hundred dollars worth of the bees, which are important in this area. Meanwhile, working with the State Patrol officers, Private Shaw and his section engaged in getting traffic through the water over the highway. It being too deep to drive small cars through because of their fans drowning the ignition system, they were linked together in trains of up to fifteen cars and were hauled through by our truck. Choker cables for use on this job were procured from the Kittitas County equipment yard, the men there being very cooperative and helpful in seeing that we got what we wanted. First Sergeant John O. Ireland was sent to Thrall to take charge of my men there and turned in a fine job of it.

While at Thrall our crew was joined by a Captain Steele of the 9th Infantry, 2d Division, who happened along on his way back from Yakima. He stayed to help with his trucks and men and a friendly rivalry between the two groups grew up over who was going to take the most people through. I do not know how many Captain Steele pulled through, but with our one truck we took over 250 cars in sixteen trips. Mrs. Phillips also took hot food to both crews at Thrall and we were able to furnish Capt. Steele and his men a good dinner at the end of the job that evening. Captain Steele complimented me on having a good bunch of workers on the job.

At about 1300 Saturday, the State Highway Department called for assistance in traffic control on the Ellensburg-Cle Elum highway which had had a washout. Three traffic control points were set up, one at the detour point near town, one at Teanaway Junction near Cle Elum, and one at a weakened bridge on the detour route. Traffic was filtered so as to let construction and gravel hauling vehicles through to the washout and also to the broken dike which was on this road, and to reroute all other traffic. This system was maintained 24 hours a day until Tuesday at noon, using three six-man sections to operate on 4 six hour shifts a day.

About 1800 Saturday a call came to help get groceries to a man stranded on high ground surrounded by water. He had stayed to take care of a large herd of cattle which was grouped and to milk them to prevent their drying up. Sergeant Jarrett again waded his truck, delivering the food and bringing out several cans of milk, thus preventing their loss by souring.

Sunday morning, traffic could get through unaided at Thrall and flagmen were sent out, equipped with radios, to maintain traffic control and assist stalled cars. Two more calls for a boat at the city wells were answered, once to attempt to get another, larger pump, into the pump house to keep the water from shorting the main city water pumps and leaving the city without water. This attempt failed because of the fast running water, but fortunately the main pumps didn't short out and we did have enough water in town. The other time the boat was used to take in a bottle of chlorine for use in purifying the water as an extra precaution against disease.

There were some other small jobs done around town, such as helping a woman get things out of her flooding basement and helping move sandbags which were placed in a city street to help control a small stream which runs through town. The preceding, however, cover the main activities we engaged in which may not seem to be much but seem to have been appreciated according to comment I have heard from several sources, I believe we were able to be of value to the community in that we were ready to go

out on an instant's notice and do anything we were equipped for. Had the flood become worse there would have been an increasing demand for someone just as ourselves to save whole families in threatened areas.

We suffered no casualties to men and equipment excepting a borrowed electric lantern which was run over. We put about 1200 miles on our vehicles and used up 170 gallons of our training and administrative gasoline.

* * * * *

As the disaster developed, guardsmen from Spokane, Omak, Okanogan, Yakima, Prosser, Pasco, Richland, Kennewick, Walla Walla, Vancouver, Chehalis, Aberdeen, Olympia, Bremerton, Port Orchard, Tacoma and Seattle were called out to operate in the twelve counties hit by the floods.

Temporary housing and bedding were supplied by the Washington National Guard and moved into needy areas. 243,000 sandbags were transported by air and ground units to threatened dikes. In one area, 8-1/2 miles of dike were built two feet higher and twenty feet wider in one twenty-four hour period. Equipment and manpower were secured for the reconstruction of irrigation ditches in the Methow Valley. Seven electrical generators were secured and transported by air and truck to communities without electricity as a result of the flood action. Over 6500 families were evacuated by Guardsmen using military vehicles. Over 6,000 cows were moved from flooded and flood threatened areas to safety. Guard "Ducks" (DUKW) transportation was used to keep flooded roads opened to civilian traffic and other needs. Guard planes transported medical and other emergency supplies to areas cut off by flood waters. Protection against looting was supplied by Guard troops at Washougal, Camas, Vancouver, Woodland, Puget Island, Pasco, Kennewick and Richland. Guard bulldozers were used to clear flood damaged roads and make these roads passable. Guard manpower and equipment were used to re-establish community water systems, and clear away debris in flood damaged areas. Private homes and farm buildings washed away from foundations during the flood were towed back to original sites during the flood by National Guard "Ducks", saving owners thousands of dollars. Cattle feed and farm produce were moved "free-of-charge" by Guardsmen, in and out of Flood isolated communities. A State wide survey of flood damage was secured and maintained for use by public and private agencies interested in intelligently assisting flood victims.

To cover the entire scope of this great emergency operation, some of the operational reports and other media generated during this period is published verbatim hereinafter:

OPERATION "WOODLAND"
S-3 JOURNAL REPORT - 115th AAA BRIGADE

The initial order for Mobilization of the Olympia Units of the 115th AAA Brigade was received by Colonel McKay at 2050 hours, Saturday, 29 May 1948, from Colonel McMorris, Office of The Adjutant General. Brigade Headquarters Battery was alerted at 2100 hours; Operations Detachment at 2100 hours; and Battery C, 700th AAA at 2100. The orders were to Mobilize 100 officers and men, and to proceed to WOODLAND, reporting to General Llewellyn for duty in flood protection and relief.

S-3 Journal

- 0040 30 May Operations Detachment. 3 Officers, 16 enlisted men, departs Olympia Armory for State Highway Garage, Tumwater, for gasoline for trip.
- 0050 Hq. Battery, 115th AAA Brigade, 2 officers, 23 EM, depart same destination.
- 0100 Btry C, 700th AAA (AW), 2 officers, 27 men, depart same destination.
- 0100 Staff - McKay, Haskett, Clark, depart for Highway Garage to join troops.
- 0200 Units depart Highway Department Garage on US 99 and move south, destination WOODLAND. Vehicles as follows: Hq Btry (5) Opns Det (6) Btry C (4). One civilian car (Captain Newell).
- 0225 Entered TENINO.
- 0300 Arrived CENTRALIA, police escort through CENTRALIA-CHEHALIS area.

OPERATION "WOODLAND" (CONT'D)

- 0338 Rest stop at LEWIS & CLARK STATE PARK on US-99.
- 0500 Reach LONGVIEW on US-99.
- 0510 Enter area where water covers road to depth of approximately 18 inches.
- 0525 Arrive CAMP KALAMA, high ground, stop to survey trucks and. assess any damage due to passing through water -.no real damage evident.
- 0600 Arrive WOODLAND, met by Coast Guard Det., orientation as to situation.
- 0630 Mess, Breakfast at Lloyd's Rendezvous Cafe. (All troop meals eaten here while at Woodland, except those provided in the form of lunch by Red Cross).
- 0630 Colonel McKay and Major Nostrant go on reconnaissance of Dike area.
- 0830 Troops bivouac in Woodland Grade School, truck park to rear Dike work reliefs established as follows:
0300 to 1100, Col Stevens, 803d Tk Bn, Centralia, 42 men.
1100 to 1900, Col Beattie, 167th FA Bn, Vancouver, 67 men.
1900 to 0300, Col McKay, 115th AAA, Brigade, Olympia, 66 men.
Note: Col Stevens had but 42 men, they were to be augmented by elements of the 700th AAA AW Bn SP, from Aberdeen, due to arrive during day of 30 May.
- 0900 City Administration Bldg, CP, A. W. Welch, Corps of Engineers, District Engineer, was in charge of entire operation. NG troops to assist as directed by Welch. City Hall phones Woodland, 154-48 -137; Tulip farm phone No. 151; Red Cross located in High School, phone 108, Mr. Baird and Mr. Hugh Jacobs in charge.
Relief agencies: 1 DUKW available to Fire Department.
Coast Guard Surf Boat in area.
Coast Guard and State Patrol Radio in City Hall.
- 0900 Col McKay places call to General Llewellyn, unable to reach him.
- 1035 General Llewellyn arrives, Col McKay in conference with Gen. and relief agencies.
- 1045 Col Stevens returns to City Hall.
- 1050 General Llewellyn informs Col McKay that he (McKay) is in charge of all National Guard troops in area and will operate in WOODLAND as directed by Mr. Welch, who is the authorized representative of the United States Engineer in Portland.
General Llewellyn, Col McKay, and party, tour dike area.
- 1050 to
- 1430 General Llewellyn and Col McKay make reconnaissance of Dike districts as required by the situation. Col McKay made calls to Highway Department at Olympia and Vancouver in effort to obtain additional equipment as requested by Mr. Welch.
- 1430 Col McKay retires to Bivouac area, places Haskett in charge, requests to be called prior to 1900 to relieve Col Haskett.
- 1500 Mr. Welch has call sent out by Radio for 300 men to work on dikes. Mr. Button, Jr. assigned men to areas as they reported. Vancouver hiring hall sent men to Woodland as requested; quota reached and exceeded, exact number of men reporting for work is not known.
- 1515 Dike district personnel worried over lack of coordination by civilian agencies, request Mr. Welch to coordinate actions of all personnel working in area to insure greater efficiency on dike operations. Mr. Welch then assumed charge and proceeded to coordinate all agencies. Mr. Devers, Highway Department reported to Welch, a meeting was held in which all agencies, and National Guard were represented. Mr. Devers placed himself and equipment entirely under direction of Welch, and coordinated plan reached to raise freeboard of Dike #5. All equipment was employed then in concentrated effort to raise the level of No. 5 dike, and also to initiate the construction of a buffer dike between RR embankment and Lewis river to absorb shock in event of collapse of Dike 11.

OPERATION "WOODLAND" (CONT'D)

- 1530 General Llewellyn introduces Mr. Baird of Red Cross to Col Haskett, and to Mr. Welch; Mr. Baird advised that NG troops were available to Red Cross if required.
- 1530 to
- 1900 Routine, maximum effort being made by all personnel and equipment on Dike Work. One Bulldozer sinks into Dike 11, dozer then sandbagged to save dike from collapse at that point.
- 1900 Col McKay arrives, relieves Haskett, Haskett to Bivouac area to rest, McKay in charge.
- 2100 Mr. Welch retires to get sleep; Major Derrick, Capt. Clark, depart for Olympia. 2300 Two additional Engineers arrive from US District Engineer Office in Portland to assist Mr. Welch.
- 0430 31 May: Col McKay and two engineers make reconnaissance of Dikes No. 5 and 11. Dike 11 has been raised in height. about 18 inches by sandbagging its entire length. Height being above expected crest of river. Several serious leaks being worked upon to stop seepage. On Dike No. 5, two power shovels and 22 trucks are placing dirt fill on top of low sections and raising the dike about 14 inches. One-half mile in one section remains to be raised, and about 1/4 mile in scattered sections. Freeboard in low sections is about 8", Highway Department Foreman (Ormsby) estimates that 1/2 mile section can be completed by 1400.
- 0600 Additional volunteers for labor arrive from Vancouver and night shift is relieved. Maximum effort directed to control leaks in Dike No. 11.
- 0830 Mr. Welch advised that Dike No. 11 unsafe for personnel, Welch gives order to abandon Dike 11. Troops and Civilians ordered from Dike. This order relayed by phone, radio, and messenger. S-3 notifies Col McKay of the action.
- 0915 Col Stevens returns from dike, reports all troops safely removed from Dike 11. Col Beattie arrives from Vancouver with 5 officers, 102 men; ordered to stand by.
- 1015 Col McKay send Col Stevens as Liaison to Red Cross Headquarters; advises Red Cross that troops and equipment are at their disposal to evacuate people if required.
- 1115 Col Forbes calls from AGO, advised that 3 DUKW'S on way to Woodland from Camp Murray 17 more available at Rainier Ordnance Depot if required. DUKW'S left Camp Murray at 1100.
- 1127 Mr. Welch advised that Dike No. 5 no longer safe and ordered Dike 5 abandoned. Col Beattie leaves for reconnaissance of dike area.
- 1135 General Llewellyn returns, reports Dike No. 11 broken near Tulip farm house. General Llewellyn goes on reconnaissance; McKay goes to Red Cross.
- 1150 Jack Gorrie calls for Governor, inquires as to situation in WOODLAND area; advised by Col Haskett as to what is taking place.
- 1325 General Llewellyn directs Col McKay and Col Crabill to fly to KELSO-LONGVIEW area to make an estimate of the situation in that area. McKay places Haskett in charge and departs for Vancouver to catch plane. Expect to hear from him in about 3 hours.
- 1330 General Llewellyn calls Jack Gorrie, reports on Woodland area. 1410 General Llewellyn departs on reconnaissance of area.
- 1505 General Llewellyn requests Coast Guard to notify their plane to take pictures of the dike break area each hour in order that a time-picture of the damage may be made available to the Engineers for future planning.
- 1520 General Llewellyn returns, asks Haskett to place guards on road to Tulip farm to halt sight-seers. 167th FA furnished guards.
- 1525 Three DUKWS arrive from Camp Murray, R. A. Ottman in charge, reports 29 civilians in KALAMA need transport to KELSO. Ottman reports too much water over Highway at Camp Kalama to allow truck move to Kelso.
- 1535 General Llewellyn orders Lieut. Phillips to take one DUKW and Ottman, and move civilians as requested.

OPERATION "WOODLAND" (CONT'D)

- 1630 Col Crabill calls from Kelso, reports situation in hand, 2600 persons being ,evacuated locally. Recommends that Col Stevens return to home station and be alerted to move to Kelso as required. Wants Stevens to contact Mr. Ingram of Red Gross upon arrival in Kelso.
- 1630 General Llewellyn places Col Stevens in command, senior officer present.
- 1735 Capt Grout reports water in 115th Brigade motor park area, requests permission to move troops out of school to bivouac area on high ground. Captain Newell and Lieut. Phillips make same request. Troops then moved out of Woodland center to assembly area across old highway Bridge.
- 1945 Major Nostrant calls from Vancouver has cots there wants to know if we will need them in Woodland, or if we are moving into Vancouver for the night.
- 1915 General Llewellyn takes Col Stevens on reconnaissance of Dike No 5.
- 1800 to
- 2200 Woodland gradually being inundated as water from District 5 encircles outer area of the city. Water held in check by new highway grade. Water encircles city hall area, about 100 yards away. One of the DUKWS turned over indefinitely to local PUD for use by power men in handling transmission lines. Remaining two DUKWS used to patrol and evacuate citizens from flooded areas. Col Stevens assigns Lieut. Cooper of Aberdeen guard troops to remain in Woodland for patrol duty. Guards posted at all roads leading into the flooded area. Lieut. Cooper and Woodland Fire Chief collaborate in establishing Guard. Local personnel to assist Guard in order that authorized persons may be allowed in flooded zone when necessary. Colonel Stevens evacuated high school building, his troops in trucks awaiting march orders.
- 2300 Col McKay returns, learns troops are out of Grade School Bivouac area, Haskett makes reconnaissance of school area, water around school, Unit CO's elect to remain in present Bivouac area overnight in view of the fact that it is planned to return to Olympia via Kelso in the morning.
- 2330 Impossible to return by Kelso, or by Interstate Bridge through Portland, move to Vancouver Barracks for rest until route is OK'D. March order at 2330.
- 0030 1 June. Convoy arrives Vancouver Barracks, met by Col McKay and Major Nostrant; billeted in 167th FA Bn area; areas located; troops bed down. Plan is to rest troops in Vancouver; 1 June and 2 June to depart for Olympia by way of GOLDENDALE, YAKIMA, RENTON; plan to arrive OLYMPIA. Thursday 3 June.
- 0030 1 June to
- 0500 2 June Routine, troops at Vancouver barracks.
- 0500 Breakfast, Fruit Valley school building.
- 1700 Initial Point, Lower Gate, Vancouver Barracks
1st Serial, 96 men, 36 Vehicles, Col McKay
2nd Serial, 42 men, 13 Vehicles, Col Stevens
- 0810 Rest stop, vicinity DALLESFORT.
- 1100 MARYHILL, start to climb MARYHILL.
- 1115 Summit of MARYHILL, rest stop, and regroup.
- 1130 Depart Summit.
- 1145 Arrive GOLDENDALE, Noon Mess, Gas Trucks.
- 1316 IP GOLDENDALE, move north on Highway 97.
- 1348 Enter SATUS PASS.
- 1430 Rest stop, below SATUS PASS, 13 miles from PASS summit.
- 1515 Enter TOPPENISH, meet Col McKay outside city.
- 15.30 Enter WAPATO, detour across RR tracks. State Patrol for guide. Use HI-3C.
- 1550 Enter Junction at PARKER.
- 1555 Pass through UNION GAP.

OPERATION "WOODLAND" (CONT'D)

1600 Arrive YAKIMA, park in vacant area across street from Armory, joined by second serial.

1830 Supper Mess, at GOLDEN WHEEL CAFE.

2100 Post Guard as follows: 2 man guard over Motor park

Hq Btry, 115th AAA Brig -2100 to 2300

C Btry, 700th AAA, -2300 to 0100

Opns Det, 115th - 0100 to 0300

236th AAA Group - 0300 to 0500

2nd Serial (Stevens) furnished own guard

2030 Col McKay holds Btry CO meeting, March Order for 3 June given orally to CO's

0500 3 June 1948. First Call.

0530 Breakfast mess, Donnelly Hotel, Yakima.

0700 IP Armory, YAKIMA, City Police and State Patrol escort to city limit.

0715 Rest at View Point, Col McKay orients troops on location of YAKIMA FIRING RANGE, points out salient features of camp.

0830 Stop, Highway Garage, North city limits of ELLENSBURG, to gas vehicles. IP, Highway Garage Gate, Gassing completed.

1000 Enter CLE ELUM.

1015 Take ROSLYN ROAD and Detour.

1045 Enter EASTON.

1110 Passing LAKE KEECHELUS.

1130 Reach SUMMIT SNOQUALMIE, Idaho NG pulls out as we enter; Rest stop, Summit.

1230 Arrive NORTH BEND, noon mess.

1330 IP NORTH BEND to Highway.

1400 Arrive ISSAQUAH.

1430 Arrive RENTON, wrong road, Police escort back to Valley Road. No time lost.

1500 Arrive KENT.

1510 Arrive AUBURN.

1513 Pass first serial (Col Stevens) parked on roadside waved on by escort.

1530 Arrive SUMNER, joined by Col McKay, troops riding in 236th Group Trucks join own organizations.

1545 Arrive PUYALLUP, drop 236th Group trucks from column, escort takes them from there to home station in TACOMA.

1610 Enter US-99, vicinity MCCHORD FIELD entrance.

1630 Cross NISQUALLY BRIDGE.

1645 Enter CITY LIMITS, OLYMPIA, picked up by Police Escort.

1650 Arrive OLYMPIA ARMORY, units revert to unit Commander control for dismissal.

END OF OPERATION "WOODLAND".

ANNEX NO. 1 -OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF COLONEL MCKAY

On arrival at Woodland, it was apparent that there was a lack of coordination of effort to handle the problem of raising the freeboard on the dikes. Mr. Welch who was the representative of the US District Engineer was nominally in charge but the Dike District personnel as well as the troops already at the site were working more or less independently. Mr. Welch had plans for the method to be used to strengthen and raise the dikes, but too much time was being lost in arranging for the necessary equipment.

OPERATION "WOODLAND" (CONT'D)

General Llewellyn's orders placing the troops under the direction of the US Engineers led to the clarification of the situation and with the arrival of Highway Department equipment, and the conference at 1515, 30 May, the situation assumed more order, and proper coordination was effected.

It is recommended that in future operations of this nature, the troops assigned had an adequate staff to provide for the operation of a Command Post independent of the US Engineers Headquarters; but that they establish liaison with the US Engineers and the Red Cross. The use of troops on the dike protection should be as requested and directed by the US Engineers and requests for assistance in moving civilians to safe locations should be channeled through the Red Cross.

(Signed) Neil R. McKay
 NEIL R. MCKAY
 Colonel, CAC
 115th AAA Brigade

LIST OF WASHINGTON NATIONAL GUARD TROOPS PARTICIPATING IN FLOOD DUTY - 1948

UNIT	PERIOD	OFF	EM
Battery D, 420th AAA Gun Battalion	27 May - 20 Jun	3	52
Company A, 161st Infantry	29 May - 2 Jun	3	29
Attached to Co. A from other units	29 May - 2 Jun	2	9
Battery B, 420th AAA Gun Battalion	4 Jun - 20 Jun	1	41
Hq & Hq Company, 2nd Bn, 161 Inf.	30 May - 4 Jun	11	64
41st Division Quartermaster Company	4 Jun - 11 Jun	1	0
	27 May - 3 Jun	2	53
803rd Tank Battalion	29 May - 5 Jun	1	44
115th AAA Operations Detachment	29 May - 3 Jun	1	16
Hq & Hq Battery, 115th AAA Brigade	29 May - 3 Jun	5	23
Hq & Hq Battery, 236th AM Group	28 May - 3 Jun	1	22
Battery C, 700th AAA AW Battalion	29 May - 3 Jun	1	29
41st Div. Mecz Cav. Recon. Troop	4 Jun - 11 Jun	1	15
41st Div. Mecz Cav. Recon. Troop	21 May - 1 Jun	1	15
Battery A, 167th FA Battalion	28 May - 26 Jun	1	29
Service Battery, 167th FA Battalion	28 May - 26 Jun	3	20
Hq & Hq Battery, 167th FA Battalion	28 May - 26 Jun	6	60
Medical Det., 167th FA Battalion	28 May - 26 Jun	0	8
Det. 143rd Sq. & 110th Rad Gal Det	10 Jun. - 29 Jul	2	42
State Headquarters Detachment	28 May - 4 Jun	1	1
Company I, 161st Infantry	28 May - 5 Jun	2	11
Det. 143rd Acft & 146th FA Bn.	30 Jul - 26 Jun	1	2
41st Quartermaster Company	27 May - 3 Jun	1	3
Company I, 161st Infantry	28 May - 5 Jun	1	15
Company A, 161st Infantry	29 May - 2 Jun	0	7
Battery C, 420th AAA Gun Battalion	29 May - 2 Jun	2	38
Det, 143rd Acft Contr & Wn Sq	10 Jun - 31 Oct	1	5
Hq & Hq Battery, 167th FA Battalion	28 May - 26 Jun	0	4
	Grand Totals	54	642

OPERATION "WOODLAND" (CONT ' D)

REPORT OF THE AMERICAN NATIONAL RED CROSS, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF.,
ON THE FLOOD IN MONTANA, IDAHO, WASHINGTON & OREGON - 1948

RED CROSS CHAPTERS	FAMILIES AFFECTED	FAMILIES IN NEED	FAMILIES REGIST'D	HOMES DESTR'D	HOMES DMGD	PERSONS HOME-LESS	PERSONS SHLTRD	NUMBER BEING FED
CHELAN	75	25	0	0	60	UNKN	28	16
KITTITAS	35	20	0	0	35	UNKN	0	0
OKANOGAN	500	365	0	50	400	UNKN	0	650
SPOKANE	20	20	0	UNKN	UNKN	UNKN	0	140
WHITMAN	18	8	0	UNKN	18	UNKN	0	0
BENTON	1700	500	150	17	350	UNKN	100	300
CLARK	534	340	0	UNKN	524	UNKN	135	135
COWLITZ	1200	261	400	3	250	UNKN	176	800
FRANKLIN	150	75	0	20	55	UNKN	12	250
KLICKITAT	10	0	0	0	0	UNKN	0	0
PACIFIC	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
SKAMANIA	3	0	0	0	3	0	0	0
WAHIAKUM	260	20	250	0	5	0	30	450
WALLA WALLA	30	20	0	0	30	0	0	0
YAKIMA	200	175	0	40	150	UNKN	348	250
TOTALS	9235	1829	800	130	1880	UNKN	829	2991

FLOOD DAMAGE SURVEY	TOTAL DAMAGE ALL COUNTIES	
TYPE OF PROPERTY	NUMBER OF UNITS	VALUE/ AND OR REPAIR
HOMES DESTROYED	839	\$2,819,000.00
HOMES DAMAGED	3632	4,039,900.00
FARM STRUCTURES DESTROYED	311	1,506,300.00
FARM STRUCTURES DAMAGED	1772	1,198,800.00
PERSONAL PROPERTY LOSS AND DAMAGE		1,985,800.00
FARM CROP LOSS AND DAMAGE		6,582,140.00
FARM PASTURE LOSS AND DAMAGE		1,432,250.00
BUSINESS STRUCTURES DESTROYED	42	107,000.00
BUSINESS STRUCTURE DAMAGED	345	1,194,400.00
BUSINESS STOCKS DAMAGED & DESTROYED		102,000.00
INDUSTRIAL PROPERTIES DESTROYED	7	559,300.00
INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY DAMAGED	110	8,714,000.00
PUBLIC BUILDINGS DESTROYED	2	128,000.00
PUBLIC BUILDINGS DAMAGED	19	50,000.00
PUBLIC SEWER SYSTEMS DAMAGE		697,420.00
WATER SYSTEM DAMAGE OR DESTROYED	9	442,030.00
POWER SYSTEMS DAMAGE OR DESTROYED	1	194,500.00
ROADS, MILES DAMAGED 708.8; DESTROYED	16	4,342,800.00
BRIDGES DAMAGED	55	269,660.00
BRIDGES DESTROYED	32	2,076,000.00
	GRAND TOTAL	\$43,675,490.00

OPERATION "WOODLAND" (CONT'D)

LOSSES BY CITIES AND COUNTIES

<u>COUNTY OR CITY</u>	<u>TOTAL LOSS</u>
DOUGLAS COUNTY	145,600.00
WENATCHEE, CHELAN COUNTY	160,000.00
CHELAN COUNTY	3,591,000.00
LONGVIEW, COWLITZ COUNTY	182,000.00
KELSO, COWLITZ COUNTY	696,000.00
WAHIAKUM COUNTY	536,000.00
BINGEN, KLICKITAT COUNTY	76,500.00
RIDGEFIELD, CLARKE COUNTY	134,000.00
WASHOUGAL, CLARKE COUNTY	659,000.00
CAMAS, CLARKE COUNTY	590,000.00
VANCOUVER, CLARKE COUNTY	3,645,000.00
CLARKE COUNTY	5,323,000.00
KALAMA, COWLITZ COUNTY	837,000.00
ELLENSBURG, KITTITAS COUNTY	259,000.00
KITTITAS COUNTY	560,500.00
PASCO, FRANKLIN COUNTY	850,000.00
COWLITZ COUNTY	4,122,000.00
OKANOGAN COUNTY	4,727,540.00
PEND OREILLE COUNTY	2,333,950.00
FRANKLIN COUNTY	180,000.00
WALLUA, WALLA WALLA COUNTY	326,000.00
TWISP, OKANOGAN COUNTY	247,000.00
WINTHROP, OKANOGAN COUNTY	172,800.00
ELMER CITY, OKANOGAN COUNTY	67,200.00
CONCONULLY, OKANOGAN COUNTY	13,800.00
PATEROS, OKANOGAN COUNTY	79,500.00
WOODLAND & VICINITY, COWLITZ COUNTY	7,159,000.00
YAKIMA COUNTY	1,164,000.00
OROVILLE, OKANOGAN COUNTY	68,000.00
OMAK, OKANOGAN COUNTY	155,650.00
OKANOGAN, OKANOGAN COUNTY	258,660.00
RIVERSIDE, OKANOGAN COUNTY	11,000.00
TONASKET, OKANOGAN COUNTY	40,000.00
PUGET ISLAND, WAHIAKUM COUNTY	3,200,000.00

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES
 HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
 WASHINGTON, D. C.

June 15, 1948 AIR MAIL

Dear General Llewellyn:

Thank you for forwarding to me the survey of damages caused by the recent floods in the State of Washington. It has been most helpful in presenting to Federal agencies and the Congress the need for all possible and proper forms of assistance in rehabilitation of the stricken area.

I am enclosing for your information copy of recent release in which I outlined generally to people of my own district the manner in which Federal resources were being made available in the emergency. Most of this information will be well known to you.

OPERATION "WOODLAND" (CONT'D)

Since that time, there has been enacted S. J. Res. 231, authorizing use of ten million dollars by the Federal Housing and Home Finance Agency for emergency housing in the Portland-Vancouver area. The House Appropriations Committee today reported out a deficiency bill containing three items of flood-relief, which probably will be enacted within two or three days. They are:

1. To the President's Disaster Relief fund, an additional \$500,000 to be spent as he sees fit;
2. To the Army Engineers, for emergency repair of flood control works, \$6,000,000; and,
3. To the Agriculture Department's Forest Service, for repair and construction of forest highways, roads, trails and bridges, \$15,000,000.

There is still under consideration, awaiting a Budget Bureau estimate from the Administration, release of some \$1,400,000 in funds for grants or loans to farmers for feed, seed and fertilizer for crop losses, together with possible increase in these funds. I still hope the Administration request will come to Congress in time for action this week.

The above amounts, added to emergency funds of the Public Roads Administration, Reconstruction Finance Corporation, Rural Rehabilitation Corporations and other Federal agencies, now bring to about sixty million dollars the amount of US aid potentially available for the Northwest area. Actual allocation, of course, is left entirely up to the various Administrative agencies concerned, who will use it in collaboration with State, County and local agencies according to local estimates of need and the precedents established for Federal assistance in such disasters.

It should be pointed out that long-standing precedent generally limits Federal relief to areas stricken by disasters of nature to the provision of emergency equipment, manpower and materials during the period of the emergency, the repair and replacement of structures which are Federal responsibility (such as dikes, ditches and the like) and loans to municipalities or businesses to help them get back on their feet. Such activities, through one agency or another, extend to practically every type of person struck by the disaster. The Federal Government has not in the past, however, undertaken to meet the responsibility for full reconstruction, which is basically a local and community problem.

The Members of the Oregon, Idaho, Montana and Washington delegations in Congress have met with full and complete cooperation with our own leadership and the heads of Federal agencies in expediting the several means of assistance. We have obtained action on every request forwarded to the Congress from the Administration for emergency funds or authorization of activities. As far as can be determined at this date, the various agencies have been given the necessary tools with which to do the job and, from reports received here, they have gone far beyond the call of duty in extending aid to every community in need.

In doing your job, we have been aided materially by the reports received, such as yours, estimates of personal and family losses from the American Red Cross, and other reports from county and local officials, including many photographs which have enabled us to show graphically to other Members of Congress what has happened in the Northwest.

You may be assured that we shall continue to obtain every proper means of assistance to the flood victims and all of us are proud of the reports we have seen of the wonderful, unselfish and untiring work done by so many thousands of people in the Northwest in fighting through this period of crises.

Sincerely,
(signed) Walt Horan
(typed) Walt Horan, M.C.

On 2 May 1949, by Executive Order, Brigadier General Ensley M. Llewellyn was relieved from the duties of Adjutant General and was replaced temporarily by Colonel Ellsworth C. French. then the senior officer of the Washington National Guard.

Colonel French was born in Ritzville, Washington on 15 March 1896. He was appointed 1st Lieutenant, Infantry, Washington National Guard on 1 June 1934. He was reappointed First Lieutenant in the Air Corps, Washington National Guard on 30 April 1935; Captain 23 December 1939; Major February 1942; Lieutenant Colonel 28 July 1943; and Colonel on 7 June 1946. He served as The Acting Adjutant General until 31 July 1949 when he was replaced by Colonel Lilburn H. Stevens, who was appointed The Adjutant General with the rank of Brigadier General on 1 August 1949.

General Stevens was born in Liberal, Kansas on 21 September 1902, and began his career in the United States Army on 18 January 1918. He served overseas with the 28th Infantry Division, participating in the Champagne-Marne, Aisne-Marne, Oise-Aisne and Meuse-Argonne campaigns. He was honorably discharged from WW I service on 4 June 1919. He later served in the US Marine Corps from 7 September 1920 to 16 July 1921.

He first entered the Washington National Guard as a private in the 41st Tank Company in Centralia on 18 April 1924. He received his original commission as a Second Lieutenant, Infantry on 21 March 1930. He was promoted to First Lieutenant on 11 April 1934, but resigned his commission to accept a position as Federal Caretaker. He was reappointed a First Lieutenant, Infantry on 1 January 1936 and to Captain on 1 April 1937. He was inducted into World War II service on 22 January 1941 as Executive Officer of the 103rd Anti-Tank Battalion, Washington National Guard.

He served overseas from 10 December 1944 until 28 November 1945, participating in the Rhineland and Central European Campaigns. Following his relief from active duty on 27 February 1946 he remained inactive until 18 March 1947 when he was appointed Lieutenant Colonel, Infantry and assumed command of the 803rd Tank Battalion, of the Washington National Guard. Following active duty with the Sixth United States Army at San Francisco, California, he returned to Washington to accept an appointment as Adjutant General. He was promoted to Major General on 17 May 1955 and served as The Adjutant General until 15 November 1957 when he was replaced by the present Adjutant General, George M. Haskett. General Stevens reverted to the grade of Colonel of Selective Service Detachment, from which position and grade he vacated on 31 January 1959 per voluntary retirement.

Following World War II the Washington National Guard was housed in pre-WWII buildings at Aberdeen, Bellingham, Centralia, Everett, Olympia, Pullman, Seattle, Spokane, Tacoma, Walla Walla, Yakima and at Felts Field in Spokane. Units also occupied rental facilities at Snohomish, Wenatchee, Bremerton, Kelso, Mt Vernon and Port Angeles.

With the increase in the strength of the Washington National Guard following World War II, plans envisaged the location of new armories as follows:

ANACORTES	EVERETT	PULLMAN	CHEWELAH
ABERDEEN-HOQUIAM	GEIGER FIELD	PUYALLUP	CAMAS
AUBURN	GRAND COULEE	RAYMOND	OROVILLE
BELLINGHAM	KELSO-LONGVIEW	RENTON	EPHRATA
BREMERTON	KENT	SHELTON	POULSBO
CAMP MURRAY	KIRKLAND	SNOHOMISH	GRAY FIELD
CENTRALIA-CHEHALIS	MT. VERNON	SPOKANE	BOEING FIELD
CLARKSTON	OKANOGAN-OMAK	TACOMA	TOPPENISH
COLFAX	OLYMPIA	VANCOUVER	
DAYTON	PASCO-KENNEWICK	WALLA WALLA	
EDMONDS	PORT ANGELES	WENATCHEE	
ELLENSBURG	PORT ORCHARD	YAKIMA	

CHAPTER III

UNITED STATES OCCUPATION IN POST WORLD WAR II PERIOD

Before writing about the occupation of Germany and Japan it might be well to digress and study a little of the history of Germany, Japan and Korea, before World War II. Of interest is the fact that all three of the nations had their beginning in China or Mongolia. According to early historians, the Koreans are first mentioned in Chinese history in the 11th century, B. C.; Japan in the Sixth Century, B. C.; and Germany in the 5th Century, B. C. No doubt, Japan existed centuries before this, but, there is no record of such. Similarly, the authentic history of Germany goes no further back than the beginning of the Christian era. Korea (Corea) or Chosen, as it is called by the natives, appears for the first time in Chinese history in 1122 B. C., and until Korea was taken from the Chinese by the Japanese in the Eighteenth Century, A. D., it was an integral part of the Chinese Empire.

Although early historians agree that China is older than any other far eastern nation (about 2205 B. C.) they fail to give us any account of the origin of the Chinese or Mongolian races. Some believe the original Chinese came from the region to the southeast of the Caspian Sea. However, historians also agree that the earliest evidence available in writing of the Chinese is during the period 1743 - 1710 B. C.

Authentic history of Germany goes no further back toward the origin of the German than the beginning of the Christian Era. Herodotus mentions the ancient German tribes of Cimabri and Teutones, who towards the close of the 2nd Century, B. C., burst out of their northern forests and precipitated themselves on Roman territory, and left behind them no other record than the ravaged fields of Italy and Gaul and the decaying heaps of their own slain in the vast slaughters of Aquae, Sextiae and Vercellae. Perhaps not less than three thousand years, B. C., the Aryan or Indo-European division of the human family were concentrated in Central Asia. Some occupied the western part of Bactria (Ancient Asia). To the southwest were the Pelasgic tribes, the ancestors of the Greek and Italians, whose advance guard, the Celts, are supposed to have first moved westward taking the route south of the Oxus River in Central Asia. At an early period these two great races crossed the Oxus and spread themselves over the plains of Scythia (ancient area of Europe-Asia). Here they probably remained for many centuries before moving into their present area in Europe,

They had some knowledge of agriculture and possessed horses, oxen, sheep, pigs, goats, dogs and other domestic animals. Oxen and horses were placed on the yoke, and were also harnessed to wheeled vehicles, but there is no evidence that these nomads were acquainted with the art of riding on the backs of horses. Gold, silver and bronze were known to them, but the race had not yet become iron-workers. Their weapons were lances, javelins and arrows, and for defense the buckler or shield was generally in use. Of the sword they seem to have been ignorant. Unlike the Scythians of the same general region who lived in wagons and tents, they knew how to build fixed habitations, which inclosed the family hearth and were provided with doors and roofs. The food consisted mainly of grain ground into flour and the flesh of animals, and they employed salt as a condiment. They also learned to construct small vessels for service on the water. These boats were propelled by paddles or oars, for they had not reached knowledge of the use of masts and sails.

The periodic revolutions of the moon furnished them an imperfect standard of time measurement, and they were acquainted with the decimal scheme of numeration. The basis of all social organization was the family. Marriage was a consecration and was preceded by betrothal. After the marriage, which was celebrated by the joining of hands and the pronouncing of a certain formula, the father of the bride presented a cow to his son-in-law, and the wife was conducted to the abode of her husband.

Naturally the union of families descended from the same stock which produced the tribe, at whose head was the patriarch, or chief. The head of the tribe administered justice and in doubtful cases was referred to the judgement of God. This was the origin of the "ordeal". There were two forms of ordeal by fire. In one the accused was made to pass through a trench filled with live coals, and if not burned was declared innocent. In the other, he was compelled to carry a red-hot lance head or ball of

metal a certain distance and without injury to himself. or suffer the penalty of guilt. In the judgement by water, a ring was thrown into boiling water and the accused was required to take it out without being scalded, or he was thrown into a pond of cold water and if he floated without effort he was decided to be guilty. Both forms of the ordeal by water were practiced by the Germans in the name of the Merovingian kings (4th Century A. D.)

Tacitus, a Roman, in describing the Germans indicated they were aboriginal, a pure and unmixed race of people. They were wide and strong in chest; the hair of adults was yellow and that of the young children was dazzling white. Their skin was white and they had blue eyes, which were bold and piercing. With large powerful bodies, they possessed great strength. Tacitus further stated that the bodies of their youth were hardened by all the means within their reach. Infants were dipped in cold water immediately after birth, and the cold bath was used as a strength renewer by both sexes through life. He further stated that their principle vice at times seemed to have been the immoderate use of liquor, which they brewed from fermented barley or wheat. They had few public spectacles; these consisted mainly of dancing by bands of young men among pointed swords and javelins. Funerals among them was conducted with simplicity. The funeral pile was made of wood, the arms of the deceased was committed to the flames with his body and sometimes his horse was sacrificed. To adopt the quarrels of relatives was held to be an indispensable duty.

Physically there seems to have been a marked difference between the mode of life of the nations characterized as "Suevi", (confederation of Germanic tribes) who inhabited the highlands in the interior, and those who dwelt in the lowlands near the coast. The Suevi had early banded themselves together in a union, the purposes of which were distinctively those of war and conquest. Their love of arms was assiduously cultivated and they were essentially a race of warriors. Their lands were held in common and were divided yearly by the leaders among their followers, no one being permitted to retain the same allotment for two consecutive years. This arose from their antipathy to agriculture, which it was believed would destroy the desire for war and glory. War was carried on systematically by a division of the men into hundreds, half of whom each year took the field under their chiefs, while the other half remained at home to superintend the cultivation of the soil. In the following year an exchange of employment was made and the farmers became warriors while the fighting men of last year took charge of the fields and flocks. In the lowlands near the coast the tribes had made agriculture a regular occupation, and they lived in settled dwellings. Their farms were marked by boundaries, usually a hedge and a bank of earth. Nobles, freemen, freedmen, or peasants, and slaves composed the body politic of all divisions of the race. Such legislation as existed was under the control of the nobles and freemen. The freedmen were permitted to bear arms but they were excluded from participation in legislation and government. The slaves were at the absolute disposal of their masters, and in law were classed with the beasts. Originally the nobles appear to have been selected from among the freemen, because of conspicuous valor or the possession of great wealth in herds and flocks. Among the Saxon peoples, whose wars at first were chiefly of a defensive character, a common general was required only while the conflict lasted, while among the Suevi, whose principal business was war, generals with the title of King are found at an early date.

When a common danger threatened the people formed themselves into a confederation, at the head of which was the most powerful tribe. Unless called together by a sudden alarm, the assemblies of the people were held either at the time of the new or full moon. All the members of the assembly took part in the proceedings and when any proposition not agreeable to them was made, it was rejected with a general murmur of disapproval approval was expressed by brandishing their javelins and by shouts. The punishment for treason or desertion was hanging on a tree, but the coward, or one convicted of an infamous crime was plunged into a bog and was suffocated.

On of the noble characteristics of these early Germans was their proud and independent spirit, which frequently led them to suicide for the purpose of escaping captivity. The favorite occupation of the men was war. Their shields, constructed of wood, were painted with gaudy colors, and their helmets were often made to resemble the open mouths of wild beasts or other fear inspiring forms. The

formation for battle was in the shape of a wedge, somewhat, after the manner of the Macedonian Phalanx, or in a square. Among the horse companies were distributed the most agile footman, who in rapid evolutions, seized the horses by the mane, and were able to maintain the speed of the horsemen. In the Infantry, however, lay the main strength of their armies. In action relatives fought side by side, thus inciting each other to more heroic deeds. Before going into battle and while advancing upon the enemy, they sang war-songs relating the deeds of their ancestors and the celebrity of their fatherland. Among their musical instruments were drums and also horns made of brass or fashioned from those of the wild bull. There was no loss of honor in retreating, but to lose one's shield was held to be an inexpressible disgrace.

With the foregoing background of Germany's war like nature and the fact that for some eighteen centuries almost continuous wars between themselves and adjacent states have been fought, it is little wonder that the Post World War II directives issued by the victorious nations for Germany would insure that she never become a menace to the world again.

According to early legends numerous deities play a conspicuous part in the ancient history of Japan, the country itself being styled the "land of gods" and the pedigree of the sovereign traced back to TENSO DAIJIN, the "Sun Goddess". It is asserted that there first existed seven generations of "heavenly deities", who in turn were succeeded by five generations of "earthly deities", who in turn were followed by the mortal sovereigns of whom the present MIKADO (1880) or Emperor is the 122nd. The earliest date accepted amongst the Japanese themselves corresponds to 660 B. C., when the first Emperor (Jimmu) succeeded the throne. The present year (1881) is thus the 2541st year of the Japanese era. The long line of sovereigns comprises one hundred and eleven emperors and eleven reigning empresses. A strong ground for disbelieving the accuracy of ancient Japanese chronology even after 660 B. C., is the extraordinary longevity assigned by it to the early Mikados. Of the fifteen emperors from Jimmu onwards, eleven are said to have lived considerably over one hundred years; one of them, Suinin, reached the age of one hundred and forty one years, while his successor Keiko attained to one hundred and forty three. After the year 399 A. D., however, these wonderful assertions are no longer made. From the commencement of the 10th century the Japanese are more to be trusted, and, although, many discrepancies no doubt exist, still the events recorded are generally accepted as authentic.

The precise origin of the Japanese race is by no means easy to determine, and it would seem probable that it is amalgamation of several different races. The present Aino tribes of the Island of Yezo (Hokkaido) are supposed to be descendents of the ancient aborigines of the empire. These aborigines, or "savages" as Japanese historians style them, were first spread over by far the greater portion of the country, but were gradually driven towards the north by an opposing race who advanced from the southwest. This latter race, the ancestors of the present true Japanese people are by some writers supposed to have been of Chinese origin; and Japanese annals certainly make mention of such a colony as founded during the reign of the seventh emperor, Korei (290-215 B. C.). It is, however, beyond all doubt that the Malay tribes are also represented in the Japanese people, and history further notes an invasion by "black savages" which would seem to point to the natives of Papua or New Guinea. From the relative positions of Japan and Corea (Korea), too, it seems probable that some of the inhabitants of the latter place may have also crossed the narrow seas dividing them from Tsushima and the main island of Japan. Ethnologists are not unanimous in their opinions on these points, but it is generally conceded, that there did exist an ancient indigenous race, who were subsequently subjugated and driven towards the north by certain tribes advancing from the southwest. Thus, in early history of Japan we find that Kioto (Kyoto) and the provinces immediately around it were occupied by the conquerors, from whom descended the modern Japanese; while the aboriginal tribes were with difficulty restrained and kept up in the eastern and northern regions.

The MIKADO himself dwelt in Kioto, with his court. The nobles composing the court were styled KUGE, and were themselves descended from cadet branches of the imperial family. There was

but one sovereign, and to him the whole empire owed allegiance; he lived in extremely simple style both as regards to food and dress, and rode out to the chase surrounded by his retainers. But the inroads of the savages on the eastern borders necessitated constant and vigilant measures for their repression. In such expeditions, however, no special class of generals was created; everything was ordered in the name of the MIKADO himself, or in some cases an imperial prince acted as his representative, so that in no instance did the power even appear to pass from the hands of the sovereign. In the Middle ages, however, the Chinese military system was adopted as a model, and generals were appointed; the able-bodied males in each province were formed into distinct military corps and men were told off according to the muster-rolls to garrison the capital or to guard the frontiers. Expeditions were carefully organized, being placed under a general (SHOGUN), who was assisted by subordinate officers. All weapons of war and other appliances were kept in the military stores, and issued as occasion required; when warlike operations were suspended, the arms were returned to the stores for safe keeping. As time passed on the powerful family of Fujiwara began to exercise the administrative power, hereditarily, in virtue of its relationship to the throne by the female side, and it then became the usage that high descent should be the only qualification for office. The rank and title of general were constantly conferred on the two rival clans of REI and GEN, or TAIRA and MINAMOTO, as they were also termed. Upon this there first arose the expression "military class" and during the period 770-780 the complete severance of the agricultural class and the soldiery took place. From this time onwards the military domination acquired yearly greater strength, while the power of the MIKADO decreased in proportion. The turbulent common people of the provinces of Oshiu, Dewa, and the Kwantu were always in the possession of armor and horses, and openly styled themselves "warriors". In the 10th and 11th centuries the clans of Taira and Minamoto increased in warlike power and influence, became deadly rivals and virtually ruled the whole country, all the inhabitants owing fealty to one or the other of the two factions. A terrible civil war ensued, extending from, the middle to the end of the 12th Century, when the Taira clan was annihilated by its rivals, who thereupon seized the supremacy. They in their turn succumbed and were succeeded by others, down to the last dynasty (that of the Tokugawa family), which existed from 1603 till 1868. All this time the MIKADOS were in reality merely puppets swayed at will by the military faction in power at the time; the ancient state of affairs was overthrown, and the sovereign was kept a prisoner at his palace in Kyoto. In 1868, however, the revolution shattered the might of the then ruling clan of Tokugawa, the restoration of the MIKADO was effected, and the present position of the sovereign (1881) is at last almost similar to what it was in the very ancient times.

Just as Germany has for centuries been a menace to all European countries, Japan has attempted to emulate their co-partners in World War II. Thus strict Post-War directives were necessary for Japan to insure peace in the Far East. However, developments since World War II have brought about what appears to be permanent occupation of both Germany and Japan.

As previously stated at the beginning of this Chapter, Korea (Corea) until the 18th century was a part of China and in 1122 BC was an asylum for the Chinese refugee, the Viscount of Ke. Neither at that time, nor for centuries afterward, does it appear to have formed a political unity, various states as Hwuy, Chinhan, Pih-tse, and Sin-lo being mentioned in the Chinese records. In the first century of our era three of these states stand out as important: Kao-li in the north and northeast, Pih-tse in the west, and Sin-lo in the south. Out of the civil wars which fill the next ten hundred years, Sin-lo emerges predominant; but in the 11th century the King of Kao-li, known as Wang-kian, or Wang the Founder, united the whole peninsula under his sway, and established the dynasty which has given the name to the country. The fall of the Mongolian dynasty in China brought about a similar revolution in Corea; and in 1392 Tai-tso or Li-tan became the founder of the present dynasty of Tsi-tsien, and the author of the system of administration still in force (1890). The Chinese at that time imposed on the Coreans the use of their chronology and calendar.

Under Siong-siong, who held the throne from 1506 to 1544, the Coreans, carried on a war with Japan, but in 1597 the great Japanese monarch Taiko-sama retaliated by a remarkable invasion. According to the journal of O-o-gawutsi, a Japanese general who took part in the expedition, the force

consisted of 163,000 horsemen; three fourths of the country was occupied and several of the oldest cities destroyed, in spite of the fact that two Chinese kings appeared to assist the Koreans with a force of 100,000 horsemen. The death of Taiko-sama in 1598 led the Japanese to abandon their conquest; and in 1615 peace was definitely signed, but only on conditions of great hardships for the Koreans. A tribute was exacted and the fort of Fuson-kai (Puson) was retained; and the Korean king until 1790 had to send an embassy to Japan to announce his accession. When the Manchu dynasty ascended the throne of China, the Koreans defended the Mings; but being defeated by the new power, they had in 1637 to formally recognize the Manchu sovereignty, and to pay henceforward a heavy annual tribute. Since 1636 there has been no war with China or Japan (written about 1890); and the Koreans have maintained in regard to every other nation the most absolute isolation.

Two earlier wars were fought over Korea, the Sino-Japanese War of 1895-95 and the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05. Japan won both of these encounters and established a protectorate over Korea after the latter war and completely annexed it in 1910. Until Korea was liberated following World War II, it was an integral part of the Japanese Empire.

It may be recalled from Volume VI of our history, that the troops of the 41st Infantry Division were called upon to perform occupation duties in Japan following the United States victory in 1945. In view of this it would appear appropriate to examine United States policies with respect to occupying the countries of the vanquished.

During hostilities the United States has always had to exercise some degree of civilian control in the combat and occupied areas. In the Mexican War of 1847, the civil affairs actions of General Winfield Scott contributed to the success of his campaigns, and after the Civil War the Army was not relieved of its military government responsibilities until 1877. In the Spanish-American War the army continued long after the military operations were terminated, extended from the Caribbean to the South China Sea, and resulted in the creation of the Bureau of Insular Affairs (later transferred to the Department of the Interior) in the War Department to deal with the problems of occupation. Although they extended over a period of five years, military government responsibilities of World War I involved a limited territory only and presented relatively few problems. It was this experience, however, that prompted civil affairs courses at the Army War College where student-officers committees prepared several civil affairs manuals and recommended the publication of an official training manual for military government. Early in 1940, The Judge Advocate General was directed to prepare FM 27-5, Military Government, which was published one year before the entry of the United States into World War II.

Shortly after Pearl Harbor the Army started training officers for civil affairs duties, an action prompted by British experience with the civil affairs problems in East Africa.

On 11 May 1942, the School of Military government opened at the University of Virginia at Charlottesville, with student body of 49 officers who were graduated 4 months later - in time for a few of them to participate in the invasion of North Africa. Thereafter civil affairs training was extended to 11 other universities throughout the country. By August 1945 more than 7,000 officers had received this special training.

The North African campaign demonstrated that in areas occupied and liberated by the Army the commander had to assume foreign policy executive authority. This campaign also proved the need for a War Department agency to coordinate United States Policy, both within, the several executive agencies and with our allies. As a result, the Civil Affairs Division of the War Department was established on 1 March 1943. This was followed by the creation within a year of an elaborate national and international system of committees to insure that coordinated United States and Allied civil affairs policy directives were sent to theater commanders. On the United States side were the Joint Civil Affairs Committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Working Security Committee (State, War & Navy), and the State, War, Navy Coordinating Committee (later designated the State - Army - Navy - Air Force Coordinating Committee). In March 1946, a new assistant secretary-ship (office of Occupied Areas) was created in the Department of State to take the lead in formation of occupation policy. On the Allied side, there was first established the Combined Civil Affairs Committee of the Combined Chiefs of Staff and later the

European Advisory Commission. In addition to the policy determinations of these committees numerous major policy decisions were made by the heads of state, both at personal conferences and by diplomatic communications exchanged between Washington, London and Moscow.

In the theaters, civil affairs responsibilities were discharged by civil affairs staff sections and teams of civil affairs operating personnel. Although there were variations between commands, civil affairs were, generally a special staff function at division level, and a general staff, (G-5) function at corps, army, army group and theater level. The civil affairs operating unit used depended on the government subdivision of the occupied or liberated area for which the unit was charged with responsibility. The staff division remained with its headquarters as the troops advanced. Ordinarily the operating teams (the spearhead detachments) accompanied the forward elements of regimental combat teams, with support teams deployed behind them to relieve them of area responsibility; these detachments would thereafter remain in place with command of the detachment generally shifting from division to corps and to army as soon as those headquarters assumed responsibility for the areas controlled by the detachments.

By the end of hostilities the Army had civil affairs sections functioning in all theaters. In North Africa the Army shared the civil affairs responsibility with several executive agencies of the Government; chiefly as a result of lessons learned there, henceforth the Army was the sole executive agency in liberated and occupied territories.

In Italy, an ex-enemy nation, the Army first exercised military government control which was progressively changed to a civil affairs and liaison operation, as the Germans were pushed up the Italian boot.

The Allied forces moved into France, Luxembourg, Belgium and the Netherlands, and finally Norway, under civil affairs agreements with the governments-in-exile or with the military leaders. These agreements provided for a civil affairs and liaison operation, but gave the commander power to institute military government control if the situation required. Actually, it was unnecessary to institute military government in any of these liberated territories.

Because of the sparsely settled areas, civil affairs in the Far East did not present many major problems until the Philippines were reached, where the operation may be described appropriately as military aid to the civil power; civil government representatives accompanied the troops and control of the country passed to them as the Japs were driven out.

In China, civil, affairs operations were relatively minor in scale.

While the operational aspects of civil affairs and military government were largely the function of the Army, major responsibility for high-level policy making in the occupied areas was carried by the Department of State. It originally had been contemplated that the entire military government operation would be transferred to the Department of State soon after the end of the war. However, this transfer was indefinitely postponed.

As a result of the Potsdam Agreement (August 1945) Germany's boundaries were established to include all the pre-war (1939) Germany west of the Oder-Neisse line. German nationals, expelled from East Prussia, the area incorporated by Poland east of the Oder-Neisse; Hungary, and Czechoslovakia moved into the present borders of Germany, significantly increasing its population density.

There being no central government in Germany following VE-day, the commanders- in-chief (military governors) of the occupying powers were each vested with supreme authority in their respective zones and joint authority, through the Control Council, in matters affecting the country as a whole. Immediately subordinate to the Control Council, and functioning as its executive arm was the Coordinating Committee. The following individuals constituted these agencies in July 1948.

CONTROL COUNCIL

United States	Lucius D. Clay
United Kingdom	Gen. Sir Brian Robertson
USSR	Marshal Vassily D. Sokolovsky
France	General Pierre Koenig

COORDINATING COMMITTEE

United States	Major General G. P. Hays
United Kingdom	Major General W. C. D. Brownjohn
USSR	Lt. Gen. M. I. Dratvin
France	Major General Roger Noiret

Quadrupartite discussions and negotiations in specific fields took place in the control staff, consisting of 10 directorates; Political, Legal, Economic, Finance, Manpower, Transport, Internal Affairs, and Communications, Combined Services (military, naval and air), Reparations Deliveries and Restitution, and Prisoners of War and Displaced Persons. The rule of unanimity required in the Control Authority frequently thwarted action with the result that the zonal commanders practically functioned independently.

Greater Berlin was under joint four power control and divided for purposes of occupation into four sectors. The four commandants, approved their respective Commanders-in-Chief, served in rotation Chief Commandant, but decisions required unanimity.

Because of quadrupartite failure to implement the Potsdam Agreement in treating Germany as a single economic unit, the United States on 20 July 1946 proposed an economic fusion of its zone with all or any other zones. As a result, the British and United States effected an economic union of their two zones on 1 January 1947. The bi-zonal area was supervised by the Bipartite Board (United States and United Kingdom Governors), and the Bipartite Control Office in Frankfurt. Occupation costs originally borne equally by the United States and the United Kingdom have been largely assumed by the United States which has gained correspondingly increased economic and financial control.

According to the Potsdam Agreement and a Joint Chiefs of Staff directive of May 1945, occupation forces were ordered to destroy Germany's military power and prevent its revival. Land, naval, and air forces were disbanded; more than eight million men were either discharged or transferred to the custody of the allied powers; and practically all military installations and war material were either destroyed or otherwise disposed of.

The prevention of a rebuilding of German military power involved surveillance; prohibition of planning or construction of military installations, and the manufacture, import and transport of war materials; control of scientific research, capital reparations to countries which suffered by Nazi aggression; and establishing a level of industry easily convertible to military use.

At London in August 1945, the four powers established an International Military Tribunal to conduct war crimes trials. It was declared a crime against society to wage a war of aggression, to persecute minorities on political, racial, or religious grounds, or to exterminate, enslave, or deport civilian populations. The 22 principal Nazis were tried at Nuremberg during the period November 1945-September 1946. Twelve military tribunals were established with United States civilian judges designated by the President and appointed by the Military Governor to continue trials of major war criminals in the United States Zone. As of 31 May 1948, the following was the status of Denazification operations:

	NUMBER	PERCENT
**TOTAL REGISTRANTS	12,797,703	100.0
Not chargeable cases.	9,467,073	74.0
Total chargeable cases	3,330,630	26.0
Chargeable cases completed	3,238,923	25.3
Amnestied without trial.....	2,373,115	18.5
Trials completed.	865,808	6.8

Chargeable cases to be completed	91,707	0.7
By trial.	31,707	0.2
By expediting process	60,000	0.5

** Source: Information Bulletin, Magazine of the US Government in Germany No. 146

The first actions of the military government were concerned with the immediate significance of physical devastation; Lack of water, food, fuel, transportation, and maintenance of public health and safety. United States authorities then faced the broader economic implications of establishing a self-supporting economy, with physical controls designed to prevent a resurgent military-industrial machine. The Quadripartite Reparations and Level of Industry Plan (March 1946) which set up rigid production limits was modified by the United States and the United Kingdom in the Bizonal Revised Level of Industry plan of 29 August 1947. The objective of the revised plan was to make the bizonal area self-supporting, with production levels at about 75% of 1936 output. By August 1948, Bizonal production had reached 43% of 1936 production.

Pre-war Germany produced about 80% of the food consumed. To 1948, postwar food production in the highly industrialized Bizonal area had not risen above 65% of pre-war production; lack of fertilizer, seeds and agricultural machinery aggravated the problem.

Under Nazism all political parties, with the exception of NSDAP, were abolished.

The press was controlled, anti-Jewish laws enacted, States rights revoked, a German church was created, rearmament and aggression began, and foreign labor was imported and overran countries.

Grand Admiral Karl Doenitz proclaimed himself fuehrer on 1 May 1945, announcing that Hitler had fallen.

After Germany's surrender on 8 May 1945, a central German Government ceased to exist. The occupation authorities governed through military government based upon the following Surrender Terms:

SURRENDER OF GERMANY - WORLD WAR II

The following is the text of the surrender terms signed at Reims, France at 0241 hours on 7 May 1945:

"1. We, the undersigned, acting by authority of the German High Command, hereby surrender unconditionally to the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, and simultaneous to the Soviet High Command, all forces on land, sea and in the air who are at this date under German control.

2. The German High Command will at once issue orders to all German military, naval, and air authorities and to all forces under German control to cease active operations at 2301 hours (11:01 PM) Central European Time on 8 May and to remain in the positions occupied at the time. No ship, vessel, or aircraft is to be scuttled, or any damage done to their hull, machinery, or equipment.

. The German High Command will at once issue to the appropriate commanders and insure they carry out any further orders issued by the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, and by the Soviet High Command.

4. This Act of Military Surrender is without prejudice to, and will be superseded by, and general instrument of surrender imposed by, or on behalf of, the United Nations and applicable to Germany and the German Armed Forces as a whole.

5. In the event of the German High Command or any other forces under their control failing to act in accordance with this Act of Surrender, the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force and the Soviet High Command will take such punitive or other action as they deem appropriate."

Colonel General Gustav Jodl signed the document on behalf of the German High Command.

Lieutenant General W. Bedell Smith; United States Army, signed on behalf of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force; General Ivan Susloparov signed on behalf of the Soviet High Command; and General Francois Sevez signed on behalf of the French.

Following the surrender, occupation authorities established indigenous local governments in their respective zones. Each zone was composed of a number of administrative units called "laender". The laender was subdivided administratively into rural counties, larger cities and municipalities. Berlin was subdivided into 20 boroughs. At the outset of the occupation, German officials at all levels were appointed by the Military Government. On 20 October 1946, the voters of Berlin elected representatives to the city assembly and borough assemblies. These representatives subsequently elected an executive council. Thus began the return of a German government and the democratization of the German people. The rehabilitation of Austria followed the German structures.

In many respects the occupation of Japan was similar to Germany. Based upon the following directives, Japan was stripped of possessions gained by conquest and was limited to the four main islands of Honshu, Kyushu, Shikoku and Hokkaido plus a few minor islands. This reduced their population by about 50%, i.e., from about 172 million to about 81 million:

DIRECTIVE TO THE SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS

In accordance with the agreement among the Governments of the United States, Chinese Republic, United Kingdom, and Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to designate a Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers for the purpose of enforcing the surrender of Japan, you are hereby designated as the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. (General Douglas MacArthur designated)

You will require the issuance of a proclamation signed by the Emperor authorizing his representatives to sign the instrument of surrender. The proclamation to be signed should be substantially in the form appended hereto. You will take the necessary steps to require and receive from the duly authorized representatives of the Japanese Emperor, the Japanese Government, and the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters the signed instrument of surrender. The text of the instrument of surrender is appended hereto. You will accept the surrender for the four governments concerned and in the interests of the other United Nations at war with Japan.

I have asked the heads of state of China, Great Britain and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics each to designate a representative who may be present with you at the time and place of surrender. I have designated Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz to be present as the United States representative for this purpose. As soon as I have received the other designations you will be advised. You will make the appropriate arrangements.

Having accepted the general surrender of Japanese armed forces, you will require the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters to issue general orders which will instruct Japanese commanders wherever situated as to the mechanics of surrender, and other details effectuating the surrender. You will effect any necessary coordination of arrangements with the Japanese Imperial Headquarters with regard to the surrenders to the Allied Commanders concerned of Japanese armed forces abroad.

From the moment of surrender the authority of the Emperor and Japanese government to rule the state will be subject to you and you will take such steps as you deem necessary to effectuate the surrender terms.

You will exercise supreme command over all land, sea and air forces which may be allocated for enforcement in Japan of the surrender terms by the Allied Powers concerned.

Your appointment as Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers is effective upon receipt of this directive.

Enclosures:

1. Proclamation
2. Instrument of Surrender

(Signed) Harry S. Truman

PROCLAMATION BY THE EMPEROR OF JAPAN

Accepting the terms set forth in the Declaration issued by the heads of the Governments of the United States, Great Britain and China on July 26, 1945, at Potsdam and subsequently adhered to by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, I have commanded the Japanese Imperial Government and the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters to sign on my behalf the instrument of surrender presented by the Supreme Commander for the Allied powers and to issue General Orders to the Military and Naval forces in accordance with the directive of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. I command all my people forthwith to cease hostilities, to lay down their arms faithfully to carry out all the provisions of the instrument of Surrender and the General Orders issued by the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters thereunder.

INSTRUMENT OF SURRENDER

We, acting by command of and in behalf of the Emperor of Japan, the Japanese Government and the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters, hereby accept the provisions set forth in the declaration issued by the heads of the Governments of the United States, China and Great Britain on 26 July 1945 at Potsdam, and subsequently adhered to by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which four powers are hereafter referred to as the Allied Powers.

We hereby proclaim the unconditional surrender to the Allied Powers of the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters and of all Japanese armed forces and all armed forces under Japanese control wherever situated.

We hereby command all Japanese forces wherever situated and the Japanese people to cease hostilities forthwith, to preserve and save from damage all ships, aircraft, and military and civil property and to comply with all requirements which may be imposed by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers or by agencies of the Japanese Government at his direction.

We hereby command the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters to issue at once orders to the Commanders of all Japanese forces and all forces under Japanese control wherever situated to surrender unconditionally themselves and all forces under their control.

We hereby command all civil, military and naval officials to obey and enforce all proclamations, orders and directives deemed by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers to be proper to effectuate this surrender and issued by him or under his authority and we direct all such officials to remain at their posts and to continue to perform their non-combatant duties. Unless specifically relieved by him or under his authority.

We hereby undertake for the Emperor, the Japanese Government and their successors to carry out the provisions of the Potsdam Declaration in good faith, and to issue whatever orders and take whatever action may be required by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers or by any other designated representative of the Allied powers for the purpose of giving effect to that declaration.

We hereby command the Japanese Imperial Government and the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters at once to liberate all allied prisoners of war and civilian internees now under Japanese control and to provide for their protection, care and maintenance and immediate transportation to places as directed.

The authority of the Emperor and the Japanese Government to rule the state shall be subject to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers who will take such steps as he deems proper to effectuate these terms of surrender.

Signed at _____ at _____
on the _____ day of _____ 1945

By Command and in behalf of the Emperor of Japan
and the Japanese Government.

By Command and in behalf of the Japanese Imperial
General Headquarters.

Accepted at _____ at _____
on the _____ day _____ 1945
for the United States, Republic of China, United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,
and in the interests of the other United Nations at war with Japan.

United States Representative
Republic of China Representative
United Kingdom Representative
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Representative

The foregoing surrender agreement was signed aboard the U. S. S. MISSOURI in Tokyo Bay on 2 September 1945.

Foreign Minister Magoru Shigemitsu signed in behalf of the Japanese Emperor and General Yoshijiro Umezu signed for the Japanese Imperial General Staff.

General of the Army Douglas MacArthur signed as Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz for the United States; General Hsu Yung-Chang for China; Admiral Sir Bruce Fraser for the United Kingdom; Lieutenant General Kuzma Derevyanko for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics; General Sir Thomas Blamey for Australia; Lieutenant General L. H. Van Oyen for the Netherlands; Colonel L. V. M. Cosgrave for Canada; General Jacques Leclerc for France; and Air Marshal L. M. Isitt for New Zealand.

At the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers held on 27 December 1945, the Far Eastern Commission was created and included members from Australia, Canada, China, France, India, Netherlands, New Zealand, Philippines, United Kingdom, United States and the USSR. This commission was created to formulate the policies, principles and standards in conformity with which the fulfillment by Japan of her obligations would be accomplished. Far Eastern Commission decisions were to be made by majority vote, provided the representatives of the United States, United Kingdom, USSR and China all agreed.

Headquarters of this commission was located in Washington, D. C., from where policy decisions were to be transmitted to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP) via the United States Government in accordance with the Moscow Agreement. This commission held its first-meeting on 26 February 1946.

The Moscow Agreement also provided for the establishment of the Allied Council for Japan (ACJ) to consult with and advise SCAP on the implementation of the Terms of Surrender, occupation, and control of Japan, and directives supplementary thereto. The ACJ located in Tokyo was composed of SCAP (or his Deputy) as Chairman and United States member; one representative from USSR; one from China; and one representing jointly Great Britain, Australia, New Zealand and India.

General of the Army Douglas MacArthur was designated Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP) on 14 August 1945 with duties: To enforce Japanese fulfillment of Surrender Terms; to implement policy decisions issued by the Far Eastern Commission and interim policy decisions of the

United States Government; and to issue the necessary interim directives not covered by Far Eastern Commission policy.

The State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, later the State-Army-Navy-Air Force Coordinating Committee directive made it clear that the authority of the Emperor and the Japanese Government to rule the State was subordinate to SCAP and stated that the control of Japan should be exercised through the Japanese Government to the extent that such an arrangement produces satisfactory results.

To implement Allied policy, SCAP established the necessary Staff Sections to issue directives to the Japanese Government as required on prefectural and local levels. Military Government units of the Eighth U. S. Army performed the necessary supervisory functions.

The British Commonwealth Occupation Force (BCOF) composed of units from the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand was a part of the occupation forces under SCAP. The BCOF exercised military control of its Hiroshima area but military government remained the responsibility of United States units.

The Basic Initial Surrender Directive, approved by SWNCC and forwarded to SCAP on 8 November 1945 defined his authority, prescribed initial policies for the occupation and control of Japan and established two ultimate objectives: (1) To give the greatest possible assurance that Japan will not again become a menace to world peace; and (2) to permit her eventual admission as a responsible and peaceful member of the family of nations. Specifically the directive stated:

(a) Japan's sovereignty will be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and such minor outlying islands as may be determined, in accordance ... agreements to which the United States is or may be a party.

(b) Japan will be completely disarmed and demilitarized. The authority of the militarists and the influence of militarism will be totally eliminated from her political, economic and social life. Institutions expressive of the spirit of militarism and aggression will be vigorously suppressed.

(c) The Japanese people shall be encouraged to develop, a desire for individual liberties and respect for fundamental human rights, particularly the freedom of religion, assembly, speech and the press. They shall also be encouraged to form democratic and representative organizations.

(d) The Japanese people shall be afforded opportunity to develop themselves an economy which will permit the peacetime requirements of the population to be met. Persons charged by the Supreme Commander or appropriate United Nations agencies with being war criminals, including those charged with having visited cruelties upon United Nations prisoners or other nationals, shall be arrested, tried and, if convicted, punished.

On 19 June 1947, FEC issued a policy decision essentially confirming the United States directive. Later FEC directives were issued and covered a variety of subjects.

The directives covered Demobilization and Repatriation; Elimination of ultra-nationalistic elements; Apprehension and trial of war criminals; Economic rehabilitation; Prevention of disease and unrest; Food and agriculture; Rural land reform; Economic reforms; Labor reforms Industry and production; Foreign trade; and Reparations and political rehabilitation.

Prior to World War II, Japan was controlled by an oligarchy of Saibatsu militarists and bureaucrats. Under the "Prussian modeled" Imperial Constitution, all laws were sanctioned, war declared, peace made and treaties concluded through the Emperor. Through its ordinance power and ultimate control of finances, the Cabinet was able to render the Diet virtually impotent.

An initial directive of 4 October 1945 to the Japanese Government, a virtual "Bill of Rights" required the removal of restrictions on political, civil, and religious liberties and the ending of discrimination on grounds of race, nationality, creed or political opinion. This together with later directives called for the suspension of laws, decrees, orders, ordinances, and regulations effecting such restrictions, the abolition of all organizations created to carry out, enforce, or supervise these restrictions, removal from office and employment of certain high officials, prohibition of physical

punishment of all persons detained or imprisoned under the discriminatory statutes and the submission of a comprehensive report on action taken in compliance with the directive.

A new constitution promulgated on 3 November 1946 and effective 3 May 1947, established the framework for a representative democratic government. Sovereignty, formerly vested in the Emperor, now rests with the people. The constitution secures individual rights and prescribes the functions and relationships of the legislative, executive, and judicial branches, of government. It established a bicameral Diet, the sole law-making organ of the State, consisting of the House of Representatives (466 seats) and House of Councilors (250 seats). All members were elected by secret ballot. Executive power was fixed in the Cabinet with the Prime Minister at its head. The Prime Minister must be a member of the diet and is appointed by the Emperor after designation by the Diet. Judicial Power is vested in a Supreme Court and in inferior courts established by law. No extraordinary tribunal may be established nor may any executive organ or agency be given final judicial power. The Imperial institution survives only in the modified form with the Emperor even more restricted than the heads of state in most parliamentary governments. Drastic changes were also made in local government's public information media and in education.

The Surrender terms for Japan provided that Japanese troops north of the 38th parallel in Korea would surrender to Soviet forces and those to the south to the United States forces. While the United States did not intend this surrender arrangement to be a permanent division, the Soviet authorities' strict interpretation of their responsibilities has made it a barrier of this line agreed upon to effect the Japanese Surrender. However, the United States was charged with responsibility for military government since September 1945 a circumstance that resulted from United States adherence to Allied policy for Korea as established through war time and post-war Allied agreements.

By the Cairo Declaration of 1943, the United States, United Kingdom, and China joined in proclaiming their determination "that in due course Korea shall become free and independent". This pledge was reaffirmed in the Potsdam Declaration of 1945 with the USSR subscribing thereto. In the Moscow Agreement of December 1945, representatives of the United States, United Kingdom, and USSR agreed, with later adherence of China, upon the procedures for the establishment of an independent Korea including the establishment of a provisional democratic Korean government and the creation of a Joint Occupation Commission (representing the two occupying commands) to assist in setting up a provisional government.

Despite United States efforts to achieve the implementation of the Moscow Agreement, no provisional government was established. The Joint Commission held sessions both in 1946 and 1947, but was unable to reconcile conflicting US-USSR views. Finally, in recognition of the failure of bilateral efforts, the United States presented the whole problem of Korean Independence to the General Assembly of the United Nations on 17 September 1947, recommending that (1) occupying powers hold elections under UN observation in their respective areas not later than 31 March 1948 (2) the Korean Government thus established constitute its own security forces and arrange for the "early and complete withdrawal" of American and Soviet forces, and (3) the UN discharge its responsibilities in the problem through the establishment of a United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea (UNTCOK). Though opposed by the USSR, the United States proposal was approved, with some modifications, by the General Assembly on 14 November 1947.

United States authorities cooperated with UNTCOK in holding elections in South Korea on 10 May 1948. A National Assembly of 200 members was elected, met on 31 May 1948, and began the organization of a Korean Government. The United Nations observed election was never held in North Korea.

On 15 August 1948, the third anniversary of the liberation of Korea, the democratic Republic of Korea was established in formal ceremonies held at Seoul, the national capitol. With the establishment of this new government, formed by representatives of the Korean people, chosen in a free and democratic election held under the observation of United Nations representatives the United States

Army Military Government in Korea (USAMGIK) came to an end and the transfer of government began.

On 12 August 1948, the Department of State announced the appointment by President Truman of John J. Muccio as special representative to Korea with rank of Ambassador. On 26 August 1948 the President of the United States announced that he had instructed the Economic Cooperation Administrator to make preparations to take over within a few months responsibility for the United States economic aid program in Korea.

During the ensuing two years economic rehabilitation of Korea was undertaken to try and establish its prewar economy despite the division of the country. Food and agriculture programs were undertaken to alleviate shortages; land reform program was launched; industry and production revived; and foreign trade resumed; Koreanization of the Government was undertaken as well as efforts to keep the Korean people informed through increased output of daily newspapers; and education system was re-oriented to eliminate Japanese influence and instructors. Thus Korea was just beginning to rehabilitate itself when the North Koreans launched their attack from above the 38th parallel on 25 June 1950, driving the United Nations forces to the small perimeter in the Pusan area in July 1950.

CHAPTER IV

WASHINGTON NATIONAL GUARD IN THE KQREAN POLICE ACTION

On 1 August 1946, the States began building up the National Guard whose strength for fiscal year 1949 was set by The Congress at 350,000 for the Army National Guard and 49,500 for the Air National Guard. Although the assumption was that universal - military training would be adopted as the basis for a well-trained citizen army, actually the National Guard had to build up its strength by volunteers, a notable achievement in view of the fact that the Guard lacked instructors, equipment, and armories.

Following the passage of the National Security Act of 1947, the Secretary of Defense appointed the Committee of Civilian Components to make a "comprehensive, objective, and impartial study" of the civilian components of the Armed Forces. Assistant Secretary of the Army, Gordon Gray, was appointed chairman of the committee which submitted its report on 30 June 1948. The Committee pointed out that-

"The need for such any inquiry had been demonstrated by recurring dissatisfaction with the Reserve programs in the Congress, in the press, and among the Reserves themselves. The critics have charged that the Regular services have failed to accept the Reserve forces as essential parts of our national security structure and that, as a result, these forces have become victims of neglect, discrimination, and conflict producing in them a "drift toward impotence". Such criticisms require particularly urgent attention today because of the position of the United States in the postwar world and because of the vital role assigned the Reserve forces in the country's defense plans".

Demobilization and the expiration of the selective service law on 31 March 1947 led to an acute situation with regard to military manpower. Early in 1948, the President asked for the reenactment of the selective service and also for universal military training. The Selective Service Act of 1948 was accordingly enacted on 24 June 1948 which provided that men from 19 to 26 years of age would be inducted for 21 months, should serve for 5 years in a Reserve component, but were not required to render active duty service or attend drills or classes. By enlisting for 3 years in an organized unit, a man could cut down his 5-year reserve obligation; or he could discharge it by remaining an extra year on active duty. This was the law which was on the books at the time the Korean conflict broke out.

The invasion by North Korea of the Republic of Korea on 25 June 1950 created an entirely different situation. The Korean Republic was sponsored by the United Nations and the use of armed force by the Communists was an overt act of aggression which instantly met with the use of military forces of the United Nations. The United States was faced with the problem of partial mobilization of men and equipment for military duty in a limited geographic area. At the same time there could be no letup in planning for the contingency of total mobilization in case the Korean war spread to other areas. The military strength of the United States at the time of the Korean invasion was 593,167 for the Army, 381,538 for the Navy, 411,277 for the Air Force, and 74,279 for the Marine Corps a total of 1,460,261. The National Guard had an authorized strength of 354,000 which it had attained in 1950. Immediate expansion of the United States Armed forces was brought about at the outbreak by calling up individuals and units from the Reserve components and the National Guard, by Selective Service inductions, and volunteer enlistments. By September 1950, 437,323 men had been added to the Armed forces and Congress authorized a ceiling to 5 million persons until 31 July 1954. By early 1952 there were approximately 3.6 million persons in the Armed Forces. Thus, we were faced, at one and the same time not only with problems characteristic of total mobilization, but also with partial mobilization for a limited war.

Representatives of the National Guard urged that the entire organization be ordered into active duty, but the Federal Government decided upon eight divisions. Participation of the National Guard during the Korean conflict is summed up by the President of the National Guard Association, Major

General Ellard A. Walsh, in his testimony before the House Armed Service Subcommittee on 18 February 1957:

* * * * within a few weeks, six (6) Infantry Divisions of the Army National Guard and, two (2) of its Regimental Combat teams were alerted, and 30 days thereafter were in active Federal service. Subsequently, 2 additional Infantry Divisions, a third Regimental Combat Team, and 714 company-size units, amounting, to 37 percent of the Army National Guard were mobilized. During the same period 22 combat wings, together with their combat support units, aggregating 84 percent of the Air National Guard were mobilized. Some National Guard units were shipped to the combat zone within a matter of weeks, while thousands of individuals were plucked from other mobilized National Guard units and rushed into battle as replacements Altogether 138,600 Army National Guardsmen and 45,000 Air National Guardsmen, or an aggregate of 183,600 entered the active Armed Services with their units.

National Guard units and individual Guardsmen reinforced our Armed Forces in Alaska, Iceland, England, France, Western Germany and elsewhere, while those retained in the States constituted according, to the Chief of Staff of the Army, the only reserve in being.

Representative of National Guard performance in the Korean emergency was this statement by the Honorable Earl D. Johnson, then Assistant Secretary of the Army, with respect to the 481 battlefield promotions extended to personnel of the 40th Infantry Division of the California National Guard, in their first few months in combat, and I quote "This rate of advancement is indicative of the division's high calibre, particularly in view of the comparatively short time their men have been eligible for combat promotions".

On 6 April 1951, the Secretary of Defense signed the Department of Defense, policies relating to the Reserve Force's and explained the general policies to be followed by that Department. These Reserve Forces, which included the National Guard-and other Reserve Forces were divided into three categories: the Ready Reserve; the Standby Reserve and the Retired Reserve. The National Guard was included in the Ready Reserve.

On 19 June 1951, the Universal Military Training and Service Act was passed by the Congress, which amended the Act of 1948. The act provided that every man between 18 and 26 years of age should register for military service; that those between 18-1/2 and 26 years were liable for training and service in the Armed Forces; that they must meet minimum standards of physical and mental fitness that each man should be given full and adequate training for no less than 4 months; and that no man should be assigned to duty outside the United States, its territories, and possessions until he had been given the equivalent of at least 4 month's basic training.

Furthermore, the law provided with regard to periods of service that everyone inducted, enlisted, or appointed in the Armed Forces, prior to his becoming 26 years of age, should be required to serve: on active training and service in a Reserve component for a total period of eight years unless sooner discharged because of personal hardship. Each man inducted, after 19 June 1951 was required to serve for 24 months in the Armed Forces, and upon his discharge for six years in a Reserve component.

The Secretaries of the Army, Navy and Air Force were authorized to provide that persons who volunteer for and are accepted into organized units of the National Guard and the Air National Guard and other Reserve components could be released, from training and service in the Armed forces before they served 24 months. Any such reservist, however, could be called to active duty. Certain deferments could be authorized by the President for persons in any category of industry, agriculture, etc. Also certain members of National Guard units were also exempt from induction. The Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952 approved by the Congress on 9 July 1952 provided authority for the President to call certain units and individuals in the event of an emergency. This act also provided that each of the Armed Forces could maintain a Ready Reserve, a Standby Reserve and a Retired Reserve, the total strength thereof being limited to 1,500,000 persons. Men who completed their active duty under the Universal Military Training and Service Act were placed in the Ready Reserve unless they qualified for the Standby. These three different categories of Reserve were subject to different degrees of vulnerability for recall to active

duty and a limitation was placed on the recall of Korean veterans to insure a fair "sharing of hazardous duty".

Initial instructions regarding the induction of units and volunteer members of the Washington National Guard were received from the Commanding General, Sixth United States Army, San Francisco, California under date of 1 July 1950. This was immediately followed by telegraphic instructions from the National Guard Bureau in Washington, D.C. For security reasons news releases regarding Washington National Guard units to be ordered to active duty for service in Korea were limited to statements of Unit Commanders that his unit had been alerted.

On 22 July 1950, Governor Langley received instructions from the Department of the Army that the 115th AAA Operations Detachment would be ordered into active Federal Service on 14 August 1950. On 23 July 1950 similar instructions were received on the 770th AAA Gun Battalion to be inducted on the same date. Instructions from the Adjutant General were dispatched to these units on 24 July 1950. On 3 August 1950, Induction Order Number 2, Sixth U.S. Army ordered these units into active federal service with instructions to remain at their respective stations, Olympia and Seattle pending further instructions.

On 14 August, the Commanding General, Sixth U.S. Army alerted the Hq. & Hq. Battery, 66th F. A. Group stationed in Seattle. Induction Order No, 15, Sixth U.S. Army ordered this unit into active Federal Service at their home station on 11 September 1950. In the meantime the 770th AAA Gun Battalion was ordered to take station at Fort Lewis, Washington on 25 August 1950. Similar orders were received moving the 115th AAA Opns. Detachment to the same station. Initially the 66th FA Group was scheduled to take station at Camp McCoy, Wisconsin, however on 15 September 1950 this Group was directed to take station at Fort Lewis, Washington. When inducted these units had a combined strength of 47 officers and 433 enlisted men. When released from Federal Service in July of 1952, only 4 officers and 74 enlisted men reverted to State Control. Those not released elected to remain on active service with other units.

On 1 February 1951 the 116th Fighter Squadron, Jet and the 116th Weather station were inducted into federal service at Geiger Field, Spokane, Washington. On 1 March 1951, Hq & Hq Squadron, 142nd Fighter Wing was inducted from the same station. This was followed by induction of the 560th USAF Band on 1 April 1951, also from Geiger Field. On 1 May 1951, the following additional units of the Washington National Guard were inducted:

UNIT	HOME STATION
Hq & Hq Battery, 420th, AAA Gun Battalion	Yakima
Battery A, 420th AAA Gun, Battalion	Yakima
Battery B, 420th AAA Gun Battalion	Prosser
Battery C, 420th AAA Gun Battalion	Toppenish,
Battery D, 420th AAA Gun Battalion	Pasco
Medical Detachment, 420th AAA Gun Battalion	Yakima
Hq. 160th Aircraft Control & Warning Group	Geiger Field, Spokane
141st Aircraft Control Squadron	Geiger Field, Spokane
110th Communication Squadron	Geiger Field, Spokane
143rd Aircraft Control & Warning Squadron	Boeing Field, Seattle
110th Radar Calibration Detachment	Boeing Field, Seattle
610th Signal Light Construction Squadron	Boeing Field, Seattle

The strength of the foregoing Washington National Guard units ordered into active Federal Service was 183 officers and warrant officers and 1,370 enlisted men.

All units of the 420th AAA Gun Battalion were released from active Federal service on 20 December 1952 and the Air National Guard units during the period 1 November 1952-1 February 1953.

The following is a listing of all members of the Washington National Guard inducted into Federal Service for active service during the Korean incident as shown on the initial rosters on date of induction:

115th AAA OPERATIONS DETACHMENT

CAPTAINS

Grout, Charles W. Phillips, George G.

2ND LIEUTENANT

Torner, Floyd P.

MASTER SERGEANT E-7

Gustin, Clifford H.

SERGEANTS 1ST CLASS E-6

Giles, Phillip G. Kautz, Vernon W.

SERGEANTS E-5

Hoyt, Fred I. Owen, Clarence E. Rayfuse, James L. Smith, Wilbur L.

CORPORALS E-4

Cunningham, Kenneth L. Kelley, Joseph L. Rice, Keith R. Tabor, Ross
Gager, Marvin D. Kuhlman, Richard O. Rice, Kenneth M. Vincent, Gordon A.
Hanna, Walter S. McClamma, Leon F. Jr. Strandberg, Stanley L. Yantis, Phillip A.
Hirvela, David A.

PRIVATE FIRST CLASS E-3

Davenport, Richard F. Johnson, Roy M. Reilly, James R. Whalen, Dennis J.
Elliott, Pinkney L. Kohler, Gustav G. Stockton, Fred R. Jr.

PRIVATE E-2

Brennan, Denis M. Lockhart, Frank L. Wilson, Gerald C. Zawistowski, Vernon L.
Hendrickson, Earl F.

HQ & HQ BTRY, 770TH AAA GUN BATTALION

LIEUTENANT COLONEL

Dittrich, Karl W.

MAJOR

Tichenor, Hilton R.

CAPTAINS

Cayce, Sam W.	Dittrich, Frank O.	Payne, Thomas A.	Rose, Kirk M.
Culbert, Roy F.	Hampson, Earl R.		

FIRST LIEUTENANTS

Bowden, Edmund R. Jr. Chaffee, Arthur R. Price, Maylon D.

SECOND LIEUTENANTS

Hess, Cyril G.

CHIEF WARRANT OFFICERS

Taylor, Paul C. C-4 Pritchard, Hughes L. C-3

MASTER SERGEANTS E-7

Bair, Warner B.	Dahl, Donald	Mills, Earl S.	Wilson, Richard E.
Bell, Jack N.	Madden, Robert H.		

SERGEANTS FIRST CLASS E-6

Dexter, William B.	Layton, Lawrence L. Jr.	Lester, Charles L.	McFarland, Clarence R.
Hayes, William H.			

SERGEANTS E-5

Chenaur, Nelson G.	Kramps, John P.	Moum, Adolph I.	Tat, Ronald P.
Emery, Loren S.	Kuhblank, William L.	Newcomb, John C.	Turner, David E.
Estes, Charles B.	Lohrer, William M.	Suess, John W.	Williams, Ward J.
Goforth, Floyd S.	Martin, Robert D.		

CORPORALS E-4

Carey, Allen F.	Haleva, Samuel	Lester, Raymond P.	Sanders, Robert H.
DeLaurenti, John	Johnson, Alonzo LeRoy	Marshall, Harry W.	Sloan, Ivey J.
Fry, Don W. Jr.	Jones, Cecil V.	McClellan, Lonnie J.	Sposari, Felix
Girard, Donal E.	Lehde, James F.	Munsell, Jack A.	

PRIVATES FIRST CLASS E-3

Barry, Robert W.	Burkett, Harold B.	Harris, Arthur D.	Ridley, Stanley A.
Bowerman, Kenneth V.	Dyer, Standley	Mason, Eugene M.	Stewart, Edgar E.

PRIVATES E-2

Anderson, Leroy F.	Hedberg, James L.	Turner, Roger C.	Werfhorst, Jan C.
Clark, Williams W.	Kirby, William R.	Umbenetti, Joe R.	

PRIVATES E-1

Morley, Richard C.	Ryan, Elwood	Wellington, Denny P.	Young, Franklin R.
Seltz, Arthur W.	Toyne, Frank C.	Weyer, Mark	

BTRY A, 770TH AAA GUN BN

CAPTAIN

Skirving, Charles D.

1ST LIEUTENANT

Eby, Arthur R.

2ND LIEUTENANT

Schatz, Joseph D.

MASTER SERGEANTS E-7

Christine, Clinton R.

SERGEANTS FIRST CLASS E-6

Banton, Walter O. Culbert, Cornelius P. Kay, Vadim P.

SERGEANTS E-5

Baker, Edwin N.	Dailey, Edmund H.	Joseph, Jimme P.	Scheuffele, Walter
Barnes, William A.	Goebel, Edward B.	Parker, George M.	Simos, Hector G.
Benjamin, Richard S.	Heaslett, James E.	Richey, Woodrow	Wolky, Donald W.
Bennett, Perry M.	Houston, Robert L.	Salvino, Carl S.	Woeck Harold L.

CORPORALS E-4

Andes, Henry G.	Frederick, Lewis A.	Kelson, Donald E.	Smith, Robert A.
Clay, William M.	Frederick, Wesley G.	Peterson, Laurence B.	Wallawine, James D.
Cuvreau, Loring A.	Groh, Donald B.	Schwartz, Elmer H.	Walsh, Patrick W.
Christofaro, Joseph M.	Ihly, Steven R.	Simos, John G.	

PRIVATE FIRST CLASS E-3

Akre, Elert J.	Flowers, Bryant M.	Miles, Alfred E.	Schmidt, Kenneth C.
Borland, Arthur J.	Goodson, Ron J.	Printz, James E.	Somers, James H.
Cummings, David L.	Matthews, Frederick E.	Rantala, Richird A.	Torp, Cliffton F.
Evans, Ray C.	McDaniel, James P.	Rowley, Gerald H.	Wilson, Robert W.

PRIVATE E-2

Chesterfield, Jack D.	Morefield, Gene C.	Norstrom, Richard F.	Smith, Wayne M.
Church, William H.	Moulett, Gary A.	O'Brien, Jess J.	Umbinetti, Earl M.
Iacolucci, Henry	Myers, Jack E.	Patten, Gene B.	Westphal, Donald H.
James, Robert G,	Nelson, Kenneth W.		

PRIVATE E-1

Armstrong, Robert O.	Condon, Raymond F.	Foster, William T.	Staves, Leonard D.
Bronk, Robert W.	Crawford, Jack R.	Heaton, Keith V.	Weaver, Donald R.
Chase, James A. Jr.	Cuvreau, George L.	McDonald, John W.	Wiltse, Richard F.

BTRY B, 770TH AAA GUN BN

FIRST LIEUTENANT

Skube, Noel

SECOND LIEUTENANTS

Jackson, John Nelson, Rudolph S.

MASTER SERGEANTS E-7

Campeau, Paul F.

SERGEANTS FIRST CLASS E-6

Foster, Robert W. Johnston, William E. Sommers, Richard N.

SERGEANTS E-5

Casal, Samuel R.	Lynn, Robert R.	Shaw, Elwin J.	Wilson, Jack S.
DeArment, Stanley N.	Reynolds, Dick G.	Stillson, Merle T.	Winkleman, Donald A.
Harmon, Harold D.	Rutan, Clarence A.		

CORPORALS E- 4

Buchanan, Ira K.	Denny, Evan (NMI)	Moshier, Leonard H.	Remillard, Bruce M.
Campbell, Robert F.	Dickinson, David N.	Nelson, Robert J.	Taylor, James A.
Chew, Robert H.	Hague, Raymond J. Jr	Nichols, Garold D.	

PRIVATE FIRST CLASS E-3

Brownfield, William G.	Contois, John E.	Hoffman, Darrell H.	Martin, Raymond F. Jr.
Campbell, Graham T.	Douglas, Everett A.	Kay, Clifford J.	Pettit, Lloyd E.
Cleary, Frank J.	Grove, John L.	Maloney, Kenneth L.	Tollefsen, Henry P.
Cloquet, Richard A.			

PRIVATE E- 2

Akrish, Menachem	Gerard, Edward R.	Holcomb, Arthur S.	Westby, Clarence T.
Drake, Paul E.	Hoekstra, Ronald H.	Maloney, Patrick R.	Whitney, Richard K.
France, Rowland G.	Hoffman, Bernard J.		

PRIVATE E-1

Cave, James M.	Howe, William W.	McCarthy, Donald Y.	Reinser, Robert C.
Day, James M.	Hutchinson, Jim O.	McKivor, Thomas G.	Richards, Charles L.
Doll, Michae E.	Logsdon, Donald L.	McQuade, William L. Jr.	Schack, Frans E.
Ebaugh, Robert G.	Lohse, Cecil M.	Nokes, Robert E.	See, John H.
Ettel, Arthur B.	Lycette, John P. Jr.	Patterson, Gerald M. Jr.	Strand, Ralph D.
Groff, Claude M.	McAtee, William D.	Perrin, Carl O.	Voland, Edward H.

BTRY C, 770TH AAA GUN BN

CAPTAIN

Hall, Walter E.

FIRST LIEUTENANT

Montgomery, Charles B.

SECOND LIEUTENANT

Wubbins, Marvin G.

MASTER SERGEANTS E-7

Stonestreet, Charles W.

SERGEANTS FIRST CLASS E-6

Ellis, John W. Stone, William C.

SERGEANTS E-5

Abbey, Julian	Long, Samuel E.	Miller, Jack L. W.	Randall, John E.
Calvin, Derrill A.	McCartney, Lawrence D. II	Nolan, James M. Jr.	Schrader, Robert H.
Greene, Joseph	McMillan, John G.	Paup, Martin A.	Trepus, George E.
Hawkins, Ellsworth J. Jr.			

CORPORALS E-4

Bloss, Albert P.	Galloway, Clyde E.	Jensen, Gerald L.	Sondheim, Werner A.
Brewer, Stanley J.	Gowan, Floyd E.	Lustig, Arthur J.	Taylor, Robert L.
Cady, Gordon L.	Hellenkamp, Henry Jr.	Martin, Harold W.	Wingate, Jack W.
Fox, Kenneth D.	Hext, William A.	Nelson, William H.	

PRIVATE FIRST CLASS E-3

Bean, Gary M.	Darnell, Rawleigh E.	Jones, David J.	Potts, William A. Jr.
Boyle, Walter G. Jr.	Hesson, Larry W.	Majack, Conrad P.	Quinnett, Milton D.
Briscoe, Donald R.	Johnson, Jerald E.	McMullan, Robert A.	

PRIVATE E-2

Barrett Richard B.	Casal, Eugene R.	Farrar, Robert N.	Schubert, John W.
Bowman, Don E.	Cole, Warren W.	French, Larry R.	Wells, Lynn W.
Bucke, William A.	Doyle, David C.	Hurst, Robert H.	Woldt, Robert F.
Carey, Robert A. B.			

PRIVATE E-1

Donoghue, John J.	Guelker, Roger W.	Lea, Robert E.	Thomas, Billie J.
Gaines, Walter P.	Goodwin, Eugene H.	Standish, Myles	Thrasher, Jesse F.
Garbutt, Howard W.	Ivanowsky, Eugene N.	Taylor, William A.	

BTRY D, 770TH AAA GUN BN

CAPTAIN

Mitchell, Charles E.

SECOND LIEUTENANTS

King, Ray C. Langabeer, Robert L. Werner, William M.

MASTER SERGEANTS E-7

Russo, Joseph

SERGEANTS FIRST CLASS E-6

King, Ray C. Kirkpatrick, Emry L. Schumacher, John T.

SERGEANTS E-5

Belshaw, George Jr. Myers, Donald D. Ruebush, Leland P. Walior, James E.
Flegel, Marvin W. Newton, William S. Simmons, Alan T. Whipple, Daniel M.
Kaiser, John P. Nixon, James C.

CORPORALS E-4

Barkley, L.arry W. Faaberg, Richard Herdeck, Fordon A. Rogers, James H.
DeJausserand, Theodore L. Hatch, Paul H. Powers, Joseph E. Tillisch, Paul W.

PRIVATES E- 3

Carlson, William R. Fuller, Daniel R. McPhail, James E. Silliman, Gerald W. Jr.
Dinklemen, Herman F. Hughes, Charles H. Noftsgger, Cleo B. Westergren, Jerome B.
Duncanson, Bruce D. Lundsten, Roy D. Ritter, George S. Woods, Jay O.

PRIVATES E- 2

Bace, Thomas J. Ehlers, Ronald L. Morgan, David L. Nelson, Jim C.
Berg, Blaine G. Grimlund, Douglas G. Neiger, Fred J. Wood, Donald E.
Blake, Buel B. Guernsey, Donald D.

PRIVATES E- 1

Anderson, Robert L. Griffiths, George V. Markey, Edward E. Romine, Doyal E.
Black, David S. Hiscock, Peter A. Norton, James D. Steffen, Edward J. Jr.
Castrilli, Louis T. Howe, Robert Orr, Arthur W. Tessmer, Wallace D.
Forsyth, James A. Kurry, Basol M. Radeke, Richard P. Willett, William D.
Galbraith, Lloyd H. Lyon, John L.

MED DET., 770th AAA GUN BN

SERGEANTS E-5

Allan, Donald F. Armstrong, Alexander G.

E-4

Fiorito, Michael R. Hess, Gerald W. Zwanzig, Lester U.

PRIVATES FIRST CLASS

Baronsky, Norman J. Plaskett, Jack W.

PRIVATE E-1

Romei, Carl F.

HQ & HQ BTRY, 66TH FA GROUP

COLONEL

Phillips, Harry L.

LIEUTENANT COLONELS

Lyon, John D. Smith, John A.

MAJORS

Baird, Hugh Jr. Humphrey, Omar J. Jr. Keys, Edward M. Tobiason, Orville L.

CAPTAINS

Bryant, Layne P. Nave, John A.

FIRST LIEUTENANTS

Crommett, Ralph L. Geyer, Richard W. Judkins, Vernon T. Stickler, Lee R.

SECOND LIEUTENANTS

Anderson, David G. Joralemon, Fred J.

WARRANT OFFICERS, W-1

Stahl, Calvin J. Tuck, Marvin L.

MASTER SERGEANTS E-7

Eichmann, Jack R. Pearce, Stanley L. Ruebush, Paul A. Shull, Robert J.

SERGEANTS E-6

Eichmann, Jack A. Schwetz, Joe S.

SERGEANTS E-5

Eichman, Randall F Hanna, Norval C. Pang, Ted Stutes, Otis
Fisher, Wendelin J. Kogita, Ted Robinson, Ralph M. Jr. Versoi, Richard P.
French, William P. II Morrison, Lawrence E. Stone, Rodney T. Wicknick, Robert M.
Giambone, Anthony V.

CORPORALS E-4

Miller, James, M. Moore, Cortez E. Morris, Richard J. Wicker, Albert V.

PRIVATES FIRST CLASS

Anderson, Robert W. Miller, Joseph L. Smith, Robert E. Yielding, Reuben D.
Budke, Robert D.

PRIVATES E-2

Box, Gary D. Heiser, George G. Lefstrom, Oscar N. Morris, Donald P.
Hays, Richard E. Ingold, Ray H. Moore, Lawrence D.

PRIVATES E-1

Baldwin, Carey C. Hess, William C. Marshall, Herbert E. Stewart, Alfred L.
Carlsen, Ted A. Humphrey, Jack V. Powers, James S. Suddeth, Robert R.
Craig, Warren K. Lambert, Kenneth L. Pringle, Jack J. Turner, James S.
Edwards, Charles E. Lofstrom, Henry S. Smith, John Keating Wong, Jack K.
Erickson, Gale S.

116TH WEATHER STATION (TYPE A)

CAPTAIN

Wilson, Ray H.

SECOND LIEUTENANT

Kinkade, Lester D. F.

SERGEANT E-5

Southwell, Robert A.

SERGEANT E-4

Stewart, John C.

CORPORALS E-3

Small, Robert J. Stiles, Richard W.

PRIVATE E-1

Carrieres, John N.

116TH FIGHTER SQUADRON, JET

LIEUTENANT COLONEL

Frost, Frank W.

MAJOR

Vomaske, Richard F.

CAPTAINS

Adams, Robert R.	Burns, William H.	Jurgensen, Elmer V.	Robinson, Robert M.
Allison, Raymond	Cosby, Irl R. Jr.	McDonald, Leroy M.	Rowles, Patrick F.
Bollinger, Walter L.	Jacobs; Herbert L.	Murray, Robert P.	

FIRST LIEUTENANT

Baertsch, Richard E.	Crewse, Roger G.	Ogden, Kenneth B.	Sartz, Dallas P.
Bailey, Kenneth F.	Drollinger, Lynn H.	Palmer, Frank S.	Searl, Robert B.
Barnes, Robert E.	Hecock, Ward E.	Peterson, Harold E.	Stack, Donald
Berg, Bruce H.	Hines, Kenneth C.	Phillips, Henry P.	Stevens, Joseph W.
Bossio, Galleo F.	Howard, Lloyd A.	Quimby, George E.	Stevenson, John R.
Carrieres, Joseph E.	Linderman, Vernon M.	Rasmusson, Leo G.	Strong, Robert L.
Carson, Kit L.	McLaughlin, William S.	Roestel, Ray E. L.	Trumble, Robert L.
Crawford, Harold R. Jr.	Myers, Dafford W.	Roll, Frederick A. Jr.	

SECOND LIEUTENANTS

Bisterfeidt, Raymond E.	Lindgren, Walter H.	Miller, Robert H.	Thomason, Donald
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MASTER SERGEANTS E-7

Benjamin, Raymond L.	Colman, John H.	McBride, Robert W.	Volberding, Ted E.
Blair, Mintford I.	Hearing, Oscar V.	Poirer, Milton C.	Ward, Andrew W.
Brunton, Lloyd L.	Knoles, Ervin L.	Sherman, Ronald	

TECHNICAL SERGEANTS

Audette, DeVere J.	Gossett, Clyde V.	Morse, John H.	Schenewerk, Robert L.
Beers, John H.	Kaluza, Edward W.	Nesbitt, Gene J.	Toles, Everett
Benbow William G.	Krogh, Roy M.	Ormsby, Walter D.	Trowbridge, Harold B.
Chaffee, Don A.	McClure, Edward E.	Partch, Delmar H.	Van Klaveren, William Jr.
Cuff, Robert J.	McCracken, William E.	Patterson, Gene W.	Walls, Benjamin F
Finlayson, Clair J.	Merritt, Dorlon J.	Person, William S. K.	Warren, Richard B.
Fry, Robert A.	Miller, Charles L. Jr.	Rains, Richard C.	

STAFF SERGEANTS E-5

Bockmeyer, Kenneth D	Frost, Jack K.	Massaia, Felix E.	Sanders, Marion A.
Bollman, Merton E.	Gandy, Curtis III	McEvers, James R.	Schaefer, John R.
Bradley, John D.	Glover, Jack A.	Morris, Norman E.	Schott, Larry H.
Brask, Dwight C.	Harris, George V.	Patterson, Richard D.	Simpson, James T.
Campion, Louis M.	Hatch, Jason J.	Plastino, Joseph C.	Smith, Alfred T.
Cook, James R.	Hodgson, Robert	Porterfield, Francis L.	Spendlove, Paul L. Jr.
Dallas, Everett T.	Houser, Robert C.	Pressnell, Douglas C.	Sullivan, Thomas E.
Davis, Mark C.	Ingham, Leonard C.	Puhek, Rudolph J.	Walsh, Robert J.
Dellino, Frank J.	Jackman, Donald L.	Regan, Wesley G.	Watkins, Ernest W. Jr.
Downing, Robert W.	Keene, Wendell O.	Repp, Lawrence G.	Wheatcroft, Vernon C.
Fairbanks, Harold S.	Macdonald, James C.	Rowe, LeRoy R.	Wheeler, Joe H.
Foley, George L.	Malone, Richard B.	Russell, Dalton J.	

116TH FIGHTER SQUADRON, JET (CONT'D)

SERGEANTS E-4

Allan, William G.	Downing, Richard F.	Loski, Robert R.	Renner, Wilmer E.
Amsbury, Douglas G.	Eacho, Richard G.	Megrue, Emil A.	Richter, Wilmer L.
Anderson, Gene M.	Ellingson, Gerald G.	Mielke, Edward R.	Robinson, Chester A.
Arendt, Richard J.	Evans, Robert L.	Misterek, Arnold R.	Samish, Norman C.
Ayer, Donald E.	Forshee, Don G.	Moad, Jack L.	Schmidt, Raymond H.
Baker, Walter R.	Glenn, Robert	Morton, William V. Jr.	Snoey, Leonard
Bates, Glyndon W.	Grier, Jack W.	Moss, Ted L.	Stewart, William A.
Bertenshaw, William M.	Gunning, Theodore G.	Mosso, Francis	Thiele, Richard N.
Blaydon, Leroy G.	Gunning, Vernon W.	Murphy, Jon P.	Thompson, Harold S.
Blundell, William H.	Hawley, Richard G.	O'Connor, Denis W.	Tuntland, Richard B.
Boyer, Loren J.	Holgerson, Richard N.	Ogden, Dwaine E.	Utigard, Ralph S.
Burton, James W.	Holmes, Donald E.	Ottmar, Harley	Vazanko, Donald R.
Casey, Gerald A.	Houghan, Charles T.	Pandelis, John A. Jr.	Vest, Frank E.
Collier, Wilbur F.	Jacobson, Ronicle R.	Penna, Roy W	Ward, Richard A
Cook, Charles R.	Jones, Arthur W.	Perry, Bruce T.	Watkins, James L.
Cook, Alton D.	Lantz, Robert B.	Pray, Charles L.	Weiler, Rex H. Jr.
Cunningham, John P.	Lloyd, Gene L.	Prickett, Donald R.	White, James E. Jr.
Dagley, Robert F.	Locker, Carlos L.	Pryor, Lawrence F.	Zeller, James, I.

CORPORALS E-4

Ball, Donald R.	Gertlar, Melvin J.	Myers, Richard F.	Snoey, Herbert
Bankson, Richard P.	Glasgow, Harold C.	Nelson, Roy M.	Standal, Alfred E.
Barker, Thomas R.	Harder, Robert W.	Odell, Donald G.	Stansbury, Donald R.
Beck, Donald W.	Hoadley, James W.	Ott, Louis M.	Staples, Wyman L.
Bennett, Donald V.	James, Kenneth B.	Ottmar, Victor	Stazel, Phillip R.
Bethel, Brian J.	Jordan, James R.	Parkison, Neil E.	Thomas, Wayne W.
Brady, Floyd M.	Kellmer, Melvin R.	Paullin, John V.	Treffry, Gerald W.
Burkley, Williazn E.	Kelly, John	Perron, Norman R.	Tuntland, Donald E.
Cassell, Hugh E.	Koch, John R.	Peterson, August A.	Wainwright, Dale E.
Clift, James P.	Lathrop, Richard F.	Powers, Tommy W.	Walker, John R.
Cranston, Richard L.	Luft, Robert L.	Rohlinger, Howard E.	Waybright, Ryle J.
Crosby, Leslie A.	Lundy, Harold C.	Schlosser, Harold J.	Welch, LeRoy E.
DeLancy, Parryl L.	MacPherson, Duncan A.	Schroder, James F.	Yoke, Charles M.
DuVall, Robert D.	Marisch, Edward E.	Shinn, Homer J.	Young, Jack G.
Ellern, Albert J.	McFerran, Donald E.	Skaufel, Leroy B.	Zimmennan, Donald R.
Ellingson, James E.			

PRIVATES E-2

Barton, Robert W.	Hafner, Charles E.	Miller, Laurence D.	Richardson, George F.
Beckham, Richard L.	Heath, Wilford G.	Murbach, Robert H.	Stevens, Robert D.
Church, James V.	Hieb, Alvin R.	Nelson, Hubert A.	Tellefson, Douglas R.
Cox, Everett W.	Higgins, Edward J.	Olson, Robert J.	Warford, Edward W. Jr
Downing, Patrick J.	Licht, Robert R.	Reardon, James M.	Welch, Robert A.
Groom, George E.	McConnell, William E.		

116TH FIGHTER SQUADRON, JET (CONT'D)

PRIVATES E-1

Alden, Donald R.	DeCroff, William R.	Howard, Harry G.	Proelss, Laurence J.
Allen, Hairy H.	Dickerson, Raymond E.	Hunt, William M.	Primmer, Jack L.
Andrus, Gerald M.	Dixon, Laird D.	Imbert, Andrew J. P.	Pringle, Richard E.
Balum, Edwin	Donder, Norman N.	Imler, Dennis D.	Rettig, Gene W.
Basler, Wilmer W.	Drumheller, Frederick C.	James, Alan	Reynolds, Delbert L.
Bass, Wayne C.	Dubois, David L.	Jameson, John E.	Robert, Richard E.
Basye, David G.	Estes, Roger Q.	Jones, William S.	Rowse, Ray S.
Battles, Willis E.	Felts, Gerald C.	Kaufman, Harold F.	Salmonson, Earl B.
Bell, John H.	Fiedler, Harold J.	Kazanis, Richard A.	Sheely, William E.
Benway, William L.	Fields, Ray A.	Knodel, Stanley K.	Smith, Warren E.
Best, Everett L.	Filan, Hjalmar W.	Layton, Floyd L.	Solem, George L.
Betts, James W.	Fleming, Kenneth W.	Leinweber, Wilbur J.	Stack, Terry J.
Boyd, William D.	Flynn, Richard E.	LeMar, Robert E.	Steele, Don R.
Brash, Guy E.	Fotchman, Larry B.	Logan, Loren E.	Summers, Carl L.
Bronkhorst, Bill	Getz, Bernard H.	Manring, Jack W.	Sweo, James R.
Carlson, Edwin D.	Glubreacht, Robert H.	Marple, Norman E.	Taylor, Robert L.
Casey, Patrick S.	Graff, Robert W.	McConnell, James E.	Thibault, Joseph E.
Celio, Frank M.	Gregerson, James F.	McDowell, Morris L.	Town, Wayne E.
Christian, Eldred W.	Groom, Stanley K.	Mellick, Joseph E.	Vest, Robert L.
Claflin, Merle W.	Halstead, Clyde A.	Middleton, Donald E.	Wagner, George R.
Clausen, Arnold H.	Hammel, Ronald R.	Mitchell, George L.	Warrant, Leonard J.
Cole, Wayne C.	Hanke, Thomas D.	Munro, Robert D.	Wentworth, Joel B.
Craft, Harold J.	Harkins, Frank C.	Ottmar, Dean E.	Wolford, James J.
Curtis, Benjamin F.	Helgerson, Robert C.	Paysse, Robert R.	Wollweber, Glenn E.
Dabolt, Laurence L.	Henderson, Jerry W.	Pfaff, Harold D.	Worley, Raymond L.
Davis, William N.	Hornaday, Harold J.	Pfaff, Stanley M.	York, Raymond E.
Day, Arthur C.	Howard, Donald G.	Pflugrad, Myron J.	Zappon, Richard F.

HQ & HQ SQUADRON, 142D FIGHTER WING

COLONEL

Lavin, John N.

LIEUTENANTS COLONELS

Alton, Wilfred D.	Hamilton, Richmond L.	Ward, Samuel G. Jr.
Gibbons, Harry	Shore, Marshall B.	Wilcox, Robert

MAJORS

Gillis, Wilson	Harbison, Chester C. Jr.	White, Hugh B.
Grieser, Walter J.	Weeks, Carl L.	

CAPTAINS

Adams, Frank E.	Blair, James B.	Keenan, Wilbur J.	Sanderson, Hayes K.
Ahrens, Richard G.	Brown, Gordon S.	Moore, Donald W.	Thompson, EarL R.
Beyer, Alwin P.	Byers, William E.	Ogle, William R.	Wuhrman, John L.

FIRST LIEUTENANTS

MacKelvie, Arthur R.	Natwick, Leo H.
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SECOND LIEUTENANTS

Schodel, John D.

WARRANT OFFICER, JG

Hepker, Robert R.

MASTER SERGEANTS E-7

Bucher, Clair L.	Gunter, Wilbur D.	Lookabaugh, Marcena G.	Young, Robert M.
Child, Frederick R.	Hopkins, Jay L.	Mitchell, William F.	

SERGEANTS, E-6

Avery, Robert M.	Dailing, Floyd W.	Elliott, Noel B.	Gruber, James J.
Blair, Vern G.			

SERGEANTS E-5

Gerke, Alonzo W.	McGlocklin, Richard K.	Rehm, Harry	Sontag, Delbert E.
Gillespie, Thomas J.	Melanson, Eugene A.	Steiger, Charles A.	Wilson, Elgon O.
Ladish, Mike S.	Parker, Horace J.		

SERGEANTS E-4

Bothun, Chester L.	Downing, Leonard E.	Johnson, Robert H.	Schwartz, Donald E
Cameron, Clyde W.	Freese, Donald A.	Keady, Robert B.	Warn, John R.
Culhane, Richard R.	Gray, Weston D.	Nechodom, Warren S.	Wilson, Thomas M.
Davis, George F.	Griffiths, Herbert W.	Norton, Glen W.	Weaver, Joseph E.
Domrese, Lyle M.			

CORPORALS E-3

Austin, Robert N.	Getchell, Ronald D.	Hucks, Randall B.	Santorsola, James E.
Curran, Jack W.	Gruber, Richard M.	Johnson, Norman F.	Thompson, Dayne R.

Decker, Alverado N. Heiser, Donald R. Miller, Donald L.
HQ & HQ SQUADRON, 142D FIGHTER WING (CONT'D)

PRIVATES FIRST CLASS E-2

Carpenter, Robert F.	Fowler, Jerry G.	Ickes, Jack H.	Suzuki, Stimson S.
Cloyd, Roscoe G.	Gothsberg, Donald S.	Mengart, Alfred J.	Utter, Fred B. Jr.
Coldeen, Raymond B.	Henry, William K.	Perron, Ronald H.	Young, John W.

PRIVATES E-1

Boyd, John E	Gaiser, Gerald O.	Neighbor, Ronald D.	Woollett, Sidney H.
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566TH USAF BAND

WARRANT OFFICER JG W-1

Hallgrimson, Benedict T.

MASTER SERGEANT E-7

Ward, Willis W. Jr.

SERGEANTS E-6.

Thomas, Frank R. Wilson, James R.

SERGEANTS E-5

Allgaier, Donald H. Munther, Gunnar E. Prehm, Ray E.
Hilton, Robert V. Plowman, Wallace B. Taylor, Douglas H.

SERGEANTS E-4

Ashton, Phillip E. Hawes, Richard A. Savedge, Wallace A. Jr. Wise, Thomas E.
Cammack, Nathan E. Jr. Iller, Robert W. Taylor, Donald L.

CORPORALS E-3

Donaldson, Donald L. Kittilson, Marvin D. Mosbarger, Gene L. Schaar, Waiter J.
Gotfredson, William W.

PRIVATES FIRST CLASS E-2

Bensen, Edwin W. Davis, Maurice R. Hollingsworth, William K. Morgan, Wesley B.
Breitsprecher, Glen L. Gross, Roger D. Ley, Robert L.

PRIVATES E-1

Barnes, Ray T. Bartlett, Ronald W. Marrazzo, Louie G. Morris, Bert M.

HQ 160TH AIRCRAFT CONTROL & WARNING GROUP

COLONEL

French, Ellsworth C.

LIEUTENANT COLONEL

Evans, James D.

MAJOR

Bickerton, Ralph, E.

CAPTAINS

Beaudon, Robert B. Dean, Marshall A. King, Robert F. Werner, Paul D.
Bolick, Ralph W.

FIRST LIEUTENANTS

Blankinship, Albert B. Crabtree, Roe D. Loosmore, Thomas R. Thomas, Willard W.

SECOND LIEUTENANTS

Burgess, Donald W. Drumheller, Calvin S. Turner, Herbert P.

MASTER SERGEANT E-7

Broome, General L. Smith, Rupert L.

SERGEANTS E-6

Harter, Harold M. Lundberg, Richard S.

STAFF SERGEANTS E-5

Burgess, Dale I. Natwick, Donald C. Puhek, James A. Walter, Frank B.
Cooledge, Herbert G.

SERGEANTS E-4

Anderson, Martin E. Farley, Don E. Lilly, William D. Polson, Dexter G.

CORPORALS E-3

Butler, Stephen L. Duehr, Jerry D. Lamphere, George R. Lebahn, Allen L.
Cooney, Donald V.

PRIVATE FIRST CLASS E-2

Anderson, Leslie W. Davis, Earl W. Hefner, Walter A. Stevens, Allen L.
Anderson, Robert E. Davis, Gaylord A. Johnson, Clark L. Thompson, Merrill L.
Aspaas, Ivar A. Grothe, Ronald N.

PRIVATE E-1

Bradley, Paul D. Cunningham, James D. Thomas, Norman E. Wyer, Gale D.
Chandler, Charles H. Gruberm, Robert J. Thompson, Jack L.

141ST AIRCRAFT CONTROL SQUADRON

MAJOR

Ahlstrom, John M.

CAPTAINS

Alloway, Clarence C.	Hagen, Carl J.	Moore, Richard T.	Wagg, Charles E. Jr
Ferris, Franklin D.	Lamb, Lloyd W.		

FIRST LIEUTENANTS

Boyd, Arthur L. Jr.	Missildine, Harry F.	Phillips, Richard H.	Williams, Hubert L.
Lorenzi, Robert O.	Miller, Roger A.	Schoch, Frederick G.	

SECOND LIEUTENANTS

Deets, Robert D.	Shuey, Victor G.	Stimson, Harry E. Jr.	Waye, Robert E.
McKanna, William R.			

MASTER SERGEANTS E-7

Cribby, Gordon L.	Hertzberg, William E.
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SERGEANTS E-6

Graham, Jennings H.	Libey, Herschel A.	Quentin, Robert G.	Weidman, Myron L.
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SERGEANTS E-5

Battin, Kenneth L.	Hobson, Leo F. Jr.	McFarlane, John W.	Smith, Lionel K.
Courtwright, Maurice F.	Jones, Roderick W. Jr.	Meyers, Wesley G.	Standal, Norman S.
Culkin, Myron L.	Lampman, Gordon E.	Osborn, Lewis K.	Thompson, John A.
Doeleman, Daniel A.	Luce, James L.	Shaffer, Ronald W.	Young, Richard E.
Hanson, Robert R.			

SERGEANTS E-4

Barrett, Robert L.	Green, Raymond Jr.	Miller, Walter R.	Stofferan, Edward C.
Caudill, Cecil W.	Havlovick, Francis A.	Norman, Charles E.	Thompson, Craig W.
Chinn, Delford L.	Ifft, William L.	Peterson, Carl A.	Triber, Delbert H.
Crisp, Lester V.	Lomas, George E.	Peterson, Gerald J.	Tryon, Robert D.
Ford, Edward E.	Marx, Donald G.	Simmons, Lewis G. Jr.	Watson, Darrell C.
Frederick, John H.	McDonald, Floyd L.	Stevens, Melvin L.	

CORPORALS E-3

Allen, Jack E.	Croyle, Homer D.	Kenyon, Robert H.	Porta, Robert T.
Anderson, Carl S.	Gaston, LaVerne A.	Lidke, William E.	Quentin, Harry L.
Backstrom, James M.	Gerimonte, Donald L.	Mattern, Floyd H.	Riley, John R.
Brewster, Frederick T.	Graham, William G.	Montecucco, Richard M.	Sweetland, Richard M.
Burns, Francis R.	Hinz, Henry E.	Peacock, John A.	Wicks, Garnet W.
Camyn, John N.	Holland, Clarence L.		

141ST AIRCRAFT CONTROL SQUADRON (CONT'D)

PRIVATES FIRST CLASS E-2

Ackerman, Will A.	Duty, Rolla G.	Jones, Robert L.	Richards, Wendell W.
Allenton, Robert Jr.	Elliott, Carl T. Jr.	Kircher, Bennie R.	Ross, Gerald D.
Armbruster, Dean L.	Erickson, Kenneth L.	McBride, John R.	Schmidt, Leonard G.
Ault, Richard R.	Evans, Richard L.	McCannon, Bruce B.	Sheppard, Rodger J.
Beck, Sherman D.	Franck, Donald R.	Mickelson, Ralph L.	Shimizu, Aisei R.
Benner, Jack W.	Gum, Donald J.	Morgan, Claud E.	Smith, Flake F.
Bogar, Jack L.	Haglund, Lloyd G.	Moss, Louis N. Jr.	Stimson, Randolph A.
Brecto, Alden R.	Harding, Lloyd K.	Myers, Thomas P.	Tobie, Paul G.
Brecto, Floyd C.	Henwood, James A.	Pencosky, David	Tufto, Duane J.
Burton, George L.	Hordemann, John L.	Pickerel, Robert L.	Turnquist, Kenneth R.
Camyn, Roger L.	Hoy, Jon R.	Porter, Edwin L.	Wall, Ernest
Carman, Roland E.	James, Donald W.	Read, Harold E. Jr.	Walter, Jack M.
Carter, Charles H.	Jamison, Don C.	Repogle, Harold J.	Waterman, Paul W.
Clark, Norman R.	Johnson, Robert C. Jr.		

PRIVATES E-1

Anderson, Donald C.	Davidson, Robert V.	Lakewold, Kenton B.	Perry, Kenneth R.
Austin, Douglas M.	Elliott, Brantley R.	Lasz, Lloyd L.	Pierson, Ernest W.
Bagdon, Kenneth R.	Engle, Donald W.	Liming, Loren D.	Presnell, Robert K.
Barton, Edward L.	Falk, Theodore A.	Lucas, James W.	Quade, Stanley L.
Barton, Lawrance G.	Fode, Richard T.	Mace, William J.	Quine, William D.
Bell, William R.	Folland, Leonard E.	Malmoe, Orin M.	Reed, Terry L.
Bergman, Ronald L.	Forshee, Jack E.	Mason, Charles W.	Richardson, Richard E.
Bingman, Ivan E.	Friesen, Byrl G.	McConnell, Delmar C.	Rusk, Willard D.
Byrnes, Charles C.	Geiger, Clarence L.	McKenzie, William B.	Sheard, Donald
Carlos, Ernest W.	Geiselbright, Willard L.	Meagley, James A.	Stender, Edwin C.
Carlson, Mylon S.	Haye, Dale R.	Meyer, John E.	Stokes, Donald E.
Connors, David G.	Hearty, James R.	Meyer, Richard E.	Swanbeck, Arnold B.
Cronkhite, Frederick H.	Hooe, William I.	Miller, Lawrence P.	Swink, Elbert M.
Culton, Richard J.	Jacobs, James G.	Miller, Wayne A.	Triber, Darrell A.
Dahlberg, Richard W.	Johnson, Bruce W.	Milne, Robert D.	Wright, Lewis F.

110TH COMMUNICATION SQUADRON

FIRST LIEUTENANTS

Ferrell, James A. Zastrow, Laurence A.

SECOND LIEUTENANTS

Coldeen, GERALD E. Haislip, Thomas W. Lambert, Francis L. Peters, Joel B.

MASTER SERGEANTS E-7

Emerson, William J. Wilhelm, Henry

SERGEANTS E-6

Fredrick, Ernest J. Jr. Robbins, Clifford E. Tift, Paul W.

SERGEANTS E-5

Anderson, Lowell L. Chafee, Francis W. Grose, Vernon L. McRoberts, Harold H.
Baggett, Wallace R. Cram, Henry D. Hoffman, Frank T. Stone, Floyd R.
Brisbois, Clifford

SERGEANTS E-4

Bennett, Paul J. Fechner, Emil D. Grebe, Richard E. Hart, Gordon D.
Carlson, Glenn D. Ferrer, Rafael G. Grimes, Larry Schwartz, Robert D.
Dishman, Robert G.

CORPORAL E-3

Addy, John R. Griffin, Robert L. McTighe, Ronald E. Straub, Edwin A.
Biallas, James R. Ives, Edgar J. Peters, John E. Thomas, Harry C.
Bourbeau, Frank J. Kohl, Harry H. Sanders, James J. Weimer, Calvin H.
Cunningham, Karl W. Kulm, Harold H. Schmidt, Robert L.

PRIVATEES FIRST CLASS E-2

Abey, Clarence E. Jr. Butts, Wallace E. Meier, Lawrence B. Soehren, Marvin F.
Ahlin, Arnold C. Christenson, Donald E. Mikulecky, Dwight L. Sooy, Fred W.
Ambrose, Joseph F. Christenson, Robert A. Moos, Lester A. Souders, P. Barkley
Barnes, James D. Daniels, Harry R. Paggett, Frank L. Stone, Richard E.
Bartlett, Douglas H. Ensor, Laurence E. Perron, Carl E. Timm, Harvey D.
Birge, David K. Fitch, Eugene K. Smith, Boyd M. Truitt, Delbert W. Jr.
Brainard, Elbert C. McLeod, Robert N. Smith, Juel D. Wilson, Wayne E.
Broemeling, Vincent H.

PRIVATEES E-1

Hall, George W. Jr. King, Robert C. Smith, Robert E.

143RD AIRCRAFT CONTROL AND WARNING SQUADRON (C)

LIEUT. COLONEL

Brice, Jeane O.

CAPTAINS

Boynnton, George H.	Hollowwa, Roy W.	McCarty, Daniel L. S.	Tillman, Arnold A.
Farrow, Vern L.	Horngren, David A.	Peach, Samuel W.	Watt, Ross W. Jr.
Frease, Edgar L.	Huntley, Gerald B.	Rayton, Ronald C.	Wigen, Robert A.

FIRST LIEUTENANTS

Dalke, Harry	Jule, Wesley L.	Kuxhaus, Vernon
Hosken, James E.	King, Coen A.	Troetschel, William O.

SECOND LIEUTENANTS

Burns, Charles W. M.	Duerksen, Emerson P.	Halvorsen, Norman S.	McElhaney, John H.
Costello, Edward G.	Eisinga, Dirk Jr.	Herzog, Dale A.	Penn, Homer J.
Douglas, Willaim A.	Frost, John G.	Linkenbrink, Francis G.	Renfroe, William O.

WARRANT OFFICER JG W-2

Foster, Wallace C.

WARRANT OFFICER JG W-1

Schrey, Joseph L.

MASTER SERGEANTS E-7

Benjamin, Floyd T.	Johnson, Elbert R.	Stevens, Oliver H.
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TECH SERGEANT E-6

Devlin, Eugene T.

STAFF SERGEANTS E-5

Anderson, Leroy W.	Gorman, Robert L.	Morvee, Paul W.	Tannler, James R.
Bowers, Francis L.	Mahood, Charles L.	O'Malley, Earl T.	Weekes, Norvell E.
Dorn, Charles H.	McCall, Howard M.	Richardson, Weldon B.	Williams, Thomas A.

SERGEANTS E-4

Anthony, Lawrence R.	Dunn, Donald G.	Heald, Arthur F.	Moldenhauer, Heinz D.
Bannon, Frank H.	Dye, Richard L.	Hilton, Louis E.	Montague, Eugene A.
Belaja, Mike A.	Easterbrook, William E.	Hogan, Michael J.	Nishimori, Tairoku G.
Belsen, Arthur B.	Fandrich, Ernest	Mallory, Fred L.	Reeser, Ralph R.
Bonney, Brandon F.	Farmer, Richard E.	Marmsoler, Clyde A.	Solam, Morris
Burrill, Robert C.	Fredrickson, Ralph C.	Mathews, Allyn D.	Sizelove, Fred E.
Cholaj, Frank	Galloway, Robert L.	McCall, Charles W.	Tarica, David E.
Cisski, Irving E.	Gordon, Douglas L.	McMurtrey, Ronald E.	Tooker, Robert M.
Clement, William C.	Hamlin, Benjamin F.	Mildenberger, Michael	Williams, Leonard O.
Crisman, Gerald W.	Haug, Frain B.	Moe, Peder R.	

143RD AIRCRAFT CONTROL AND WARNING SQUADRON (C) (CONT'D)

CORPORALS E-3

Amdal, Solomon	Clary, James R.	Keeney, William E.	Schmutz, Charles J.
Anable, Ronald E.	Crawford, Billie C.	Kuffel, John D.	Selivanoff, Gennady M.
Audette, Joseph E.	Ely, Rudolph S.	Kutz, Robert L.	Shepherd, Peter E. K.
Balch, Herbert R.	Eshom, DuWayne H.	Lundin, Bernard E.	Singletary, Clifton Jr.
Bandle, Roy T.	Eskenazi, Sam I.	Miller, Ronald D.	Stoural, Willard A.
Bartholomew, Paul E.	Ferguson, Howard E.	Nelson, Leland F.	Takemoto, Fred M.
Benezra, Raymordt L.	Freeberg, Carlin H.	Olsen, James A.	Terry, Irvin L.
Bitseff, Edward L.	Giese, Clarence	Passey, Richard I.	Thomas, Jack W.
Blaine, George L.	Haven, Donald W.	Patenall, Thomas P.	Walker, Ivan R.
Bollman, Robert S.	Humphries, William E.	Porter, Roland L.	Wisbey, George W. Jr.
Brown, Willam L.	Huson, Leonard E.	Rhoads, Gerald L.	Woodman, Thomas H.
Capeloto, Joseph S.	Isaacson, Giles J.	Rockman, George W.	Zimmerman, Leroy A.
Carter, Donald L.	Jernigan, Noel W.	Rousso, Sam G.	

PRIVATEES FIRST CLASS E-2

Anderson, Duane I.	Fey, Earl S. Jr.	Martin, Curtis M.	Reynolds, Cecil H.
Anderson, Edward N.	Francisco, Grant E.	Marshall, Carol E.	Rhea, Herbert A.
Anderson, Frederick H.	Franks, William J.	Marshall, Gary N.	Schalin, Gerald L.
Bauman, Douglas L.	Fresonke, Keith G.	Mastor, John Jr.	Stief, Robert A.
Bauthues, Bjourney L. Jr.	George, Clayton B.	Mastor, Theodore J.	Stielow, Jack C.
Baxter, Robert L.	Green, Norman L.	Mercereau, Keith A.	Stranne, Douglas S.
Becker, Jack L.	Greenway, Lewis I.	Monroe, Richard A.	Stream, Robert S.
Benner, Theodore G.	Hammer, Reidar Jr.	Moye, Russell B.	Swaffield, Robert A.
Bennett, Carlton H.	Hardin, Glen R.	Murphy, Wallace W.	Taniguchi, Terou B.
Benton, Paul D.	Hildebrandt, Philip L.	Murray, Arthur C.	Thiele, Robert B.
Bland, Frankie L.	Hillius, Pearson C.	Murray, Jack F.	Todhunter, Frank E.
Bollman, David L.	Hinze, Gaylord W.	Neri, Frank A.	Trecker, Francis D.
Borchers, Donald E.	House, James T. Jr.	Nordquist, Arnold D.	Tripp, James M.
Brown, Ken G.	Hughes, Charles R.	Noteboom, Leroy M.	Verbarendse, Albert
Callahan, James M.	Iverson, John O.	Pearson, Rex A.	Vujovich, Robert N.
Campben, Ribhard J.	Jackson, Floyd M.	Perry, Wallace F.	Wallace, George W. Jr.
Chandler, Martin E.	Johnson, Rennie W.	Peterson, Wallace R.	Wear, Donald K.
Christy, Robert K.	Just, Richard L.	Pflugger, Roy F.	Webb, Keith T.
Cox, Everett G.	Koura, Kenso	Pirrung, John T.	Weir, John S.
Ebright, Maivin E.	Lallas, Louis T.	Porter, Robert F.	Whipple, Ronald R.
Elsner, Roger E.	Lynch, Edmond P.	Pulley, Cecil M.	Wood, William K.
Erickson, Andrew J.			

143RD AIRCRAFT CONTROL AND WARNING SQUADRON (C) (CONT'D)

PRIVATES E-1

Adsen, Jay R.	Hansen, James A.	Mechlenburg, Bruse W.	Shahan, Joseph B.
Anderson, Erornett R.	Hardan, William A.	Morris, Theodore H.	Shearer, Ralph T.
Brown, Duane M.	Hofferber, Robert W.	Morse, Martin B.	Simonds, Ralph S.
Brown, Floyd F. Jr.	Home, John L.	Olson, Richard A.	Smith, Jack K.
Christensen, Donald A.	Huson, McLain E.	Patterson, Gene A.	Strickland, Burl A.
Crape, Alfred C.	Irwin, Lawrence W.	Protteau, Daniel P.	Teed, Ronald L.
Davis, Charles B.	Kelley, Carlyn L.	Reeff, Leonard M.	Totten, James B.
Didlake, Jimmie P.	King, Russell D.	Robertson, Richard K.	Vik, George I.
Dunn, William A.	Kohler, Donald B.	Rodenburg, Franklin G.	Walker, James D.
Egaas, Stanley J.	Larsen, Marvin B.	Ross, John R.	Wallace, John E.
Flodin, Lyle D.	Lien, Allen W.	Russell, Albert L.	Wenger, Max E.
Franklin, Lawrence F.	Lockhart, Frank L.	Sammons, Maurice A.	Williams, Donald E.
Garries, Donald A.	Marchand, Leo L.	Samuelson, Donald W.	Wilson, George E.Jr.
Graham, Norman M.	McClellan, Howard E.	Schell, Melville A.	Yenne, George A.
Gruber, Garry R.	McNulty, Donnell D.	Scrimsher, Elwyn, L.	

110TH RADAR CALIBRATION DETACHMENT

CAPTAINS

Andriesen, Johanes M. Wallace, Edwin E.

FIRST LIEUTENANTS

Farnham, Alvin L. McFadden, George E. Mickelson, Martin C. Raher, John B.

SECOND LIEUTENANT

Carroll, John D.

MASTER SERGEANTS E-7

Burke, Robert E.

TECH. SGTS E-6

Hagen, Lawrence H. Thompson, Robert E.

STAFF SGT E-5

Vass, John A.

SERGEANTS E-4

Gerrodette, William E. Manty, Walter N. Myers, Harold E. Rhodes, Harold E.
Lewis, Eugene W. Massey, Hugh B. Nelson, Carl M.

CORPORALS E- 3

Adams, David C. Bennett, Richard L. Engebo, Ronald J. Nelson, Paul A.

PRIVATES 1ST CLASS E-2

Studeman, Jean A. Abel, Frank L.

PRIVATES E-1

Coons, Budd H. Prothero, Robert H.

610 SIGNAL LIGHT CONSTRUCTION SQUADRON

FIRST LIEUTENANTS

Napper, William D. Stacy, Don E.

MASTER SERGEANT E-7

Douglas, John E.

TECH SERGEANTS E-6

MacMillan, Allan H. McCleary, George M. Sparhawk, Donovan R. Taylor, John W.

STAFF SERGEANTS E-5

Barnard, Richard D. Malcolm, Joseph D. Patterson, James C. Stager, Clifford F.

SERGEANTS E-4

Adams, Royal D. Fish, Robert E. Kraft, Michael L. Roberts, Calvin A.
Blakeney, Ralph V. Haddican, Marlow E. McDaniel, Eugene E. Rostron, Donald S.
Denton, Gavin M. Holman, Leroy C.

CORPORALS E-3

Bigelow, Robert M. Galante, Raymond M. Olson, Harvey D. Sanford, Clayton L.
Esterbrook, Charles L. Hudson, Kenneth L. Rorden, Harold R. Tauntont, Ralph
Fenton, Roger J. Jr. McLarnan, Kirk M. Sakellaris, John G. Whitcomb, Gordon E.

PRIVATES 1ST CLASS E-2

Bolster, Kenneth W. Kerley, Samuel O. McEachern, Lawrence M. Rosenowm Delwyn L.
Brooke, Ralph C. Learn, Harvey W. Mullen, Ronald Z. Stanaway, Tom D.
Keegan, Dwight D. MacDonald, Bruse R. Opel, William R. Wolfer, Robert R.
Keesler, Donald E. McDaniel, Gene T.

PRIVATES E-1

Anderson, Floyd F. Chigaras, John N. Kiger, Whitman D. Rowbottom, Robert G.
Atkinson, Lloyd J. Curulla, Joseph J. Knowles, Thomas A. Simpson, Robert R.
Balcom, Bruce N. Dale, James M. Korsgaard, Gordon P. Slotvig, Keith A.
Baughman, Don R. Eidsvoog, Merle K. McCusker, Robert M. Smith, Lowell R.
Blackett, Lamar J. Evanson, Donald H. Nelson, Carsten C. Jr. Smith, Robert L.
Blanchard, Wayne A. Fuller, Richard L. Peyton, Grant J. Stenson, Vernell L.
Block, John V. Gronning, Harold J. Piper, Robert B. Stonecipher, Thomas J.
Bonesteel, Richard D. Holden, Kenneth M. Poole, Edward R. Walker, Robert L.
Buchman, Gaillard F. Hollingshead, Harry C. Rogers, Frederick K. Watts, Dale E.
Cameron, Bryant J.

HQ & HQ BTRY, 420TH AAA GUN BN

LIEUT. COLONEL

Green, Grant S.

MAJORS

Beebe, Albert H. Jr. Wheeler, Glynn E.

CAPTAINS

Holden, Donald P. Kerby, John B.

SECOND LIEUTENANT

Cook, Adrian B. Lee, Elbert C. Jr. Wagner, Melvin G.

WARRANT OFFICER W-2

Brooks, Arthur F.

WARRANT OFFICERS W-1

King, Nathan A. Scott, John A.

MASTER SERGEANTS E-7

Blaylock, Furman G. Matterson, Joseph D. Roy, Lester E.

SERGEANTS FIRST CLASS E-6

Christopher, Glenn M. Cooper, Harold M. McGillivray, Francis J. Smith, Welford H.

SERGEANTS E-5

Elsasser, Edward J. Lee, Dennis D Stewart, Clarence E Trusley, Clifford A.
Kelly, Marion L. Newland, Gail E. Stoican, Nicholas. Young, Robert A.
LeDuc, Clifford F. Palmer, William B.

CORPORALS E-4

Christman, William G. Ludwig, Donald F. McMillen, Allen R. Steiner, Ivan D.
Herin, Clemen E. Mahoney, William A. Menard, Lee H. Jr. Yeaman, Kenneth D.
Linden, Eldred G.

PRIVATE FIRST CLASS E-3

Barbee, Robert A. Kellio, Willard J. Nye, Jack E. Rose, Kenneth C.
Friedline, James G. Kellio, William E. Ray, Elmer J.

PRIVATE E-2

Bates, Thomas H. Gress, Melvin R. Peterson, William E. Sell, Charles L.
Bro, Ive D. Ham, Dale W. Pieti, Leslie L. Stohr, Robert S.
Flick, James B. Logan, Alton W. Romans, Cecil P. Vetter, Lester H.
Carrecht, Richard W. Lucas, Frank J.

PRIVATE E-1

Holthaus, Wilfred F. Mullins, John L.

BTRY A, 420TH AAA GUN BN

CAPTAIN

Pratt, Richard H.

FIRST LIEUTENANT

Selvinoff, Vladimar M.

SECOND LIEUTENANT

Eklund, Frank A. Jr.

MASTER SERGEANTS E-7

Ellis, Gordon L. Sherry, Lloyd J.

SERGEANTS FIRST CLASS E-6

Cyr, Kenneth W. Ehlert, Ewald O. Netland, Robert Rooney, William L.
Easter, Orville A. Dumler, Conrad E.

SERGEANTS E-5

Andring, Richard J. Easter, Dwight M. Jenks, Norman T. Pister, Curt D.
Glose, Willard Hernandez, Andrew McGaw, Milan G. Stanton, Richard D.
Detty, Leslie E.

CORPORALS E-4

Alberts, David L. Graham, Delbert L. Lane, William J. Miller, Darryl K.
Bennett, Robert E. Herberg, Marlin J. Larez, Tony Moss, Robert E.
Burchfield, Jim W. Kardack, Richard J. Lidke, Carl L.

PRIVATES FIRST CLASS E-3

Assink, Gene Elms, William A. Hunt, Francis A. Rupert, Kenneth D.
Davis, Franklin D.

PRIVATES E-2

Andrews, Hershel D. Fosburgh, Robert W. May, Walter L. Snyder, Damian J.
Brown, Max N. Hall, J. W. Melton, Paul W. Swanson, Gerald N.
Cantrell, Leo E. Hallingstad, Jack A. Morrison, Hayden H. Tidd, Billy R.
Cox, Eidwell E. Hammermeister, Eugene H. Parnell, Keith R. Tidd, Darrell L.
Cox, Roy E. Krienke, Sam R. Sandberg, Donald J. White, Wayne R.
Crosier, Ellwood B. Lane, Thomas L. Sewell, William E.

PRIVATES E-1

Blehm, J. B. Conner, Gene V. Steinke, Elmo L. T. Jr. Straube, Kenneth L.
Chambers, Charles W. Early, James D.

BTRY B, 420TH AAA GUN BN

FIRST LIEUTENANTS

Campbell, Duane W.

SECOND LIEUTENANT

Matthews, Clifford R. Wyckoff, Charles A.

MASTER SERGEANTS E-7

Nessly, Laurence D.

SERGEANTS FIRST CLASS E-6

Connant, James E. Shields, Jerald R. Taylor, Dalton B.

SERGEANTS E-5

England, Harley H. Kimmel, Larry M. Paradis, Ernest G. Sills, Ben A.
Hutchinson, Robert E. Ouderkirk, Louis E. Rudd, Conrad A. Warriner, Lester L.

CORPORALS E-4

Conant, Robert E. Fish, Robert B. Kilian, Herman Jr. Van Patter, Maurice W.
Cortez, Rodolpho M. Hutton, Alfred L. Schneider, Abie

PRIVATE FIRST CLASS E-3

Hutchinson, William D. Peterson, Robert L. Schumacher, Julius J. Sizemore, Taylor J.
MacKenzie, Joe C. Fulliam, Dewite D. Short, William D. Wegner, Mark J.
Manka, Ronald G. Sartain, Albert L.C.

PRIVATE E-2

Folkman, Don R. Kuatt, Lonnie L. Laughlin, Eugene D. Price, Dean M.
Gregory, Robert R. Lalka, Daniel Linker, Terr F. Smith, Clair
Jacobson, Leo E.

PRIVATE E-1

Hendricks, Elmer S. Lane, David D. Williams, Doyle D. Wilson, Donald D.
Korrell, Louis C. Watson, Lorin R. Willson, Don E.

BTRY C, 420TH AAA GUN BN

CAPTAIN

Murtagh, William F.

FIRST LIEUTENANT

Schell, Jacob J.

WARRANT OFFICER W-1

Sutton, Robert L.

MASTER SERGEANTS E-7

Taylor, Joseph E. Risher, Francis J.Jr.

SERGEANTS FIRST CLASS E-6

Stahl, Cloyd Jr. Wallace, Melvin C.

SERGEANTS E-5

Baird, Robert T. Moszeter, Erviri L. Patton, Lewis E. Still, Charles S. Jr
Butler, Otho G.

CORPORALS E-4

Ashlemann, Fred A. Kelly, Edward J. McKimmy, Gradon L. Olmstead, Raymond C.
Hause, John R. McEwen, William H. Ocker, Lyle D.

PRIVATES FIRST CLASS E-3

Abella, William F. Bowles, Ralph E. Morris, James E. Thomas, William E.
Ashelman, Perry E. Kelley, Elmo R. Sainsbury, Robert K. Wells, James W.
Barthlow, Donald C. Lancaster, Haskell W. Strong, Allen M.

PRIVATES E-2

Aldrich, Alwood Heming, Rollin J. Plumlee, Richard W. Ruiz, Louie F.
Butler, Ronald. D. Jackson, George W. Potter, Raymond H.

PRIVATES E-1

Adams, Darwin L. Carr, Bobby G. Morgan, Claud M. Morris, Roy D.
Anderson, Delbert W. Hubert, Allen G.

BTRY D, 420TH AAA GUN BN

FIRST LIEUTENANTS

Davidson, Paul B.

SECOND LIEUTENANT

Walker, James A. Jr.

WARRANT OFFICER W-1

Yearout, James L.

MASTER SERGEANTS E-7

Keene, Harvey S.

SERGEANTS E-6

Dahl, Rex A.

Lomax, Clyde M.

Whitmore, Robert W.

SERGEANTS E-5

Boies, Frank L.

Hubbard, Gerald O.

Levine, John B.

Post, Ellsworth W. Jr.

Comer, Taylor W. Jr.

Hughes, Albert G.

Lewis, Stanley L.

Strahsburg, Eldon L.

Farragher, Milton A.

Kempf, Lawrence L.

Lucus, Robert L.

CORPORALS E-4

Alexander, John A. Jr.

Felton, Ward L.

Kiessling, Donald E.

Paris, Joe B.

Aman, Loyd R.

Galbreath, John F.

Ishmael, Ray L.

Schreier, George I. Jr.

Amstadt, Carl J.

Gale, Donald C.

Lawton, Thomas R.

Schreier, Robert D.

Barger, Reece

Garner, Arthur J.

Miller, Glenn B.

Sorrels, Ivie N.

Champagne, Martin H.

Higley, Clyde O.

Miller, Lloyd E.

Wamsley, James R.

Eakin, Tom W.

Hubbard, Dale R.

Oliver, James M.

Wilcoxson, Joseph T.

PRIVATE FIRST CLASS E-3

Ashby, Bruce A.

Jones, Darrell E.

McQueen, William L. Jr.

Rice, William E.

Davis, Harold A.

Kirley, Lytle W.

Merrill, Norm D.

Roberts, Keith B.

Donahue, Bernard A. Jr.

Lindquist, Elmer E. Jr.

Nix, Norm D.

Robertson, Arland S.

Flynn, Elvin L.

Low, Truman R.

Rau, Melvin O.

Sebring, Howard I.

Galbreath, James H.

Manning, Welsey L.

Raymond, Hobart E.

Stordahl, Wesley D.

Jons, Keith W.

Massingale, Kenneth

PRIVATE E-2

Bauder, Milo B.

Houger, Monte A.

Nelligan, Gale L.

Stroh, Philip R.

Godel, Myron E.

Lucus, Ray G.

Rudningen, Gale L.

Wilson, Lonnie L.

Hall, Robert M.

MED DET., 420TH AAA GUN BN

SERGEANT FIRST CLASS

Rutherford, Louis J.

SERGEANT

Carr, John H.

CORPORALS

Kastel, Robert L.

Ochs, Raymond L.

PRIVATES FIRST CLASS E-3

Hesseltine, Ronald A.

Sleight, Donald B.

PRIVATES E-2

Burnham, John W.

Muncy, James O.

Parker, Wayne E.

TOTAL INDUCTED: 266 Officers
 15 Warrant Officers
 1828 Enlisted men
GRAND TOTAL: 2,109

The 420th AAA Gun Battalion, following its induction into Federal Service on 1 May 1951, was ordered to Fort Bliss, Texas where the battalion remained until ordered back to home stations in December of 1952. All units of this Battalion were released from Federal Service on 19 December 1952 and reverted to State control the following day. Many of its members elected to remain on active duty with other Anti-Aircraft units.

The 116th Fighter Interceptor Squadron, following its induction into Federal Service on February 1, 1951, was assigned to the 81st Fighter Wing at Larson Air Force Base. They continued their training there in F-84 Thunder Jets from Geiger Field until equipped with F-86A Sabre Jets, following which the Squadron was ordered to England to bolster NATO forces in Europe. The 116th had the distinction of being the first USAF Fighter Squadron to fly the North Atlantic as a tactical unit. The Squadron returned to the United States in November of 1952 following which it reverted to state control.

Following entry into Federal Service the 142nd Fighter Interceptor Wing was transferred to O'Hare International Airport in Chicago, Illinois where it served until released to State control on 1 December 1952. The 160th A C & W Group and the 141st Air Control and Warning Squadron were transferred to Elmendorf Air Force Base, Alaska. Following their return to the United States on 1 December 1952 they were released from Federal service.

The 110th Communications Squadron supplemented the Air Material Command units and the 560th Air Force Band hopped around the Northwest providing entertainment for the Armed Services. These units were also released to State control on 1 December 1952. Many of the men originally inducted with these Air National Guard units were transferred to other Air Force units and continued in active Federal service until the cessation of hostilities in Korea.

In the meantime in Korea, following the invasion by Northern Koreans on 25 June 1950, the Eighth United States Army in the months that followed were filled with bitter reverses, gallant defenses, spectacular advances, sudden blows, and more withdrawals for the United Nations forces. The enemy's advances in July had forced the U S Eighth Army to withdraw to a relatively small perimeter in the vicinity of Pusan at the southeast tip of the Korean peninsula. Here, as several of the United Nations other than the United States sent in reinforcements, the beleaguered troops made a gallant and successful stand throughout the grim summer of 1950. Then, on 15 Sept. 1950, when the allied forces made their spectacular amphibious envelopment of Inch' on, on Korea's west coast about half-way between the 37th and 38th parallels, the tide of war abruptly turned in favor of the United Nations. The South Korean capitol city of Seoul was recaptured; and the troops broke out of the Pusan perimeter. As the North Koreans fled northward the UN forces crossed the 38th parallel in hot pursuit. They scored a series of victories until late November 1950, when they launched an offensive directed toward seizing the line of the Yalu River, the boundary between North Korea and Manchuria, and ending the conflict.

But now the tide of war changed once again. Some Chinese Communist "volunteer" forces, crossing from Manchuria, struck in strength. They halted the UN advance, then forced a withdrawal.

The two principal ground commands, the US Eighth Army and the US X Corps, had been physically separated from each other when the Chinese struck. The Eighth Army was in the western portion of the Korean Peninsula, the X Corps in the east, with towering mountains between. Both had been operating directly under the United Nations Command in Tokyo, which was led by General MacArthur, who in turn received orders from President Truman and the US Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington acting as Executive agents of the United Nations Security Council.

December 1950, was a period of withdrawal and reorganization. All UN troops withdrew rapidly to the south with Chinese forces in pursuit. The X Corps, valiantly resisting the enemy in the bitter cold of the northeastern mountains, made its way to Hungnam on the northeast coast. From there UN Naval forces took it safely off in one of the greatest evacuations in all history. The corps was brought to the vicinity of Pusan for reorganization.

Meanwhile, in mid-December, the UN commanders selected a defense line for the Eighth Army. Lying generally along the 38th parallel, it started from the flats of the Han River delta south of the parallel, ran northeastward along the Imjin River, then bent eastward through steep mountains to the Sea of Japan. By the end of 1950, enemy forces estimated at nearly half a million men were poised in the snow-covered mountains along the 38th parallel.

On 30 December 1950, General MacArthur warned the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the Chinese Communist forces, could, if they desired to make the effort, drive the United Nations forces out of Korea. The United States Government, though anxious to avoid a full-scale war in Korea, was also determined to resist the Chinese-North Korean aggressors. Therefore, MacArthur was ordered to defend his positions, to retire, if forced, through a series of defense lines as far as the old perimeter around Pusan, to inflict as much damage on the enemy as possible, and to maintain his units intact. Though no one wished to evacuate Korea, MacArthur was authorized to withdraw his troops to Japan if that drastic measure proved necessary to avoid severe losses. At this time, his forces for Korean operations included the US Eighth Army with attached troops from nine other United Nations, the Army of the Republic of Korea, the Far East Air Forces, and the Far East Naval Forces.

To Lieut. Gen. Matthew B. Ridgeway, who replaced the late General Walton H. Walker as commander of the Eighth US Army on 26 December 1951, MacArthur passed on the orders to defend positions, inflict maximum damage to the enemy, and maintain units intact. Within this framework he vested Ridgeway with complete authority to plan and execute operations in Korea and ceased the close supervision he had formerly exercised over the Eighth Army and the X Corps. He assigned the X Corps to the Eighth Army so that for the first time since the X Corps landed at Inch' on the Eighth Army commander controlled all UN ground troops in Korea. By now 15 of the United Nations, the United States, Great Britain, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, India, South Africa, France, Greece, the Netherlands, the Philippines, Thailand, Turkey, Belgium, and Sweden had troops in Korea.

General Ridgeway commanded about 365,000 men. The largest single contingent was the Army of the Republic of Korea, which was under his control but not part of the Eighth Army. The next largest force was the Eighth Army to which certain US Air Force, US Marine Force and several United Nations units, including Koreans, were attached. The UN Command estimated that about 486,000 enemy troops, or twenty-one Chinese and twelve North Korean divisions, were committed to the Korean front and that reserves totaling over one million men were stationed near the Yalu, in Manchuria, or on the way to Manchuria.

In establishing the defense line along the 38th parallel in late December, Gen. Ridgeway concentrated the bulk of his Eighth Army forces in the relatively flat central and west sectors because it was obvious that the enemy was concentrating strong forces above Seoul. Major General Frank W. Milburn's I Corps held the left (West) sector south of the Imjin River; on the right (east) of the I Corps, Major General John B. Coulter's IX Corps held the center. (The I Corps consisted of the US 25th Infantry Division, the Republic of Korea (ROK) 1st Infantry Division, the Turkish Brigade, the 29th British Infantry Brigade; the IX Corps included the US 1st Cavalry Division, 24th Infantry Division, the ROK 6th Infantry Division, the 27th British Commonwealth Brigade, and the Greek and Philippine Battalions.) Because it was believed that the mountainous land in the east could be more easily held than the western portion of the Peninsula, a seventy-mile mountain front was first assigned to the weakened ROK II Corps and the newly committed, inexperienced ROK III Corps. Shortly afterwards these were reinforced by the ROK I Corps with the crack ROK Capital Division. The US X Corps, under the command of Major General Edward M. Almond, was reorganizing in the vicinity of Pusan. The 1st Marine Division, until recently a part of the X Corps, was held in army reserve.

At daybreak on 1 January 1951, after a night of incessant mortar and artillery bombardment all along the line, enemy soldiers struck southward through minefields and barbed wire in great force. They attacked along the entire front but directed their major effort against the US I and IX Corps in the west and center. Seven Chinese Communist armies and two North Korean Corps penetrated deeply toward Seoul and the rail and road center of Wonju, in the central sector. (Note: Chinese Army is equivalent in strength to a US Corps) The only units escaping the fury of the attack were the US 25th Division and the Turkish Brigade, on the extreme left and the ROK Capital Division on the east coast.

As the offensive gained momentum General Ridgeway reluctantly ordered the UN forces to pull back to a line which ran along the south bank of the frozen Han River to Yangp'yong, thence to the Sea of Japan through Hong'chon and Chumunjin. This line included a crescent-shaped bridgehead around Seoul which was intended to delay the enemy armies and deny them the Han River bridges. Coordinating their move with the retiring ROK forces in the east, the I and IX Corps pulled back to the Seoul bridge-head line. The US X Corps (2nd and 7th Infantry Divisions) reentered the fight on 2 January; next day it assumed control of three additional ROK divisions in a new corps zone on the central front between the US IX and the ROK III Corps. UN forces now presented a stronger, more solid front, than they had in the tragic month of November 1950 when the Chinese had struck the widely separated Eighth Army and X Corps.

With three enemy armies comprising a total of nine divisions astride the northern approaches to Seoul, and a division from each of two adjacent armies in position to exploit successes, the South Korean capital was imminently threatened. The enemy, evidently sure that he would not be seriously opposed, followed up successes much faster than before and though the Eighth Army fought hard, it could not check the advance.

In the belief that standing in place would invite destruction, General Ridgeway decided to withdraw instead of holding his present line. Withdrawal offered the chance to preserve the UN forces and to capitalize on the fact that the enemy's logistical capabilities did not match his tactical abilities.

This weakness had been noted in China when the Communists' attacks against the Nationalist forces had invariably slowed down, then stalled after the first blow, presumably while the attacking units were resupplied and reinforced. The Chinese attacks against the American Forces in November had followed the same pattern. Lacking complete motorized transport, and using pack horses, ox carts, and

human backs to bring up supply, the enemy had outran his supply lines and was forced to pause above the 38th parallel before continuing the attack.

Ridgeway decided to roll with the punch according to MacArthur's orders to maintain his units intact and to achieve "maximum punishment, maximum delay". UN forces would damage the enemy as much as possible while withdrawing to carefully selected defensive positions. When the attack stalled, the UN troops could strike back before the enemy's supplies and reinforcements came up.

As the enemy intensified his attacks and began crossing the ice of the Han River both east and west of Seoul, it became clear that the capital city bridgehead could not be held. Ridgeway ordered another withdrawal south to a line in the vicinity of the 37th parallel. This line ran from P'yongt'aek on the Seoul-Taejon highway east through Ansong, northeast of Wonju, thence in a curving, irregular fashion to the east coast town of Samch'ok. The US I and IX Corps were first to occupy intermediate positions in front of Suwon, about sixteen miles south of Seoul, to cover the removal of great stocks of supplies. Movement to the new line began on 3 January 1951, with bumper-to-bumper columns of vehicles jamming the roads.

With the advancing enemy hard on their heels, the UN troops had no time to save 500,000 gallons of fuel and 23,000 gallons of napalm at Kimpo Airfield west of Seoul. These were burned in a great holocaust, as were barracks, hangars, and other military installations.

On 4 January 1951, South Korean Government officials and UN troops pulled out of Seoul as the points of enemy columns entered it from the north. Incendiaries set to work, and office buildings, hotels and shacks burned. Smoke swirled through the streets as civilians who had waited until the end in the hope that the capital might be saved stumbled along in a haze of wind-whipped embers. When the civil police left, bands of looters ranged the city. All during the day columns of UN jeeps, trucks, staff cars, and soldiers poured south over two engineer bridges that spanned the Han. Refugees clogged the single footbridge that was spared them. That night huge clouds of black smoke billowed up into the bleak winter sky as Seoul changed hands for the third time in a little over six months.

At the front the US I and IX Corps fell back to their immediate positions on the P'yongt'aek-Samch'ok line after the supplies at Suwon had been removed and the airfield installations burned. Osan, where the 24th US Division had begun its heroic delaying action almost six months before, was abandoned. But now the Chinese attacks in the west tapered off; the enemy pushed light forces south of Seoul but did not follow up in force. As the UN units withdrew farther south, contact with the enemy diminished sharply. Consequently, on 7 January, even before the I and IX Corps had occupied their new positions, the US 27th Infantry (the "Wolfhound" regiment) of the 25th Division, reinforced with field artillery, tanks, engineers, and two air force liaison parties pushed north from P'yongt'aek toward Osan without finding an enemy soldier. A IX Corps patrol went as far as Ich'on, east of Suwon, and met only scattered enemy detachments. Local patrols along the western front made no contact.

Now that Seoul had fallen, many enemy units shifted eastward to concentrate on driving through the rough, mountainous land along the Hongch'on-Hoeng'song-Wonju axis. Success in this area would place the enemy in position to attack southwestward behind the US I and IX Corps. Further, this attack threatened the railroad and highway between Rongch'on and Pusan, the main north-south supply route. The capture of Wonju, moreover, would seriously limit UN movement in central Korea. Thus when Rongch'on and Roengsong were abandoned and the US X Corps retired in coordination with the withdrawals of the I and IX Corps to the P'yongt'aek-Samchock line, the enemy quickly followed up with strong attacks at Wonju.

Wonju was defended by elements of the US 2nd Division. This unit had suffered severe losses when it screened the Eighth Army withdrawal in North Korea in late 1950. Now reconstituted and strengthened by the French and Dutch Battalions, the "Indianheads" showed their mettle by making a stand on high ground immediately south of Wonju and holding in the face of repeated assaults by at least two divisions.

January produced some of the worst weather of the winter and air support was seriously limited. On 10 January, for example, the Far East Air Force could fly no close-support sorties. On other days

during the period F-80 and F-84 jets skimmed the tops of hills through snow flurries and clouds to give what support they could. Thus lacking complete air support, and fighting in temperatures as low as 25 degrees below zero, the men of the 2nd Division hurled back all the enemy's assaults and counterattacked time and time again through knee-deep snow. But this defense was not enough. The almost total disintegration of the line of the 2nd Division's right forced abandonment of Wonju. During this action the division was commanded by Major General Robert B. McClure to 13 January, the thereafter by Major General Clark L. Ruffner.

By 10 January large numbers of the enemy flooded through the gap to the 2nd Division's right and infiltrated the ROK III Corps, while enemy guerrillas harried the supply lines. To meet this threat, Ridgeway ordered Major General Oliver P. Smith to move his 1st Marine Division from the vicinity of Masam on the South coast northward to prevent enemy penetration from north of the Andong-Yongdok road on the east and to protect the supply routes to the ROK units.

With the central and eastern sectors seriously threatened, the west was now comparatively quiet. Patrols of the US I and IX Corps ranged north in attempts to make contact with the enemy. Air reconnaissance in front of the I Corps revealed a build-up of enemy troops and supplies between Suwon and Osan, astride the main highway from Seoul to Taejon and Taegu. This coupled with police reports of large groups of guerrillas between Taejon and Yongdong, indicated the enemy might renew his attack along the main route to southeast Korea. But ground sightings and contact in the I Corps sector were so few that it seemed the enemy was moving at night and avoiding roads, or that the bulk of his forces was moving eastward.

Clearly, General Ridgeway needed more exact information about the enemy. To attempt to reestablish contact in the west, and to force the diversion of some forces from the X Corps sector, he planned Operation "WOLFHOUND" a reconnaissance in force in the I Corps Sector. Accordingly, the 27th Infantry was again reinforced with field artillery, tanks and Engineers and ordered north.

The task force struck northward in the early morning hours of 15 January. A Battalion from the 3rd US Infantry Division covered its right flank, while other units to the west delivered local covering attacks. Blown bridges and other obstacles that the withdrawing UN troops had set up were the chief impediments to the advance. As the task force moved north along the Seoul highway towards Osan, it passed over bare frozen hills and through deserted villages where an occasional solitary civilian might be seen dimly beside his ruined home. Thin wisps of smoke showed the presence of other human beings in this barren land, but investigating patrols found only more wretched South Koreans huddling around small fires. Not a single enemy soldier was encountered until the task force reached a point just south of Osan, where it met and exchanged shots with a small enemy detachment, which then fled.

Advancing in two columns, the task force converged on Suwon the next day, 16 January, and met machine gun fire about 800 yards south of the ancient city. But by now the high command was satisfied, and ordered the task force to withdraw about twelve miles southward.

Another reconnaissance by elements of the 1st Cavalry Division also indicated minor troops in their front. This reconnaissance and Operation "WOLFHOUND" further demonstrated that the enemy did not occupy any positions close to the front lines of the US I and IX Corps in strength. Therefore General Ridgeway scheduled a still larger operation, THUNDERBOLT, for 25 January 1951. This operation was to be another reconnaissance in force, with each US Corps authorized to use one US Division and one ROK regiment. Since the terrain in the coastal sector was flatter and the road network denser, the I Corps planned to use five columns of infantry and armor, while the IX Corps employed but two. The operation was to be a methodical, coordinated advance designed to push through the area south of the Han River and seek out the enemy.

On the first day of THUNDERBOLT (26 January 1961) six of the seven participating columns proceeded against scattered resistance. Only the Turkish Brigade east of Osan encountered stiff opposition. By nightfall elements of the US 35th Infantry, 25th Division, were on the south edge of Suwon, and in the US IX Corps zone a column reached Ich'on and took up positions north and east of the town. UN air units meanwhile coordinated their close support missions, armed reconnaissance, and

interdictory attacks with the fire and movement of the advancing ground elements. General Ridgeway requested UN Naval forces to intensify their offshore patrolling along the west coast in order to prevent any amphibious infiltration of the army's left flank.

The support furnished by the air forces was most effective during this period. When Eighth Army foot elements flushed elusive enemy soldiers into the open, UN aircraft closed in to destroy them. Air strikes softened up points of resistance almost as fast as they developed. Most important was the damage inflicted upon Communist supply lines by air power, which, according to air intelligence estimates, kept as much as 80 percent of the enemy's supplies from reaching front lines. The enemy now had to move not only ammunition but food down from the north, for local rice stockpiles had been removed or destroyed by withdrawing UN forces or burned during the fighting, and he could no longer live off the countryside.

During the rest of the month of January 1951 the US I and IX Corps advanced slowly as all units proceeded cautiously and methodically, ridge by ridge, phase line by phase line, to clear out enemy soldiers. UN task forces advanced a limited distance each day. The tanks, "quad 50's" (multiple anti-aircraft machine guns mounted on half tracks), and field artillery would cover a certain number of hills with fire; and the infantry, under this cover, would sweep the same ground clean. Each pocket of resistance was wiped out before the next coordinated advance was made. The Eighth Army commander insisted that UN forces maintain a solid front, for an attempt to advance only in road bound columns would surely invite the enemy to drive down the ridgelines between roads to UN rear areas.

During the first days of THUNDERBOLT the enemy launched a few small night counterattacks, but in general fought only outpost actions. Prisoners of war reported that only two divisions of the Chinese Communist 50th Army occupied a front of nearly thirty miles, a strong indication that it had a screening mission.

But by 30 January resistance had stiffened, and the enemy began launching counterattacks in battalion strength. Hostile machine gun, mortar, and artillery fire north and northwest of Suwon increased, and in some sectors Chinese, armed only with grenades and sticks of dynamite, attacked. But the enemy still fought a delaying action. The US 3rd Division had joined the battle on 27 January, and as the operation continued it developed from a reconnaissance in force to a full-scale attack. Eighth Army troops were not only finding and destroying the enemy but were taking ground and holding it.

Then came indications that the extended frontage of the Chinese Communist 50th Army was being greatly reduced. Identified from west to east across both corps' zones were the 148th, 149th and 150th Divisions of the Chinese 50th Army, the North Korean 8th Division and the 112th, 113th, and 114th Divisions of the Chinese Communist 38th Army. UN air observers warned of numerous freshly dug enemy foxholes along the Inch'on-Yongdungp'o highway, and on the last day of January the US I Corps advanced less than a mile, with some units engaging in hand to hand fighting. Nevertheless, UN armor spearheads probed aggressively towards Seoul, their way paved by massed Eighth Army artillery, bombing and napalm attacks, and naval gunfire that included the 16-inch rifles of the US Battleship MISSOURI. During Operation THUNDERBOLT, the Eighth Army was for the first time able to bring the full weight of two major weapons - armor and artillery - to bear on the Chinese enemy. In return, the enemy increased the size and strength of counterattacks. Columns of UN tanks and other vehicles found roads heavily mined and defensive mortar and artillery fire dropped into UN lines with mounting intensity.

The enemy resisted vigorously until 9 February, then abruptly gave way. Patrols that penetrated to a point three miles east of Inch'on reported no enemy activity. Other patrols raced north through a heavy snowstorm, past abandoned foxholes and frozen rice paddies, to the Han River without contact. Task forces from the US 25th Division made an 11,000 yard advance the following day to secure Inch'on and Kimpo Airfield without firing a shot. By nightfall on 10 February, the US I Corps closed up to the south bank of the Han River and UN Troops looked across at the Capital City.

Although no massive amphibious invasion had been necessary to recapture Inch'on, the UN demolitions during the January evacuation were so completely that the port looked as if it had suffered

another such destructive operation. The city was three-quarters destroyed. Piers were smashed and battered; barbed wire entanglements and twisted metal blocked the streets; buildings were blackened and deserted. At Kimpo hundreds of charred 55-gasoline drums, which withdrawing UN troops had set afire, still littered the bomb-pocked runways, and the hangars were now but gaunt skeletons.

On the central front, meanwhile, UN armored patrols reached Wonju, now deserted except for a few civilians. Since there was little activity in the center and east at the end of January, Ridgeway ordered the US X Corps to create diversionary efforts to the north. Elements of the corps accordingly pushed toward Hoeng'song along the Wonju-Hoeng'song road, and captured the town on 2 February against slight resistance. But presence of the North Korean II and V Corps in the vicinity foreshadowed stiffer opposition to a farther advance northward.

The time now seemed ripe for more ambitious efforts. Ridgeway instructed the X Corps and the ROK III Corps to initiate an attack similar to that being so successfully carried out in the zones of the US I and IX Corps. The plan called for the ROK 5th and 8th Divisions of the X Corps to spearhead enveloping attacks on Hongch'on in order to disrupt the regrouping of North Korean forces south of the town. At the same time ROK III Corps units would advance in the central-east zone to protect the X Corps' right flank.

This attack, called Operation ROUNDUP, began on 5 February, and all units moved forward without opposition on the first day. By nightfall on the sixth, however, the ROK 5th and 8th Divisions were both meeting resistance. The former, on the right, found the going particularly difficult northeast of Hoeng'song. Moreover, ROK III Corps units to the east could not keep pace with the advances in the central zone, and by 8 February strong North Korean forces were hitting the right flank of the US X Corps. The ROK 5th Division therefore took up blocking positions along the exposed flank, and the ROK 3rd Division was given the mission of continuing the envelopment of Hoeng'song from the east.

For several days, pressure on the US X Corps increased steadily and signs pointed to a large enemy build-up on its front. UN troops encountered mine fields and booby-trapped foxholes. Although the enemy was definitely on the defensive he began launching stronger counterattacks all along the line. In some cases the enemy seemed to be trying to entice UN troops into attacking. Air observers reported the presence of large enemy groups north of the boundary between IX and X Corps and of other groups moving south and east of Hoeng'song. In addition, UN intelligence thought it probable that the enemy had shifted the bulk of his forces in the west to the west central zone, and the threat of a counter-offensive there became more likely as US I and IX Corps closed up the Han River.

This threat materialized on the night of 11-12 February, when elements of the Chinese Communist 40th and 66th Armies and the North Korean V Corps struck violently in subzero weather against the ROK 3rd, 5th and 8th Divisions, north of Hoeng'song. Signaling his attack with bugle calls, whistles and the beating of drums, the enemy made immediate penetrations and forced the ROK Divisions to withdraw rapidly. Large enemy groups moved southeast through the snow-clogged, ice-glazed mountains in the battle zone, and air observers reported numerous enemy road blocks behind UN lines. The three ROK divisions attempted to build a defensive line just north of Hoeng'song, but the situation had already deteriorated to a point where an organized defense was impossible. Only remnants of the ROK 5th and 8th Divisions remained. One regiment of the ROK 3rd Division north of Hoeng'song was surrounded, UN units became disorganized and individuals streamed southward, fighting desperately to break through the road blocks. Hoeng'song was abandoned on 13 February, as Eighth Army troops battled their way south toward Wonju. This tiny village, no more than a few thatched-roofed huts clustered in a valley surrounded by snow-covered rocky peaks, happened to be the junction of several roads, and as such was a keystone of the central zone. If it fell the entire Eighth Army front might be endangered. The 23rd Infantry of the US 2nd Division and the French Battalion formed a defensive perimeter on a ring of low hills immediately around the town, and by mid-morning of the 14th they were surrounded by a force later estimated to have comprised three Chinese Communist divisions. For three days the stalwart UN troops fiercely defended the Chip'yong'ni road junction against repeated assaults as enemy fire poured in on them from the surrounding mountains.

UN Air Forces dropped food and ammunition to the beleaguered men and destroyed hundreds of enemy troops with strafing and napalm attacks. Even at night, aircraft were able to give a measure of support by using magnesium flares to illuminate the battlefield. American and French ground troops were fighting gallantly when an armored task force from US 5th Cavalry Regiment ran the gauntlet of enemy fire to join them. The following day when weary American and French soldiers climbed out of their foxholes they found that pressure had melted away.

During the action at Chip'yong'ni, some twelve miles of front had lain totally undefended between Chip'yong'ni and a point southwest of Wonju. Two units of the US IX Corps, the ROK 6th Division and the 27th Commonwealth Brigade, hurriedly moved in to fill the gap. Although the time lag in getting them to their assigned sectors could have been exploited by the enemy, he apparently was more intent on driving on the road junctions at Chip'yong'ni and Wonju, and the IX Corps filled the hole before he could act.

While UN soldiers were thus bitterly defending in the central and central west sectors, strong North Korean forces had attacked northeast of Wonju in an attempt presumably to recapture P'yongch'ang. This attempt was believed to be an effort secondary to the major thrust in the US X Corps zone, but the North Koreans soon made a deep penetration east of Wonju and drove to within ten kilometers of Chech'on to expose the right flank of the X Corps once more. General Ridgeway had to muster all resources to contain the enemy salient. Elements of the US 7th Division and remnants of the recently disorganized ROK 3rd and 5th Divisions hastily formed a defensive line north of Chech'on. The situation was unstable for several days but the enemy's southward surge near Chech'on was at least temporarily arrested.

At the same time the US I and IX Corps were gradually taking all the ground up the Han River in their zones to the west. Some I Corps units were in position along the south bank west of Seoul. Here the action was confined largely to patrolling and duels between UN tanks and enemy self-propelled guns located across the river. Several ROK patrols attempted to slip over to the north bank, but were driven back by artillery and mortar fire. The South Korean capital was reported to be bristling with enemy troops, and it was estimated that the Chinese Communist 50th Army, numbering approximately 18,000 men, was in the city itself, while the North Korean 8th and 47th Infantry and 17th Mechanized Divisions, totaling about 19,800 men, were in the vicinity.

The enemy still retained a sizeable foothold south of the Han, generally between Seoul and Yangp'yong. Although he defended it resolutely, troops of both US Corps were steadily narrowing it down. On the night of 13-14 February, a powerful enemy counterattack from the bridgehead pushed between two UN units and plunged into I Corps rear areas toward Suwon. This counterattack, probably intended to divert attention from the enemy's main effort in the central regions, was quickly contained. During the next day, US troops searched out the hostile force, by actual count, killed 1,152 and took 353 prisoners. The remaining enemy troops fled to the north.

Meanwhile, far to the south, guerrillas and remnants of the North Korean II Corps continued operations in the rear area. Although these forces were scattered throughout the entire southern Korean peninsula, large concentrations between Andong and Uisong posed a constant threat to the UN supply routes. No truck convoy was safe from the marauders. All attempts to destroy the guerrilla groups by attacks from a single direction failed. The enemy simply fell back and disappeared. The US 1st Marine Division, which fought them until the middle of February, soon learned the most effective technique; first surround the hostile bands to prevent their escape; then, attack with the support of mortars and artillery.

Gradually the guerrillas became less active, less eager to fight, and prone to disperse after short skirmishes. It was estimated that UN counteractions had reduced the strength of these forces to about 18,000 by the end of February, a decline of approximately 15% during the first two months of 1951.

The last two weeks of February, however, saw the enemy strengthen his forces considerably on the fluid central front. Elements of nine Chinese Divisions had been identified in the enemy offensive in the central zones, as well as elements of the North Korean II and V Corps, with the North Korean III

Corps attached. In addition, one more Chinese Communist army was known to be immediately available.

When the Chinese Communists attacked in November, they had been fresh, confident and unhurt. By the time their mid-February attack died down, they had been weakened by the UN air and ground action, and had suffered cold, hunger, and disease. The cold in particular had affected the Chinese much more than the UN forces for most of the UN forces were adequately clothed. Moreover, they did not have, by western standards, proper medical facilities. As few towns were left standing, they could not find buildings to protect them from the freezing weather. When they did, UN aircraft wiped out the buildings along with enemy soldiers. Frostbite and trench foot were taking their toll within enemy ranks and, if prisoners of war were to be believed, they were plagued by typhus, that age-old scourge of armies. Fighting 260 miles south of the Manchurian border, the Chinese Communists found the situation quite different from that in November when they had their bases to their immediate rear.

At 0745 on 18 February, Major General Bryant E. Moore, who had assumed command of the US IX Corps on 31 January, reported to Ridgeway that one of the regiments in the sector of the US 24th Division had found no opposition before it. The enemy's foxholes were empty and abandoned weapons and cooking equipment lay strewn about. Eighth Army headquarters passed this information to the US I and X Corps with the request that combat patrols be sent out to gain contact. The commander warned that any withdrawal by the enemy might be a ruse, but findings of the patrols confirmed the fact that enemy forces along the entire Eighth Army central front were beginning a general retreat. General Ridgeway immediately ordered US X Corps to attack eastward to destroy the North Koreans on its eastern flank, near Chech'on. At the same time, he directed the IX Corps to seize positions running from Hajin to Yangp'yong, and thence northwest to the intersection of the US IX Corps boundary on the Han River. These moves met very light, scattered resistance and disclosed evidence of hasty retreat. By 19 February the initiative all along the front had passed from the enemy to UN hands.

General Ridgeway was determined to give the North Koreans and Chinese neither rest nor opportunity to reorganize. On 21 February, he inaugurated a general advance (OPERATION KILLER) by both the US IX Corps and X Corps to deny important positions to the enemy and to destroy as many hostile troops as could be found. The objective was a line which ran generally eastward from Yangp'yong on the Han River east of Seoul to points north of Chip'yong-ni and Hwang'song'ni, and thence eastward so as to secure the east-west portion of the Wonju-Kangnung road between Wonju and Pangnimni. In order to include the US 1st Marine Division in KILLER, the boundary between the two corps was shifted eastward so that Wonju and Hoeng'song fell within the IX Corps zone. The Marine division was relieved of its anti-guerrilla mission and committed near Wonju as part of the IX Corps.

During the first week of OPERATION KILLER the UN troops advanced up to ten miles in the Chip'yong'ni area, and by 24 February the 1st Marine Division had seized the high ground overlooking Hoeng'song. The same day General Moore, the US IX Corps commander, died of a heart attack following a helicopter accident in which he and his pilot crashed into the Han River. General Smith, commander of the US 1st Marine Division, assumed temporary command of the corps pending the arrival of Major General William M. Hoge who took command on 5 March 1951.

Advances in both corps zones were slow and unspectacular, for South Korea was just beginning to thaw. Swollen streams and mud greatly hampered military operations. In the X Corps zone thaws coupled with extremely mountainous terrain made each day's advance a test of endurance for both men and equipment. Heavy rains turned frozen rice paddies into treacherous brown slime, and men stumbled and slithered in deep mud. At night, UN troops scraped through sodden sand and muck to hack out foxholes in the frozen ground beneath. Though opposition in front of the US IX Corps was heavy, enemy tactics along the entire central and central-east fronts were much like those encountered by OPERATION THUNDERBOLT a month before. Enemy groups contested UN advances, but their mission was plainly one of delay.

As UN troops began moving back into the areas lately occupied by the enemy they found evidence of the effectiveness of their attacks. The hills around Wonju and Chech'on were littered with

enemy dead. Many more had been buried in shallow graves on the bleak mountain sides. Apparently the Chinese and North Korean invaders had been more severely mauled than had been imagined. The Eighth Army Psychological Warfare Branch went into action, and shortly thereafter the Fifth Air Force dropped leaflets to the retreating enemy with the terse invitation: "Count your Men!"

In the I Corps zone the Han River became a formidable obstacle shortly after the beginning of the thaws. Behind this obstacle the Communist defense of Seoul and other areas on the north bank was apparently being conducted with a reduced number of troops. The port of Inch'on was again in limited use, but many weeks would pass before piers, cranes, tidal gates and other port installations could be fully restored. Kimpo Airfield would not again be operational until May.

In eight days UN forces had advanced to their assigned objectives in the central and central-east zones. Operation "KILLER" was nearly completed. Its success had been due in large measure not only to continuous pressure against the enemy who appeared unable to launch a major counterattack unless granted time to organize, but also to the strict observance of the basic tactical doctrine of coordinated movement,

On 28 February, after weeks of ceaseless hammering by UN forces, the Communist foothold south of the Han River collapsed. By 1 March the entire Eighth Army front was relatively stable. For the first time, the UN line had no gaping holes, no soft spots, and no enemy salients threatening to tear into it.

Upon completion of Operation "KILLER", Ridgeway, with MacArthur's approval determined to continue the offensive with a new attack, OPERATION "RIPPER". He planned to attack northward in the central and eastern zones to capture Hongch'on and Ch'unch'on and seize a line, designated "IDAHO", just south of the 38th parallel. RIPPER'S purpose was, again, to destroy enemy soldiers and equipment, to keep up pressure that would prevent the mounting of a counteroffensive, and to split the Chinese from the North Korean forces, most of which were posted on the eastern front. The US IX and X Corps were to advance in the center through successive phase lines to IDAHO while the ROK units in the east covered the right flank with local attacks and the I Corps in the west maintained its positions south and east of Seoul. The drive by the IX and X Corps would create a bulge east of the capital city from which UN forces could envelop it.

Operation RIPPER began on 7 March 1951 when, after one of the most tremendous artillery preparations of the war, the US 25th Division crossed the Han River near its confluence with the Pukhan and established a bridgehead on the north bank. Simultaneously, the ROK 1st Division delivered a diversionary thrust northwest of Kimpo Airfield and the US 3rd Division demonstrated along the Han River south of Seoul in an attempt to draw attention from the 25th Division. At first the enemy vigorously contested the bridgehead, but after three days of heavy fighting retired in disorder. In the central and eastern zones, UN forces made substantial gains on the first day, and thereafter moved steadily forward. Opposition to the drive took the form of a series of small delaying actions, a tactic well adapted to the rugged terrain. Wherever the land was least favorable to attacks, wherever roads were lacking, slopes precipitous, and natural approaches few, there the enemy held most stubbornly. For the next six weeks a grinding type of warfare prevailed. Nevertheless, by 11 March, elements of the US IX Corps had reached the first phase line. Other units reached it in the next two days, and the attack to the second phase line began on the 14th of March, 1951.

As intended by General Ridgeway, the advance in the central and eastern zones had threatened the enemy's control of the capital. To search out the positions that still barred the way, patrol from the ROK 1st Division crossed the Han River west of Seoul and proceeded northward for several miles before running into enemy fire. Another patrol probed the outer defenses of the city, found them almost deserted on the night of 14-15 March, and UN troops moved in. Thus Seoul changed hands for the fourth time. Within a matter of hours the Republic of Korea flag was raised over the National Assembly building.

Heavily blasted by UN and enemy bombardment, some of the principal buildings, the scenes of previous fighting, Seoul showed both old and new scars. The Bun Chon shopping district, untouched

when UN troops had withdrawn in January, had been flattened. United States Ambassador John J. Muccio's official residence had taken two more direct hits. The great brass-studded red gates of the embassy compound were leveled and buried in rubble. No utilities were in operation. Streetcar and light wires dangled from poles. Of the city's original population of 1,500,000 only some 200,000 ragged civilians remained. By the end of March, however, a city government was once more functioning in Seoul.

During the next week the enemy fought only delaying actions. In the X Corps zone, some of the worst terrain yet encountered proved to be more of an obstacle than the enemy. The mountainous country consisted of high peaks and narrow valleys, and UN troops were constantly either descending sharp slopes or climbing steep heights to attack enemy positions that were sometimes above the clouds. Each enemy position was, in effect, a strong point which had to be approached, enveloped, and carried by assault. The early spring's rising temperatures were turning battlefields into quagmires. All supplies had to be hand carried, and usually only the barest essentials reached the front lines. Prompt action by air rescue and evacuation units saved many wounded who otherwise would have died, for it took sometimes two days to carry the wounded out to litter jeeps. Far East Air Forces cargo aircraft contributed by dropping food and ammunition, and thus gave the ground forces greater flexibility. Despite the enemy and natural obstacles, OPERATION RIPPER ground slowly forward.

About this time, Ridgeway ordered ROK I Corps in the east to complete the destruction of remnants of the North Korean 10th Division in the Chung'bong Mountains southwest of the coastal town of Parhan'ni. This enemy division, currently harassing the South Korean forces engaged in OPERATION RIPPER, had infiltrated southward in January through the mountains from the 38th parallel to within twenty miles of Taegu. Relying on the country side for food and clothing and on captured materiel for ammunition, it had been able to make itself the full-time concern of at least one UN division plus ROK security forces. It had suffered constant attack and heavy losses. Because it had no medical facilities, only the fittest survived. Yet the North Korean 10th Division managed to maintain the form of a military organization.

As early as 13 March, what was left of the division had made its way as far north as the Chung'bong Mountains, where the surviving elements continued their operations. During the next few days, four ROK regiments harried the North Koreans in an effort to wipe them out. Though the 10th Division casualties were high, many must have survived to escape; the major activity in the sectors of the ROK 3rd and 9th Divisions on 17 and 18 March, consisted of fighting enemy groups that entered UN areas from the rear, fought their way through and disappeared to the north.

With this threat eliminated, other ROK forces in the east were able to move to line IDAHO by 17 March. The US IX and X Corps neared their third phase line in the central zone and, Hongch'on having been secured, US Marines advanced toward Ch'unch'on. The enemy in this sector fought vigorously from bunkers which were little affected by aircraft and artillery attack. In many instances enemy soldiers had to be dislodged by the bayonet. Since Ch'unch'on was an enemy supply and communications center, and it seemed probable that the city could be taken only after a hard fight, the 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team (RCT) was alerted to make the drop there on 22 March. By the 19th, when UN armored patrols entered the Ch'unch'on basin, it became apparent that the progress of Operation RIPPER and the withdrawal of the enemy had been so rapid that the airdrop would not be profitable. The project was cancelled.

Once Seoul had fallen I Corps troops took up positions on a line from Yong-dungpo through the capital's northern suburbs, thence northeast. Ridgeway then enlarged RIPPER to include a move by the I Corps westward to the Imjin River, and the corps began its attack on 22 March.

Next day the 187th Airborne RCT and two ranger companies parachuted from more than 100-twin-tailed "FLYING BOXCARS" onto drop zones at Munsan'ni about 20 miles northwest of Seoul. An armored task force from I Corps then rolled forward through mine fields and quickly made contact with the paratroopers. But the jump, which had been designed to block enemy movement along the Seoul-Kaesong axis and trap large numbers of enemy troops, failed to achieve these results. The enemy, here

and elsewhere during Operation RIPPER had elected to withdrawal rolling with the punch and trading space for time. His prompt withdrawal made the advance to the Imjin River rapid and very nearly bloodless.

This advance placed Eighth Army troops on the west flank of the enemy. The US I Corps Commander quickly ordered the 187th RCT to attack due east to capture the commanding ground behind the enemy troops facing the US 3rd Division. This move would allow the latter to attack and hammer the enemy against the anvil formed by the airborne regiment. But foul weather and all but impassable roads supporting armored elements were forced to return to Seoul slowed the eastern movement of the 187th RCT. By the time the objective was reached the enemy had withdrawn.

By the last of March, as RIPPER came to a close, Ridgeway's forces had fought their way through rain and mud generally to the 38th parallel, and by 31 March, South Korean troops were in control of the roads leading west and south from Yang'yang on the east coast. In the west, an American armored column probed over the line north of Uijongbu above Seoul. The enemy had pulled back and broken contact in many areas across the front. All UN forces were in position on LINE IDAHO, and all objectives had been taken. But the main body of the enemy had slipped away and escaped destruction. RIPPER was thus a qualified success.

Throughout February and March, UN Naval Forces played an important role in the Korean conflict. Ships from the navies of the United States, Australia, Canada, Great Britain, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the Republic of Korea, and Thailand constantly harassed the enemy. A blockading force had initiated a continuous bombardment of Wonsan and Songjin that was to surpass the Civil War record established when Federal ships shelled Vicksburg for forty-two consecutive days. Both Wonsan and Songjin were communications centers for the road and rail networks along the east coast, and the blockade and bombardment were designed to keep the supply arteries severed. By the end of March the siege was in its forty-third day.

In addition, South Korean units raided Wolsa Peninsula, about forty-five miles southwest of P'yong'yang, killed and wounded a number of the garrison, and withdrew with a bag of prisoners. Similar raids were delivered at Inch'on, and ROK marines hit far up the east coast in the vicinity of Wonsan. The UN commanders launched these operations for several purposes; to inflict physical damage on the enemy to net prisoners who could furnish valuable information; and to force the enemy to keep garrisons in areas where such raids might be expected.

When the main enemy forces had pulled back before RIPPER, it was to a line north of the 38th parallel which had apparently been built before the North Korean onslaught of June 1950. This line was probably the strongest position in enemy territory. The most stalwart portion of this line lay in the center, where a series of fortifications built in solid rock and reinforced by logs and concrete, protected the road network and supply and assembly areas in the popularly termed "IRON TRIANGLE" bounded by Ch'orwon, Kumhwa and P'yong'yang.

Sending UN troops in force across the 38th parallel was not an undertaking to be entered into lightly. A northward advance would lengthen their communications lines while correspondingly shortening the enemy's and eventually a point would be reached where UN air superiority would be nullified. General MacArthur had reported that his force could successfully proceed one hundred miles over the parallel before they reached this point, but in the United States and among the other participating United Nations, it was all too easy to remember the debacle of late 1950 after the first UN crossing of the parallel. On the other hand, the enemy armies could not be allowed to regroup and reorganize unmolested for a counterattack which intelligence sources considered inevitable. To complicate matters, the forthcoming March-July rainy season would limit the mobility of armored and mechanized forces. The decision whether to cross the parallel or stand pat was a vital one. President Truman considered it a tactical decision which should be made by the responsible commander. The choice was made by Ridgeway. With MacArthur's approval he elected to continue the advance with the hope of achieving maximum destruction.

In making their plans, UN commanders were sure that the enemy was engaged in a full scale build-up of troops and materiel not far to the north. While UN tactical advances were taking place, they gave careful consideration to the expected Chinese Communist spring offensive. That it would come was a foregone conclusion, and the only elements that remained in doubt were the time and place of the attack. The enemy was still generally on the defensive, but there were definite offensive overtones in his actions. He was building no new positions farther to the rear. The Chinese were believed to have moved their XIX Army Group (consisting of, the 63rd, 64th and 65th Armies) close to the Eighth Army's western front. If so, they could be expected to attack in the west and west central zones over open, comparatively flat land, the only territory along the existing line where armor could be used advantageously. That armor would be used seemed certain, for air observers had reported the presence of the equivalent of one armored division and possibly two armored regiments in rear areas. And on the central and central-east fronts, additional Chinese and North Korean troops had moved to within striking distance of the line.

By the end of the first week in April, UN intelligence officers reported that nine Chinese Communist armies had been positively identified, and ten more tentatively identified, together with eighteen North Korean Divisions and six Brigades. The combat efficiency of three of the armies had doubtless been reduced by the recent offensive, but the other armies were a formidable force.

The possibility that the enemy might use his increasing air strength now believed to be a minimum of 750 aircraft of all types was a cause for concern. Numerous reports and air photographs left little doubt that the North Koreans were making airfields ready for immediate use. In some instances runways were being lengthened to accommodate jets and bombers. In P'yong'yang the enemy was readying a street to serve as a runway by demolishing adjacent houses. It was reasonable to assume that all this was intended to permit use of air power in conjunction with a ground offensive.

In face of these potential threats, it was better for the UN forces to move forward rather than stand still. Thus on 5 April, Ridgeway followed RIPPER with OPERATION RUGGED, a general advance toward a new objective called KANSAS. Running along commanding ground north of the 38th parallel, KANSAS was approximately 115 miles in length, including fourteen miles of tidal water on the left flank and, in the center, the ten mile water barrier of the Hwach'on Reservoir, which was Seoul's source of water and electric power. The terrain on the right flank of this line was rough, nearly devoid of roads and therefore difficult for both UN and enemy units. But by shortening and strengthening their line, the UN commanders could use the water and terrain barriers to establish a stronger defense in depth. They could also make KANSAS the base for later operations designed to seize the Iron Triangle.

By 9 April, all units in the US I and IX Corps and the ROK I Corps on the east coast had battled their way against fluctuating enemy resistance to positions on Line KANSAS. Although the US X Corps and ROK III Corps, in the central and central east sectors, had been delayed by rugged terrain and hampered by the lack of adequate supply routes, they were steadily drawing up. On the same day, 9 April, the enemy opened sluice gates of the dam that controlled the water passing from the Hwach'on Reservoir into the lower Pukhan River. The Pukhan, originating in the mountainous country to the north, flowed south to the reservoir and thence southwest to its confluence with the Han River east of Seoul. Within an hour the water level had risen several feet; one engineer bridge was broken, and IX Corps Engineers were forced to swing a second one back to the banks. To prevent the enemy from opening all eighteen sluice gates and flooding the Pukhan, a task force from the 7th Cavalry and the 4th Ranger Company was hastily organized and sent to seize the dam, close the gates, and immobilize the gate-opening machinery.

This raid failed for a variety of reasons: lack of enough landing craft, poor visibility, difficulty of movement over the almost trackless terrain, and stubborn enemy resistance. But the enemy's opening of the Hwach'on gates, while dramatic, had less effect on UN operations than originally feared and the task force was recalled after two days.

While the US X and ROK III Corps drew up to the KANSAS line, the US I Corps and left-flank units of the IX Corps continued the advance by attacking Ch'orwon, the southwest corner of the Iron

Triangle, with the intention of seizing a line designated UTAH which was in effect an outward bulge of KANSAS. As UTAH's northernmost point lay just south of Ch'orwon, this move would place the UN forces in position to strike at the Triangle. The main body of the IX Corps remained in position and patrolled, and on the east coast the ROK I Corps advanced by column of divisions.

During this period came a dramatic change in command. On 11 April, after a series of public utterances revealed sharp differences over national policy and military strategy, President Truman relieved General MacArthur of all of his commands and replaced him with General Ridgeway. Lt Gen. James A. Van Fleet was dispatched posthaste from Washington to take command of the Eighth Army and attached forces. He arrived and assumed command on 14 April 1951.

Meanwhile UN forces continued forward, although the enemy burned off large areas of the front to create dense smoke screens that reduced the effectiveness of close air support. The Hwach'on Dam fell on 16 April, and on the east coast South Korean forces took Taep'o-ri. Other ROK troops north of Seoul sent patrols across the Imjin River and far to the northwest. By 17 April the Eighth Army front line units could not make contact with the enemy and US IX Corps units not already moving joined in the advance north from the line KANSAS. Thereafter the general progress toward Line UTAH was virtually unopposed. Even as the advance continued, however, evidences of enemy preparations for counterattack continued to be reported to Van Fleet.

The enemy had long boasted in his press and radio releases that his offensive would be designed to force a military decision by either driving the UN forces from Korea or destroying them in the field. Van Fleet foresaw different results. His army had improved during the winter campaign. US soldiers had become highly skilled in the months since they had entered the war as green occupation troops. Van Fleet decided to meet the expected attack by continuing the doctrines developed by his predecessor those of "maximum punishment, maximum delay . . ." The UN forces would, if compelled, buy time with space, and conduct a coordinated withdrawal to defensive positions well south of the 38th parallel, maintain contact with the enemy at all times, and inflict maximum losses on him by utilizing superior UN fire power from the ground and air. When the offensive had run its course the Eighth would counter-attack, cut the enemy's supply lines, and endeavor to destroy all hostile troops in forward areas.

To anticipate an enemy offensive did not mean to sit and wait for it. By 19 April, all US I and IX Corps units were in position along line UTAH and preparing to continue the advance to Line WYOMING, an eastward extension of the UTAH bulge. After consolidating their gains for two days these corps started northward again. If his attack proved to be successful, UN forces would be on the high ground overlooking Ch'orwan at the base of the Iron Triangle. But during the daylight hours of 22 April enemy activity across the whole front sharply increased and the UN offensive halted abruptly. Their lines alive with movement, the Chinese and North Korean abandoned cover and concealment and moved boldly into the open. The expected enemy spring offensive was at hand.

By the light of a full moon in the early evening hours of 22 April, three Chinese Communist Armies attacked the UN forces following four hours of artillery bombardment. The initial attack, a secondary one, was delivered through the Kwandok Mountains in the Yonch'on-Hwach'on area of central Korea. By daybreak the enemy was in motion across the whole peninsula. .

Delivering his main effort against the US I and IX corps, the enemy attempted a double envelopment against the west sector to isolate Seoul, coupled with the secondary thrust in the Yonch'on-Hwach'on area and push against the eastern part of the line near Inje. Radio P'yongyang announced the ultimate objective - destruction of the UN command would be readily accomplished. Of an estimated 700,000 available troops in Korea, the enemy commanders employed about half in the offensive, but they used little artillery, few tanks (contrary to UN expectations), and no close air support. Their tactics assaults by a "human sea" of massed infantry were the same as before, and again bugle calls and flares coordinated night attacks in which small units infiltrated the UN lines. When dawn came the enemy broke contact and, using camouflage and natural and man-made features, sought cover and concealment against artillery fire.

The UN lines held firm against the first assaults everywhere except in the central sector held by the IX Corps, where the ROK 6th Division was defending the center with the US 24th Division on the right. Here the enemy struck the ROK division in the Namdae River valley south of Kumhwa and drove it back. As the division withdrew in confusion south the Utah line the enemy attempted to exploit this advantage by moving into the gap between the 24th Division and 1st Marine Division, which refused their exposed flanks and held on.

With his line cracked, General Van Fleet ordered the I and IX Corps to retire step by step to KANSAS while the infantry, supported by artillery and aircraft, slowed the enemy. Thus was lost the ground gained on the recent UN offensives. Task forces built around the US 5th Cavalry and the 27th Commonwealth Brigade darted into the gap left by the ROK 6th Division, struck the advancing Chinese south of the 38th parallel and stopped the exploitation. On the right the 1st Marine Division retired southward from the Hwach'on area to take up new positions before Ch'unch'on. When an enemy thrust cut the Seoul-Ch'unch'on-Kasong highway near Kap'yong on 26 April, Van Fleet pulled the IX Corps back to the Hongch'on River.

Meanwhile, although the enemy did not throw his full weight against Seoul, until after the Seoul-Kasong road was cut, the I Corps was heavily engaged in the west. Forging the waist-deep Imjin River about midnight of 22 April, Chinese infantrymen established shallow bridgeheads on the south bank between Korangp'o-ri and Majon-ni. Other enemy troops cut south along the Ch'orwon-Seoul highway, but the I Corps slowed the attacking Chinese, as it retired to the KANSAS line until the morning of 23 April, when the enemy drove the ROK 1st Division south of the KANSAS line. This set back exposed the left flank of the 1st Battalion Gloucestershire Regiment of the British 29th Brigade. During the next few days this unit gallantly held its position even after it was isolated and virtually overrun. Only a handful from the Gloucestershire battalion were able to make their way back to the main UN line.

Once the enemy had cut the Seoul-Kasong highway on 26 April, he put his weight into a strong attack against Seoul. Next day he outflanked Uijongbu and the US 3rd Division pulled back to positions four miles from the outskirts of Seoul while the ROK troops withdrew down the road from Munsan-ni. Van Fleet directed the establishment of a new transpeninsular line to halt the enemy in front of Seoul and north of the Han.

On 29 April, UN pilots strafed an estimated 6,000 enemy soldiers when they tried to ferry the Han and attack down the Kimpo Peninsula and outflank Seoul from the West. The survivors were never able to offer a serious threat to the peninsula's defenders, the ROK 5th Marine Battalion.

The enemy also attempted to outflank Seoul to the east in the V-shaped area between the Han and the Pukhan Rivers, but the 24th and 25th Divisions checked this maneuver and held the enemy on the north bank of the Han in the vicinity of Kumgong'ni and Punwon'ni. On the east-central front North Koreans attacked ROK units in the Yang'gu-Inje area, made several gains, and captured Inje, but by 29 April their drive had been halted.

On this day General Van Fleet established a new line, not named and therefore termed NO-NAME-LINE which extended from North of Seoul to Sabangu, thence northeast across the 38th parallel to Taepo'ri on the East Coast. Because the major weight of the enemy's attack had struck in the west, Van Fleet re-shuffled his units to put more American Divisions there. Assigned to I Corps, on the left, were the ROK 1st Division, and the US 1st Cavalry Division, and the 25th Infantry Division, with the US 3rd Division in reserve. Holding the Kimpo Peninsula was the British 29th Brigade. The IX Corps, on the I Corps' right, had the 28th Commonwealth Brigade, the US 24th Division, the ROK 6th and 2nd Divisions, and the US 7th Division in line, with the US 187th Airborne RCT in reserve. In the center the X Corps, consisting of the US 1st Marine and 2nd Infantry Divisions, and the ROK 5th and 7th Divisions, held the line, and the ROK III and I Corps defended the eastern sector.

Thus by the end of April the UN infantrymen, strongly supported by artillery and air (UN airmen flew 7,240 sorties during the eight days of attack) had halted the enemy short of Seoul and the Han, and held strong continuous defense lines. The enemy had fallen far short of his announced intention of

destroying the UN forces. UN intelligence officers, reasoning on the basis of information gained by air reconnaissance, concluded that he would start another offensive soon.

While the Chinese and North Koreans regrouped and brought supplies forward, General Van Fleet decided to capitalize on the lull and take the initiative. During the first of May regimental patrol bases were established almost eight miles in front of NO-NAME-LINE. UN forces cleared the KIMPO Peninsula. The ROK 1st Division fought its way up the Munsan'ni road. Uijongbu fell to the 1st Cavalry Division on 6 May, and a 25th Division Task Force drove northeastward up the Seoul-Sinp'al-li highway. In the west-central sector an armored patrol regained control of the Seoul-Kap-Yong road for the United Nations, and on 7 May, US Marines dug North Koreans out of camouflaged bunkers on the Wonju road and captured Ch'unch'on. A task force consisting of the French Infantry Battalion, the US 1st Ranger Company, one Company of the 9th Infantry, and the US 72nd Tank Battalion probed northeast of Chaunni. On the extreme right the ROK III and I Corps also advanced northward. General Van Fleet then planned a general offensive based on NO-NAME-LINE designed to carry through to KANSAS, but increasing evidence that the enemy was preparing to resume the offensive forced the Eighth Army commander to postpone his plan.

The signs were unmistakable. After 10 May enemy resistance to local attacks stiffened. Airbase construction was still increasing. UN Intelligence placed enemy air strength of 1,000 planes, with fifty new air bases being pushed to completion. Supply columns moved southward were reported daily, and air patrols noted heavy movements north of IX Corps.

To cripple enemy air strength before the new offensive, the 5th Air Force and the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing stepped up their attacks. A good example of their efforts came on 9 May when a total of 312 planes - F-80 Shooting Stars, F-84 Thunderjets, F-86 Sabres, and F-51 Mustangs struck at Sinuiju Airbase on the south bank of the Yalu and reported demolishing fifteen enemy jets and over 100 buildings.

During the first ten days of May, when it looked as if the enemy would concentrate his attack west of the Pukhan River against Seoul, General Van Fleet had strengthened the western portion of his line. But between 10 and 15 May, according to intelligence reports, the Chinese had moved five armies eastward and deployed them in front of the Ch'unch'on-Inje area held by the US X Corps and the ROK III Corps. Because time was short, Van Fleet decided not to shift his forces from the west, but he alerted the US 3rd Division, in I Corps reserve, to move out on his order. The rough and mountainous Ch'uncht'on-Inje area generally favored the defender, but it would provide the attacker with some security from Air and Armor.

The daylight hours of 15 May saw all the usual signs of impending enemy attack, including an increased number of enemy agents trying to slip through the lines. Air patrols reported more bridge construction, and enemy probing attacks grew more numerous. Van Fleet's command made ready to stand firm.

By 14 May NO-NAME-LINE had been considerably strengthened. The UN forces had laid mines, registered artillery, established bands of interlocking machine gun fire, and strung over 500 miles of barbed wire. Interspersed among the mine fields and barbed-wire networks were 55-gallon drums of gasoline and napalm, ready, to be detonated electrically. General Van Fleet resolved not to yield ground, but to hold his line with all the weapons and power at his disposal. As he phrased it, "We must expend steel and fire, not men.... I want so many artillery holes that a man can step from one to the other."

After darkness fell on the night of 15-16 May, an estimated twenty-one Chinese Divisions, flanked by three North Korean divisions in the west and six divisions on the east, struck down the center of the peninsula against the US X Corps and the ROK III Corps in the Naep'yong-ni - No-dong area. The X Corps held a thirty-seven mile sector of NO-NAME-LINE from the high ground west of Hongch'on northeastward to Inje. The US 1st Marine Division held the left part of the Corps line on the jagged terrain overlooking Ch'tunch'on plain. To the right was the US 2nd Division, with the ROK 5th and 7th Divisions on its right and the ROK III Corps to their right. Chinese units crossed the Pukhan River west of Ch'unch'on, and on 16 May other units struck hard against the ROK 5th and 7th Divisions.

The patrol base regiments fell back to NO-NAME-LINE, and by 1930 hours of 16 May the two ROK divisions were heavily engaged along the twenty-mile front in the vicinity of Han'gye-ri, a village ten miles northeast of Inje. The two divisions held their ground for a time, then fell back, disorganized and broken.

In the left (west) shoulder of the enemy salient, the US 2nd Division, including the French and Dutch Battalions, withstood resolute enemy attacks until 18 May, and then, together with the 1st Marine Division, moved right to fill the gap left by the two ROK Divisions. The IX Corps extended its front to the right to cover the area left by the 2nd Division and marines. Van Fleet raced the 15th RCT of the US 3rd Division from Seoul to bolster the west face of the salient, and sent the 7th and 65th Infantry Regiments to blocking positions at the southernmost part of the penetration. The swarming columns of Chinese and North Koreans soon almost surrounded the 2nd Division, pushing against its front, right and rear. The Chinese even blocked the 2nd's main supply route, but a coordinated attack by the US 9th Infantry driving northward, and the US 23rd and 38th Infantry Regiments attacking southward along with their French and Dutch contingents, regained control of the route. The 2nd Division stood fast and punished the enemy heavily. The 38th Field Artillery Battalion, firing in support, fired 12,000 105-mm rounds in twenty-four hours.

It was this kind of monumental artillery support which helped to create the so-called ammunition shortage that later was the subject of public debate and a Congressional investigation in the United States. All UN artillery units were firing the "VAN FLEET LOAD", which was five times larger than the ammunition allowance previously in use. The Van Fleet load, together with a shortage of motor transport and the difficulties of supply inherent in mountain warfare, was largely responsible for the much publicized shortage.

Lt. Gen. Edward M. Almond, commanding the X Corps, ordered the 2nd Division back to a new line south of Han'gye-ri on 18 May. The division, commanded by Major General Clark L. Ruffner, successfully withdrew. During its defense it lost 900 men killed, wounded and missing - enemy casualties were estimated at 35,000. During this period, while the Seoul Sector was relatively quiet, the divisions of the ROK III Corps, on the X Corps right, were heavily engaged, broke, and pulled back to P'yongch'ang -Kang'nung road. The ROK I Corps, on the coast, withdrew from Taep'-o-ri to Kang'nung.

While the battle raged on the central and eastern fronts, the enemy struck in the Western sector held by Lt. Gen. Frank W. Milburn's I Corps and the IX Corps. On the night of 17 May, an estimated 25,000 enemy force struck down the Pukhan River toward the Han, but the US 25th Division and the ROK 6th Division stopped this drive just south of Masogu-ri in three days of violent action. A weak attack directed against Seoul by some four North Korean Battalions was quickly halted.

By 20 May the UN troops had brought the enemy's offensive to a standstill. The X Corps stabilized its front. The US 1st Marine Division still held its portion of the NO-NAME-LINE, and the US 2nd Division, with the 15th Infantry attached, prepared to wrest the initiative from the Chinese and retake its positions on NO-NAME- LINE. Having thus stopped two major enemy offenses, and with two more UN battalions about to join Eighth Army, General Van Fleet decided to take the offensive again.

General Van Fleet opened his new offensive with a series of local attacks designed to relieve enemy pressure on the US X Corps. On 18 May he ordered the US I and IX Corps, and the US 1st Marine Division, the left flank elements of the X Corps, to send out strong patrols and prepare to attack a phase line (TOPEKA) about halfway between NO-NAME-LINE and KANSAS. The next day, after bolstering the US 3rd Division by attaching to it the newly arrived Canadian 25th Brigade, he enlarged the goals of his offensive by directing the I, IX and X Corps to advance to enemy supply and communications areas near Mansedari, Hwach'on, and Inje. The ROK I Corps, on the east, was to advance and conform to the movements of the X Corps right flank. The ROK III Corps, which had recently broken under enemy attack, was deactivated. Together with part of the old ROK III Corps front, the ROK 9th Division was given to the X Corps, and the ROK 3rd Division and its front were given to the ROK I Corps. The new offensive, Van Fleet hoped, would deny the enemy any chance to gather himself for another counterstroke, threaten the enemy supply route in the Hwach'on Reservoir area, and

eventually result in the capture of the Iron Triangle. He shifted boundaries to place the western third of the Hwach'on Reservoir in the IX Corps zone, leaving the remaining two thirds the responsibility of the X Corps. Once the X Corps had taken its objective, he hoped to send it in an enveloping attacks north-eastwards to the coast to block the enemy while the ROK I Corps attacked northwestward. As he put it, "The 38th Parallel has no significance in the present tactical situation. The Eighth Army will go wherever the situation dictates in hot pursuit of the enemy".

Once more, as the enemy pulled back, the United Nations forces rolled forward against light resistance. On 19 May units of the ROK I Division reconnoitered the Seoul highway toward Munsan-ni. Within the next few days I Corps troops reached the Imjin River north of Munsan-ni and entered Uijongbu and Sinp'al-li. Elements of the IX Corps pushed toward Kap'yong, drove the enemy across the Hongch'on River, and moved toward Hwach'on Reservoir.

In the X Corps zone, while aircraft executed a continuous series of close support missions, the American divisions made ready to trap or destroy the enemy soldiers that had burst through the lines in the offensive just halted. Using tank-infantry task forces as well as regular formations, General Almond planned to employ the US 1st Marine Division, on the left, in the Yanggu area to push the enemy back against the Hwach'on Reservoir while to the southeast the US 3rd Division struck at the farthest point of enemy penetration. At the same time, the 187th Airborne RCT was to drive northeast along the Hongch'on-Kansong highway to cut the enemy supply route to Inje, east of Yanggu, while a task force composed of American and Korean Infantrymen covered the right flank. ROK 8th and 9th Divisions were in reserve; the ROK 5th and 7th were reorganizing.

The 1st Marine Division attacked toward, yanggu at 0800 on 24 May, while the 187th RCT started out for Inje. One battalion of the airborne regiment broke loose and crossed the Soyang River the next day to hold a bridgehead pending the arrival of the 23rd Infantry of the US 2nd Division two days later, when the 7th Marines also reached the Soyang. Almond formed a task force of the 187th, the US 72nd Tank Battalion, and other elements to drive to the coastal town of Kansong in accordance with Van Fleet's orders. Although rain, mud, and enemy resistance slowed the offensive on 27 and 28 May, and in many instances permitted the enemy to withdraw with his supplies, the 187th had taken Inje by the 27th, the marines were making a final push toward Hwach'on Reservoir and Yanggu, and the 17th Infantry of the 7th Division, in the IX Corps, had taken Hwach'on. At the end of the month the X Corps was deployed along the Soyang River. Its flanking drive to Kansong proved unnecessary, for the town fell to the ROK Capitol Division of the ROK I Corps.

The Eighth Army had scored a significant advance which had brought it just back to the KANSAS line. The front now ran from Munsan-ni through Yongprong, Hwach'on, and Yanggu, dipped southward sharply, and then swung north and east to Kansong. Except in the west where it slanted southward to take tactical advantage of the Imjin River, the line lay north of the 38th parallel. South Korea was virtually cleared of the enemy.

Enemy casualties for the last half of May, Eighth Army headquarters reported, included 17,000 counted dead and 17,000 prisoners of war. Its own casualties for the entire month numbered 33,770. The South Koreans had lost the most; American losses totaled 745 dead, 4,218 wounded, 572 missing, and 6,758 non-battle casualties, most of which were caused by disease.

What should be done next? General Van Fleet's statement about the hot pursuit of the enemy did not mean that he intended another advance to the Yalu for the Joint Chiefs of Staff had prescribed that the Eighth Army was not to go beyond the general vicinity of Line KANSAS. General Ridgeway, however, had authorized local advances to gain better ground. In any event, it was clear that the UN forces were not numerous enough to encircle and destroy the enemy in large scale maneuvers, but would have to stabilize along a strong defensive line. In addition to KANSAS, there were other transpeninsular lines-the Yesong River-Wonson line north of the 39th parallel - that were relatively short; but they possessed less defensible terrain than KANSAS, their road systems were poorer, and to seize them would lengthen the UN communications while shortening the enemy's. Clearly, then, the best policy

appeared to be to defend KANSAS, meanwhile taking advantage of Ridgeway's authorization to conduct local advances to more favorable ground.

On 1 June 1951, therefore, Van Fleet directed reserve elements of his forces to clear out all civilians and to strengthen KANSAS by stringing barbed wire, clearing fields of fire, laying mines, constructing shelters with overhead cover, establishing trail and road blocks, and plotting artillery concentrations. He hoped thus to make the line virtually impregnable. Meanwhile the I and IX Corps were to continue their advance toward Line WYOMING; the bulge north of KANSAS that ran from the Imjin River to just south of Ch'orwon and Kumhwa, thence southeast. With this order Van Fleet lowered his sights slightly, for his earlier plans had aimed at capturing the Iron Triangle rather than stopping short on Wyoming.

This advance, dubbed Operation PILEDRIVER, was carried out with comparative ease except along the approaches to the Iron Triangle where the enemy resisted stoutly. Except for a range of hills, the Triangle was a low-lying area surrounded by saw-toothed mountains. It was the terminus of a main highway from Manchuria and was interlaced with dirt roads and two single tracked railroads. It served the enemy as a supply and communications area. Elements of both the I and IX Corps fought their way toward the WYOMING line near the Ch'orwon-Kumhwa base of the triangle and the enemy fought back hard from defenses arranged in depth. As happened so often, heavy rains in the first few days of June limited direct air support and turned the roads into veritable quagmires.

But the Eighth Army moved forward. The 1st Cavalry Division pushed from Uijonbu toward Ch'orwon against hard-fighting Chinese, as sweat-soaked engineer parties moved ahead of creeping tanks to probe for wooden box-mines. Infantrymen of the US 3rd and 25th Divisions used flame throwers against mud and log bunkers. By 10 June, aided by drier weather that made possible round-the-clock air support, the 3rd Division, with the ROK 9th Division and the 10th Philippine Battalion, attacked and gained high ground south of Ch'orwon, while the 25th Division and the Turkish Brigade fought their way within three miles of Kumhwa. Next day at 1330 Ch'orwon fell, abandoned by the enemy; two hours later the Turkish Brigade entered Kumhwa, from which the enemy had also departed.

Now firmly in control of its portion of Line WYOMING, the I Corps sent out task forces to pursue the enemy. On 13 June, two tank-infantry task forces, from Ch'orwon and Kumhwa, reached P'yonggang, which they found deserted. When they discovered that the enemy held the dominating ground north of the city, however, the two task forces quickly returned. Units of the IX Corps pushed northeast toward Kumsong and found the enemy present in strength and obviously establishing a defensive line. As the triangle was dominated by the surrounding heights, neither side attempted to hold it in strength thereafter, although Chinese troops struck back at the I and IX Corps and reoccupied P'yonggang on 17 June.

On the east-central front, meanwhile, the X Corps had pushed through mountains toward its sector of the KANSAS line, which extended over a series of ridges from the Hwach'on Reservoir northeastward to the lower lip of the "PUNCHBOWL", and aptly named circular depression north of Inje. Using three divisions, the ROK 7th, the US 1st Marine and the ROK 5th (which had relieved the US 2nd Division), the X Corps ground forward against the North Korean II and V Corps. The enemy, well dug in on ridge tops and amply supplied with machine guns, mortars and artillery, fought back hard. Marines and South Koreans assaulted successive bunker-studded ridges to push the enemy out, and on 16 June elements of the 1st Marine Division reached KANSAS, while on the right of the X Corps the ROK I Corps advanced from Kansong toward Kosang.

Thus by mid-June the Eighth Army had largely attained the principal terrain objectives of PILEDRIVER, although the enemy had again managed to get away. Action for the rest of the month, except the PUNCHBOWL area where the 1st Marine Division fought a violent battle, was confined to developing the KANSAS and WYOMING lines and to patrolling and local fights which, although fierce and bloody, did not materially affect the dispositions of either side.

As the first year of the Korean conflict came to the end, the United Nations could look back on their accomplishments with considerable satisfaction. South Korea had been cleared of the invading

enemy, and the UN forces, after receiving and delivering severe batterings, had pushed north of the 38th parallel and successfully executed the missions that were in their power to accomplish. Thus, when on Sunday evening, 23 June, in New York City, Jacob Malik, Deputy Foreign Commissar of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and his country's delegate to the United Nations, proposed cease-fire discussions between the participants in the Korean conflict, his proposal, while it may have been made for the convenience of the Chinese, came at a fortunate time for the Eighth Army.

After Mr. Malik made his proposal, the Peiping radio followed his lead and indicated that the rulers of Communist China favored a truce. President Truman then authorized General Ridgeway to conduct negotiations with the enemy generals. The UN Commander at once sent radio messages to his opposite numbers in the enemy camp, and after some argument, both sides agreed to meet in Kaesong, a town near the west coast of Korea, about three miles south of the 38th parallel and between the opposing army's front lines.

After liaison officers had made preliminary arrangements, the negotiations opened on 10 July with Vice Admiral C. Turner Joy, the Far East naval commander, acting as chief delegate for the United Nations. Lieut. Gen. Nam Il led the enemy delegation.

Both sides agreed that hostilities would continue until the truce was signed, but neither side was willing to start any large scale offensive while the talks were in progress. All along the front - which now extended from the Imjin River to Ch'orwon, paralleled the base of the Iron Triangle, swung southeast to the lower edge of the PUNCHBOWL, and then ran north and east to the Sea of Japan above Kansong - the fighting died down, UN troops busied themselves improving their positions and consolidating the ground they had just won. Action was characterized by artillery fire and air strikes, plus a continuing bombardment of Wonsan. Combat patrols went out regularly; enemy attacks were repulsed. Offensive action consisted chiefly of limited regimental or battalion attacks, designed to seize more favorable terrain, capturing prisoners, and keep the enemy from nosing too close to the UN lines. With the exception of the flare-up in the fall of 1951 that followed the breaking-off of the truce negotiations in August, this general pattern was to prevail until just, before the signing of the truce in 1953.

Enemy policy appeared to follow the same lines as that of the United Nations whose intelligence officers concluded that the Chinese forces were being strengthened. New Chinese units were identified northeast of the Iron Triangle, in front of the IX Corps below Kumsong, and in the vicinity of the PUNCHBOWL. The enemy, like the UN forces, appeared to be holding a main line of resistance with screening units in front rather than relying on defense by maneuver.

Throughout the summer months there was continuous, though local, fighting for limited objectives, and no day passed without casualties. In general the front lines remained stable except in the Iron Triangle and the PUNCHBOWL. The Triangle, action focused on the low SOBANG HILLS-which the Chinese had reoccupied after being driven out during Van Fleet's June offensive. On 1 July tank-infantry task forces from the I Corps tried to eject the Chinese but failed. Repeating the attacks thru Independence Day, tanks and infantry, finally pushed the enemy entirely from the area between the Triangle's base and P'yonggang, then withdrew to the main UN line. At the same time I Corps patrols crossed the Imjin to harry the enemy, and the X Corps bombed and shelled positions in the PUNCHBOWL where North Koreans appeared to be concentrating artillery and mortars.

Later in July Van Fleet ordered a northward advance on the X Corps zone to shorten the line, prevent- enemy from freely observing the KANSAS line, and force the enemy to pull back his mortars- and artillery.- The specific objective was a 3, 890-foot-high mountain, designated Hill 1179 or Taeu-san, at the southwest edge of the PUNCHBOWL which ROK marines had unsuccessfully attacked. It was defended by what was estimated to be a regiment (1,700 men) or North Koreans. Elements of the 2nd Division, strongly supported by aircraft and artillery, took over and after a four-day assault secured the crest of Taeu-san.

In August the strength of all forces under Van Fleet's command numbered 586,769 at their peak. This figure included, in addition to 229,339 in the Eighth Army proper, 357,430 from the Republic of

Korea, the United States Marines, the Fifth Air Force, and the seventeen other UN contingents. By now the Colombian Battalion had reached Korea to join in alongside the men from the United States, the Republic of Korea, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Ethiopia, France, Great Britain, Greece, India, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, the Philippines, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey and the Union of South Africa.

Action was focused again in the zone of the X Corps and the ROK I Corps to the east. Both corps, the latter supported by gunfire from warships lying offshore, advanced their fronts to gain more favorable terrain to the northeast and west of the PUNCHBOWL, and the UN units on the western portion of the line sent out raiding parties to divert the enemy reserves. The X Corps and the ROK I Corps offensive were carried out almost exclusively by South Koreans under American command and supported by American units. But on the night of 27-28 August, when a unit of the ROK 5th Division crumpled under an enemy counterattack delivered against a newly captured hill mass "BLOODY RIDGE" west of the PUNCHBOWL, the US 9th Infantry Regiment of the 2nd Division was committed. It was unable to retake the lost ground.

Late in August, after the truce negotiations had been suspended, Van Fleet determined to resume the offensive in order to drive the enemy farther back from the Hwach'on Reservoir (Seoul's source of water and electrical power) and away from the Ch'orwan-Seoul Railroad. Success in each of these enterprises would also straighten and shorten the UN front, give greater security to the KANSAS line, and inflict damage on the enemy. Therefore, when the 9th Infantry's attack failed, the UN commander determined to put forth a major effort in the X Corps zone, using all five divisions in that corps to continue the ridge-top and mountain actions in the PUNCHBOWL area.

The US 1st Marine Division, with ROK marine units attached, opened a drive against the northern portion of the PUNCHBOWL on 31 August. Two days later the 2nd Division attacked northward against BLOODY and HEARTBREAK ridges in the vicinity of the PUNCHBOWL'S western edge and TAEU-SAN. Both assaults, delivered uphill by burdened, straining infantrymen, met with initial success. By 3 September, the two divisions had reached their first objectives. Van Fleet ordered them to continue the advance as far north as the northwesterly leg of the Soyang River above the PUNCHBOWL.

On 11 September the 1st Marine Division attacked again. After seven days of heavy fighting, with the enemy resolutely defending each ridge top from mutually supporting positions and yielding only after repeated counterattacks and seesaw struggles, the marines secured their objective on 18 September.

Meanwhile the 2nd Division, on BLOODY and HEARTBREAK ridges, west of the PUNCHBOWL, was engaged in the most fierce action since spring. Like the marines, the 2nd Division infantrymen, often carrying the 60-mm mortar or 75-mm recoilless rifle rounds as well as their own ammunition and equipment, crawled hand over hand up towering knife-crested ridges to assault the hard fighting enemy who would yield a ridge only in desperation, then strike back in vigorous counterattack. The same crest often changed hands several times each day.

By 19 September the X Corps front was stabilized except the 2d Division's zone. Supplied by airdrop and by sturdy Korean carriers with A-frames strapped to their backs, and heavily supported by aircraft and artillery, the 2d Division fought on bitterly. In one instance it delivered, within a space of twenty-four hours, no less than eleven separate assaults, all unsuccessful, against one ridge. The battle raged into October. Finally, on the 14th, after the enemy seemed willing to reopen truce talks, the last ridge was secured and the 2d Division consolidated its hard won gains.

Along the western portion of the front, action in September was characterized by local attacks, counterattacks, and combat patrols which culminated, in the eastern portion of the TRIANGLE, in the capture thereof in a series of successful raids by tank-infantry task forces from the IX Corps. Once these were accomplished, the five divisions, the ROK 1st, the 1st British Commonwealth, the US 1st Cavalry, and 3rd and 25th US Divisions struck north across a forty-mile front from the Kaesong area to Ch'orwon to advance the front three or four miles, establishing a new line, JAMESTOWN, and thus protect the

Ch'orwon - Seoul Railroad. By 12 October, JAMESTOWN was secured. The IX Corps, to the right, followed with aggressive patrolling toward Kumsong. By 21 October the 24th Division had seized the commanding heights just south of Kumsong. The successful advances of August, September and October gave the UN forces possession of commanding ground along the entire front, and may have influenced the enemy leaders to decide to sit down at the peace table once again.

General Ridgeway had attempted to persuade the enemy to resume negotiating on 4 October, while the 2d Division was fighting hard west of the PUNCHBOWL. Six days later liaison officers met again this time at Panmunjon, a tiny village on the Seoul highway north of the Imjin River. Their deliberations were interrupted by a misdirected UN air attack near Panmunjom that brought from the enemy a violent protest. It was 22 October before the liaison officers met again, and three days later the plenipotentiaries once more resumed the negotiations that were to continue for many weary months. Meanwhile, for the soldier at the front, the war went on.

As the year 1951 drew to a close the character of the conflict returned to that of July and early August. Fighting tapered off into, monotonous routine of patrol clashes, raids, and bitter small unit struggles for key outpost positions. By the end of the year a lull had settled over the battlefield with the opposing sides deployed along defense lines that spanned the breadth of the peninsula. Not until the early summer of 1953 was the fighting resumed on a larger scale, and then only briefly.

The lull resulted from General Ridgeway's decision to halt offensive ground operations in Korea. Two factors influenced his decision: the cost of further major assaults on the enemy's defenses would be more than the results would justify; and the possibility that peace might come out of the recently opened armistice talks ruled out the mounting of any costly large-scale offensives by either side. His orders to Van Fleet, therefore, issued on 12 November 1951, were to cease offensive operations and begin an active defense of the Eighth Army's front. Attacks were to be limited to those necessary for strengthening the main line of resistance and for establishing an outpost line 3000-5000 yards forward of the main positions.

The line to be defended was manned by three American and one South Korean corps and extended from the Yellow Sea in a great arc eastward for 155 miles to the shores of the Sea of Japan. Defending the army's left wing, the US I Corps, now commanded by Lt. Gen. John W. O'Daniel, occupied the sector originating at the confluence of the Imjin and Han Rivers and extending northeast to a point midway between Ch'orwon and Kumhwa. On the US I Corps right flank the defenses of Major General Willard G. Wyman's US IX Corps began, bulging northward toward Kumsong and east to the Pukhan River, which formed the corp's right boundary. East of the Pukhan the US X Corps under Major General Clovis E. Byers, from 15 July to 5 December, and thereafter under Major General Williston B. Palmer, extended its lines eastward over the mountainous spine of the Peninsula to the Nam River, to meet the left boundary of the ROK I Corps. This latter Corps, commanded by the ROK Army's Major General Paik Sun Yup, defended the Eighth Army's right wing; its zone extended due north along the Korean east coast from the Nam River to Kosong.

Action on the Eighth Army front during the last two months of the year was limited mostly to patrol clashes and repelling light enemy attacks. Blanketed by UN harassing artillery fire, the enemy moved only at night, and his own artillery was restricted by the liberal use of UN counterbattery fire. In the US I Corps sector, the ROK 1st Division mounted a series of tank-infantry raids against enemy positions in the area south of Panmunjon, but after 16 December these small-scale actions gave way once more to patrolling.

The third week of December saw a series of changes on both sides. The US 45th Division, the first National Guard Division to fight in Korea, arrived from Japan and replaced the 1st Cavalry Division north of Seoul in the I Corps sector. The 1st Cavalry Division returned to Japan for a well-earned rest. Following up this change the US 2nd Division, which had been in IX Corps reserve, relieved the US 25th-Division.

On the enemy side, Eighth Army intelligence, reported, the North Korean I Corps had moved from its positions in the western sector of the enemy battle front to reserve positions in the eastern

sector. As a result the Chinese now defended the entire western and central parts of the enemy line. This concentration of the North Korean forces in the rugged eastern sector, where there was little likelihood of a major UN thrust, indicated that the North Korean Army might be suffering from a manpower shortage.

The air conflict over Korea continued at a slower pace as snow, fog, and heavy cloud cover reduced visibility, but sorties averaged 700 daily. Enemy pilots seemed reluctant to close with American Sabres. Either their losses had begun to tell, or a new group was being pushed through a jet training cycle and the enemy flyers were not ready to do battle with the Sabres. UN bombers and fighter-bombers continued their interdiction campaign. Operation STRANGLE, against railroad tracks, bridges and highway traffic was maintained on a daily basis.

At sea, naval units of nine nations tightened their blockade around the coast line of North Korea. Naval planes from the fast carriers ANTIETAM and VALLEY FORGE bombed the rail systems around YONGHUNG, blasted bridges, and blew up box cars. A landing ship, equipped with 5-inch rockets, joined in the bombardment of the north-east port city of Singjin. Two thousand rockets fell in the harbor area to destroy a large supply point, shunting yards, and bridges while coastal roadways were raked with shell fragments. United States Destroyers continued to bombard Wonsan while the Cruiser SAINT PAUL, supporting the ROK I Corps at the eastern extremity of the front, fired on targets of opportunity. Off the west coast, south and west of Chinnamp'o, the British light cruiser BELFAST, the US destroyer EVERSOLE, and the British frigates MOUNTS BAY and WHITE SAND BAY scored direct hits on three enemy gun emplacements and blew up a small arms supply depot.

On the ground, patrols from both sides were out in force. As expected, the enemy jumped off in a series of small scale attacks during Christmas week. The initial thrust, delivered by about a battalion, came in the X Corps sector deep in the eastern mountains. Covered by 82-mm mortar and artillery fire, the enemy captured an outpost of the ROK 3rd Division. Two counterattacks failed, but on 28 December a battalion of the ROK 3rd restored the outpost position and enemy attacks stopped. That afternoon action erupted in the far left flank of the otherwise quiet front. A Chinese battalion, its members wearing white parkas in the snow-covered terrain, lashed out at a company-held outpost of the ROK 1st Division that served as a patrol base for the division. A forty-minute pitched battle ensued in bitter subzero weather, before the ROK company fell back. Two days later, tank supported elements of the ROK first won back 800 yards of the ground the company had lost but failed to recapture the outpost itself. The high ground was secured by the last day of the year despite bad weather and heavy enemy resistance that cut short the attack.

Although the decision by General Ridgeway to discontinue offensive operations changed the Eighth Army's mission to one of defense, he had not implied that all action should cease. His order did not preclude raids, attritional warfare, or local limited offensives under favorable conditions. Therefore in December 1951, Van Fleet directed his corps commanders to make their attacks against enemy positions as costly to the foe as possible. Later, at a meeting of corps commanders, he directed them to begin attacking with artillery and air strikes to impress the Chinese and North Koreans with the tremendous fire power of the Eighth Army. As the new year began, the Eighth Army made ready to carry out these instructions.

The 155-mile front remained generally quiet in the opening of 1952, although patrols were regularly dispatched to gain prisoners and information. The most significant activity during the first month of the year occurred in the western extremity of the I Corps line. When light counterblows had failed to dislodge the Chinese from a ROK 1st Division outpost, the division opened a coordinated attack on the height on 31 January. After a five-day struggle, the infantry succeeded in seizing and securing a hill and adjacent positions. The Chinese lost heavily in the action, suffering an estimated 4,000 casualties and the destruction of a considerable amount of precious equipment and supplies.

In January 1952 the Eighth Army opened a month-long artillery-air-campaign against enemy positions. The artillery units of the four corps fired on remunerative targets, and on alternate days UN aircraft struck at others with high explosives and fire bombs. Thousands of rounds of artillery shells and

bombs fell on the targets during the month. No doubt this artillery, air attack discouraged enemy offensive action, but the strength of the enemy's positions and his skill in camouflage minimized its effect.

The superiority of UN air and artillery fire forced the Chinese and North Koreans to dig in deeply. Simple emplacements became dirt and log fortifications with overhead cover that varied from four to fifteen feet in thickness. It was common practice to place primary defense positions in the forward slope of a hill and dig personnel shelters, artillery emplacements, command posts, and supply points, all well camouflaged, on the reverse slopes. Tunnels or covered trenches connected the fighting positions with shelters. Thus enemy troops could move to shelters when attacked by aircraft or artillery, then return to their positions when the fire lifted. All positions afforded cover from high angle fire and provided good fields of fire.

UN artillery and the infantry's recoilless weapons, employing direct fire, neutralized many of the positions on the forward slopes of hills but were less effective against enemy fortifications on the reverse slopes. Many times the shells would fall into the valley below rather than the target. The aerial firebomb was no more effective. Only a direct hit from a 500 or 1000 pound bomb would destroy these emplacements.

Sporadic, light ground action continued to mark the fighting during the remainder of January and February of 1952. Patrols went out daily to feel out the enemy positions. The newly arrived 45th Division carried out a number of tank-infantry raids near the end of January to destroy enemy positions and seize prisoners. Various ruses aimed at luring the enemy out of his position met with little success.

While the spring rains and mists that cloaked Korea in March and April limited air and ground operations, Van Fleet shifted his units along the front to give the South Korean army a greater share of responsibility for defending the battle line and to concentrate American firepower in the vulnerable western section.

By 1 May the 1st Marine Division had moved from the PUNCHBOWL area in the US X Corps zone to replace the ROK 1st Division in General O'Daniel's I Corps. Here the marines' amphibious training and equipment could be utilized to conduct small raids across the Imjin River. The ROK 1st Division, after nine weeks of training, replaced the US 3rd Division in the corps' right center sector. General O'Daniel now had the 1st Marine Division on the left wing, the 1st British Commonwealth and the ROK 1st in the center, and the 45th on the right.

General Van Fleet made more extensive changes on the central front. He erased the US I Corps - US IX Corps boundary and redrew it farther west. At the same time he also had the right boundary of the latter corps moved west. With this shift, General Wyman's IX Corps, by 1 May, consisted of the ROK 9th Division on the left, the US 7th Division in the center, and the US 40th Division on the right. The 40th, the second National Guard division to fight in Korea, arrived in late January 1952. Assigned to the IX Corps, it relieved the 24th US Division, which returned to Japan. On the IX Corps' right flank, into the gap created by the shift in boundary, Van Fleet moved the reactivated ROK II Corps. The new corps' battle front, defended on the left by the ROK 6th Division, in the center by the ROK Capitol Division, and on the right by the ROK 3rd, extended eastward from Kumsong, to the X Corps boundary.

Only two changes occurred on the east central and eastern fronts. In General Palmer's X Corps, the ROK 8th replaced the 1st Marine Division. General Palmer's sector now had the ROK 7th Division on the left wing, the US 25th in the center, and the ROK 8th on the right Wing. On the eastern front, the ROK 11th Division moved up from its training area and took over defense of the left half of the ROK I Corps zone, while the ROK 5th assumed responsibility for the right sector on the Sea of Japan.

Ground action had continued to be limited to patrols in March and April, but the enemy became bolder in May. He increased his probing attacks and patrols, intensified his artillery fire, and aggressively intercepted UN patrols. The increased enemy activity was most pronounced in the US I Corps sector, where the Chinese executed thirty probing attacks, all unsuccessful, during May against the ROK 1st Division. But Chinese thrusts in the 45th Division sector overshadowed all other action across the entire front. When the Chinese made three raids against the 45th the US division

countered by sending nine tanks of the 245th Tank Battalion and a ROK infantry unit to raid the town of AGOK eight miles west of Ch'orwon, on 25 May. That night the Chinese launched an unsuccessful attack against one of the Division's patrol bases. Three nights later two Chinese companies intercepted a patrol from the 279th Infantry Regiment, on the division's right. Cut off, the patrol engaged the enemy with small arms and automatic weapons fire and radioed for assistance. Although the Chinese fired nearly three hundred mortar and artillery rounds on the main line of resistance, a relief platoon started out immediately and reached the besieged patrol three hours later. When aircraft illuminated the battle area with flares, the enemy's fire lessened. Finding the patrol reinforced and the battle field light as day, the Chinese broke off the engagement and withdrew.

The enemy's increased aggressiveness was greatly aided by his growing strength in artillery. In July 1951 the enemy had fired an estimated 8,000 artillery and mortar rounds, but in May 1952 an estimated total of 102,000 rounds fell on the Eighth Army's positions. Furthermore, the firing was more effective. The Chinese and North Koreans showed ability to mass eight to ten guns on a target, and to place counter-battery fire accurately. They fired widely spaced alternating guns and moved their artillery pieces frequently. In May the Chinese also moved artillery forward to within 2000-6000 yards of the Eighth Army's defenses.

As a result of increased Chinese ground activity at the hinge of the Eighth Army's line west of Ch'orwon, Major General David L. Ruffner, the 45th Division commander, planned an operation to establish eleven patrol bases across his division front. If his plan succeeded these bases would screen the division's main line of resistance more adequately by denying the enemy their use. This operation, known as operation COUNTER, began on 6 June when the two front-line regiments of the division launched a series of attacks to occupy the eleven objectives. By 7 June all but one objective had fallen to the assault units of the division. The enemy followed up with a series of counterblows during the next five days, but were successfully repulsed.

Seven days later, 13 June, the 45th opened Phase II of COUNTER to seize the last objective, a hill which the 45th had abandoned in March. It lay at the southern tip of a T-shaped ridge line eight miles west and slightly north of Ch'orwon. the struggle for the height began with an air strike and preparatory artillery bombardment. The 2nd Battalion of the 180th Infantry then crossed the line of departure and engaged the Chinese at close quarters. American Infantry repulsed four company-size Chinese counterattacks. Next day the regiment's 3rd Battalion relieved the 2nd and secured the objective. UN aircraft flew fifty-eight close-support missions during the first eighteen hours and UN guns fired 43,600 rounds during the forty-eight hour battle. At noon on 14 June, Phase II of Plan COUNTER ended with a new chain of patrol bases one half to two miles in front of the main line of resistance secure in the division's hands.

The Chinese immediately launched counterattacks along the entire front of the 45th Division. They first expended about two battalions in futile efforts to retake Hill 191. Then, on the night of 20-21 June, they opened a regimental assault, supported by 5,000 rounds of artillery and mortar fire against Hill 255, southwest of Hill 191. When this failed they struck at outpost positions on the western anchor of the Division's outpost line climaxing their efforts on the night of 28-29 June with an unsuccessful attacks that lasted four and a half hours. Throughout June the 45th sustained 1,004 casualties, but the Chinese lost an estimated 5,000 men, including thirty captured.

Patrol clashes and light probing attacks by the enemy marked the action elsewhere on the front during May and June. Strong positions and the mountainous terrain acted as deterrents to any large-scale action on the central and eastern fronts.

If ground action waned during the first half of 1952, so did air action. Enemy jet pilots had flown 3,700 sorties in January 1952, but only 308 in June. Even though the Chinese and North Koreans put fewer and fewer operational aircraft into the air, they continued to expand their air potential. UN intelligence estimated they had a total of 1,000 planes, including 400 jets, in Manchuria and China during May 1951, but twelve months later they were reported as possessing 1,800 planes, including 1,000 jets, in the same areas. The enemy also tightened his night air defenses. Over a dozen of his

cannon and rocket firing jets attacked ten B-29's on the night of 10-11 June as the UN aircraft were carrying out a bombing raid on the Kwalsan railroad bridge south of the Yalu River Assisted. By radar controlled searchlights, the jets shot down one bomber and caused a second to make a forced landing.

Throughout the first half of 1952, then, the UN forces waged a war of containment. UN infantry units parried enemy thrusts and launched attacks of their own, while naval units blockaded the coasts of North Korea and established an anti-invasion patrol to protect ROK partisans holding off-shore islands. Sabrejets successfully limited hostile aircraft to the area north of the Ch'onghc'on River line, and friendly bombers interdicted hostile supply lines. The front-line soldier continued to watch for enemy assaults while hoping that the armistice negotiators would soon reach agreement.

Deadlock continued as the Korean conflict went into its third year in late June 1952. Since November 1951 the battle front had been relatively stable, both sides having settled down to an active defense of their positions. In the following winter and spring the fighting dwindled to patrol clashes, raids, and small-scale attacks, but the enemy grew more aggressive in May 1952 and action along the entire front increased. Enemy attempts to seize key outposts and terrain guarding the approaches to the Eighth Army's main positions sparked frequently and intense fire fights occurred during the summer and fall of 1952. The army successfully defended these positions breaking up the enemy's attacks and killing thousands of Chinese and North Koreans.

July began with a series of small-scale attacks on both sides. In the Eighth Army's western sector the US I Corps, under its new commander. Major General Paul W. Kendall conducted a number of raids on Chinese fortifications opposite the corps' front. On the first day of the month, infantrymen from the ROK 1st Division raided enemy territory overlooking the Imjin River. In the fight that followed the ROK troops killed 112 Chinese before returning to the division's lines. Two days later, on 3 July, the marines, on the corp's left wing, struck at a Chinese battalion. Supported by mortar and artillery fire, two companies from the 7th Marine Regiment swept into the enemy positions to inflict 200 casualties on the surprised Chinese before retiring. The corps handed out more punishment when a tank-infantry team from General Ruffner's US 45th Division attacked a hill mass northwest of Ch'orwon. The tankers and infantrymen returned to their lines after killing seventy-nine of the enemy on the hill.

Light action marked the fighting on the remainder of the front. In General Wyman's U.S. IX Corps, troops from Major General Wayne C. Smith's US 7th Division raided an enemy-held hill ten miles south of P'yonggang on 3 July. The raiding infantry wiped out the forty-five Chinese defenders and destroyed enemy fortifications before returning to their lines. The ROK 9th Division followed up this raid with two of their own against enemy positions, killing sixty Chinese and destroying bunkers, trenches and gun emplacements. In the ROK II Corps area, South Korean infantrymen struck enemy positions northeast of Kumwha to kill sixty-five Chinese. In the ROK I Corps sector North Korean troops unsuccessfully attacked an observation post for naval gunfire on the enemy's Nam River line. The enemy lost an estimated 600 men in this attempt.

Torrential rains in the last week of July and the first week of August restricted activity along the front, but periods of clear weather brought renewed attacks by both sides. In the US I Corps zone, Major General James C. Fry, the US 2nd Division Commander, sent two reinforced companies against Hill 266 during the night of 31 July -1 August. Determined to regain the height that had been lost in July, the infantrymen stormed up the slopes and drove the Chinese out. Quickly digging in and organizing their position, the 2nd Division troops awaited the inevitable counterattack. It came the following night, but massed division artillery and small arms broke up the Chinese assault. Enemy attacks later in the month met with no success, and the hill remained in the hands of the 2nd Division.

Heavy rains again drenched Korea in the latter part of August to bring the fighting to a halt. Then, as September began, the skies cleared and the enemy renewed his assaults on the Eighth Army's outpost positions. These attacks were accompanied by an increasing amount of mortar and artillery fire support.

For quite some time the enemy had gradually been increasing the volume of mortar and artillery fire used in the support of his attacks. In September an all time high of 45,000 rounds fell on the army's

front in one day. Despite the enormous effort exerted by the Fifth Air Force and the Naval Arm to sever the enemy's supply lines the Chinese and North Koreans kept their front line troops supplied and even managed to accumulate a reserve stock of ammunition and supplies.

Various sectors of the Eighth Army's line came under enemy attack in September. After unsuccessfully assaulting an outpost that the marines had seized and established the previous month, the Chinese shifted their efforts to the US I Corp's right wing. On the night of 18 September, after their artillery had smothered Hill 266 in the US 2nd Division sector with 1,000 shells, an estimated two enemy companies, reinforced with tanks, swarmed up the slopes and rapidly overrun the crest. The Americans withdrew 400 yards and established new positions, then counterattacked. But the heavy and accurate Chinese artillery fire prevented the assaulting troops from making any headway. On the evening of 20 September another counterattack formed and began to envelop the hill. After slow progress through heavy enemy fire the attacking companies, reinforced by a platoon of tanks, made a coordinated assault that carried them to the crest. The Chinese fell back as the attacking infantrymen swept over the hilltop and secured the position.

In the central sector of the Eighth Army line, the enemy struck at two separate points in the front of the ROK II Corps' Capital Division. On the division's left flank the Chinese overran an outpost position to threaten the main line of resistance while another outpost position on the division's right fell to enemy assaults. Both were soon re-taken by the South Korean infantrymen.

In the eastern sector of the front North Koreans attacked main line of resistance positions on the right wing of the US X Corps on the night of 21-22 September. While the US 45th Division was in the process of relieving the ROK 8th Division, elements of two enemy battalions overran the western slope and crept of the hill serving as part of the ROK division's main line. Driving one company back about 1,000 yards, the enemy then swung to the west to widen the penetration. But the defending South Koreans on the left of the penetration held firm and halted the North Korean attack. The next morning, 22 September, an infantry company from the ROK 8th Division, supported by tanks of the 45th Division's 245th Tank Battalion, managed to regain part of the hill. At noon the same day, after artillery fire and air strikes had covered the penetration, elements of the ROK 8th's reserve regiment counterattacked and drove the enemy back. By nightfall the mainline of resistance had been restored and all enemy troops driven out. During the next two days the North Koreans made several weak attempts to penetrate the Division's main line of resistance without success. Meanwhile the 45th Division continued its relief of the 8th, completing it on 26 September.

While the troops of the Eighth Army defended their outposts and main battle positions against local enemy assaults, the air war over Korea intensified during the summer of 1952. Aircraft from the Fifth Air Force and the Far East Bomber Command, Marine aircraft, and Navy carrier-based planes struck at supply centers, troop concentrations, power plants, factories and rail and road networks. In addition to striking deep into enemy territory, air units rendered valuable assistance to front line troops. Enemy bunkers, trenches, gun positions and communication lines were bombed and seared with napalm. On 29 August the Fifth Air Force carried out the largest raid of the Korean conflict. Hundreds of Air Force, Marine, and Navy planes accompanied by aircraft from Australia and the United Kingdom raided P'yong'yang, the North-Korea capitol. In this massive strike, supply installations, repair shops, troop concentrations, military headquarters, and a host of other targets were destroyed or badly damaged.

An increasing number of enemy jet interceptors rose to challenge Fifth Air Force Sabrejets during the summer. But the superiority of American Pilots was clearly demonstrated by the number of enemy' aircraft destroyed in aerial combat. During the month of September alone, pilots from the 5th Air Force shot down sixty- four MIG-15s at a cost of seven Sabrejets.

The Navy maintained its blockade of both coasts of North Korea. On the east coast, warships of the US Seventh Fleet continued to bombard the enemy port of Wonsan. Ships from the fleet also continued to provide gunfire support for friendly forces near the east coast of the peninsula. On the Korean west coast the UN Fleet helped protect islands off the North Korean coast and assisted guerrilla units to recapture an island that had been seized by an enemy force.

The rising tide of enemy attacks that began in May culminated in a series of assaults in October that produced some of the heaviest fighting in more than a year. Battles raged on many sections of the front as Chinese and North Korean units, sometimes employing their familiar human-sea tactics, tried to penetrate the Eighth Army's main line of resistance or to seize dominating terrain. The heaviest fighting centered around two key heights, Hills 281 and 395, northwest of Ch'orwon. Capture of these strategic positions, astride the US I Corps-US IX Corps boundary, would give the Chinese control of the lateral roads behind the corps' lines and threaten the main supply route to Ch'orwon.

To herald the opening of their attacks the Chinese unleashed the largest volume of mortar and artillery fire received by the Eighth Army since the fighting began. On one day, 7 October, more than 93,000 rounds fell on UN positions along the front. The Eighth Army estimated that during these attacks the enemy's daily expenditure of artillery and mortar ammunition doubled to more than 24,000 rounds.

The Chinese began a coordinated attack against both hills on the evening of 6 October after daylong bombardment of the objectives. Two enemy companies struck Hill 281, the eastern anchor of the I Corps, line. The US 2nd Division's French Battalion, defending the height, repelled this assault, but the Chinese added two more companies to the attacking force, reformed and attacked again. The gallant French would not yield; and as the battle progressed the Chinese continued to build up their attacking strength. By dawn, they had an entire regiment hammering away vainly at the French. Finally, with hundreds of their dead and wounded strewn about the besieged position, the Chinese broke off the attack and withdrew. They kept up pressure against the French-held hill for the next two days, but on 12 October abandoned further attempts to capture it.

The main enemy attack in the meantime struck Hill 395, guarding the US IX Corps left flank. The Chinese hurled an estimated two battalions against the height in coordination with the attack on Hill 281. Elements of the ROK 9th Div., defending the hill, held their positions until the following afternoon, 7 October, when the enemy threw in additional battalions and forced the South Koreans to withdraw. A counterattack restored the lost ground, but the enemy renewed his assault in regimental strength the next day and again forced the ROK troops to withdraw. They established a new defense line south of the lost position and then began the counterattack. Assisted by numerous air strikes and massed corps artillery, the South Korean infantrymen managed after two days of heavy fighting to fight their way to the crest of the hill and drive the Chinese back. An enemy battalion then attempted to push the infantrymen back, but the defenders, backed by artillery fire stopped the Chinese short of their goal.

To relieve the pressure against Hill 395 a battalion from the ROK 9th Division, supported by a company-sized tank-infantry team, seized high ground several hundred yards north of the hill. Securing this newly won terrain, the battalion continued to advance northward and by 15 October had secured two screening positions, 1,000 yards north of Hill 395. With the South Koreans now in firm control of the disputed ground the enemy gave up further efforts to penetrate the IX Corps left flank. After the battle was over, the 9th Division reported that the major part of the Chinese reserve division from the 38th Chinese Communist Army had been destroyed. Over 2,000 Chinese dead were counted on the slopes of Hills 281 and 395 in the ten-day battle.

The Eighth Army countered enemy aggressiveness by making several attacks during the middle of the month. The primary aim of these attacks was to strengthen the defense of Kumwha, the right leg of the Iron Triangle and the hub of an important road net. Two dominating hill masses, Hills 500 and 598, about four miles north of the city were the objectives of the IX Corp's US 7th and ROK 2nd Divisions. The attack began on the morning of 14 October when two battalions from the 7th Division's 31st Regiment executed a double envelopment of Hill 598 from the south and southeast. Advancing under heavy enemy fire, the battalion succeeded in driving the enemy from the hill after six hours of intense fighting. The Chinese counterattacked that night and forced the Americans off the height.

The next morning, 15 October, the infantrymen of the 31st again attacked. Moving silently and swiftly through the morning mists they went up the slopes of Hill 598 and ejected the enemy from the crest. Two smaller heights that lay a short distance from the main objective also fell to the attacking troops. The Chinese then retaliated by throwing two battalions against the hill in an effort to dislodge the

Americans. The enemy attack failed. Three days later, on 18 October, the American infantrymen advanced another 1,000 yards deeper into enemy territory and seized key terrain to protect Hill 598 from the north. But counterattacking Chinese Battalions forced the troops of the 31st to pull back to the main hill mass. Further enemy attempts to regain Hill 598 failed until 30 October. At that time, three days after the ROK 2nd Division had taken over the height from the US 7th Division, an enemy regiment stormed up the slopes and drove out the South Korean defenders. Successive counterattacks by the 2nd failed to regain the hill. While the 7th Division had been fighting for Hill 598, a battalion from the ROK 2nd Division streamed up Hill 500 and seized the crest against light enemy opposition. The usual enemy counterattack followed, and for a week the position changed hands repeatedly. Near the end of October the ROK troops finally managed to seize and hold the height.

Meanwhile more fighting broke out in the ROK II Corps' sector. Two Chinese companies attacked hilltop positions near the left flank of the ROK Capital Division on the night of 6 October. The South Koreans made a determined stand and prevented the enemy from making any penetration of the main battle line. About 500 yards east of these positions the enemy also struck with two companies and seized an outpost guarding the division's center. The following morning ROK troops counterattacked and managed to reach positions 300 yards from the crest. The Chinese prevented any further advance, and as October ended the enemy still remained in possession of the hilltop.

Fighting along the remainder of the Eighth Army front consisted of patrol clashes and light raids, by the enemy. Harassing attacks occurred in the US I Corps' front against the 1st Marine Division when the Chinese attacked several outposts without success.

With the coming of winter weather in November, enemy aggressiveness began to decline. Although the Chinese kept pressure on the central front, the severe defeat inflicted on them by the IX Corps in October and the adverse weather evidently dampened their desire to conduct further large-scale attacks against the Eighth Army's battle line. For the remainder of the year, fighting diminished in intensity as both sides prepared to meet the rigors of the Korean winter.

As ground fighting slowed to a near halt during December, General Van Fleet made several changes in his battle line. To strengthen the Kumhwa-Ch'orwon sector of the Iron Triangle, the army commander increased the number of front line divisions in the IX Corps. The front of the ROK 9th Division on the corps' right flank was narrowed and the left boundary of the ROK II Corps shifted several miles east. The ROK Capital Division then filled in the resulting gap. One other change occurred in the IX Corps when the ROK 2nd Division relieved the US 3rd Division on the corps' left flank. Lt. Gen. Reuben E. Jenkins who had taken over command of the IX Corps from General Wyman in August, now had three ROK divisions and one US Division, the 25th, defending the front.

At the year's end General Van Fleet had sixteen divisions manning the Eighth Army's battle line. Included in this number were one US Marine, one British Commonwealth, eleven South Korean, and 3 US Army divisions. Contingents of troops from other United Nations countries reinforced the American divisions, and a Korean Marine Regiment became an important adjunct to the 1st Marine Division. The Army Commander also had four divisions available as reserve forces - one South Korean and three American.

As the year 1953 began, activity along the entire front subsided. Patrolling and small-scale harassing attacks characterized the fighting during the winter months of the new year. Then, as spring began, the enemy renewed his assaults upon the Eighth Army's outpost line, attempting to seize terrain that overlooked the army's main line of resistance. These attacks increased in frequency and intensity until, in July, they approached the scale of the enemy's heavy attacks of May, 1951.

During January 1953 General Van Fleet continued to make changes in the Eighth Army's line. In the right-wing corps, he replaced the veteran ROK 5th Division with the newly activated 15th. In the left-wing corps, the US 2nd Division relieved the 1st British Commonwealth Division, the first time the latter unit had been out of combat for nearly eighteen months. In the IX Corps in the Eighth Army's center, the US 3rd Division took over the sector held by the US 25th Division, while in X Corps, the US 45th relieved the US 40th Division. After these changes the army Commander had twelve South Korean

and Eight UN divisions to defend the army front. The thousands of service and security troops that supported the combat divisions brought the army's total strength to nearly 768,000 men.

To oppose the Eighth Army's twenty divisions the enemy disposed a formidable array of strength along the front. Seven Chinese armies and two North Korean Corps, totaling about 270,000 troops, manned the enemy defense line. Another eleven Chinese armies and North Korean corps with an estimated strength of 531,000 remained in reserve. With service and security forces, the total enemy strength amounted to more than a million men.

The enemy employed his forces along a battle line that roughly paralleled that of the Eighth Army. The Chinese occupied about three-fourths of this line; their armies extended from the Korean Coast eastward to the Kum River. East of the river the North Koreans manned the remainder of the line to the Sea of Japan a sector, incidentally, where there was little likelihood of a main UN thrust. Although a manpower shortage probably explains this division of responsibility, it is also possible that the Chinese questioned the fighting ability of their allies.

Other than a few patrol clashes, little fighting occurred during January and February. Only in the sector of the ROK 12th Division did the enemy make any serious attempts to penetrate the army's main line of resistance, and these failed. Meanwhile the Eighth Army carried out a number of raids on enemy positions. Supported by Air strikes and accurate artillery fire, raiding parties from all five corps struck hard at Chinese and North Korean positions to kill or capture enemy soldiers and destroy emplacements and fortifications.

During February the command of the Eighth Army changed hands. General Van Fleet, after nearly two years as the Eighth Army's leader, turned over his command to Lt Gen Maxwell D. Taylor and returned to the United States for retirement.

As March began the enemy increased his attacks on the army's outpost line, evidently in retaliation for the UN raids of January and February. The US I Corps bore the brunt of these attacks. On the first day of March an enemy battalion assaulted main line of resistance positions on Hill 355, held by elements of the US 2nd Division. Although part of the enemy force managed to reach the foxholes and trenches of the defenders the attack was beaten off. The Chinese hit the hill again on 17 March with a battalion. Attacking in two elements from the north and northeast, the Chinese breached the protective mine fields and wire and drove into the trenches on the crest. The center of the line gave way, but two platoons that were previously placed in blocking positions moved up to contain the penetration. Meanwhile, on the crest and forward slope of the hill the fighting was heavy. At dawn an infantry company arrived to reinforce the troops on the hill top and the Chinese began withdrawing. As they pulled back, UN artillery hit their routes of withdrawal and inflicted further casualties.

The Chinese again struck at the US I Corps during the final week of the month. On the evening of 23 March an enemy regiment assaulted Hills 266, 255, and 191, outposts of the US 7th Division. Defended by the division's Colombian Battalion, Hill 266 was the target of the main enemy effort. A Chinese battalion supported by artillery and mortar fire drove into positions on the western slope of the hill at 2100. The Colombians on the hill received reinforcements amounting to a company, but this was not enough to withstand the enemy assault and the defenders fell back to positions on the southeastern slope of the height. The following morning, 24 March, a battalion from the 7th Division counterattacked and managed to gain the crest of the hill and engage the Chinese in trenches and bunkers. The struggle continued throughout the morning with both sides supported by heavy artillery fire. The Chinese stubbornly fought to retain their positions and the Americans broke off their attack, pulling back to the southern slope. Early the next day another American counterattack failed and the Chinese still held crest of Hill 266.

Concurrently with the attack on Hill 266 two enemy battalions hit Hills 255 and 191. The battle on Hill 191 was short. As the Chinese companies advanced up the slopes the Americans called for and received reinforcements. After a brief fight with the defenders, the Chinese broke contact and withdrew. Over on Hill 255 the Chinese were more successful. Supported by tanks and by artillery and mortar fire

the Chinese forced the defenders with withdraw 700 yards. Shortly after midnight two companies from the 7th Division counterattacked uphill 255 and drove the enemy off the crest.

Although the Chinese had gained their chief objective, Hill 266, the price was high. The 7th Division reported that the battles on the three hills cost the enemy 750 casualties.

While the battle see-sawed about the outposts of the 7th Division sector, the enemy prepared for another attack farther to the west in the I Corps sector. Early in the evening of 26 March several outposts of the 1st Marine Regiment received diversionary attacks by small enemy forces. Then the enemy struck three nearby outposts in regimental strength. Over-running two of the three positions quickly, the Chinese advanced toward the main line of resistance. But an American blocking force placed between the Chinese line of advance and the main line of resistance intercepted the enemy regiment. After a vain, all-night effort to get this obstacle the Chinese withdrew. Later in the morning of 27 March a marine battalion counter-attacked and recaptured one of the lost outposts. The rest of the day, 28 March, they took the remaining outpost, but shortly afterward a Chinese counterthrust drove the Americans back 400 yards. In the afternoon the marines again regained the outpost. Reinforcing and digging in, they waited the next onslaught. It came that night when a Chinese Battalion attacked. More marine reinforcements were poured in while corps and division artillery fire isolated the battlefield and prevented the Chinese from increasing the size of the attacking force. By the next morning the enemy had made no more headway and withdrew.

Friendly and enemy patrols kept busy in the I Corps sector. The Chinese apparently sensitive to the activities of the corps patrols and raiding parties, began to establish ambushes. One patrol of thirty-four men from the US 7th Division fell into a trap set by the enemy on 9 March. Surrounded by some sixty Chinese the whole patrol became casualties; twenty men were killed, twelve wounded, and two missing. On another occasion, a thirty-four man patrol from the US 2nd Division ran head on into two Chinese companies. The patrol called for and received reinforcements, and the resulting engagement lasted until the next morning when the enemy broke contact and withdrew. The Americans suffered a total of sixty-three casualties in this fight, twelve of them killed, forty-three wounded, and five missing. Two platoons from the Colombian Battalion, raided enemy positions on the morning of 10 March, engaged the Chinese in a short but intense firefight. Forced to withdraw under heavy enemy artillery fire, the Colombian's lost nineteen men killed, forty-four wounded, and eight missing.

After the flare-up of fighting in late March, activity along the battlefield again settled into routine patrolling and small-scale harassing attacks. The calm persisted through April, interrupted only by Eighth Army raids on the enemy's outpost and main line of resistance positions. But, as April ended, and the Armistice negotiations at Panmunjon approached a decisive stage, there were signs that the enemy intended to increase the size and frequency of his attacks. Troop movements indicated that he was shifting his forces from the northern coastal areas and concentrating them in forward areas. His artillery and armor were being positioned in depth and his troops realigned on the front and in the rear. An increasing number of contacts between Eighth Army and enemy patrols showed considerable tightening of the enemy counter-reconnaissance screen.

Then, in the final week of May, the Chinese conducted several attacks against the army's left wing. In the sector held by the IX Corps, attacks estimated to be in regimental strength struck the ROK 9th Division. After intense fighting the South Koreans stopped these assaults and forced the enemy to withdraw. In the ROK Capital Division sector, two Chinese Battalions tried to make a penetration. Although supported by large volumes of mortar and artillery fire, the Chinese were unable to drive the South Koreans from their positions and had to withdraw under punishing corps and division artillery fire.

The enemy's heaviest-blow struck the US I Corps. On the evening of 28 May five outpost positions came under attack by an enemy regiment. These outposts, about 1,000 yards forward of the division's main line, guarded routes of approach to the division's center. Nicknamed Carson, Elko, Vegas, Berlin, and East Berlin, they were defended by platoons from the division's Turkish Brigade. Moving under extremely heavy artillery support, one Chinese battalion advanced on Carson and Elko.

At the same time another enemy battalion, concealed by a smoke screen, attacked the center position, Vegas, while a third assaulted outposts Berlin and East Berlin on the right. Three hours after the attack began the enemy had reached the Turkish positions on Carson and Elko and were engaging the defenders in hand-to-hand combat. Unable to overcome the Turks the enemy withdrew to evidently to reform, then attacked again. At outpost Elko, the action continued, intermittently until mid-morning of 29 May when the Chinese broke contact. A few minutes later they struck again at Elko. The fight continued about the outpost as the enemy pressed the attack. Finally, near midnight, the division ordered the outpost abandoned and the Turks withdrew to their main line of resistance.

Meanwhile, a furious fight had developed around outpost Vegas. One half hour after the Chinese began the attack on Vegas they reinforced their attacking elements with another battalion. Pushing forward through the artillery and mortar fire of both sides, they broke into the defensive positions and engaged the Turks in close combat. A Turkish company, rushed to reinforce the outpost, found hand-to-hand fights going on around the position. Two hours later the enemy began to break off the attack, once again suffering numerous casualties as the 25th Division artillery raked the enemy routes of withdrawal.

Just after daylight the Chinese attacked again with two battalions. This assault was also unsuccessful and the attackers withdrew. Two hours later the Turks counterattacked enemy elements on the north slope of the hill that contained outpost Vegas and drove them back. The Turks now had control of the entire outpost, but the Chinese seemed determined to seize Vegas at any cost. At midafternoon of the same day, 29 May, another battalion struck the battered position. The fight raged around the outpost for the remainder of the afternoon. Then at 2300, the order to withdraw came from the divisions and the defenders fell back to their main line of resistance,

The enemy attack on outposts Berlin and East Berlin did not last long. After a bitter two-hour fire fight the enemy gave up the effort on these two positions and withdrew.

The Chinese had succeeded in occupying Carson, Elko and Vegas, but they paid a heavy price. The 25th Division reported evaluated enemy casualties in the battle as 2,200 killed and 1,057 wounded. In contrast the Turks reported their losses as 104 killed, 324 wounded and 47 missing.

By the first of June it appeared certain to intelligence officers of Eighth Army that the Chinese planned to strike a major blow soon. Their failure to follow up the May attack against the US I Corps indicated that those had been diversionary efforts to screen their real intentions. The continued movement and realignment of troops on the enemy front and rear and the large build-up of supplies near the battle zone further confirmed the army's belief that a large-scale Chinese attack impended. When the enemy blow would fall or where remained a matter of conjecture. As the first week of June passed the front remained relatively quiet. On the night of 10 June, the Chinese struck.

The enemy directed his efforts against the ROK II Corps, whose line bulged out to form a salient in the vicinity of Kumsong. Striking down both sides of the Pukhan River, with two divisions, the Chinese succeeded forcing the right wing and center of the Corps back about 4,000 yards in six days of heavy fighting. No since the spring offensive of April-May 1951 had fighting on such a scale occurred. The main enemy blow fell on the II Corp's right wing and center. Shortly after dark on 10 June a Chinese division attacked the right regiment of the ROK 5th Division, whose lines lay east of the Pukhan River. By seizing Hill 973, the dominant height in the regiment's area the enemy forced the South Koreans to fall back about 1,000 yards. Counterattacks by the reserve regiment of the 5th and a regiment from corps reserve the following morning failed to restore the main line of resistance or halt the enemy advance. The Chinese kept up their unrelenting pressure, forcing the 5th to withdraw again, and by 15 June the South Koreans had been pushed back to the east bank of the river at a point where the stream cut sharply eastward. There the division formed a new main line of resistance.

In the corps center the situation was just as critical. On the night of 12 June elements of another Chinese Division struck the ROK 8th division's right, which rested on the Pukhan. As the Chinese pressed forward they made several penetrations during the next twenty-four hours. Counterattacks by the reserve regiment of the 8th failed to halt the advance, and the Chinese began exploiting their gains.

Attacking in regimental strength early in the morning of 14 June they soon enveloped the division's right regiment. The hard-pressed South Koreans began falling back under the weight of the enemy attack.

While the Chinese were attacking the II Corps' right, a smaller enemy force struck the ROK 20th Division on the left of the X Corps. Evidently this was not a holding attack, for the Chinese did not press their assault. But the collapse of the ROK 5th Division, on the II Corps' right, threatened the left of the X Corps. Lt. Gen I. D. White, the X Corps Commander, therefore narrowed the front of the 20th Division on 16 June and committed the ROK 7th Division in Corps Reserve, on the left of the 20th Division to strengthen that flank. Other changes were being made to meet the situation in the ROK II Corps.

The failure of the 8th Division's right to hold coupled with the withdrawal of the 5th east of the river opened a gap between the divisions. The ROK II Corps commander filled this gap by committing the ROK 3rd Division, in corps reserve, between the 8th and 5th Divisions on 15 June. At the same time General Taylor, in order to facilitate control, temporarily shifted the boundary between the II and X Corps westward to the river and gave the ROK 5th Division to the X Corps. To replace the ROK 3rd, the army commander shifted the ROK 11th Division from the ROK I Corps to the II Corps but kept it under army control.

The Chinese continued their attacks against the 8th Division, this time concentrating on the division's right and center. Under the heavy blows of the Chinese assault the South Koreans reeled back. A counterattack by elements of the division on 16 June failed to push the enemy back and the 8th drew up on a new main line of resistance 3,000 yards south of the original one.

While the enemy concentrated his main effort against the ROK II Corps, he delivered several attacks on other parts of the front. Two outpost positions in front of the ROK 1st Division, in the US Corps, fell to the enemy near the end of June after a prolonged attack by the Chinese regiment. Farther east in the sector of the IX Corps, the Chinese employed forces in battalion and regimental strength in a thrust against the US 3rd and ROK 9th Divisions. They made minor penetrations in the lines of the 3rd, but counterattacks quickly restored the positions. In the ROK 9th Division's sector the Chinese failed to make a dent in the eastern sector of the Eighth Army's front, North Korean attacks forced a minor readjustment of main line of resistance positions on the X Corp's right wing. At the same time enemy forces were successful in seizing Hill 351, the northern anchor of the ROK I Corps line.

By 18 June, a slackening of enemy pressure enabled the corps to stabilize its front. General Taylor directed the commanders of the ROKII corps and the US X Corps to readjust their forces so as to permit the relief of the ROK 5th and 7th Divisions and to reestablish the boundary that existed between the corps before 15 June. The enemy made no further attempts on the II Corps front until the middle of July, just before the termination of hostilities.

Meanwhile a major airborne movement brought General Taylor additional troops from Japan. The 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team assembled at two air bases in Japan on 21 June. In a matter of hours and entire unit, completely equipped for combat with vehicles, artillery, ammunition, and rations, was flown to forward air bases near the front. A few days later a similar movement took place. The 34th Regimental Combat Team (less one rifle battalion) of the 24th Division, similarly equipped, boarded aircraft at an air base near Tokyo and was flown to Pusan and Taegu.

Measured in terms of ground gained, the enemy attacks caused three ROK divisions to be redeployed in reinforcing and counterattacking roles. Both sides incurred heavy losses. The Chinese lost and estimated 6,628 men and the U Corps reported 7,377 casualties as a direct result of the attacks.

Enemy attacks against the II Corps subsided after 18 June, and by the end of the month action along the entire army front returned to routine patrolling and light attacks. But the Army Commander felt that the Chinese would again launch an attack in strength. It was not long in coming, this time against the left flank of then Corps and the right flank of the IX corps. The Capital Division, defending the IX Corp's right flank sector, faced northwest.

On the night of 13 July, the Chinese attacked the IX Corps' right flank with three divisions and soon broke through the South Korean lines. A good deal of confusion ensued as the Capital Division's right and center fell back. Some of the troops withdrew into the zone of the II Corps as units became

entangled and lateral communication was lost. On the division's extreme left, things went somewhat better. There the units fell back in an orderly fashion under the crushing weight of the Chinese attacks. But the collapse of the Capital Division made matters worse for the II corps whose situation was already serious.

The Chinese had timed their assault on the Capital Division with another attack, in division strength, against the ROK 6th Division protecting the II Corps' left. After vainly trying to hold back the onslaught, the South Koreans began giving away. Their left flank was exposed by the withdrawal of the Capital Division, and the enemy was threatening to get into the rear of the 6th and cut it off. To prevent an enemy envelopment the division had no choice but to pull back. Retiring slowly, the 6th took a heavy toll of attacking Chinese while farther to the east the ROK 8th and 3rd Divisions moved back under heavy enemy pressure.

To meet the situation in the Eighth Army's center, General Taylor directed the commanders of the IX and II Corps to establish and hold a new line of resistance along the south bank of the Kumsong River, a tributary of the Pukhan. In order to restore the line of the Capital Division zone, he permitted the US 3rd Division to be moved from its sector in the vicinity of ch'orwon to the right wing of the IX Corps. The US 2nd Division extended its sector to the right to cover the position vacated by the 3rd. The corps commander reinforced the 2nd by attaching to it the 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team, which dug in on the division's right. At the same time the 34th Regimental Combat Team (less one battalion) came up from Pusan and assumed the role of a counterattacking force. It took up positions in rear of the 2nd Division.

In the II Corps the ROK 11th Division, in reserve, moved up to relieve the hard pressed 6th. The ROK 7th Division on the left wing of X Corps moved out of the line, and its place was taken by the US 45th Division. The 7th then came over to the II Corps. Further changes occurred in the corps when the ROK 6th hastily reorganized and moved into the sectors held by the ROK 3rd and 5th Divisions. The two latter divisions went into corps reserve. After this reorganization the II Corps counterattacked on 17 July with three divisions in an attempt to seize the high ground along the Kumsong and establish a new main line of resistance. By 20 July the II Corps attained its objective and held it. No attempt was made to restore the original line, inasmuch as the imminence of an armistice made it tactically unnecessary to expend lives for terrain not essential to the Eighth Army's front.

Enemy losses in July were tremendous. The army estimated that the Chinese lost over 72,000 men, more than 25,000 of them killed. Out of the five Chinese armies that had been identified in the attacks upon the II and IX Corps, the enemy had lost the equivalent of seven divisions.

While the fighting raged on the central front the negotiators at Panmunjon rapidly approached an agreement on armistice terms. On 19 July agreement was reached on all points by both sides. The next day Liaison and staff officers began the task of drawing up boundaries of the demilitarized zone. All details of the armistice agreement and its implementation were completed in a week. At 1000 hours on 27 July Lt. Gen. William K. Harrison, Jr. the senior United Nations delegate to the armistice negotiations signed the armistice papers. At the same time the senior enemy delegate General Nam II, placed his signature on the documents. The signing took place at this time to permit the armistice to go into effect at 2200 hours the same day, as required by the agreement. Later General Clark, for the United Nations, General Kim IL Sung, for North Korea, and General Peng Teh-Huai, for the Chinese forces on the peninsula affixed their signatures.

The conflict in Korea had lasted three years, one month and two days. It had destroyed Korean homes, fields and factories, wrecked the nation's economy, and threatened the populace with famine and disease. The signing of the armistice brought an end to the shooting; it did not bring an end of the ideological war. "We have won an armistice on a single battle ground" said President Eisenhower as the Panmunjon negotiators reached agreement, "not peace in the world. We may not now relax our guard nor cease our quest."

The Korean Military Armistice Agreement provided for the cessation of hostilities and the maintenance of a military power status quo as a prelude to the settlement of the basic question a divided

Korea. To date, there has been no solution which is acceptable to both and Communists and the Free World.

The Armistice Agreement provided for a 4,000 meter wide Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) dividing the Korean peninsula and extending eastward from the Han River Estuary to the Sea of Japan, as a buffer zone between the forces of the United Nations Command and the Korean People's Army/Chinese People's Volunteers. In addition, the Han River Estuary was used to further extend this buffer zone westward to the Yellow Sea.

The agreement also prescribed a Military Demarcation line which extends 151 miles from the Han River Estuary to the east coast, and divides the Demilitarized zone into equal halves. A total of 1292 markers have been installed on the ground to define the exact location of the Military Demarcation Line (MDL). These markers are numbered consecutively from west to east and contain printing in Chinese on the side facing north, English on the south side and Korean on both sides.

The Armistice Agreement provided for several agencies, the principal one being the Military Armistice Commission (MAC).

The mission of the MAC is to supervise the implementation of the Armistice Agreement and to settle, through negotiation, any violations of the agreement which may occur. The MAC is a jointly manned organization in which the interests of the commander of both sides is represented. It consists of ten senior officers-five representatives from each side. The MAC meets on the call of either side. As of 8 March 1963, 1964 meetings of this commission had been held.

The Armistice Agreement provided also for a Secretariat, responsible for maintaining records and providing language-translator-interpreter service. Although originally intended as a joint organization, each side appointed a Secretary and established a separate Secretariat. The Secretaries also meet on call of either to negotiate minor violations of the Agreement. Continuous contact is maintained between the United Nations Command (UNC) and the Communists at the Paumunjon conference area by Joint Duty Officers from the Secretariat of both sides.

Telephones connect the UNC and Communists joint duty offices, located in the conference area. In addition, the Joint Duty Officers meet daily, except Sunday, to exchange correspondence, reports and information.

Another agency prescribed by the Armistice Agreement is the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC) composed of senior officers from four neutral nations. Sweden and Switzerland were nominated by the UNC for this Commission. The Communists nominated Czechoslovakia and Poland. The NNSC operates as an independent, fact-finding body outside of the authority of the MAC. Its mission is to conduct inspections, investigations, and observations outside the Demilitarized Zone into the rotation or exchange of military personnel and combat materiel at prescribed ports of entry in Northern and Southern Korea.

The final agency provided for in the Armistice Agreement is the Joint Observer Teams (JOT). This agency of the Korean Military Armistice Commission provides ten Joint Observer Teams to assist the Armistice Commission in carrying out those provisions of the agreement pertaining to the DMZ (Demilitarized Zone and the Han River Estuary (HRE)). By mutual agreement, the number of teams were later reduced to five.

Each team is organized with six field grade officers - three Communists and three UNC personnel. The senior member of each team component is the spokesman for his respective side. Although there are five separate teams, the senior members of the UNC and the KPA/CPA (Korean People's Army and Chinese People's Army) are the same individuals for all teams.

Mission of the JOTS is to investigate reported violations of the Armistice Agreement. In addition, their tasks include the exchange of detained personnel; recovery and exchange of remains; maintenance of safe lines, roads and trails within the DMZ; and maintenance of markers delineating the Military Demarcation Line (MDL) and the boundaries of the DMZ and HRE.

On the UNC side, working from the Secretariat, United Nations Commission, Military Armistice Commission (UNCMAC), the Senior Member, JOT conducts or coordinates all unilateral investigations relative to actual or alleged violations of the Armistice Agreement.

In a message from General G. S. Meloy, Jr., Commanding General, Eighth U. S. Army to the troops of that command, he stated:

"The Military Armistice Agreement was signed by the opposing military commanders in Korea almost a decade ago. Still, the Communist side sends agents to infiltrate our lines. Many of these infiltrators have been captured or killed by our troops - or put to death by the Communists when their capture was imminent.

Neither side wants a resumption of hostilities the Red armies because they are aware of the might of the United Nations Command, and the UN Command because of the belief that every possible effort must be made to settle this problem peacefully without resort to arms.

Through the talks at the Joint Security Area near Panmunjon neither side has reached a final settlement of the Korean War, but further bloodshed has been prevented. There is no peace - only a cease-fire agreement.

We are here in Korea because the war is not over. And here we will remain on Freedom's Frontier ready to meet the aggressors from the North should they break the terms of the Armistice. The Demilitarized Zone is heavily guarded-defensive measures include minefields, barbed wire, and Civil Police posts manned around the clock".

General Maxwell Taylor, while commanding the Eighth Army in Korea, once said: "There must be no thought of going home until permanent peace and stability have been restored to Korea". As long as the situation remains unstable, we stay in Korea and we stay combat-ready.

The people of the Republic of Korea have rejected Communism with its false ideologies. They are our staunchest friends in the Far East. However, Korea today is a house divided-divided by the Communists into two rival camps contrary to the wishes of the Korean people. This has caused great suffering and loss of life and national wealth. It has divided families and separated friends.

Although the Republic of Korea's progress as a Free World nation has helped to heal the wounds of war, the people: know that the communists at this very minute are plotting the tactics designed to subjugate them again. The United Nations forces will not allow this to happen.

In this decade of courage we have helped to preserve the longest military armistice in modern history - knowing that our presence here deters the resumption of hostilities.

JOT meetings may be called by the senior member of either component of the MAC. Initially, both components of a JOT meet at one of the MDL markers, exchange credentials, then proceed to the scene of the reported violation. Here the real purpose of the meeting is revealed, usually for the first time. Evidence is examined and witnesses are interrogated. At the conclusion of the on-the-scene investigation, the JOT agrees on a time and date to meet at Panmunjon to discuss a joint report to the MAC.

With the duration and purpose of the meeting unknown, the UNC Component travels to the meeting site prepared for an indefinite stay and any eventuality. In the vicinity of the DMZ, a field camp is set up and direct communications are established to the UNC Secretariat at Seoul. Accompanying equipment includes portable tape recorders which stenographers use to make a verbatim record of the meeting.

In addition to logistical and administrative support personnel, the official UNC party includes the three UNC team members (two US officers and one ROKA officer); stenographers; tape recorder operators; interpreters; official photographers; appropriate specialist advisors to include medical, ordnance and grave registration personnel; members of the UNC Advisory Group; and members of the press.

A maximum of thirty personnel is authorized for the official party of each side. In addition, ten news media representatives may attend. Displaying prescribed Yellow armbands and vehicle flags as identification, both components of the JOT proceed to the agreed meeting place escorted by armed DMZ

Police. UNC and Communist components face each other across the single strand of barbed wire. DMZ Police, carrying bayonet-tipped rifles, stand by. In this atmosphere of tension, the meeting is conducted.

When the scene of the reported violation is in Communist territory, the senior member of the KPA/CPA component guarantees the personal safety of the UNC part; and UN security guards (DMZ Police) are left behind. Communist guards escort the UNC party back to the MDL at the conclusion of the day's meeting. The same procedure is applied when the KPA/CPA party enter UNC territory, since armed personnel are not permitted to cross the MDL.

As a rule, the side that called the JOT meeting acts as the "prosecution" by introducing material evidence, introducing and examining witnesses, and the like. The opposing side, in turn, is permitted to cross-examine witnesses and introduce evidence.

Communist techniques are designed to place the UNC component at a disadvantage with the objective of discrediting the United Nations Command in the eyes of the press and, ultimately, the world. Such techniques include trickery to extracted missions from the UNC component; distortion of facts; evading or disregarding evidence which is adverse to their side; introduction of false, prearranged evidence, and witnesses who have been carefully coached and rehearsed; utilization of Communist propaganda to cloud the issue; and fabricating false incidents.

Witnesses for the UNC are deliberately antagonized by personal insults and their testimony interrupted by frequent objections. Attempts to maintain order are deliberately misinterpreted as obstructionism. Such Communist tactics frequently are coupled with actions designed to antagonize or to distract. These include personal insults, shoving of UNC personnel, particularly photographers trying to record the proceedings; verbal harassment by Communist guards to include the pointing of loaded rifles at members of the UNC party.

Although established procedures require the submission of a joint report of investigation to the MAC, records indicate that such a report has never been submitted concerning a violation of the Armistice Agreement. A meeting is always conducted following an investigation, and the recommendation of each side of the joint report is reviewed and discussed. Agreement is never reached, however, due to the Communist habit of distorting and falsifying the facts involved. A unilateral report is subsequently submitted to the MAC by each component of JOT.

The JOT meeting concerning the 5 September 1962 incident exemplifies Communist tactics to evade responsibility and blame the UNC for the serious violation of the Armistice.

The incident developed when six Communist personnel, wearing DMZ Police identification and uniforms of the KPA, crossed the MDL and entered UNC territory. All carried rifles except the officer, who was armed with a pistol. It developed later that the personnel armed with rifles also carried concealed pistols. Subsequently, it was confirmed that all six Communist personnel were trained espionage agents and that at least two of those wearing enlisted uniforms were actually officers. Their mission on this day was to return to North Korea with ROK Army personnel, either through voluntary defection or by force.

Approaching a UNC work party involved in cutting grass in a UNC safe lane parallel to the MOL the Communists tried to engage the UNC personnel in conversation. The UNC work party consisted of seven unarmed work personnel, equipped with sickles and three armed DMZ Police, all members of the ROK Army. Offering candy, cigarettes and whiskey, the Communists tried to get the UNC personnel to sit down and talk. The Lieutenant in charge of the UNC work party ordered the Communists to return north of the MDL and directed his personnel to continue work. Ignoring him, the Communists continued to harass members of the UNC work party. At one point, one of the Communists attempted to force a member of the UNC work party to sit down and talk. The UNC soldier resisted, at which time the Communist became angered, pulled a concealed pistol, and shot the UNC soldier in the arm. This precipitated hand-to-hand fighting between the Communists and the UNC work party.

A second UNC Work party nearby heard the shot, rushed to the scene and joined the fighting. When smoke cleared, three of the Communists were dead and three seriously wounded. One wounded communist managed to escape to the north by rolling over a bank on the Communist side near the MDL.

The UNC work parties retired to the rear, under fire from the Communist side, taking with them the five Communist personnel (three dead and two wounded). Two UNC personnel received wounds during the incident.

In an attempt to gain the initiative and obtain a psychological advantage, the KPA/CPA component quickly called a JOT meeting to investigate a violation of the Armistice Agreement by the UNC. Explaining the reported violation, the Communist component stated six KPA Civil Police were on routine patrol when they encountered seventeen ROK personnel on the MDL. Being of the same nationality, they exchanged words and sat down to rest and eat together. Suddenly, the ROK personnel attacked the KPA personnel with rifle butts, knives, and rifle shots. Five KPA personnel had been abducted. The Communist component demanded that the five personnel be returned to their side. The UNC component acknowledged the possession of five Communist personnel, three of whom were dead and two seriously wounded. The UNC component agreed to return the three bodies but would not agree to deliver the wounded personnel, due to their critical condition, explaining that they would be returned, according to their desires when they had recovered sufficiently to travel.

The scene of the incident was examined and the Communist component introduced material evidence which included paper candy wrappers and a candy box manufactured in northern Korea, in the center of the UNC safe lane, and bloodstains on the ground and paper at the same location. The Communists also introduced as evidence a trigger housing group from an M-1 rifle; an armband of the type worn by UN DMZ Police; hand sickles; a cal. .30 cartridge; and one cal. .30 cartridge cases allegedly found at the scene.

This established only that an incident did occur; that it happened in UNC territory; and that the six Communist personnel had illegally entered UNC territory.

Faced with this condemnatory information, the Communists claimed that the MDL actually ran in the center of the UNC safe line, and that the strand of barbed wire outlining the northern edge of the safe lane was not the MDL and had been installed illegally by the UNC. The fact that both sides had officially agreed the MDL had been properly marked and that the line, as shown on the official maps, coincided exactly with the markings on the ground, did not sway the Communists. Throughout the investigation they strongly adhered to their untenable position.

After delaying the investigation for nearly three days, the Communists finally introduced, as their only witness, the sixth man who was wounded and escaped during the incident.

The Communist witness was carried to the meeting site on a litter. He testified that the officer in charge of the UNC work party had persuaded the KPA personnel to enter the UNC safe line, that personnel of both sides exchanged greetings, sat down, talked, and ate candy together until suddenly, without provocation, the UNC personnel attacked the Communists.

The UNC component introduced four witnesses, including the wounded personnel, who had participated in the incident. Their testimony established without a question that the six armed KPA personnel illegally crossed into UNC territory, with ulterior motives as manifested by the carrying of concealed weapons, and remained there despite the objections of the officer in charge of the UNC work party. It also established that a member of the KPA party precipitated the incident by shooting an unarmed member of the UNC work party with a concealed pistol.

The KPA/CPV component used every communist trick in the book to extricate themselves from a completely untenable situation. The Communists endeavored to antagonize and confuse UNC witnesses with questions such as "Are you the murderer" used to stir anger. Minor deviations in testimony were exploited by the Communists and claimed to be proof of false testimony of coached witnesses. Concerted use of propaganda was evident throughout the meeting.

Failing to reach an agreement on a joint report, both components of the JOT submitted unilateral reports to the MAC. Each report concluded that the opposing side planned and precipitated the incident, thus violating certain paragraphs of the Armistice Agreement.

The 156th meeting of the Military Armistice Commission was called by the UNC, closely following the final meeting of JOT. Here Major General James R. Winn, U.S. Army, former senior

member, UNC component, charged the KPA/CPA side with violating the Armistice Agreement and warned the Communists "Keep your personnel on your side of the Military Demarcation Line if you do not want them shot or captured". The Senior Member of the KPA/CPA component immediately countercharged that the UNC had actually violated the Agreement and demanded the return of the two wounded KPA personnel. The UNC component refused to comply. The Communist demand was repeated numerous times during the next two meetings of the Commission.

In the meantime, the two wounded KPA personnel, partially recovered from their wounds, decided that it would be healthier to remain in the Republic of Korea. They revealed that they were actually KPA officers and that all six KPA personnel involved in the incident were trained espionage agents. They explained the mission of their group and the details leading up to the incident.

At the 158th meeting of the Military Armistice Commission, in response to renewed Communist demands to return the wounded personnel, General Winn stated "I am surprised that you would want the world to know the reason why we detained the two wounded and captured personnel of your side following the 5 September incident". General Winn then informed the Communists that the KPA agents had revealed the details of the incident and that their clandestine scheme had been exposed. The Communists dropped the subject.

The report of the 275th meeting concerning the 5 September 1962 incident was filed with the permanent records of the Korean Military Armistice Commission.

This incident was not the first or the last willful and premeditated Communist violation of the Armistice Agreement, resulting in the spilling of blood, since the signing of the Agreement nearly 12 years ago. Many incidents preceded this one. Within four months following the 5 September incident, four UNC personnel were killed and four others wounded in two separate incidents involving surprise attacks by the Communists.

There is one thing in common to all violations of the Armistice Agreement charged against the Communists at Panmunjon - they are all denied. Of approximately 2000 violations of the Agreement charged against the Communists by the UNC, only two have been admitted, and these were eleven years ago.

The cold war atmosphere, punctuated by hot flashes, continues in Korea after more than a decade of military truce.

ARMY CASUALTIES FROM WASHINGTON IN KOREAN CONFLICT*

NAME	SERIAL NUMBER	RANK	REASON
ADAMS COUNTY			
HEIMBIGNER, RICHARD	US 56 084 992	PRIVATE FIRST CLASS	DIED OF WOUNDS
BENTON COUNTY			
BAUER, JESSIE E.	RA 19 348 339	PRIVATE FIRST CLASS	FINDING OF DEATH
CHANDLER, JOHN W. JR	RA 19 336 127	PRIVATE FIRST CLASS	KILLED IN ACTION
COGDILL, KENNETH C.	RA 19 061 406	MASTER SERGEANT	KILLED IN ACTION
FOSTER, CLYDE N.	US 56 083 714	PRIVATE E-2	KILLED IN ACTION
MURPHY, JOE L.	RA 19 348 103	CORPORAL	KILLED IN ACTION
ROBERTS, CLAYTON L.	US 56 083 303	PRIVATE E-2	KILLED IN ACTION
SHELL, GLENN E. JR	RA 19 416 913	PRIVATE FIRST CLASS	FINDING OF DEATH
SNYDER, IVAN J.	US 56 115 402	PRIVATE FIRST CLASS	KILLED IN ACTION
CHELAN COUNTY			
DANIEL, RICHARD A.	RA 19 336 196	PRIVATE E-2	DIED, NON-BATTLE
FELS, LEO D.	RA 19 354 625	CORPORAL	KILLED IN ACTION
GALARNEAU, EDWIN L.	RA 19 196 029	PRIVATE FIRST CLASS	DIED OF WOUNDS
GILBERT, BILLY M.	RA 28 974 536	PRIVATE E-2	KILLED IN ACTION
MCKAY, CONNIE C.	O 2 211 927	SECOND LIEUTENANT	DIED OF WOUNDS
CLALLAM COUNTY			
CONSTABLE, MELVIN E.	RA 19 353 944	SERGEANT	KILLED IN ACTION
FISHER, VIRGIL L.	RA 19 353 858	SERGEANT	KILLED IN ACTION
HODGE, HERMAN H.	RA 22 029 233	CORPORAL	KILLED IN ACTION
SANDERS, JACK D.	O 062 837	1ST LIEUTENANT	KILLED IN ACTION
CLARK COUNTY			
BAINBRIDGE, EDMOND S.	RA 39 925 748	SERGEANT	KILLED IN ACTION
BUTZ, WILLIAM R.	RA 19 367 193	PRIVATE E-2	FINDING OF DEATH
CHRISTIANSON, JOHN	RA 19 351 701	PRIVATE E-2	KILLED IN ACTION
COSTELLO, WILLIAM J.	RA 19 278 274	CORPORAL	KILLED IN ACTION
ELLIS, JAMES H.	RA 06 245 643	MASTER SERGEANT	KILLED IN ACTION
GRIFFITH, GEORGE H.	RA 19 333 075	CORPORAL	KILLED IN ACTION
HANLEY, JACK	RA 39 337 077	SERGEANT	KILLED IN ACTION
KEENAN, WILLIAM R.	RA 56 035 001	PRIVATE FIRST CLASS	KILLED IN ACTION
KIRSTINE, DARELL D.	RA 19 333 236	PRIVATE FIRST CLASS	KILLED IN ACTION
QUATIER, ROBERT D.	RA 19 308 439	PRIVATE E-2	FINDING OF DEATH
SMITH, DOUGLAS Y.	RA 19 333 344	PRIVATE FIRST CLASS	KILLED IN ACTION
COLUMBIA COUNTY			
PROCTOR, WILLIAM E.	RA 13 261 294	CORPORAL	KILLED IN ACTION
COWLITZ COUNTY			
ADAMS, EDWIN E.	O 2032997	1ST LIEUTENANT	KILLED IN ACTION
DAY, CHARLES M.	O 1320108	CAPTAIN	KILLED IN ACTION
FUNKHOUSER, EUGENE	RA 19 351 595	PRIVATE E-2	KILLED IN ACTION
HARRIS, ROBERT G.	RA 39 494 869	SERGEANT	KILLED IN ACTION
LAKE, HAROLD J.	O 2 210 338	SECOND LIEUTENANT	KILLED IN ACTION
MACHEN, WILLIAM A.	RA 19 323 701	PRIVATE FIRST CLASS	KILLED IN ACTION
PETERSON, LYLE E.	RA 19 351 553	PRIVATE E-1	FINDING OF DEATH
SAUM, JACK	RA 06 555 549	MASTER SERGEANT	KILLED IN ACTION
FERRY COUNTY			
JERRED, JOHN M.	US 56 089 360	PRIVATE FIRST CLASS	FINDING OF DEATH
FRANKLIN COUNTY			
FELLOWS, WILLIE JR.	US 56 114 929	PRIVATE E-2	KILLED IN ACTION
MAGERS, DALE L.	RA 19 348 283	PRIVATE FIRST CLASS	KILLED IN ACTION

* NOT MEMBERS OF THE NATIONAL GUARD

NAME	SERIAL NUMBER	RANK	REASON
GARFIELD COUNTY			
MAC NEIL, CHARLES E.	RA 19 308 331	CORPORAL	KILLED IN ACTION
GRANT COUNTY			
PORTER, HAROLD B.	RA 19 308 331	CORPORAL	KILLED IN ACTION
SHEPPARD, ROBERT L.	US 56 091 384	SERGEANT	KILLED IN ACTION
GRAYS HARBOR COUNTY			
BACHTELL, CLAUDE E.	RA 19 335 957	PRIVATE FIRST CLASS	DIED OF WOUNDS
BLAIR, LARRY L.	RA 19 354 739	PRIVATE FIRST CLASS	KILLED IN ACTION
BROOKS, ROY E.	US 56 113 224	PRIVATE E-2	KILLED IN ACTION
COOPER, BILLIE J.	RA 19 319 645	CORPORAL	DIED NON-BATTLE
FRICKE, ERVIN A.	RA 39 476 640	CORPORAL	FINDING OF DEATH
HAMILTON, GENE E.	US 56 083 719	CORPORAL	KILLED IN ACTION
HARRIS, JACK E.	RA 19 354 590	PRIVATE E-2	KILLED IN ACTION
HART, HOWARD F.	RA 19 322 446	SERGEANT	KILLED IN ACTION
HENKE, BRUNO R.	RA 20 948 152	SERGEANT 1ST CLASS	KILLED IN ACTION
KEY, ROBERT E.	RA 19 336 080	PRIVATE FIRST CLASS	KILLED IN ACTION
LACY, IVAN E.	RA 39 212 823	SERGEANT	KILLED IN ACTION
LINDENAU, DAVID E.	RA 06 549 044	MASTER SERGEANT	KILLED IN ACTION
SANDERS, GERALD E.	RA 19 374 671	SERGEANT	KILLED IN ACTION
VALENCOURT, JOSEPH	RA 39 482 062	SERGEANT	FINDING OF DEATH
YORK, MELVIN D.	RA 29 005 968	PRIVATE FIRST CLASS	KILLED IN ACTION
ISLAND COUNTY			
BROWN, EMORY L.	RA 39 197 586	PRIVATE E-2	KILLED IN ACTION
DRAKE, DELBERT R.	US 56 116 102	PRIVATE FIRST CLASS	KILLED IN ACTION
JEFFERSON COUNTY			
BARE, DONALD A.	RA 19 347 470	CORPORAL	KILLED IN ACTION
FELHOELTER, HERMAN	O 0 549 715	CAPTAIN	KILLED IN ACTION
KILLIAN, CHARLES O.	RA 19 367 835	PRIVATE FIRST CLASS	KILLED IN ACTION
SUTTON, DANIEL H.	RA 06 521 009	SERGEANT 1ST CLASS	KILLED IN ACTION
KING COUNTY			
BARCHESKY, LESTER V.	RA 06 219 470	SERGEANT	DIED NON-BATTLE
BARTON, JOHN E.	RA 19 194 292	PRIVATE FIRST CLASS	KILLED IN ACTION
BENTON, DANIEL F.	RA 10 730 205	SERGEANT 1ST CLASS	KILLED IN ACTION
BOYD, ALTON C.	RA 19 361 813	PRIVATE E-2	DIED NON-BATTLE
BOYK, WAYNE J.	RA 39 475 218	SERGEANT	KILLED IN ACTION
BRINSMEAD, JOHN C.	O 0 042 715	LT COLONEL	KILLED IN ACTION
BRONELE, DOMINIC A.	US 56 116 127	PRIVATE E-2	KILLED IN ACTION
BROWN, CLARENCE J.	RA 19 197 642	SERGEANT	KILLED IN ACTION
BURNETT, RAYMOND M.	RA 19 353 854	PRIVATE FIRST CLASS	DIED NON-BATTLE
CALFEE, WILLIAM L.	RA 19 440 702	SERGEANT	KILLED IN ACTION
CLAPP, RICHARD E.	RA 19 354 264	PRIVATE E-2	KILLED IN ACTION
COLE, RALPH R.	US 56 083 065	PRIVATE FIRST CLASS	FINDING OF DEATH
DAVIS, HARRIS N.	RA 18 230 898	SERGEANT	FINDING OF DEATH
DEWALT, STUART A. JR.	US 56 113 609	PRIVATE E-2	KILLED IN ACTION
DICKERSON, CALVIN S.	US 56 080 182	PRIVATE E-2	KILLED IN ACTION
DUCHARME, FRANK J.	RA 19 374 541	PRIVATE FIRST CLASS	FINDING OF DEATH
EDDY, JOHN F.	RA 39 825 282	PRIVATE FIRST CLASS	DIED OF WOUNDS
ENAS, WILLIAM E.	RA 19 250 978	CORPORAL	KILLED IN ACTION
FERGUSON, JAMES T.	US 56 082 683	PRIVATE FIRST CLASS	FINDING OF DEATH
FOSTER, ROBERT A.	RA 28 980 333	PRIVATE E-2	KILLED IN ACTION
FURSETH, LESTER J.	US 56 114 357	PRIVATE FIRST CLASS	FINDING OF DEATH
FURUKAWA, ISAAC	RA 39 931 881	SERGEANT	KILLED IN ACTION
GARLAND, ALBERT W.	US 56 080 204	PRIVATE E-2	KILLED IN ACTION
GEBHARDT, ERVIN A.	RA 19 404 628	PRIVATE E-2	DIED OF WOUNDS
HAMERQUIST, CHARLES	US 56 083 343	PRIVATE E-2	KILLED IN ACTION
HEDIN, LOUIS M.	US 56 080 195	PRIVATE E-2	KILLED IN ACTION

NAME	SERIAL NUMBER	RANK	REASON
KING COUNTY (CONT'D)			
HOGAN, KENNETH A.	RA 19 354 580	PRIVATE E-2	FINDING OF DEATH
JACOBSON, NORMAN W.	ER 17 205 072	PRIVATE FIRST CLASS	DIED OF WOUNDS
JAMES, LARRY P.	RA 19 353 896	PRIVATE FIRST CLASS	KILLED IN ACTION
JOHNSON, JOHN R.	RA 19 350 440	PRIVATE FIRST CLASS	DIED NON-BATTLE
KELLER, ROBERT W.	RA 19 402 931	PRIVATE E-2	KILLED IN ACTION
KOSTOFF, MELFORD	O 02 210 293	SECOND LIEUTENANT	KILLED IN ACTION
LARSON, RICHARD E.	RA 19 374 682	PRIVATE FIRST CLASS	KILLED IN ACTION
LINNE, ROY W.	RA 19 361 967	PRIVATE FIRST CLASS	KILLED IN ACTION
LIPSHITZ, KENNETH C.	RA 19 261 297	CORPORAL	FINDING OF DEATH
LYTLE, JAMES W.	RA 19 308 162	CORPORAL	DIED OF WOUNDS
MAITLAND, GEORGE A.	US 56 113 958	PRIVATE E-2	FINDING OF DEATH
MARETT, NATHERINE C.	RA 19 308 396	SERGEANT	KILLED IN ACTION
MASON, ALWIN L.	RA 19 353 857	CORPORAL	KILLED IN ACTION
MASON, RALPH E.	RA 19 321 827	CORPORAL	KILLED IN ACTION
MCKEON, DONALD L.	RA 19 367 779	PRIVATE E-2	FINDING OF DEATH
MICHEAU, GORDON G.	ER 39 485 699	MASTER SERGEANT	KILLED IN ACTION
MOLONEY, EDWARD J.	O 1 334 885	FIRST LIEUTENANT	KILLED IN ACTION
MOUSER, ROBERT W.	RA 19 354 058	PRIVATE FIRST CLASS	KILLED IN ACTION
NETKA, JOHN W. JR.	RA 19 404 891	PRIVATE E-2	KILLED IN ACTION
NEVILLE, FRED G.	RA 39 185 674	PRIVATE FIRST CLASS	KILLED IN ACTION
NEWMAN, LEONARD H.	RA 19 278 359	PRIVATE FIRST CLASS	KILLED IN ACTION
PARISE, ANGELO C.	RA 19 194 526	CORPORAL	KILLED IN ACTION
PARISH, JOHN F. JR	RA 19 335 361	PRIVATE FIRST CLASS	KILLED IN ACTION
PIERCE, EDWARD E. JR	RA 19 361 978	PRIVATE E-2	FINDING OF DEATH
POLLEY, CLAY H. JR	RA 16 307 924	CORPORAL	KILLED IN ACTION
PUETZ, CARL R.	RA 28 990 503	PRIVATE FIRST CLASS	KILLED IN ACTION
ROBBINS, CHARLES F.	RA 19 322 129	PRIVATE FIRST CLASS	KILLED IN ACTION
ROGERS, GEORGE S.	RA 20 941 358	PRIVATE FIRST CLASS	DIED NON- BATTLE
ROZYKA, MYMOND E.	RA 18 150 202	MASTER SERGEANT	KILLED IN ACTION
RYDBERG, PHILLIP W.	RA 17 305 429	PRIVATE FIRST CLASS	KILLED IN ACTION
SANTISTEVAN, HERMAN	RA 19 374 528	PRIVATE E-2	KILLED IN ACTION
SHAW, WILLIAM F.	RA 20 625 250	MASTER SERGEANT	KILLED IN ACTION
SHUCKHART, EARL V.	US 56 080 190	CORPORAL	KILLED IN ACTION
SPARKS, HAROLD	RA 19 197 218	CORPORAL	DIED NON-BATTLE
SPELLMAN, DAVID B.	O 0 28 513	FIRST LIEUTENANT	KILLED IN ACTION
SPILLER, ELMO M.	RA 19 367 639	PRIVATE E-2	FINDING OF DEATH
SUNDBERG, LEONARD E.	US 56 116 524	PRIVATE E-2	FINDING OF DEATH
TALKINGTON, GLEN J.	RA 19 321 986	PRIVATE FIRST CLASS	KILLED IN ACTION
TUTTLE, ALLEN H.	RA 19 261 249	CORPORAL	DIED NON-BATTLE
VAN HARN, HENRY W.	RA 19 354 218	PRIVATE E-2	KILLED IN ACTION
WARNER, MARVIN L.	RA 19 354 168	PRIVATE E-2	DIED OF WOUNDS
WELLS, WILLARD D.	RA 19 418 311	PRIVATE FIRST CLASS	DIED OF WOUNDS
WHITE, CECIL W.	O 0 970 265	SECOND LIEUTENANT	KILLED IN ACTION
WILLIAMS, NATHANIEL	RA 19 194 119	CORPORAL	KILLED IN ACTION
WINKLER, HARLAN R.	O 1 059 337	PRIVATE FIRST CLASS	KILLED IN ACTION
WISE, GORDON L.	RA 19 335 527	PRIVATE FIRST CLASS	DIED OF WOUNDS
WOOD, HAROLD H.	RA 19 339 214	PRIVATE FIRST CLASS	KILLED IN ACTION
WOODRUFF, DELBERT D.	US 56 115 909	PRIVATE E-2	KILLED IN ACTION
WRIGHT, JOHN B.	RA 19 353 918	PRIVATE FIRST CLASS	FINDING OF DEATH
WYNALDA, MARTIN D.	RA 19 461 059	CORPORAL	DIED OF WOUNDS
ZEUMAULT, ROBERT L.	US 56 116 247	PRIVATE FIRST CLASS	KILLED IN ACTION

NAME	SERIAL NUMBER	RANK	REASON
KITSAP COUNTY			
ARVESON, ARTHUR A.	RA 19 347 751	CORPORAL	KILLED IN ACTION
BRANT, FLOYD P.	RA 19 379 711	PRIVATE E-2	KILLED IN ACTION
CASH, JACK M.	RA 19 319 102	PRIVATE E-2	FINDING OF DEATH
EHELER, DONALD L.	US 56 083 085	PRIVATE FIRST CLASS	DIED NON-BATTLE
HIGGINS, FREDERICK	RA 19 353 835	PRIVATE FIRST CLASS	DIED NON-BATTLE
JOHNSON, FRED A.	RA 19 354 533	PRIVATE E-2	KILLED IN ACTION
MAYRAND, CHARLES E.	O 0 060 922	PRIVATE FIRST CLASS	DIED NON-BATTLE
QUASIUS, CHARLES H.	RA 19 335 555	PRIVATE FIRST CLASS	KILLED IN ACTION
ROSECRANTS, NORMAN	RA 19 354 636	PRIVATE E-2	KILLED IN ACTION
SUNKEL, EDWARD I.	US 56 062 489	PRIVATE FIRST CLASS	KILLED IN ACTION
TRINEN, WILLIAM P.	O 1 996 377	FIRST LIEUTENANT	KILLED IN ACTION
KITITAS COUNTY			
DUPUIS, JOSEPH N.	RA 19 030 478	SERGEANT	KILLED IN ACTION
KLUCKITAT COUNTY			
WILSON, JOHN B.	RA 19 278 290	SERGEANT	KILLED IN ACTION
LEWIS COUNTY			
DIBBLE, RONALD W.	RA 19 317 680	SERGEANT	FINDING OF DEATH
DOWNES, MORGAN L.	RA 06 570 242	SERGEANT FIRST CLASS	KILLED IN ACTION
ESTEP, WAYNE	US 56 082 090	PRIVATE FIRST CLASS	KILLED IN ACTION
GILMORE, LAWRENCE J.	US 56 084 975	PRIVATE FIRST CLASS	KILLED IN ACTION
HALL, FRED G.	US 56 115 524	CORPORAL	DIED OF WOUNDS
HOLMES, RICHARD L.	RA 19 322 539	PRIVATE E-2	FINDING OF DEATH
MC INTIRE, MILLARD	RA 19 088 573	SERGEANT FIRST CLASS	DIED NON-BATTLE
PIER, JAMES E.	RA 19 374 786	PRIVATE FIRST CLASS	DIED NON- BATTLE
STROUP, JAMES R.	ER 57 502 543	PRIVATE FIRST CLASS	FINDING OF DEATH
LINCOLN COUNTY			
McCAFFERY, WILLIAM	US 56 091 045	CORPORAL	DIED OF WOUNDS
OLSEN, CARL C.	RA 39 465 405	SERGEANT FIRST CLASS	KILLED IN ACTION
MASON COUNTY			
EVANS, HAROLD A.	RA 19 354 698	PRIVATE FIRST CLASS	FINDING OF DEATH
OKANOGAN COUNTY			
MC COY, JOHN E.	RA 07 030 551	SERGEANT FIRST CLASS	KILLED IN ACTION
MYKRANTZ, HARVEY A.	US 56 091 252	PRIVATE E-2	DIED OF WOUNDS
PICKENS, CLARENCE D.	RA 19 374 927	PRIVATE FIRST CLASS	KILLED IN ACTION
SEXSON, JACK R.	O 2 210 634	FIRST LIEUTENANT	KILLED IN ACTION
SPOONEMORE, HERBERT	US 56 089 589	PRIVATE FIRST CLASS	DIED OF WOUNDS
PACIFIC COUNTY			
PEARSON, RAYMOND T.	RA 19 441 103	PRIVATE E-2	KILLED IN ACTION
PIERCE COUNTY			
ALES, MARION L.	O 1 185 534	FIRST LIEUTENANT	DIED NON-BATTLE
APPENFELDER, JOSEPH	O 0 514 946	FIRST LIEUTENANT	DIED NON~BATTLE
ARICK, ALEXANDER D.	RA 19 315 320	MASTER SERGEANT	DIED OF WOUNDS
BAIRD, LEON	RA 34 107 718	PRIVATE FIRST CLASS	FINDING OF DEATH
BEALS, JAMES E.	RA 19 319 570	PRIVATE FIRST CLASS	KILLED IN ACTION
BLANCHFIELD, ROBERT	RA 19 194 267	PRIVATE FIRST CLASS	DIED NON-BATTLE
BRISTOW, IVAN P.	RA 06 575 672	SERGEANT FIRST CLASS	DIED OF WOUNDS
BULLARD, JERRY E.	RA 19 196 025	SERGEANT	DIED NON-BATTLE
BUTLER, GLEN D.	RA 19 197 254	CORPORAL	FINDING OF DEATH
CABLE, JOHN L.	RA 39 210 950	SERGEANT	KILLED IN ACTION
CHEATEM, GEORGE L.	RA 35 261 278	SERGEANT	DIED NON-BATTLE
CORNETT, CROWDEN	RA 35 133 303	PRIVATE FIRST CLASS	FINDING OF DEATH
CRAWFORD, PAUL D	RA 35 784 194	SERGEANT	DIED NON-BATTLE
CULDICE, CECIL W.	US 56 083 028	PRIVATE FIRST CLASS	KILLED IN ACTION

NAME	SERIAL NUMBER	RANK	REASON
PIERCE COUNTY (CONT'D)			
DAVIS, AUSTIN	RA 39 484 770	SERGEANT	DIED OF WOUNDS
DAVIS, M. L.	O 2 209 254	FIRST LIEUTENANT	KILLED IN ACTION
ERRIGO, JOSEPH A.	O 1 040 377	CAPTAIN	DIED OF WOUNDS
ESSMEIER, WILLIAM	W 0 906 714	JR WARRANT OFFICER	FINDING OF DEATH
GUILE, CHARLES J.	RA 17 278 308	CORPORAL	KILLED IN ACTION
GUNNS, MARVIN L.	RA 19 354 644	PRIVATE FIRST CLASS	KILLED IN ACTION
HICKS, KENNETH A. SR.	RA 16 246 409	SERGEANT FIRST CLASS	DIED NON-BATTLE
JOHNSON, EUGENE P.	RA 20 949 894	SERGEANT FIRST CLASS	FINDING OF DEATH
JOHNSON, RONALD H.	US 56 080 994	CORPORAL	KILLED IN ACTION
JONES, WILLIE D.	RA 34 489 722	SERGEANT	FINDING OF DEATH
KOCH, ANTHONY A.	US 56 080 227	SERGEANT	KILLED IN ACTION
LAMPSON, HAROLD L.	RA 06 916 880	CORPORAL	DIED NON-BATTLE
LARSON, DURFEE	O 0 269 143	MAJOR	DIED NON-BATTLE
LEONBERGER, KARL	O 2 176 106	CAPTAIN	DIED NON-BATTLE
LINDSEY, ROBERT T.	O 1 321 427	FIRST LIEUTENANT	KILLED IN ACTION
LONG, DONALD G.	RA 19 308 252	CORPORAL	DIED OF WOUNDS
LYTLE, JACK W.	RA 15 419 203	SERGEANT	DIED NON-BATTLE
MAJETTE, MILTON L.	O 0 958 966	FIRST LIEUTENANT	KILLED IN ACTION
MASTERSON, HAROLD A.	RA 39 195 677	MASTER SERGEANT	DIED NON-BATTLE
MAXWELL, RAYMOND B.	O 0 421 419	CAPTAIN	KILLED IN ACTION
MC DONALD, GEORGE J.	RA 19 262 452	PRIVATE E-2	KILLED IN ACTION
MICHAELISKI, FELIX	RA 06 713 006	MASTER SERGEANT	KILLED IN ACTION
MILLER, ROBERT E.	RA 35 138 278	SERGEANT FIRST CLASS	DIED NON-BATTLE
NASET, GEORGE R.	RA 20 928 508	CORPORAL	KILLED IN ACTION
NELSON, BENJAMIN F.	RA 19 307 908	PRIVATE FIRST CLASS	KILLED IN ACTION
NORDYKE, ELWYN D.	RA 19 322 551	CORPORAL	DIED NON-BATTLE
ODEN, JIMMIE L.	RA 19 361 977	PRIVATE E-2	DIED OF WOUNDS
OSBORNE, HAROLD H.	O 2 262 263	SECOND LIEUTENANT	KILLED IN ACTION
PENINGTON, WILLIAM	O 0 059 412	FIRST LIEUTENANT	KILLED IN ACTION
POMERENE, ROBERT L.	O 0 050 438	CAPTAIN	KILLED IN ACTION
PURDY, WILLIS H.	RA 06 567 372	CORPORAL	KILLED IN ACTION
RACICH, JOHN	RA 06 547 729	SERGEANT FIRST CLASS	DIED NON-BATTLE
RICHARDS, FLINT B.	RA 37 177 967	SERGEANT	DIED NON-BATTLE
SMITH, ROY H.	RA 19 322 459	PRIVATE E-2	KILLED IN ACTION
STEPHENS, GEORGE R.	US 56 086 884	PRIVATE FIRST CLASS	FINDING OF DEATH
VELLIAS, GEORGE	US 56 080 232	CORPORAL	KILLED IN ACTION
VIZINA, HAROLD A.	O 1 031 036	CAPTAIN	FINDING OF DEATH
VLAHOVICH, MITCHELL	US 56 081 903	PRIVATE FIRST CLASS	KILLED IN ACTION
WOFFORD, LAWRENCE R.	RA 38 726 569	SERGEANT	DIED NON-BATTLE
YOSHIHARA, ELMER J.	RA 36 908 084	PRIVATE FIRST CLASS	KILLED IN ACTION
SAN JUAN COUNTY			
LARSEN, LAWRENCE E.	RA 19 347 686	PRIVATE E-2	KILLED IN ACTION
MC CLELLAN, MAURICE	RA 19 335 396	CORPORAL	DIED NON-BATTLE
SKAGIT COUNTY			
BOUGHAN, LEONARD R.	US 56 116 702	PRIVATE FIRST CLASS	KILLED IN ACTION
BRADO, GEORGE D.	US 56 115 796	SERGEANT	KILLED IN ACTION
HARTLEY, CLARENCE G.	RA 19 367 655	PRIVATE FIRST CLASS	KILLED IN ACTION
LEARY, JOHN N.	RA 19 197 492	SERGEANT FIRST CLASS	KILLED IN ACTION
SNIDER, GLENN A.	RA 39 480 119	MASTER SERGEANT	DIED NON-BATTLE
VAN ALLEN, LOYD A.	RA 19 261 630	SERGEANT	KILLED IN ACTION

NAME	SERIAL NUMBER	RANK	REASON
SKAMANIA COUNTY			
SAMSEL, DENZIL G.	RA 19 250 349	PRIVATE FIRST CLASS	DIED NON-BATTLE
SNOHOMISH COUNTY			
BURKE, LAWRENCE V.	O 1 176 904	FIRST LIEUTENANT	KILLED IN ACTION
CARLSON, JOHN H.	US 56 080 262	MASTER SERGEANT	KILLED IN ACTION
CHARLES, JOSEPH JR.	RA 39 217 444	SERGEANT FIRST CLASS	KILLED IN ACTION
CHRISTOFFERSEN, WALTER	RA 19 347 443	PRIVATE FIRST CLASS	KILLED IN ACTION
GOLDSBERRY, THOMAS O.	RA 17 196 401	PRIVATE FIRST CLASS	DIED OF WOUNDS
HANSEN, BERNARD N.	US 56 080 261	PRIVATE FIRST CLASS	KILLED IN ACTION
HENDRICKS, JOSEPH L.	RA 19 353 859	PRIVATE FIRST CLASS	KILLED IN ACTION
HORTON, HAROLD E.	RA 19 353 968	PRIVATE FIRST CLASS	KILLED IN ACTION
HUDSON, LAMAR G.	RA 19 348 205	PRIVATE E-2	KILLED IN ACTION
MOSES, WALTER JR.	US 28 976 633	PRIVATE FIRST CLASS	KILLED IN ACTION
MULKEY, BILL T.	RA 19 251 045	PRIVATE FIRST CLASS	KILLED IN ACTION
NEUE, CURTIS T.	RA 19 347 717	PRIVATE FIRST CLASS	KILLED IN ACTION
PERRY, FRANK W.	RA 20 948 659	PRIVATE FIRST CLASS	KILLED IN ACTION
PRATT, GLEN L.	RA 19 321 857	PRIVATE FIRST CLASS	KILLED IN ACTION
RUCHTY, GEORGE E.	RA 20 943 810	MASTER SERGEANT	DIED OF WOUNDS
SHUCK, HERBERT D.	RA 19 319 045	CORPORAL	FINDING OF DEATH
STEELE, JAMES A.	RA 19 402 861	CORPORAL	FINDING OF DEATH
SUNDQUIST, LARRY D.	RA 19 361 800	PRIVATE FIRST CLASS	KILLED IN ACTION
TYE, LEONARD E.	RA 19 318 817	PRIVATE FIRST CLASS	KILLED IN ACTION
SPOKANE COUNTY			
ALBI, CARLO L.	US 56 090 069	PRIVATE E-2	KILLED IN ACTION
ALLEN, ACE	O 0 061 342	SECOND LIEUTENANT	KILLED IN ACTION
BLACK, ROBERT R.	RA 06 562 359	SERGEANT FIRST CLASS	KILLED IN ACTION
BLOOM, RAYMOND U.	O 0 057 354	FIRST LIEUTENANT	KILLED IN ACTION
BRAINARD, GEORGE H.	RA 37 163 200	SERGEANT FIRST CLASS	DIED OF WOUNDS
CAMERON, DONALD B.	US 56 082 589	SERGEANT	KILLED IN ACTION
HAMMEREL, AMBROSE B.	RA 37 177 414	PRIVATE FIRST CLASS	KILLED IN ACTION
HEARD, ELBERT E.	RA 28 970 038	PRIVATE E-2	KILLED IN ACTION
HERRINGTON, WILLIAM	O 0 034 756	MAJOR	KILLED IN ACTION
HUGHES, WALTER N.	US 56 090 932	SERGEANT	KILLED IN ACTION
MATTSON, WALTER A.	RA 06 569 380	SERGEANT FIRST CLASS	KILLED IN ACTION
MELICK, KENNETH N.	RA 28 992 014	SERGEANT	FINDING OF DEATH
MILLER, RUSSELL R.	RA 19 195 997	CORPORAL	DIED OF WOUNDS
MURPHY, LEONARD A.	RA 19 335 801	CORPORAL	DIED NON-BATTLE
PACKER, LEO M.	RA 19 322 200	PRIVATE FIRST CLASS	KILLED IN ACTION
PASCHBECK, RUDOLPH	RA 19 322 297	PRIVATE FIRST CLASS	FINDING OF DEATH
RIST, ALFRED L.	O 2 210 633	SECOND LIEUTENANT	KILLED IN ACTION
ROBINS, GORDON L.	RA 28 971 318	PRIVATE FIRST CLASS	DIED OF WOUNDS
SAMUELS, ANTOINE T.	US 56 090 036	PRIVATE FIRST CLASS	KILLED IN ACTION
STAI, MELVIN R.	O 2 035 983	CAPTAIN	KILLED IN ACTION
THOMAS, KENNETH W.	RA 19 335 786	PRIVATE FIRST CLASS	KILLED IN ACTION
THOMPSON, LEE J.	RA 39 456 649	CORPORAL	KILLED IN ACTION
STEVENS COUNTY			
BRIDGER, KENNETH	RA 19 354 338	PRIVATE E-2	FINDING OF DEATH
FLETT, LEONARD J.	RA 19 417 470	PRIVATE FIRST CLASS	FINDING OF DEATH
GENTRY, ROBERT E.	RA 06 569 572	MASTER SERGEANT	KILLED IN ACTION
PRATT, ROBERT D.	RA 19 335 443	PRIVATE E-2	KILLED IN ACTION
RICHMOND, ROBERT E.	RA 19 335 806	PRIVATE FIRST CLASS	KILLED IN ACTION

NAME	SERIAL NUMBER	RANK	REASON
THURSTON COUNTY			
BURDUE, WAYNE H.	O 0 485 664	MAJOR	DIED NON-BATTLE
CHURCH, LORIN D.	RA 19 322 471	CORPORAL	KILLED IN ACTION
DARCY, RAY J.	RA 19 418 124	PRIVATE FIRST CLASS	DIED OF WOUNDS
DAVID, ROBERT L.	RA 19 367 685	PRIVATE E-2	KILLED IN ACTION
DELPLAIN, THEODORE	O 1 323 230	FIRST LIEUTENANT	KILLED IN ACTION
EUTSLER, LEO E.	O 1 341 959	FIRST LIEUTENANT	KILLED IN ACTION
JOHNSON, WILLIAM Z.	RA 19 322 466	PRIVATE FIRST CLASS	KILLED IN ACTION
NIEBEL, HARRY JR.	RA 38 399 656	SERGEANT	KILLED IN ACTION
STALLINGS, ERNEST E.	RA 16 039 491	CORPORAL	KILLED IN ACTION
WILLETT, ROBERT M.	RA 19 354 702	PRIVATE FIRST CLASS	KILLED IN ACTION
WALLA WALLA COUNTY			
BOURKE, WIIJLIAM C.	RA 19 351 557	PRIVATE E-2	KILLED IN ACTION
DUTTON, BILLIE J.	RA 19 351 470	PRIVATE E-2	DIED NON-BATTLE
GETTMAN, GORDON J.	RA 20 943 592	SERGEANT FIRST CLASS	KILLED IN ACTION
HASTINGS, CHARLES J.	O 0 423 262	CAPTAIN	KILLED IN ACTION
HUNT, ROBERT G.	O 0 061 340	FIRST LIEUTENANT	KILLED IN ACTION
KENNEDY, EDWARD L.	RA 19 197 310	SERGEANT FIRST CLASS	KILLED IN ACTION
MARTIN, BOBBIE G.	RA 19 304 435	CORPORAL	KILLED IN ACTION
MEEK, ALFRED C.	RA 19 351 698	PRIVATE E-2	KILLED IN ACTION
SIGLER, WILLIAM R.	RA 19 351 260	PRIVATE FIRST CLASS	DIED OF WOUNDS
WHATCOM COUNTY			
ALLYN, ROBERT W.	O 0 060 409	FIRST LIEUTENANT	KILLED IN ACTION
ANDREWS, ALBERT S.	RA 19 374 463	PRIVATE E-2	KILLED IN ACTION
BRAMBO, JAMES L.	RA 19347516	PRIVATE E-1	KILLED IN ACTION
BROWN, KENNETH O.	US 56 080 727	CORPORAL	KILLED IN ACTION
LEENSTRA, HENRY	US 56 080 787	SERGEANT	KILLED IN ACTION
MC ELHOLM, PATRICK	US 56 114 231	PRIVATE FIRST CLASS	KILLED IN ATION
PRATT, PARKER H.	O 1 701 607	CAPTAIN	KILLED IN ACTION
SCHOENING, ROBERT G.	RA 19 353 852	PRIVATE FIRST CLASS	FINDING OF DEATH
TRENHOIM , RICHARD R.	RA 19 403 870	PRIVATE E-2	KILLED IN ATION
WAGNER, OSCAR W.	RA 19 367 607	PRIVATE E-2	FINDING OF DEATH
WALTERS, LELAND R.	RA 19 367 876	PRIVATE FIRST CLASS	DIED NON-BATTLE
WHITMAN COUNTY			
BROEMELING, DONALD	RA 19 319 426	CORPORAL	FINDING OF DEATH
SCHIERMAN, THEODORE	RA 39 482 804	SERGEANT FIRST CLASS	KILLED IN ACTION
YAKIMA COUNTY			
BLACK, WINFIELD M.	RA 19 016 211	MASTER SERGEANT	KILLED IN ACTION
BOEHM, JOHN A.	RA 37 543 834	PRIVATE FIRST CLASS	KILLED IN ACTION
BORLEY, EVERETT H.	RA 20 943 614	SERGEANT FIRST CLASS	KILLED IN ACTION
BROWN, CHARLES W.	RA 19 334 766	CORPORAL	FINDING OF DEATH
BRUMLEY, PAUL W.	US 56 085 096	PRIVATE FIRST CLASS	KILLED IN ACTION
COLLINS, ROY J.	US 56 114 233	PRIVATE FIRST CLASS	DIED OF WOUNDS
DEHART, MELVIN L.	RA 39 463 803	CORPORAL	KILLED IN ACTION
DRIVER, FRED F.	RA 19 015 576	CORPORAL	KILLED IN ACTION
GIBSON, DON E.	RA 19 367 129	PRIVATE E-2	KILLED IN ACTION
HEMBREE, FRANK R.	RA 19 348 384	PRIVATE FIRST CLASS	KILLED IN ACTION
HERNANDEZ, JOHN	RA 19 351 264	PRIVATE E-2	DIED OF WOUNDS
JENKS, DALTON M.	RA 19 348 353	CORPORAL	KILLED IN ACTION
JENSEN, RICHARD A.	RA 19 351 264	PRIVATE E-2	KILLED IN ACTION
KARR, EVERETT .M.	RA 19 374 932	CORPORAL	KILLED IN ACTION
LADD, JAMES T.	RA 19 263 539	SERGEANT FIRST CLASS	KILLED IN ACTION
LYON, GALEN L.	RA 19 420 935	PRIVATE E-2	KILLED IN ACTION

NAME	SERIAL NUMBER	RANK	REASON
YAKIMA COUNTY(CONT'D)			
MATTSON, DALE I.	RA 19 351 381	PRIVATE FIRST CLASS	KILLED IN ACTION
MC ELHANEY, BOB D.	RA 19 319 657	PRIVATE FIRST CLASS	KILLED IN ACTION
POWELL, SAMUEL B.	RA 19 357 336	PRIVATE E-2	FINDING OF DEATH
ROSE, SYDNEY C.	RA 19 319 698	CORPORAL	KILLED IN ACTION
ROY, PAUL J.	RA 19 374 926	PRIVATE FIRST CLASS	KILLED IN ACTION
SHANKS, ROBERT D.	RA 19 319 179	CORPORAL	FINDING OF DEATH
SOLOMON, RICHARD W.	RA 33 192 936	CORPORAL	DIED NON-BATTLE
SUTTON, RAYMOND D.	RA 19 348 094	PRIVATE E-2	KILLED IN ACTION
TIEGS, REUBEN W.	US 56 081 088	PRIVATE FIRST CLASS	KILLED IN ACTION
TOM, RICHARD L.	US 56 113 752	PRIVATE FIRST CLASS	KILLED IN ACTION

AIR FORCE CASUALTIES FROM WASHINGTON*

ARNOLD, JAMES E.	AO1910209	FIRST LIEUTENANT	KILLED IN ACTION
BEATY, SHERMAN R.	O00732A	COLONEL	KILLED IN ACTION
BEESON, JACK M.	AO686882	CAPTAIN	KILLED IN ACTION
CAREY, EDWIN A.	AO1911744	SECOND LIEUTENANT	KILLED IN ACTION
DUNCAN, JAMES H.	AF14101683	STAFF SERGEANT	KILLED IN ACTION
FLOYD, JOHN C.	AO2091431	SECOND LIEUTENANT	KILLED IN ACTION
GOODWIN, WILLIAM J.	AF39217082	STAFF SERGEANT	KILLED IN ACTION
HABAKANGAS, W. E.	O016529A	CAPTAIN	KILLED IN ACTION
HAWES, RICHARD E.	AO1911344	SECOND LIEUTENANT	KILLED IN ACTION
HAYS, MELVIN B.	AF39192109	FIRST LIEUTENANT	KILLED IN ACTION
JENSEN, WAYNE F.	AF19405070	STAFF SERGEANT	KILLED IN ACTION
KINGSBURY, D. M.	AF19319571	CORPORAL	KILLED IN ACTION
MAST, CLIFFORD H.	AF19417343	A1C	KILLED IN ACTION
MATHESON, DONALD N.	AO1847782	FIRST LIEUTENANT	KILLED IN ACTION
OBZINA, FRANK	AF39174891	STAFF SERGEANT	KILLED IN ACTION
PERONTO, JAMES F.	AF19074790	STAFF SERGEANT	KILLED IN ACTION
RUSSELL, WALTER R.	AO739584	CAPTAIN	KILLED IN ACTION
SHEEHAN ROBERT E	AO0547956	FIRST LIEUTENANT	KILLED IN ACTION
SMITH, HOWARD E.	AO0947003	CAPTAIN	KILLED IN ACTION
WENZL, CHARLES P.	AO1909788	SECOND LIEUTENANT	KILLED IN ACTION
WILSON, BRUCE S.	AO2221765	SECOND LIEUTENANT	KILLED IN ACTION

* NOT MEMBERS OF THE NATIONAL GUARD

CHAPTER V
WASHINGTON NATIONAL GUARD IN THE POST - KOREAN WAR PERIOD

Following the release of Washington Army and Air National Guard units from active Federal service during the period 1 November 1952 to 1 February 1953, all units were reorganized, some were activated while others were converted or redesignated under new or changed Tables of Organization to bring National Guard Divisions in conformity with those of the Regular Army. Some units were inactivated or discontinued. Others had been allotted by the National Guard Bureau but had not been activated. The following is a summary of these changes:

UNITS ACTIVATED

UNIT	LOCATION	DATE ACTIVATED
Company A (Forward), 741st Ordnance Battalion	Camp Murray	24 Nov 52
Company B (Rear), 741st Ordnance Battalion	Camp Murray	24 Nov 52
262nd Communications Squadron (Operations)	Bellingham	1 Mar 53
Headquarters, 252nd Communications Group	Spokane	1 Apr 53
405th Signal Detachment	Camp Murray	1 Apr 53
116th Forecasting Flight	Spokane	1 May 53
Company D, 161st Infantry	Colville	29 Jun 53
Battery C, 240th AAA Battalion (Gun, 90mm)	Port Orchard	13 Oct 53
175th AAA Detachment (Operations)	Tacoma	2 Mar 54
Battery B, 420th AAA Battalion (Gun, 90mm)	Yakima	5 Apr 54
415th Ordnance Detachment	Camp Murray	17 May 54

UNITS CONVERTED, REDESIGNATED AND REORGANIZED

Heavy Mortar Company, 161st Infantry	Chewelah	1 Nov 52
Headquarters Company, 41st Infantry Division	Seattle	1 Nov 52
Hq. & Hq. Detachment, 741st Ordnance Battalion	Camp Murray	24 Nov 52
215th Communications Squadron	Seattle	1 Feb 53
Hq. & Hq. Battery, 420th Gun Battalion (90mm)	Ephrata	1 Feb 53
404th Signal Detachment	Camp Murray	1 Feb 53
242nd Airways & Air Comm. Service Sq., Mobile	Spokane	1 Oct 53
Battery C, 530th AAA Battalion (AW) (Mbl)	Bellingham	13 Oct 53
Battery D, 530th AAA Battalion (AW) (Mbl)	Bellingham	13 Oct 53
Battery D, 240th AAA Battalion (90mm)	Port Orchard	13 Oct 53
Battery D, 700th AAA Battalion (AW) (SP)	Tacoma	13 Oct 53

UNITS INACTIVATED

Hq., 160th A/C Control & Warning Group	Spokane	1 Feb 53
141st Aircraft Control Squadron	Spokane	1 Feb 53
110th Radar Calibration Squadron	Seattle	1 Feb 53
Hq. & Hq. Battery, 420th AAA Gun Battalion	Yakima	31 Jan 53
Company D, 161st Infantry	Ephrata	1 Feb 53
Battery B, 420th AAA Gun Battalion	Prosser	30 Apr 53
Battery C, 530th AAA Battalion (AW)	Tacoma	12 Oct 53
Medical Detachment, 240th AAA Gun Battalion	Bellingham	12 Oct 53

UNITS DISCONTINUED

8116th Air Base Squadron	Spokane	1 Nov 52
8235th Air Base Squadron	Seattle	1 Feb 53

UNITS ALLOTTED BUT NOT ACTIVATED

286th AAA Battalion (Gun, 90mm)
Medical Detachment, 240th AAA Battalion
Company D, 803rd Tank Battalion (90mm Gun)

In 1954 a nation-wide program called for National Guard Antiaircraft Artillery units in 26 states and the District of Columbia to augment regular army units in antiaircraft defenses of America's major industrial and population centers against sudden aerial attack. The selected National Guard were to be trained, equipped and oriented in their mission, with their equipment permanently located on-site in the established defenses. In an emergency, the plan called for all members of each National Guard unit being ordered to active duty by the President to report directly to battle stations from homes or jobs.

The program, in its application to the State of Washington, called for two (2) Washington National Guard Antiaircraft (AAA) Battalions to take over eight (8) Battery sites in the Seattle-Bremerton Area, previously manned by Regular Army battalions. The Regular Army battalions thus relieved would then occupy NIKE guided missile sites in the same defense area.

The 770th AAA Gun Battalion of the Washington National Guard in Seattle took over four of these vacated 120 mm gun sites during, July of 1954. The 240th AAA Gun Battalion stationed at Seattle, Kirkland, Puyallup and Port Orchard were also scheduled to take over the other four sites as soon as directed. At each of these eight sites the permanently located equipment (guns and radars) were to be maintained on a 24-hour basis by sixteen (16) National Guardsmen per site. These National Guardsmen were employed as civilians not on active duty. They did however, retain their National Guard status and participated regularly in drill sessions with their units. In case of emergency all members of both battalions would report to their battle stations. The permanent duty personnel at each site kept guns, radars and ammunition in a ready condition so that engagement of enemy planes could be made with the least possible delay.

Each battery site occupied or to be occupied by the Washington National Guard at that time had sufficient barracks, mess halls, and maintenance facilities to accommodate all the unit's personnel and equipment. Personnel for the units of these battalions were to be recruited from communities immediately adjacent to the on-site position.

The strength of the Washington National Guard (Army and Air) as of 31 October 1954 was 589 officers, 106 warrant officers and 5446 enlisted men for a total of 6141. The strength of full-time State employees at the end of this Biennium was 62 and the strength of full-time Federal employees 436 for a grand total of 498.

During this biennium (1953-54) two new armories were completed at Longview and Wenatchee and armories were under construction at Ellensburg, Puyallup, Chewelah, Snohomish and Bremerton. The armory for Pasco was being contracted, and those at Pasco and Shelton were waiting approval of the bids. The Armory for Camp Murray was awaiting National Guard approval. Total funds obligated for the Armory Construction program was \$440,815.40.

During the 1952-54 biennium a total of \$1,231,554.21 was expended in State funds and \$5,432,804.75 in Federal funds for operation of the department, less drill pay. The latter covered Construction, repairs and utilities, civilian payrolls, operating expenses, etc. Armory drill pay for this period amounted to \$3,375,935.00 making a grand total of Federal Funds of \$8,698,199.35, and a grand total, both State and Federal of \$10,040,293.99.

During the Biennium 1954-56 the following units were activated, converted, redesignated, reorganized or disbanded:

UNITS ACTIVATED

UNIT	LOCATION	DATE ACTIVATED
Battery B, 286th AAA Battalion	Puyallup	29 Aug 55
Battery D, 700th AAA Battalion	Port, Angeles	25 Jan 56
Company D, 803rd Tank Battalion	Port Orchard	26 Jan 56
416th Ordnance Detachment	Camp Murray	14 Aug 56
Battery A, 286th AAA Battalion	Seattle	20 Aug 56
Battery C, 286th AAA Battalion	Anacortes	22 Aug 56

UNITS CONVERTED, REDESIGNATED AND REORGANIZED

UNIT	LOCATION	DATE ACTIVATED
116th Weather Flight (Forecasting) (Formerly 116th Forecasting Flight)	Puyallup	29 Aug 55
262nd Communications Squadron (Operations) (formerly 262nd Comm. Sq., Operations)	Bellingham	1 Jul 55
560th Air Force Band, (formerly 560th USAF Band)	Spokane	1 Jul 55
Hq & Hq Battery, 286th AAA Battalion (formerly Battery C, 530th AM Bn)	Bellingham	29 Aug 55
Btry D, 286th AAA Battalion (formerly Btry D, 530th AAA Bn)	Bellingham	1 Nov 55
Btry C, 530th AAA Battalion (formerly Btry D, 700th AAA Bn)	Tacoma	1 Nov 55
530th AAA Battalion (75mm) (formerly 530th AAA Bn (AW) (Mbl))	Tacoma	1 Jan 56
204th Engineer Company (Light Equipment) (formerly Co A, 882nd Engr Avn Co)	Camp Murray	1 Apr 56
Hq., 142nd Air Defense Wing (formerly Hq. 142nd Ftr-Intcp Wing)	Spokane	16 Apr 56
41st Quartermaster Company (formerly 41st QM Co (less Sep Det))	Pasco	15 Sep 56

UNIT DISBANDED

Separate Detachment 41st QM Company	Seattle	14 Sep 56
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UNITS ALLOTTED BUT NOT ACTIVATED

Medical Detachment, 240th AAA Battalion
 Medical Detachment, 286th AAA Battalion

During this Biennium (1954-56) the Washington National Guard completed the manning of the AAA On-Sites. The 770th AAA Gun Battalion completed the occupation of the Seattle area sites (Des Moines, Olympia and Renton) in December 1954 and in July, 1955, moved its headquarters from the Seattle Armory to Site No. 50 at Des Moines. The 240th AAA Battalion completed its occupation of its four sites (Houghton and Manchester) in April 1955, with the headquarters moving to Site 11 at Houghton in April of 1956. By this time 151 Washington National Guardsmen were employed by the Federal Government full time in this program.

As of 31 October 1956, Washington National Guard Army and Air units totaled 109 with a strength of 7,154. As of this date, the armories at Ellensburg, Puyallup, Chewelah, Snohomish, Bremerton, Pasco, Shelton and Toppenish had been completed. The armory at Camp Murray was under

construction and the armory at Spokane was being rehabilitated at an estimated cost of \$36,000.00. Planned construction included an Armory at Okanogan, an armory expansion at Camas and also Poulsbo; Vehicle storage sheds at Yakima, Shelton, Snohomish, Pasco and Wenatchee. Budgeted construction included armories at Port Angeles, Anacortes, Colville and Ephrata and Vehicle storage sheds at Tacoma, Okanogan and Camp Murray.

State expenditures for this Biennium totaled \$1,622,951.52 and the United States Property and Fiscal Officer reported expenditures of \$9,600,568.30. This together with \$3,096,051.88 for drill pay and an estimated pay of Army and Air Advisors of \$639,792.59 for a total federal expenditure of \$13,336,412.77 and a grand total Federal and State of \$14,959,364.07

On 15 February 1957, the Washington Military Academy was established for the Washington Army National Guard. The Academy was organized as part of the National Guard Bureau plan to eliminate Extension School Course training for future officers and replace it with an aggressive resident training program in each state. The program of instruction consisted of approximately 350 hours of training conducted during fifteen days annual active duty training and ten two-day weekend assemblies spaced throughout the year. The course is divided between academic subjects and leadership training. Strong emphasis is placed on the leadership phase to develop this most essential quality in future officers. Lack of this leadership training and evaluation was the most serious defect in the former pre-commission extension course programs. The new course requires nearly one year to complete, with a new class starting each June and graduate the following May. Currently, new courses begin in August with graduation in July.

Thirty-five outstanding young guardsmen graduated from the first class just prior to the start of the biennium (1958-60). An additional sixty-two new second lieutenants were graduated from classes 2 and 3 during this biennium to bring the school output to 97.

Class number 4 entered training in June 1960 with thirty-eight promising candidates. Thirty five of the original group are still enrolled following the annual active duty training period, and it is estimated that a minimum of thirty will be commissioned upon graduation next May (1961).

This program represents a new achievement in the annals of the Washington National Guard. For the first time the State is training and producing new officers through its own resident officer candidate school. The new academy is considered a valued asset and plans now call for a continuous output of thirty to forty new guard officers each year.

During this same period (1958-60) 1392 National Guardsmen from Washington attended six-months active duty for training which is mandatory for all non-prior service men. The training consists of 8-weeks of basic combat training at training units or service schools, and 6-weeks unit training conducted by Army units in the operational role assigned each organization.

During this biennium, two incidents occurred in which the Washington National Guard was called upon for disaster relief. The first incident occurred in the latter part of November 1959 when floods inundated large areas in the Auburn-Kent area and in the vicinity of Snohomish. National Guard stations at Olympia, Seattle, Everett and Bellingham were alerted for partial mobilization as the situation became more critical. A helicopter and pilot were dispatched to the Kent area for control and evacuation. The Everett station furnished a volunteer detail with 2-1/2 ton trucks to Snohomish, where they assisted local agencies in implementing evacuation plans. Three amphibious trucks were also ordered to Snohomish county at the request of the State Director of Civil Defense to move supplies and evacuate inhabitants in the heavily flooded areas. As the flood subsided, the National Guard personnel and equipment were withdrawn after once again serving their State during an emergency.

In December 1959, the Snoqualmie River washed out a critical segment of the new Snoqualmie Pass Highway and caused serious disruption of cross-state and transcontinental vehicle traffic. Efforts to blast away a clay bank and reroute the River channel were not successful and the situation became more desperate. On 15 December 1959, a 155 mm Howitzer and an eight man crew from the 1st Howitzer Battalion, 146th Field Artillery, at Seattle, were ordered to move to the washout. The howitzer moved into position that evening and the morning of 16 December 1959, fired seven rounds into the

obstruction. The high explosive shells loosened the bank and river bed sufficiently to divert the flow away from the damaged highway and permit crews to restore the vital arterial roadbed.

In 1959, based upon directives from the National Guard Bureau, the Washington National Guard was again completely reorganized and totally changed in structure. These organizational changes reflected the most advanced concepts of military deployment, both in combat and combat support units. In addition the reorganization directive introduced the COMBAT ARMS REGIMENTAL SYSTEM patterned after the regular army concept. This required each State to select in the number required, Army National Guard Regiments to serve as parent regiments of its combat arms units. The ultimate number and type (by arm) of parent regiments required depended primarily on the number and type of combat arms units allocated each State and Territory in the finalized Army National Guard troop structure.

First, however, in planning for the implementation of the combat Arms Regimental system, each State and Territory was required to make a historical analyses of its combat arms units for the purpose of establishing a priority listing by arm of its parent regiments. These were to be selected from regiments listed in the 1931 and 1939 National Guard Registers.

Second, it was pointed out that some States and Territories would undoubtedly have unique historical and organization situations which could influence the selection of their regimental designations, therefore, no attempt was to be made by the National Guard Bureau to prescribe a criterion for rating regiments in order of priority. As a guide, U. S. Regiments were selected for retention in the Combat Regimental System based on a formula which considered a unit's age, campaign honors, and American decorations. Army National Guard units, however, may have additional historical factors to consider such as strong local ties or perhaps a unit's outstanding service during the early history of the State. Each State was directed to submit its priority listing of potential parent regiments to the National Guard Bureau for review, coordination, and selection, primarily to avoid duplications of designations.

Third, The National Guard Bureau pointed out that determination should be made, after receipt of new troop allotments, based upon:

- a. The historical lineage of the units. A unit whose lineage is traceable to a selected parent regiment should be designated as a member unit of that regiment.
- b. Conversion of regiments from one arm to another. The Bureau pointed out that this may be desirable to perpetuate an especially famous Army National Guard regiment that would otherwise not have an opportunity to "field" a member unit, or to preclude forming composite parent regiments, i.e., a parent regiment whose members are of different arms. The following example was shown by the National Guard Bureau for a selection guide:

CURRENTLY ACTIVE UNIT	LOCATION	TRADITIONAL REGIMENT	PROPOSED NEW DESIGNATION
182nd RCT	Charleston, Mass.	182nd Inf. Regt.	1st Battle Group 186th Infantry

Although this Department recommended the retention of all its previous regiments, the National Guard Bureau eliminated the 148th Artillery and added the 303rd Armor in lieu of the 803rd Armor. This gave the State of Washington the 161ST INFANTRY, 146TH ARTILLERY, 248TH ARTILLERY, 205TH ARTILLERY and 303RD Combat Arms Regiments. With the exception of the 303RD REGIMENT, all other regiments had their original insignia, which was not changed.

The Insignia for State Regiments bear the same "crest" but the "shield" and "motto" of each regiment is individual to that regiment. The crests for regiments is the heraldic wreath or torse which is a two-colored twist on which the crest rests. By heraldic rule, it is composed of the principal metal, silver (white) or gold (yellow) and the principal color of the shield. As the crests have been devised before the shields, the following rules for tinctures of the wreath has been followed:

- a. In States where the predominant original settlement was of English origin, the wreath is made of white and red; where Dutch, orange and blue; French, gold and blue; Spanish, gold and red; American, white and blue.

b. The eastern states were of English origin, New York was Dutch and Florida, Spanish. The Great Lakes and the Louisiana Purchase states were Spanish and the Oregon Settlement states were American; Ohio was really English and Alaska Russian. Thus the Washington Regimental Crest is Blue and White (American origin). However, when an organization adopts a shield, the principal metal and principle color of which differ from the tinctures of the heraldic wreath, the metal and color will be changed to conform to the principal metal and principal color of the shield. For example, in the case of the Washington National Guard Artillery Regiments, the shields being red, the colors of the crest on each unit's insignia is red and white. To better understand the insignia of Washington's Combat Arms Regiments the heraldic tinctures, metals and other heraldic terms associated with coats of arms will precede the history of the regiments:

TINCTURE	HERALDIC TERM
Gold (or yellow)	Or
Silver (or white)	Argent
Blue	Azure
Red	Gules
Black	Sable
Green	Vert
Purple	Purpure
Orange	Tenne
Gray	Gray
Maroon	Sanguine
Crimson	Crimson
Red	Brick
Buff	Buff
Olive drab	Olive drab

TERM	MEANING
Proper	Device in its natural color
Chief	Upper part of Shield
Dexter	Middle part of Shield
Sinister	Lower part of Shield
Embattled	Battlement outline
Fess or Fesse	Band or stripe Ordinary Shield
Fimbriated	Fringed or Bordered
Bend	Two lines diagonally across Shield

161ST INFANTRY- Constituted and organized 9 March 1886 and 7 April 1887 as 1st (west of Cascades) and 2nd (east of cascades) Regiments of Infantry, Washington Territory, comprising existing independent companies of militia, organized 1880-1884, as follows: Capitol Guards (Olympia, 1883), Seattle Rifles (Seattle, 1883), Tacoma Guards (Tacoma, 1884), Queen City Guards (Seattle, 1884), Tacoma Rifles (Tacoma, 1885) Dayton Grays (Dayton, 1880), Grant Guards (Walla Walla, 1880), and Klickitat County Guards (Goldendale, 1884). (Active Militia, Washington Territory, redesignated Washington (Territory) National Guard 28 Jan 1888). 2nd Infantry Regiment reorganized and redesignated 1st Infantry Battalion, 23 July 1895. 1st Infantry Regiment reorganized and redesignated 2nd Infantry Battalion, 1897. Elements of battalions consolidated in part and redesignated 1st Regiment, Washington Volunteer Infantry, and mustered into Federal service 6-13 May 1898 at Camp Rogers, Tacoma; mustered out 1 Nov 1899 at San Francisco, Calif. Remaining companies of battalions reorganized as Independent Battalion, Washington Volunteer Infantry, and mustered into Federal Service 2-15 July 1898 at Camp Rogers, Tacoma; mustered out at Vancouver Barracks 28 Oct 1898.

Elements reorganized and consolidated with 1st and 2nd Infantry Regiments, W. N. G. (organized in 1898), and redesignated 1st Infantry Regiment 9 Nov 1899. Redesignated 2nd Infantry Regiment May 1903. Mustered into Federal service 28 Jun 1916 at Camp Murray for Mexican Border; mustered out 8 Oct 1916 at American Lake. Called into Federal service 25 Mar 1917. Drafted into Federal service 5 Aug 1917. Consolidated with elements of 3rd Infantry Regiment, District of Columbia National Guard and redesignated 161st Infantry Regiment, 41st Division, 19 Sep 1917. Demobilized 18 Mar 1919 at Camp Dix, N.J. and Camp Dodge, Iowa (41st Division demobilized 22 Feb 1919, relieving components from assignment; reorganized 1925). State of Washington elements reorganized as 161st Infantry Regiment, W. N. G. 1 Jan 1921; assigned to 41st Infantry Division. Ordered into active Federal service 16 September 1940 at Spokane. Relieved from assignment to 41st Infantry Division 14 Feb 1942. Assigned to 25th Infantry Division 3 Aug 1942. Relieved from assignment to 25th Infantry Division and inactivated 1 Nov 1945 at Nagoya, Japan. Assigned to 41st Infantry Division 17 Jun 1946. Reorganized with Headquarters Federally recognized 24 Mar 1947 at Spokane. Reorganized, redesignated and converted to 1st and 2nd Battle Groups, 161st Infantry, 5th Engineer Company and 144th Transportation Battalion, 15 Apr 1959

BATTLE HONORS:

PHILIPPINE INSURRECTION
MANILA
LUZON, 1899
WORLD WAR I
Without inscription
WORLD WAR II
GUADALCANAL
NORTHERN SOLOMONS
LUZON

DECORATIONS:

- a. Philippine PUG embroidered 7 OCTOBER 1944 TO 4 JULY 1945.
- b. Heavy Mortar Company entitled to DUC embroidered LUZON.
- c. Company E entitled to DUC embroidered LUZON.

COAT OF ARMS. Approved 7 May 1925; Amended 25 Nov 1925.

a. Blazonry. Argent, a bend embattled to chief, guies and azure, the parting line parallel to the lower edge of the ordinary, in sinister chief, a fleur-de-lis of the third (azure), rayed, with bolts of lightening tenne, and in dexter base, a scorpion bendways proper.

b. Crest. The Crest for State of Washington. On a wreath, argent and azure, a raven with wings indorsed issuing out of a ducal coronet all proper. The crest of George Washington. Washington is a part of the "Oregon Territory" whose American title was established in 1846. The territory is purely American and the twists of the wreath are accordingly white and blue.

c. Motto. FIRST IN WAR -FIRST IN PEACE.

d. Shield. The shield is white, the old infantry color, and across it is a bend in the colors of the Philippine flag, red and blue, embattled to indicate that the regiment was engaged in actual combat in the Philippine Insurrection. The scorpion indicates duty on the Mexican Border, and the fleur-de-lis service in France in World War I. The fleur-de-lis is rayed to indicate that the regiment in this war was

broken up and its personnel used as replacements, yet in that capacity delivered forcible and effective service against the enemy.

e. Distinctive Insignia. Approved 9 October 1926. The insignia is the coat of arms of the regiment.



146TH ARTILLERY - Parent unit constituted as Field Artillery Battalion, Washington National Guard in 1914. As assigned to 41st Infantry Division, 18 July 1917. Battery A organized and drafted into Federal service 5 Aug 1917; remainder of Battalion, organized at Camp Greene, North Carolina, 25 Sep 1917 from personnel recruited for Field Artillery, Washington National Guard. Consolidated with Hq. Co., Supply Company, and 1st Battalion, 2nd Inf., Idaho National Guard, and with Battery A, Field Artillery, New Mexico National Guard; redesignated 146th Field Artillery Regiment 19 Sep 1917. Demobilized at Fort D. A. Russell, Wyoming 26 Jun 1919. Washington elements reconstituted 1 Jan 1921, consolidated with 1st Battalion and Supply Company, 161st Infantry and redesignated 146th FA Regiment, 1 May 1921, an element of the 41st Infantry Division. Inducted into Federal service at Seattle, Washington 16 Sep 1940. Regiment broken up and 1st Bn redesignated 146th FA Battalion, 17 Feb 1942. 2nd Bn redesignated 167th FA Battalion same date. Inactivated in Japan, 31 Dec 1945. Reorganized and redesignated 1st Howitzer Battalion, 146th Artillery on 15 April 1959 and assigned same date as a Combat Arms Regiment of the Washington National Guard.

BATTLE HONORS:

PHILIPPINE INSURRECTION
MANILA
LUZON, 1899
WORLD WAR I
CHAMPAGNE -MARNE
AISNE -MARNE
ST MIHIEL .

MEUSE -ARGONNE
CHAMPAGNE
WORLD WAR II
NEW GUINEA (W/ARROWHEAD)
SOUTHERN PHILIPPINES
LUZON (W/ARROWHEAD)

COAT OF ARMS: Approved 25 May 1925.

a. Blazonry Parti per fess gules and argent, a fess similarly divided embattled azure and of the first fimbriated to chief or, in chief five fleur-de-lis of the last, in base a scorpion bend ways proper.

b. Crest. That for regiments of Washington. Wreath: Argent and gules

c. Motto. ACTION FRONT

d. Shield. The divisions of the shield are three, indicating service as follows: Chief, five fleur-de-lis on a red field to indicate service in France and participation in five battles. Base, scorpion in white field, to indicate service as infantry on the Mexican Border. Fess, the colors of the Philippine flag, red and blue, embattled to indicate actual participation in combat.

e. Distinctive Insignia. Approved 9 Oct 1926; amended 16 Feb 1927. The insignia is the crest, shield and motto of the Coat of arms.



248TH ARTILLERY - Organized as the Coast Artillery Reserve Corps in 1909 consisting of five (5) companies of 2nd Infantry, Wash NG, and designated 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th and 5th companies, CARC; redesignated Coast Artillery Corps, National Guard in 1915. Expanded by addition of seven (7) additional companies and redesignated 1st Coast Defense Command, Wash NG, 5 May 1916. Drafted into Federal service 25 July 1917 and redesignated 17th to 28th companies of Coast Defenses of Puget Sound, Jan-Feb. 1918; mustered out 31 Dec 1918. Greater part of personnel from original 4th, 7th, 10th and 12th companies transferred to 63rd and 65th Coast Artillery regiments which served in France. Mustered out between 28 Feb and 28 Mar 1919. Reorganized and Federally recognized 1st Bn. Coast Artillery Corps 13 Nov 1923. Redesignated 1st Bn. 248th CA 1 Mar 1924. Redesignated 1st Bn. 248th CA HD) 1 Sep 1935. Expanded to Regiment on 1 Jan 1940. Mustered into Federal service 16 Sep 1940. Served from date of induction until 25 Apr 1944 at Fort Worden and Defenses of Puget Sound. Transferred to Camp Barkeley, Texas 8 May 1944 where regiment was inactivated and personnel thereof transferred to the 768th, 769th and 804th Field Artillery Battalions. Reconstituted as Combat Arms Regiment, Washington National Guard on 15 April 1959.

BATTLE HONOR: World. War I, Without inscription.

COAT OF ARMS: Approved 22 Jan 1934.

- a. Blazonry. Gules on a chief embattled or (gold) a fleur-de-lis of the first.
- b. Crest. That for regiments of Wash NG, Wreath: or and gules
- c. Motto. FACILLIME PRINCEPS (MOST EASILY THE FIRST OR FOREMOST)
- d. Shield. The shield is red for Artillery. During World War I the 248th CA occupied five forts at Puget Sound which barred the way to the invader; the chief is therefore embattled and has five crenelles to represent this World War I service. For the overseas duty of the organization a fleur-de-lis is used.

DISTINCTIVE INSIGNIA: Approved 19 Jan 1935. The insignia of the regiment is the coat of arms.



205TH ARTILLERY - The lineage of this regiment, as directed by the War Department, begins with the activation of Headquarters, 205th Coast Artillery (AA) about 1 Nov 1939. Although the personnel came from the 248th CA, 161st Infantry, 146th Field Artillery, 116th Medical Regiment; and Hq. Troop, 24th Cavalry Division, a direct lineage with these units was denied by the War Department due to the phraseology used in the orders which organized the regiment. Instead of converting or redesigning, the General Orders directed the "constitution of". Following induction into Federal service on 3 February 1941, the regiment was stationed at Fort Lewis. Units were later moved to Alaska and the Harbor Defenses of Los Angeles. In August 1944, the regiment was transferred to Camp Bowie, Texas, where it was inactivated and its personnel reassigned to other Coast Artillery units. Assigned to Washington as a Combat Arms Regiment on 15 April 1959. (Former Artillery Battalions, the 530th, 420th, 240th, 770th and 286th trace their lineage to this regiment.

BATTLE HONORS: Unknown.

COAT OF ARMS: Approved July 27, 1942.

a. Blazonry. Gules, in chief a bar invested argent, coupled by a fetter lock or to a bar in base vert fimbriated of the third,.

b. Crest. That for regiments of Wash. N. G. Wreath: Or and gules.

c. Motto. RES VERAЕ (DATA CORRECT)

d. Shield. The shield is red for Artillery. The silver bar represents clouds while the green bar is, representative of the earth. The fetterlock coupling the two symbolizes the idea or the link between earth and things above.

DISTINCTIVE INSIGNIA: Approved 1941. The insignia of the Regiment is the coat of arms.



303RD ARMOR - Organized and constituted on 30 September 1940 as the 103rd Antitank Battalion and inducted into Federal service 10 February 1941 at its home station, Tacoma, Washington. Redesignated as 103rd Infantry Battalion, Antitank 24 July 1941; reorganized and redesignated as the 803rd Tank Destroyer Battalion, Heavy (SF) 3 December 1941. Reorganized and redesignated the 803rd Tank Destroyer Battalion 8 June 1942, and inactivated 1 December 1945 at Camp Kilmer, New Jersey. It was converted and redesignated the 803rd Tank Battalion, 7 April 1947, allotted to the State of Washington and authorized to be organized.

BATTLE HONORS:

Normandy
Northern France
Ardennes-Alsace
Central Europe
Rhineland

UNIT DECORATIONS: Company C, 803rd Tank Battalion is entitled to a Distinguished Unit Citation streamer embroidered, "HURTTGEN FOREST" for action from 16 November to 4 December 1944.

COAT OF ARMS: Approved for the 803rd Tank Destroyer Battalion originally on 2 December 1942. Coat of Arms redesignated by The Institute of Heraldry, U. S. Army on 27 March 1961 for the 303rd Armor, Washington National Guard.

- a. Blazonry. Per bend gules and azure, issuant from sinister a dexter arm in armor fesswise, holding in gauntlet or, and assortment of tank parts argent.
- b. Crest. That for regiments of Washington. Wreath; Argent and gules.
- c. Motto. FIRE AND MOVEMENT
- d. Shield. The male arm holding the tank parts is representative of the force and effectiveness of a tank battalion.
- e. Distinctive Insignia. The insignia is the crest, shield and motto of the coat of arms.



Following the selection of Washington's Combat Arms Regiments effective 15 April 1959 the following were units activated, converted, redesignated or reorganized:

NEW UNIT	OLD UNIT	STATION
H/H Company (Part) 41st Inf Division	41st Inf Div Hq, Hq Co., Med Det & M. P. Co	Seattle
41st Avn Company (Part)	Army Avn Personnel	Camp Murray
H/H Det. 41st Inf Div Trains & Band	41st Div Staff, Personnel & Band	Seattle
41st Administration Co (Part)	41st Div Hq. Personnel	Seattle
41st Quartermaster Company	H/H Btry, 205th AAA Gp, 110th AAA Det (Opns)	Seattle
H/H Co. 241st Sig Bn	Hq, 236th AAA Gp	Tacoma
Co A, 241st Sig Bn	41st Signal Co.	Camp Murray
Co B, 241st Sig Bn	Btry A & Svc Btry, 167 FA Bn	Vancouver
Hq & Co A, 741st Ord Bn	741st Ordnance Bn	Camp Murray
H/H Det (Part) 116th Med Bn	H/H Co, 116th. Med Bn	Seattle
Co A (Amb) 116th Med Bn	Amb Co, 116th Med Bn	Seattle
Co B (Clr) 116th Med Bn	Clr Co. 116th Med Bn	Seattle
H/H Co 1st Med Tk Bn, 303d Armor	H/H Co, Svc Co, Med. Det. 803rd Tank Bn	Centralia
Co A, 1st Med Tk Bn, 303d Armor	Co A, 803d Tank Bn	Longview
Co B, 1st Med Tk Bn, 303d Armor	Co B, 803d Tank Bn	Poulsbo
Co C, 1st Med Tk Bn, 303d Armor	Co C, 803d Tank Bn	Centralia.
Co D, 1st Med Tk Bn, 303d Armor	Co D, 803d Tank Bn	Port Orchard
Co E, 1st Med Tk Bn, 303d Armor	41st Recon Co	Bremerton
H/H Co, 1st Btl Gp, 161st Inf	H/H Co, 161st Inf	Spokane
Cbt Spt Co, 1st Btl Gp, 161st Inf	Svc. Co. 161st Inf	Spokane
Co A(-), 1st Btl Gp, 161st Inf	H/H Co, 1st Bn 161st Inf and Med. Co, 161st Inf	Spokane
3d R & W Plat, Co A, 1st Btl Gp 161st Inf	Mortar Plat, Co D, 161st Inf	Chewelah
Co B, 1st Btl Gp, 161st Inf	Co B, 161st Inf	Spokane
Co C, (-) 1st Btl Gp, 161st Inf	Co C, 161st Inf	Okanogan
3rd R & W Plat, Co C, 1st Btl Gp 161st Inf	Co G, 161st Inf	Wenatchee
Co D, 1st Btl Gp, 161st, Inf	Co D, 161st Inf	Colville
Co E, 1st Btl Gp, 161st Inf	Co E, 161st Inf	Pullman
H/H Co, 2d. Btl Gp, 161st Inf	H/H Co, 3d. Bn Co's L and M, 161st Inf	Everett
Cbt Spt Co, 2d Btl Gp, 161st Inf	Btry C, 146th FA Bn	Snohomish
Co A, 2d Btl Gp, 161st Inf	Co K, 161st Inf	Seattle
Co B, 2d Btl Gp, 161st Inf	Co I, 161st Inf	Seattle
Co C, 2d Btl Gp, 161st Inf	Btry C, 700th AAA Bn	Olympia
Co D, 2d Btl Gp 161st Inf	Btry A & B, 700th AAA. Bn	Tacoma
Co E (-), 2d Btl Gp, 161st Inf	Btry D, 700th AAA Bn	Port Angeles .
3d R & W Plat, Co E, 2d Btl Gp, 161 Inf	41st Recon Co	Bremerton
41st DivArty	H/H Btry, 41st Div Arty	Tacoma
H/H Btry, 1st How Bn, 248th Arty	H/H Btry, 700th AAA Bn	Aberdeen
Btry A, 1st How Bn, 248th Arty	Btry A, 700th AAA Bn	Aberdeen
Btry B, 1st How Bn, 248th Arty	Btry B, 700th AAA Bn	Shelton
H/H Btry, 1st How Bn, 146th Arty	H/H Btry, 146th Arty	Seattle

Btry A, 1st How Bn, 146th Arty	Btry A, 146th Arty	Seattle
Btry B, 1st How Bn, 146th Arty	Btry B, 146th Arty	Seattle
H/H Btry, 2d Rkt/How Bn. 146th Arty	H/H Btry Med Det. 167th FA Bn	Vancouver
Btry A (8" How) 2d Rkt/How Bn, 146th Arty	Btry C, 167 FA Bn	Camas
Btry B (Honest John Rkt) 2d Rkt/How Bn, 146th Arty	Btry B, 167th FA Bn	Vancouver

The following non-divisional units were also either consolidated, converted, reorganized or redesignated as indicated:

NEW	UNIT OLD UNIT	STATION
H/H Btry, 115th Arty Bde (AD)	H/H Btry, 115th AAA Brig. 115th AAA Det (Opns)	Olympia
5th Det (Air Target)	225th AAA Det (RCAT)	Yakima
415th Ord Det (CC)	415th Ord Det	Camp Murray
416th Ord Det (CC)	416th Ord Det	Camp Murray
404th Sig Det	404th & 405th Sig Dets	Camp Murray
H/H Btry, 2d Msl Bn, 205th Arty (Nike)	H/H Btry, 770th Msl Bn	Phantom Lake
Btry A, 2d Msl Bn, 205th Arty (Nike)	Btry A, 770th Msl Bn	Houghton
Btry B, 2d Msl Bn, 205th Arty (Nike)	Btry B, 770th Msl Bn	Phantom Lake
Btry C, 2d Msl Bn, 205th Arty (Nike)	Btry C, 770th Msl Bn	Phantom Lake
Btry D, 2d Msl Bn, 205th Arty (Nike)	Btry D, 770th Msl Bn	Houghton
H/H Btry, 3d Msl Bn, 205th Arty (Nike)	H/H Btry, 240th Msl Bn	O'Brien
Btry A, 3d Msl Bn, 205th Arty (Nike)	Btry A, 240th Msl Bn	O'Brien
Btry B, 3d Msl Bn, 205th Arty (Nike)	Btry B, 240th Msl Bn	O'Brien
Btry C. 3d Msl Bn. 205th Arty (Nike)	Btry C, 240th Msl Bn	Harper
Btry D, 3d Msl Bn. 205th Arty (Nike)	Btry D, 240th Msl Bn	Harper
H/H Btry, 1st Gun Bn, 205th Arty	H/H Btry, 420th AAA Bn	Ephrata
Btry A (90mm), 1st Gun Bn, 205th Arty	Btry A, 420th AM Bn	Yakima
Btry B (90mm), 1st Gun Bn, 205th Arty	Btry B, 420th AAA Bn	Yakima
Btry C (90mm), 1st Gun Bn. 205th Arty	Btry C, 420th AAA Bn	Toppenish
Btry D (90mm), 1st Gun Bn. 205th Arty	Btry D, 420th AAA Bn	Pasco
H/H Btry 4th Gun Bn. 205th Arty	H/H Btry, 286th AAA Bn	Bellingham
Btry A (90mm), 4th Gun Bn, 205th Arty	Btry A, 286th AAA Bn	Seattle
Btry B (90mm), 4th Gun Bn, 205th Arty	Btry B, 286th AAA Bn	Puyallup
Btry C (90mm), 4th Gun Bn, 205th Arty	Btry C, 286th AAA Bn	Anacortes
Btry D (90mm), 4th Gun Bn, 205th Arty	Btry D, 286th AAA Bn	Bellingham
H/H Det, WashARNG	H/H Det, WashARNG	Camp Murray
105th Engr Co	Tank Co, 161st Inf	Spokane
H/H Det, 144th Trans Bn (Tm1)	H/H Co. 2nd Bn, 161 Inf	Walla Walla
506th Trans. Co. (HC)	Btry C, 530th AAA Bn	Tacoma
783rd Trans. Co. (FCDM)	H/H Btry & Med Det 530th AAA Bn, 175th AAA Det	Tacoma
881st Trans Co (-) (CCT)	Co H, 161st Inf	Walla Walla
3d Carr. Plat. 881st Trans Co	Co F, 161st Inf	Ellensburg
1040th Trans Co (Amph Trk)	41st QM Company	Pasco
1041st Trans Co (St. area)	204th Engr Co (LE)	Tacoma

UNIT	DISBANDED DATE	STATION
Med Det, 700th AAA Bn	30 Nov 1958	Aberdeen
Med Det, 146th FA Bn	30 Nov 1958	Seattle

During the 1958-1960 Biennium, 90 Army and Air units of the Washington National Guard were maintained with a strength of 7,014 as of 30 June 1960. To support the activities of this Department, \$2,333,225.28 was expended in State funds and with Field Training Pay and pay of Army and Air Advisors plus other Federal expenditures a grand total of \$19,943,780.08 was spent. The estimated value of equipment under control of the Military Department was \$32,000,000.00. As of the end of the Biennium a total of 84 State employees were employed at Camp Murray. Federal employees included 194 Air Technicians, 85 Field Maintenance Technicians, 209 Nike Onsite Technicians, 192 Unit Organizational Technicians and 60 United States Property and Fiscal Technicians for a total of 824 employees. The Army Advisory Group consisted of 23 Officers, one Warrant Officer and 32 Sergeant Advisors. 7 Officer and 8 Sergeant Advisors were on full time duty with the Air National Guard.

During this Biennium on 19 May 1960 the Washington State Guard Reserve was established by Executive Order of Governor Rossellini with a mission to provide a cadre of officers for use by the State of Washington in time of National or State emergency. In the event of War or National Emergency the Washington State Guard Reserve would replace the Washington National Guard when the latter is called into Federal Service. Headquarters of this Reserve is maintained at Camp Murray, with Internal Security Groups in the larger cities of the State. As of the end of the reporting period about 142 had been commissioned.

On 8 July 1961, Soviet Premier Khrushchev announced that the Western Military build-up resulting from the Berlin "Crisis" had "compelled" the Soviet Government to suspend planned troop reductions. This action by the Soviet leader coupled with a huge USSR Air Show the following day led to an exchange of notes between the United States and Great Britain and France. The United States note, made public the next day warned that it would defend its rights in Berlin and challenged the USSR to negotiate a German agreement on the basis of self determination. "There is no reason for a crisis over Berlin", the US note said "If one develops it is because the Soviet Union is attempting to invade the basic rights of others".

Responding with measured firmness to these Soviet threats and warnings regarding the future of West Berlin, President John F. Kennedy in an address to the Nation on 25 July 1961 stated:

"We must have sea and airlift capable of moving our forces quickly and in large numbers to any part of the world.

"But evenly more important, we need the capability of placing in any critical area at the appropriate time a force, which combined with that of our allies, is large enough to make clear our determination find ability to defend our rights at all costs - and to meet all levels of aggressor pressure with whatever levels of force are required. We intend to have a wider choice than humiliation or all-out nuclear action."

* * * * *

"I hear it said that West Berlin is militarily untenable. So was Bastogne, So, in fact, was Stalingrad. Any dangerous spot is tenable if brave men will make it so.

"We do not want to fight - but we have fought before. And others in earlier times have made the same dangerous mistake of assuring that the West was too selfish and too soft and too divided to resist invasions of freedom on other lands. Those who threaten to unleash the forces of war should recall the words of the ancient philosopher: "A man who causes fear cannot be free from fear".

"We cannot and will not permit the Communists to drive us out of Berlin, either gradually or by force. For the fulfillment of our pledge to that city is essential to morale and security of Western Germany, to the unity of Western Europe, and to the faith of the whole Free World".

* * * * *

"We cannot negotiate with those who say "what is mine is mine, what's yours is negotiable".

"To sum it all up: we seek peace - but we shall not surrender. That is the central meaning of this crisis - and the meaning of your government's policy".

To meet this threat he further stated:

"I am requesting of the Congress for the current fiscal year an additional \$3,247,000,000 of appropriations for the military forces.

"To fill out our present Army divisions and to make more men available for prompt deployment. I am requesting an increase in the Army's total authorized strength from 875,000 to approximately one million men.

"I am requesting an increase of 29,000 and 63,000 men respectively in the active duty strength of the Navy and Air Force.

"To fulfill these manpower needs, I am ordering that our draft calls be doubled and tripled in the coming months; I am asking the Congress for authority to order to active duty certain ready reserve units and individual reservists and to extend tours of duty; and, under that authority, I am planning to order to active duty a number of air transportation squadrons, and Air National Guard tactical air squadrons, to give us the airlift capacity and protection we may need. Other reserve forces will be called up if needed.

"Many ships and planes once headed for retirement are to be retained or reactivated increasing our tactical airpower and our sea lift, airlift, and anti-submarine warfare capability. In addition, our strategic air power will be increased by delaying the deactivation of B-47 bombers.

"Finally, some \$1.8 billion - about half of the total sum - is needed for the procurement of non-nuclear weapons, ammunition and equipment.

Calling for stepped up efforts in the civil Defense Program, the President stated: "I am requesting of the Congress new funds for the following immediate objectives: to identify and mark space in existing structures - public and private - that could be used for fall-out shelters in case of attack; to stock these shelters with food, water, first aid kits, tools, sanitation facilities and other minimum essentials for survival; to increase their capacity; to improve our air-raid warning and fall-out detection systems, including a new household warning system now under development; and to take other measures that will be effective at an early date to save millions of lives if needed. In addition new Federal buildings, will include space suitable for fall-out shelters, as well as normal uses".

Moving promptly to implement the goal set forth in President Kennedy's 25 July address and under authority of Public Law 87-117, approved by The Congress on August 1961, the Department of the Army announced establishment of a new Army Training Center at Fort Carson, Colorado, capable of handling 16,000 trainees at one time. Three training divisions were being converted into regular combat divisions under the U.S. Continental Command - the 1st Infantry Division at Fort Riley, Kansas; the 2nd Infantry Division at Fort Benning, Georgia; and the 2nd Armored Division at Fort Hood, Texas.

On 16 August 1961, Secretary of the Army Elvis J. Stahr, Jr. outlined a 12 - point program to strengthen Army Manpower:

1. Extended enlisted men's terms of service for periods not to exceed 4 months.
2. Extended Officers six-months active duty training to one year beyond their current six-month period.
3. Extended period of active duty to 24 months for officers commissioned through the ROTC program.
4. Encouraged Reserve Officers, completing two year tours to extend for one more year.
5. If volunteers, with certain skills are insufficient, reservists with these specialties will be called to active duty.
6. Overseas tours for Army personnel extended by six months in Japan and Germany and three months in Korea.
7. Selective service to call up 25,000 in September 1961, and at least 20,000 for October 1961.

8. Doctors, dentists, and other medical specialists to be recalled from the Ready Reserve Mobilization Reinforcement Pool if volunteers are insufficient.
9. Ready Reservists retention extended for one year.
10. Enlistments for six-months restricted to provide space for ready reservists.
11. RFA personnel will be fed back into their ready reserve units, unless they choose to enlist in Regular Army.
12. Designation of 113 units of the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve for priority call to active duty. These units, which included combat, combat support and port operational organizations totaled over 23,626 officers and men at full strength.

The additional personnel strength thus derived, the Secretary noted, would enable the Army to carry forward five main readiness measures - reinforce our forces in Europe; add both combat, combat support, and logistical units to create a more combat-ready posture for United State's Army, Europe; double the number of combat-ready divisions in the Strategic Army Corps to provide six divisions in STRAC status as well as additional non-divisional units necessary for a balanced force capable of immediate deployment; add to the training and logistics base to provide reinforcements and replacements in event of hostilities; and finally, more than double the size of the Special Forces for counter-guerrilla and other forms of sub-limited war.

As the Defense buildup gathered momentum, on 15 October the Army National Guard's 32nd Infantry Division of Wisconsin and the 49th Armored Division of Texas and 249 smaller units from the Army National Guard and Army Reserve had been ordered to active duty. This involved the call-up of about 120,000 Ready reservists. The 32nd Division was ordered to take station at Fort Lewis, Washington while the 49th was assigned to the newly re-activated Fort Polk, Louisiana. Fort Chaffee, Arkansas was also re-activated to accommodate the 100th Reserve Training Division being called up in October to operate this post. Two other Army National Guard Infantry Division, the 26th, of Massachusetts and the 28th, of Pennsylvania, plus several score smaller Guard and Reserve units, were placed in priority training status for call-up at a later date, if needed. Meanwhile, many other preparedness measures were in process. By mid-October the US Army had taken the following steps:

1. Stopped Government sponsored travel of dependents to Western Europe, except to West Berlin.
2. Begun providing the new M-14 rifle to troops in West Berlin.
3. Stepped up draft calls, with the October call for 20,000 men.
4. Started to add civilian personnel to the various camps, post and stations being affected by reactivation or expansion due to the build-up.
5. Strengthened the Army's special warfare capability by activating a fourth Special Forces Group at Fort Bragg, North Carolina.
6. Expanded the training of reserve component units, largely by adding extra hours for paid drill.
7. Accelerated the training of priority reserve units.

Based upon the build-up of National Guard units, the following message was received by Governor Rossellini from the National Guard Bureau, from Washington, D.C., on 25 August 1961:

1. BY DIRECTION OF THE PRES AND THE SEC OF DEF, UNITS OF THE ARNGUS LISTED IN PAR 7, BELOW, ARE ALERTED TO BE ORDERED TO ACTIVE DUTY AT HOME STATION BY THE COMMANDER CONCERNED EFFECTIVE ON DATE SHOWN IN PAR. 7.
2. THE PROVISIONS OF AR 135-300 (MOBILIZATION OF ARMY NATIONAL GUARD OF THE US AND ARMY RESERVE UNITS) WILL GOVERN THE MOBILIZATION AND PROCESSING OF THESE UNITS EXCEPT AS OTHERWISE INDICATED.
3. UPON RECEIPT OF THIS MESSAGE RECRUITING FOR THESE UNITS PRIOR TO ENTRY ON ACTIVE DUTY IS SUSPENDED.
4. THE MILITARY SITUATION DICTATES THAT UNITS AND MEMBERS REPORT TO MOBILIZATION STATIONS ON DATES INDICATED. THEREFORE, THE MINIMUM 30 DAY

PERIOD OF ALERT IS WAIVED WHERE A LESSER PERIOD OF ALERT IS NECESSARY TO MEET THIS SCHEDULE, IF APPLICABLE.

5. COMMANDERS CONCERNED WILL BE AUTHORIZED TO ORDER TO ACTIVE DUTY IMMEDIATELY SELECTED MEMBERS OF THE UNITS LISTED BELOW FOR: THE PURPOSE OF ASSISTING UNIT COMMANDERS IN PREPARING THE UNIT FOR ENTRY ON ACTIVE DUTY, FOR THE PURPOSE OF ASSISTING IN THE PAYMENT OF TROOPS OR OTHER FINANCIAL MATTERS, OR FOR THE PURPOSE OF ATTENDING ARMY SERVICE SCHOOLS OR OTHER APPROVED COURSES OF INSTRUCTION.

6. FOR SECURITY REASONS, IT IS REQUESTED THAT NO TOTALS OR STRENGTH OF UNITS ALERTED BE MADE PUBLIC LOCAL UNIT COMMANDERS MAY ANNOUNCE THEIR UNITS ARE ALERTED.

7. FOLLOWING UNITS ARE ALERTED FOR ORDER TO ACTIVE DUTY EFFECTIVE 1 OCT 61:

* UNIT	* TO&E & DATE	* MOB STATION	* DATE TO ARRIVE
1041ST TRANS CO (Staging Area)	15-147C 12 Aug 55	FT LEWIS, WN	AS DIRECTED BY ARMY COMDR

The foregoing was incorporated into GENERAL ORDERS NUMBER 136, HQ 6TH US ARMY, Pres of S. F., Calif., 7 September 1961 which directed the 1041st Transportation Company (Staging Area) to report to Fort Lewis, Washington on 9 OCTOBER 1961.

The Initial Morning Report showed that 5 Officers, 1 Warrant Officer and 45 enlisted men reported. Authorized Strength of enlisted men was 85. The balance were made up from assigned reservists. The following is the roster of Washington National Guardsmen who reported:

CAPTAIN

Anderson, Darrel N.

FIRST LIEUTENANT

Kinsey, Donald R.

SECOND LIEUTENANTS

Buell, Sherman E.

Jaeger, Howard E.

Langley, George

CHIEF WARRANT OFFICER - WO3

Johnson, Marvin J.

FIRST SERGEANT E-8

Coleman, Abe H.

MASTER SERGEANT E-7

Bose, Lyle E.

Fleischmann, Martin E. Nelson, Ward H.

Pruitt, Andrew D.

SERGEANT FIRST CLASS E-6

Harkness, Raymond J.

STAFF SERGEANT E-6

Jenkins, Alfred E.

King, William E.

Russo, Philip J.

SERGEANT E-5

Bishop, Rex A.

Hubbard, Ronald W.

Stemp, Charles M.

SPECIALIST 5 E-5

Bahr, Ronald E.

Cunning, Thomas E. Johnson, Gary F.

Pedersen, Clifford D.

Carle, Hugh M.

Devries, Richard J. Kvamme, Donald R.

Perkins, Richard F.

SPECIALIST 4 E-4

Brandt, Robert L.

Glenn, James G. Nelson, Lyle D.

Zierman, Richard E.

Genske, William R.

Huff, James F. Ugelstad, Robert D.

PRIVATE FIRST CLASS E-3

Jones, Jack L.

Lewis, Jarald T. Gilbert, Gerald D.

Powell, Charles E.

PRIVATE E-2

Salzman, Richard E.

Tradewell, Thomas A.

Turnbow, James R.

Individuals TDY Fort Ord, California

Hooper, Donald H. Staff Sgt-E5

Erickson, Jack E. SP5-E5

Bachmeier, Vincent Jr. PFC-E3

Merritt, Robert F. PFC-E3

Butterfield, Steven E. RCT-E1

Matthewson, John D. RCT-E1

Potter, Dennis L. RCT-E1

Pruitt, James H. RCT-E1

Rivett, Donald A. RCT-E1

Wiceking, William A. RCT-E1

Liggs, Larry E. RCT-E1

2d Lt George T. Langley TDY Ft Eustis, Va.

The 1041st was relieved from Federal service on 9 August 1962.

The Army's modernization is a continuing process and involves many aspects of its being, including equipment, tactics, and organization. Thus the modernization effected in the 1959 reorganization was by 1962 considered obsolete and another reorganization plan was announced. This plan was known as ROAD (Reorganized Army Divisions). This change provided for a Mechanized Division along with the already existent Infantry, Armor and Airborne.

The four new types of divisions have a common division base. In each division are three brigade headquarters. This was to provide for the assignment of a varying number of battalions depending on the geographic location of the division and the mission which it may be assigned or expected to be assigned. The divisions were reorganized so that: (1) They will be tailored specifically to accomplish the mission in the area to which assigned or they will be tailored to accomplish a mission where they might most logically be assigned. (2) Their mobility will be matched to their environment. The divisions in Europe would be either Armored or Mechanized. The divisions in the Far East would be more infantry and less Armor. Those in STRAC (Strategic Army Corps) would have more Parachute infantry or would have combinations of battalions adaptable to a variety of assignments. (3) The reorganization would improve the balance between nuclear and non-nuclear firepower. (4) Each division would have internal flexibility. (5) Divisions would have an improved command and control structure and (6) The reorganization would make better use of existing resources and allow expansion by the assignment of battalions as necessary. It was pointed out that the Triangular Division of World War II with three regiments had a strength of about 17,000; the Pentomic Division with battle group had a total of 14,600.

Under the "new building block concept", each division will have a common division base ranging in strength 6,000 to 7,200. To each of these divisions will be assigned there from six to 15 battalions. The battalions will range in size from 750 to 850 men. Each of the new divisions could have a different number of battalions assigned.

An "average" division would have something in the vicinity of: 15,000 men.

In all our types of new divisions, the Division Base will include:

- (1) Headquarters and Headquarters Company
- (2) One Military Police Company
- (3) One Aviation Battalion
- (4) Division Artillery:
 - a. Three 105 mm howitzer battalions (towed in Infantry and Airborne and self-propelled in Mechanized and Armor Divisions)
 - b. One General Support Battalion (155mm howitzers) (One battery of eight inch howitzers)
 - c. One Missile Battalion (Four Honest John or Little John launcher)
- (5) Three brigade headquarters (Infantry, Mechanized or Armored)
- (6) One Reconnaissance Squadron (three ground reconnaissance troops and one. Air cavalry troop)
- (7) One Engineer Battalion.
- (8) One Signal Battalion.
- {9) One Support Command.
 - a. Headquarters.
 - b. One Administration Company.
 - c. One Medical Battalion.
 - d. One Supply and Transportation Battalion.
 - e. One Maintenance Battalion.

In summary, the new divisions will provide:

- (1) Flexible forces tailored to their environment and mission.
- (2) Improved limited war capability.
- (3) Improved non-nuclear firepower.

- (4) Forces tailored as to tactical mobility.
- (5) Mechanized forces for Europe.
- (6) Separate Airborne Brigades.
- (7) Improved command control and training of subordinate leaders.
- (8) Effective use available resources.

Based upon the foregoing ROAD concept, the Washington National Guard elements of the 41st Infantry Division were reorganized pursuant to General Orders No. 6, this Department effective 1 March 1963. Some non-divisional units were also reorganized, redesignated, consolidated or converted at the same time: The following is a summary of these changes:

UNIT	OLD UNIT	STATION
41st Administrative Company (Part)	41st Admin Co (Part) (Inf Div)	Seattle
Hq & Co A, (Spt) 116th Med Bn	HHD, 116th Med Bn (Inf Div)	Seattle
Co B, 116th Med Bn	Co A, (Amb) 116th Med Bn (Inf Div)	Seattle
Co C, 116th Med Bn	Co B (Clr) 116th. Med Bn (Inf Div)	Seattle
HHC, 41st Sup & Trans Bn	41st QM Co (Inf Div)	Seattle
Co B, (TMT) 41st Sup & Trans Bn	Co B, 2nd BG, 161st Inf	Seattle
HQ & CO A (Main Spt) 741st Maint Bn	Hq & Co A (Main Spt) 741st Ord Bn.	Cp Murray
	(Inf Div) Co A, 241st Sig (Inf Bn)	
	404th Sig Det. (RMU)	
Co B, (FS), 741st Maint Bn	Co B, (FS) 741st Ord Bn (Inf Div)	Seattle
Co C, (FS), 741st Maint Bn	Cbt Spt Co, 2d BG, 161st Inf	Snohomish
Co D, (FS), 741st Maint Bn	Svc Btry, 4th How Bn, 205th Arty	Bellingham
HHC (-AT Plat) 1st Bn, 161st Inf	CSC, 1st BG, 161st Inf,	Spokane
	Co A, 1st BG, 161st Inf	
AT Plat, HHC, 1st Bn, 161 Inf	HHD, 144th Trans Bn (TML)	Walla Walla
Co A, 1st Bn, 161st Inf	Co E, 1st BG, 161st Inf	Pullman
Co B, (-2d Rifle Pl) 1st Bn, 161 Inf	Co D, 1st BG, 161st Inf	Colville
2d Rifle Pl, 1st Bn, 161st Inf	Co B, 1st BG, 161st Inf	Spokane
Co C, 1st Bn, 161st Inf	881st Trans Co (-3d Carr. Pl)	Walla Walla
HHC, 2nd Bn, 161st Inf	HHC, 2nd BG, 161st Inf	Everett
Co A, 2nd Bn, 161st Inf	Co A, 2nd BG, 161st Inf	Seattle
Co B, 2nd Bn, 161st Inf	Btry C, 4th How Bn, 205th Arty	Anacortes
Co C, 2nd Bn, 161st Inf	Co E, 1st MTB, 303d Armor 3rd	Bremerton
	R&W Pl Co E, 2nd BG, 161st Inf	
HHC, 1st Bn, 303d Armor	HHC, 1st MTB, 303d Armor	Centralia
	Co C, 1st MTB, 303d Armor	
Btry A, 1st How Bn (105mm) 205 Arty	1040th Trans Co (AMPH Trk)	Pasco
Btry B, 1st How Bn (105mm) 205 Arty	Btry B, 1st How Bn {105} (SP) 205th Arty	Pasco
Btry C, 1st How Bn (105mm) 205 Arty	Btry C, 1st How Bn (105) (SP) 205th Arty	Toppenish
Svc Btry, 1st How Bn (105mm) 205 Arty	Svc Btry, 1st How Bn (105) (SP) 205th Arty	Yakima
898th Engr Co (Hv Maint)	2d R & W Platt Co C, 1st BG, 161 Inf	Wenatchee
(less Shop Svc & Sup Pl)		
Shop, Svc & Sup Plt 898th Engr Co	3d Cargo Carr. Pl, 881st Trans Co	Ellensburg
HHD, 144th Trans Bn (TML)	HHB, 3d Msl Bn, (Nike-Ajax 205 Arty)	Tacoma
881st Trans Co (CCT) 3d Cargo Carr. Plat)	Co C, (-3d R & W Plat) 1st BG, 161st Inf	Okanogan
3d Cargo Carr. Plt 881st Trans Co.	Btry A, 1st How Bn (105) (SP) 205th Arty	Ephrata

Btry C, 2d Msl Bn, 205th Arty,	Btry C, 3d Msl Bn, 205th Arty	Olalla
Btry D, 2d Msl Bn, 205th Arty	Btry B, 3d Msl Bn, 205th Arty	Midway
118th Trans Co (Med Boat)	Co C, 2d BG, 161st Inf	Tacoma
105th Engr Co (C)	105th Engr Co (Increase Strength)	Spokane
506th Trans Co (Flt Cft)	506th Trans Co (Increase Teams)	Tacoma

During the 1960-1962 biennium, the Military Code of Washington was revised by the State of Washington to provide for the separation of the Washington National Guard into Army, and Air Divisions within the Headquarters. This provided for an Assistant Adjutant General, Army and an Assistant Adjutant General, Air. Concurrently with the activation of the Air Division, Brigadier General Lyle E. Buchanan was appointed Assistant Adjutant General, Army. Colonel Robert F. King, Air National Guard, was appointed Assistant Adjutant General, Air. At this time the approximate strength of the Air National Guard of Washington was 170 officers and 1,291 enlisted men. As of 1 July 1960, the following Air National Guard units were activated at Spokane:

Headquarters, 141st Fighter Group (AD)
 141st Air Base Squadron
 141st Materiel Squadron
 141st USAF Dispensary

Headquarters, 142nd Air Defense Wing was also reorganized effective 1 July 1960 with no change in Station as was the 116th Fighter Interceptor Squadron on same date. In October 1960 the following Air units were redesignated as follows:

PREVIOUS DESIGNATION	NEW DESIGNATION
Hq. 252nd Communications Group	Hq. 252d Comm. Group (Mobile)
262d Communications Sq. (Opns)	262d Comm. Sq. (Tributary Teams) (TT)
143d Aircraft Control & Warning Sq.	143d Communications Squadron (TT)
215th GEEIA Squadron	215th GEEIA Squadron

Again on 1 March 1961 the Washington Air National Guard was reorganized with no change in Station or minimum maintenance strength and with change in personnel authorizations.

The 242d AACS Squadron (Mobile) was reorganized and redesignated the 242d Mobile Communications Squadron effective 1 July 1961 with no change in station and some changes in personnel authorizations.

Headquarters, 142d Air: Defense Wing and, 141st Fighter Group (AD) including all subordinate units were reorganized effective 7 July 1961 with no change in station and with changes in personnel authorizations.

215th GEEIA Squadron was reorganized effective 15 June 1962 with no change in station and with changes in personnel authorizations.

On 9 March 1962, Headquarters 252d Communications Group (Mobile) and 242d Mobile Communications Squadron were relocated from Spokane International Airport to the F-37 NIKE site, Four Lakes, Washington.

As of 30 June 1962, units, locations and strengths of the Air National Guard of Washington was as follows:

UNIT DESIGNATION	STATION	OFF	WO	AMN	TOTAL
Hq. Washington ANG	Camp Murray	8	0	6	14
Hq. 142d Air Defense Wing	Spokane	27	1	47	75
Hq. 141st Fighter Gp (AD)	Spokane	19	0	77	96
116th Fighter Squadron	Spokane	54	0	16	70
141st Air Base Squadron	Spokane	3	1	81	85
141st Materiel Squadron	Spokane	8	1	137	146
141st Consol Acft Maint Sq.	Spokane	3	0	276	279

141st USAF Dispensary	Spokane	9	0	23	32
560th AF Band	Spokane	0	1	25	26
116th Weather Flight	Spokane	1	0	13	14
Hq 252d Comm Gp (Mbl)	Spokane	11	1	19	31
242d Mobile Comm. Sq.	Spokane	9	0	104	113
262d Comm Squadron (TT)	Bellingham	9	1	141	151
143d Comm Squadron (TT)	Seattle	10	0	200	210
215th GEEIA Squadron	Seattle	<u>5</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>121</u>	<u>127</u>
TOTAL AIR NATIONAL GUARD		176	7	1,286	1,469

The Air National Guard of Washington had its beginning in France on August 29, 1917 when the 116th Aero Squadron, AEF was constituted and organized. On 1 Feb. 18, it was redesignated the 637th Aero Squadron, and as such served in France from December 30, 1917 to November 11, 1918, when it was demobilized. It was reconstituted on July 24, 1924, in Spokane, Washington as Air Corps, Washington National Guard, being Federally recognized and designated 116th Squadron (Observation) 41st Division Air Service, August 6, 1924, with a strength of 14 officers and 50 enlisted men. It was redesignated 116th Observation Squadron, 41st Division Aviation, March 7, 1929. The Squadron's fuselage device and insignia was approved by the War Department on July 6, 1931 with Blazon as follows:

"The fuselage device and insignia consists of an ace of spades proper, pierced by a stiletto band sinister wise, blade and guard gold, handle blue".

The foregoing device was adopted for the newly organized 116th Fighter Squadron following World War II, with the addition of a Motto: "LET THE ENEMY BEWARE."



The insignia for the 142d Fighter Group of the Washington Air National Guard was submitted to the National Guard Bureau on 5 June 1951 and was approved and registered by the Historical Division, United States Air Force on 30 July 1951. The Description and Significance of this insignia is as follows:

SHIELD: Field blue, rising from a horizontal band scalloped white, a half sun with alternating straight and wavy rays, yellow; in upper part of shield a futuramic aircraft red, edged white, in the lower part of the shield a mountain of three peaks green, capped white.

MOTTO: "ALWAYS ON GUARD".

HERALDIC BLAZON SHIELD: Azure, issuing from a barrulet engrailed, argent, a demi-sun in splendour, or; in chief of stylized futuramic aircraft gules, fimbriated of the second; issuing from base a mountain of three peaks green, capped argent.

MOTTO: "SEMPER VIGILANS"

SIGNIFICANCE: The design represents the land, sea and air symbolic of the vast theater of operation of the 142d Fighter Wing. The far western boundary of the Group's peacetime mission is represented by the sun and wavy line for the ocean. The white-capped green mountain is emblematic of the far eastern expanse, geographically. The stylized futuramic aircraft is symbolic of speed, power and accuracy of the fighter's mission. The motto "ALWAYS ON GUARD" expresses the spirit of the organization.



The insignia or emblem for the 252d Communications Group of the Washington Air National Guard was approved by the United States Air Force on 17 November 1959 as follows:

BLAZON: Light blue, in base a globe per pale or and azure, with grid lines counterchanged surmounted by a radio tower of the third, issuing from its apex four signal flashes saltirewise throughout gules, all within a diminished border of the second.

SIGNIFICANCE: The emblem is symbolic of the group and its communications mission. The ultramarine blue and golden yellow globe reflects the Air Force colors and indicates night and day operations. The light blue background represents air space around the earth and the radio signal tower indicates the group sending its signals in all directions.



The organizational emblem for the 143d Communications Squadron (Tributary Team) was approved on 31 March 1964 by the United States Air Force, with description, significance and motto as follows:

DESCRIPTION: On an Air Force blue disc edged red, an Air Force yellow circuit issuing circle-wise eight lightening bolts, the movement counterclockwise, forming eight Air Force blue lightening bolts, the movement clockwise, surmounted by a light blue globe edged and grid lined Air Force blue; all within a white band bordered and inscribed in top UNA VOCE PRO PATRIA red.

SIGNIFICANCE: The emblem is symbolic of the squadron and its mission. The interlocked lightening bolts represent the whirling ball of communications going into space and returning to earth, depicted by the globe. The light blue of the globe alludes to the sky, the primary theater of Air Force Operations. The emblem bears the Air Force colors ultra-marine blue and golden yellow, the national colors red, white and blue.

MOTTO: UNA VOCE PRO PATRIA - With one voice for our country.



The organizational emblem for the 215th Ground Electronics Engineering Installation Agency Squadron (GEEIA), Washington Air National Guard was approved by the United States Air Force on 22 April 1964. The description, significance and motto is as follows:

DESCRIPTION: On an Air Force blue disc bordered white, apex in base, a black triangle base curved forming a fan shape points touching sides, curve banded orange, surmounted by a white radome detailed gray with a gray telephone pole issuing from it's sinister (left) base angled to sinister chief with two gray wires issuing from sinister side of dome curving up to pole and extending to sinister edge, in dexter (right) issuing from base angled to dexter chief a gray radio antenna support emitting three white double-ended lightening flashes, on to sinister chief, one to sinisiter base, one to dexter base; above in sinister chief a white tel star satellite. Above the disc a blank Air Force blue scroll bordered white, below an Air Force blue scroll bordered and inscribed PER NOS LOQUMINI white.

SIGNIFICANCE: The emblem is symbolic of the squadron and its mission. Against a background of deep blue representing the sky, the primary theater of Air Force operations, the curved orange band alludes to the rising sun which never sets on the unit's mission and the black refers to the earth where they accomplish it. The radome, telephone pole and wires, radio antenna support and tel star satellite signify the squadron's installation capabilities.

MOTTO: PER NOS LOGUIMINI -Through Us You Speak.



The Washington Air National Guard's prime objective is the maintenance of a trained and ready reserve force oriented to meet the requirements of the Air Force gaining command in the event units are called upon in a national emergency. This objective has been obtained and maintained during the 1962-64 Biennium. All units have successfully qualified for satisfactory ratings. In addition, the 141st Fighter Group (AD) successfully performed during two Tactical Evaluations and one Operational Readiness Test conducted by the major gaining command.

The desired goal of 100 percent manning for all units has not been attained this Biennium. This situation is due primarily to restrictions placed on all Air National Guard units by the National Guard Bureau. However, the operational readiness rating of all units has continued to increase as a result of on-the-job-training programs conducted by the units and through the utilization of available Air Force Technical School training spaces.

The continued participation of the 141st Fighter Group (AD) in the active air defense program under the supervision of North American Air Defense Command additionally support the contention that the units have obtained a high degree of operational readiness. At the end of the Biennium this unit had four aircraft and nine aircrew (18 personnel) on a 24 hour schedule.

At the end of the 1962-64 Biennium the strength of the Washington Air National Guard was 198 officers and warrant officers and 1278 airmen assigned to the following units: 142nd Air Defense Wing; 141st Fighter Group; 141st Material Squadron; 141st Consolidated Aircraft Maintenance Squadron; 141st Air Base Squadron; 141st USAF Dispensary; 116th Fighter Squadron; 252nd Communications Group (Mbl); 242nd Communications Squadron (Mbl); 143rd Communications Squadron (TT); 215th GEEIA Squadron; 262nd Communications Squadron (TT); 500th USAF Band; and the 116th Weather Flight (Mbl).

During this Biennium (1963-64) 60 officers and 250 Airmen attended 43,064 Man days of training.

During the past Biennium. July 1, 1962 to June 30 1964, the Washington National Guard was again reorganized to keep pace with the latest Department of Defense concepts. All 41st Infantry Division units were converted from RACED (REORGANIZED COMBAT INFANTRY DIVISION) to ROAD (REORGANIZED ARMY DIVISION) and many of the non-divisional units were either reorganized or redesignated. As of the end of the biennium the following was a listing of all Army units' together with any changes which occurred:

UNIT DESIGNATION	NON DIVISIONAL OLD UNIT	STATION
WashARNG	WashARNG	Camp Murray
122d PI Det	122d PI Det	Camp Murray
105th Engr Co	881st Trans Co	Walla Walla
144th Trans Bn	HHB, 3d Msl Bn, 205th Arty	Tacoma
506th Trans Co	506th Trans Co	Tacoma
783d Trans Co	783d Trans Co	Tacoma
1118th Trans Co	Co D, 2d BG 161st Inf	Tacoma
881st Trans Co	Co C, (-) 1st BG 161st Inf	Okanogan
1161st Trans Co	Btry A, 1st How Bn. 205th Arty	Ephrata
898th Engr Co (-)	3d R&W Plat, Co C 1st BG, 161st Inf	Wenatchee
Spec Equip Rep Plat, 898th Engr Co	3d Cargo Carrier Plat 881st Trans Co	Ellensburg
1041st Trans Co	1041st Trans Co	Camp Murray
HHB, 2d Msl Bn (Hercules) 205th Arty	HHC, 2d Msl Bn (Nike-Ajax)	Redmond
Btry A, 2d Msl Bn (Hercules) 205th Arty	Btry A, 2d Msl Bn {Nike-Ajax}	Redmond
Btry B, 2d Msl Bn (Hercules) 205th Arty	Btry B, 3d Msl Bn (Nike-Ajax)	Vashon
HHB, 205th Arty Group	HHB, 115th Arty Bde {AD}	Olympia

HHB, 1st How Bn 248th Arty
 Btry A, 1st How Bn 248th Arty
 Btry B, 1st How Bn 248th Arty
 Btry C, 1st How Bn 248th Arty
 Svc Btry, 1st How Bn 248th Arty
 HHB, 1st How Bn 205th Arty
 Btry A, 1st How Bn 205th Arty
 Btry B, 1st How Bn 205th Arty
 Btry C, 1st How Bn 205th Arty
 Svc Btry, 1st How Bn 205th Arty

HHB, 1st How Bn 248th Arty
 Co D, 1st MTB 303d Armor
 Co B, 1st MTB 303d Armor
 Co E, (-) 2d BG 161st Inf
 Btry A, 1st How Bn 248th Arty
 HHB, 1st How Bn 205th Arty
 1040th Trans Co
 Btry B, 1st How Bn 205th Arty
 Btry C, 1st How Bn 205th Arty
 Svc Btry 1st How Bn 205th Arty

Aberdeen
 Port Orchard
 Poulsbo
 Port Angeles
 Aberdeen
 Yakima
 Pasco
 Pasco
 Toppenish
 Yakima

41ST INFANTRY DIVISION

UNIT DESIGNATION
 HHC, 41st Inf Div (Part)

OLD UNIT
 HHC, 41st Inf Div (Part) &
 Hq 41st Div Arty (-)

STATION
 Seattle

41st Admin Co (Part)
 41st MP Co

41st Admin Co (Part)
 HHB, 4th How Bn 205th Arty

Seattle
 Bellingham
 Camp Murray

HHD, (Part) 41st Avn Bn
 Co B, (GS) 41st Avn Bn
 HHD, 241st Sig Bn

41st Avn Co
 Co A, 241st Sig Bn
 HHC, 241st Sig Bn

Camp Murray
 Camp Murray
 Midway

Co A, (CO) 241st Sign Bn
 Co B, (FC) 241st Sig Bn
 Co C, (Spt) 241st Sig Bn
 HHC & Band, 41st Inf Div Spt Comd

Btry A, 3d Msl Bn 205th Arty
 Btry C, 2d Msl Bn 205th Arty
 Btry D, 2d Msl Bn 205th Arty
 HHD, 41st Inf Div Trans & Band

Midway
 Midway
 Midway
 Seattle

HHC, 41st Sup & Trans Bn
 Co A, (S&S) 41st Sup & Trans Bn
 Co B, (TMT) 41st Sup & Trans Bn

41st QM Co
 Co B, 741st Ord Bn
 Co B, 2d BG 161st Inf

Seattle
 Seattle
 Seattle

Hq & Co A, 741st Maint Bn
 Co B, (FS) 741st Maint Bn
 Co C, (FS) 741st Maint Bn

Hq & Co A, 741st Ord Bn
 Co B, 741st Ord Bn
 CSC 2d BG 161st Inf

Camp Murray
 Seattle
 Snohomish

Co D, (FS) 741st Maint Bn
 Hq & Co A, 116th Med Bn
 Co B, 116th Med Bn

Svc Btry, 4th How Bn 205th Arty
 HHD, 116th Med Bn
 Co A, 116th Med Bn

Bellingham
 Seattle
 Seattle

Co C, 116th Med Bn
 Co D, 116th Med Bn

Co B, 116th Med Bn
 Excess Personnel Co A & B 116th Med Bn

Seattle
 Seattle

HHC, 3d Bde 41st Inf Div
 HHC 1st Bn 161st Inf

HHC, 1st Bn 161st Inf
 CSC, 1st BG 161st Inf

Spokane
 Spokane

Co At 1st Bn 161st Inf
 Co B, 1st Bn 161st Inf

Co E, 1st BG 161st Inf
 Co D, 1st BG 161st Inf

Pullman
 Colville

Co C, 1st Bn 161st Inf
 HHC, 2d Bn 161st Inf

Co B, 1st BG 161st Inf
 CSC, 2d BG 161st Inf

Spokane
 Everett

Co A, 2nd Bn 161st Inf
 Co B, 2nd Bn 161st Inf

Co A, 2d BG 161st Inf
 Btry C, 4th How Bn 205th Arty

Seattle
 Anacortes

Co C, 2nd Bn 161st Inf
 HHC, 1st Bn 303d Armor

Co E, 1st MTB, 303d Armor
 HHC, 1st MTB 303d Armor

Bremerton
 Centralia

Co A, 1st Bn 303d Armor
 Co B, 1st Bn 303d Armor

Co A, 1st MTB 303d Armor
 Btry B, 1st How Bn 248th Arty

Longview
 Shelton

Co C, 1st Bn 303d Armor
 HHB (Part) 41st Inf Div Arty

Co C, 2d BG 161st Inf
 115th Bde (AD) Personnel

Olympia
 Olympia

UNIT DESIGNATION	OLD UNIT	STATION
HHS Btry 1st Bn 146th Arty	HHB, 1st How Bn 146th Arty	Seattle
Btry A, 1st Bn 146th Arty	Btry A, 1st How Bn 146th Arty	Seattle
Btry B, 1st Bn 146th Arty	Btry B, 1st How Bn 146th Arty	Seattle
Btry C, 1st Bn 146th Arty	Btry A, 4th How Bn 205th Arty	Seattle
Btry D, 1st Bn 146th Arty	Btry B, 4th How Bn 205th Arty	Puyallup
HHS Btry, 2nd Bn 146th Arty	HHB, 2d R/H Bn 146th Arty	Vancouver
Btry A, 2nd Bn 146th Arty	Btry A, R/H Bn 146th Arty	Camas
Btry B, 2nd Bn 146th Arty	Btry B, R/H Bn 146th Arty	Vancouver
Btry C, 2nd Bn 146th Arty	Btry C, R/H Bn 146th Arty	Vancouver

The strength of the foregoing Army units as of 1 July 1964 was 499 officers, 105 Warrant Officers and 4,946 Enlisted Men for a total 5,550. This added to the Air National Guard strength of 192 officers, 6 Warrant Officers and 1,278 Enlisted Men provided a grand total of 691 Officers, 111 Warrant Officers and 6,224 Enlisted men and an aggregate of 7,026.

As of the end of the Biennium (30 June 1964) 92 persons were occupying State paid positions in the Military Department of Washington. Persons engaged in the various activities of the Military Department and the Washington National Guard paid from federal funds amounted to 778, including the Air National Guard.

Capital improvement projects on Armories and Air Fields amounted to some \$821,861.00 from State and Federal funds. Major Maintenance Projects, Federal Army Guard Projects and Federal Air Guard projects totaled \$1,516,340.00. Summary of disbursements of State Funds for various programs totaled \$2,317,721.03. Total Federal Disbursements was \$22,762,726.00 for a grand total of \$25,080,447.03.

CHAPTER VI REORGANIZATION OF THE WASHINGTON NATIONAL GUARD, 1965

On 12 December 1964, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara announced at a news conference that he had instructed the Secretary of the Army, Stephen Ailes to prepare plans to realign the Army's Reserve and National Guard forces to improve significantly the early deployment capability and combat readiness of the United States reserve forces. He stated that the realignment was designed to bring the Army's Reserve Component structure into balance with the Contingency War Plans and the related equipment program. He further stated that the realignment, in addition to producing increased combat readiness on the part of the units in the Reserve and National Guard, would streamline the management structure of the Army Reserve forces and would result in cost savings approximating \$150,000,000 per year. This realignment program would involve the transfer of the unit structure of the Army Reserve into the National Guard and the elimination of all units for which there was no requirement.

In effect, Secretary McNamara was proposing amendments to laws enacted by The Congress on 3 June 1916 which is known as The National Defense Act. Among other elements of this Act was the composition of the Army of the United States, i.e., "THAT THE ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES SHALL CONSIST OF THE REGULAR ARMY, THE NATIONAL GUARD OF THE UNITED STATES, THE NATIONAL GUARD WHILE IN THE SERVICE OF THE UNITED STATES, THE OFFICERS RESERVE CORPS, THE ORGANIZED RESERVES, AND THE ENLISTED RESERVE CORPS, AND SHALL INCLUDE PERSONS INDUCTED INTO THE LAND FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES UNDER PUBLIC LAW 783, SEVENTY-SIXTH CONGRESS".

The concept of the plans as announced by the Secretary and the Chief of Staff of the Army was as follows:

1. The force structure would consist exclusively of units for which there is a military requirement, including combat and combat support units (Divisions & Brigades) together with base mobilization base units such as training divisions, garrison detachments and reception station augmentation detachments and would require a paid drill strength estimated at 550,000 men.
2. Five independent brigades would be added to the eleven currently in the structure, making a total of 16 independent brigades, which could be deployed as such or in association with other forces in the structure.
3. The entire force would be included in the structure for which the Army purchases equipment; as a result equipment would be authorized for two additional divisions and five additional brigades.
4. The unit structure of the Guard and Reserve would be merged under the management of the National Guard.
5. The U. S. Army Reserve would consist entirely of individuals, rather than units and would provide individual trainees for the units at summer camp or upon mobilization.
6. The individual trainee program would be increased to the extent that the improved operational readiness achieved justifies the additional cost.
7. Other specific actions needed to increase the readiness of the units would be reviewed.

In developing the detailed plans, the Secretary and Chief of Staff of the Army were directed to give particular consideration to the following:

1. Minimizing the impact on local communities and individuals by splitting units when feasible and necessary.
2. Providing equal opportunity to Reservists and Guardsmen in the manning of the units of the force.
3. Providing, to the extent feasible, an opportunity for individuals who desire to serve in the Reserve Components to do so. In this connection a reasonable period of time will be allowed for units concerned to achieve the new authorized strength levels.

Secretary McNamara further stated that the Secretary and Chief of Staff of the Army had assured him that the transition to the new structure could be accomplished without reducing the readiness of the Reserve forces and that the resulting organization would provide a great gain in the early deployment capability and combat readiness of the Reserve forces.

In closing, Secretary McNamara stated "I want to acknowledge the great importance of our Reserve forces and the outstanding service they have rendered to our country. Under the recommended reorganization the units now, in the National Guard and those that transfer from the Reserve, as well as the individual trainees who remain in the Reserve, will make an even greater contribution to our National Defense."

In other press releases by Defense officials the following was intended to clarify some of the issues:

Implementation of the foregoing plan would reduce Reserves Drill strength (pay) from 643,000 to 555,000 - all in the National Guard, with an estimated savings of \$150 million dollars. Only Army elements are affected. However, if Congress indorses these changes, undoubtedly parallel action will be taken in the Air Force. No plans were announced for any changes in the Navy or Marine Corps Reserve.

Congress in 1965 will be asked to boost National Guard drill pay strength from an authorization of 400,000 (actual strength 367,000) to 555,000 and to vote funds for weapon modernization of reorganized Guard units.

Pentagon officials estimated that of the 300,000 Reserve drill slots, about 39,000 will be dropped in the realignment as the Reserve dips from 4100 to 3500 units. In the Guard structure, 111,000 current drill pay billets from the 400,000 total will be eliminated.

The reorganized Guard will have 6 high priority and 2 area-oriented (Alaska and Panama) divisions, but these will be reduced from their present strengths to a division base and one brigade. Attached to each of these divisions will be two other brigades from different states.

These will come from the 21 low priority divisions which will be reduced to 16 brigades of four battalions each, plus a brigade headquarters, with TO&E strength of 3100, to be maintained at 80% strength.

There will be additional brigades in the National Guard structure, which also will include the two present Reserve divisions which are designed to operate basic training centers in time of mobilization.

The reorganization will lead to the elimination of 14 Army Corps Headquarters in the United States, each headed by a Major General.

In addition to the 267,000 drill pay members, the Army Reserve today includes 453,496 members who are in a "pool" status. These are men with obligated Reserve Forces service. The drill strength of the Army Reserve includes 50,000 obligors. They will be given the opportunity to volunteer for service in the Guard, if positions are available.

Officials emphasize that every person shifting from the Reserve to the Guard must do so voluntarily.

The entire plan is geared to supplying only the reserve component units and personnel necessary to maintain the Army's 22-division force structure. Army units above this need would be eliminated. This will also eliminate the Reserve's 13 training divisions with a resultant transfer to the Guard.

The following is the text of a message from the Secretary of the Army to U.S. Army Reserve Commanders on the proposed realignment which was released to the press on 15 December 1964:

"A concept proposing major changes in Army Reserve components was announced today. As a Reserve officer in a command position with a unit, you will be affected; We here at the Department of the Army want you to know from the beginning what it is we are doing and what our reasons are.

"First I want to say that I am well aware of the record and the achievements of USAR units. I have visited many in the field. I watched with pride the job done during the Berlin call-up by a long list of these units.

"But we are faced with two principal problems which require correction.

“As of today, we have some 700,000 men on paid drill strength in the Army Reserve components. On the other hand, we are only buying equipment for the priority units with paid drill strength of about 450,000, which have a role in our contingency war plans. The remaining units lack the necessary equipment both for training and combat. Our present position is therefore logistically out of balance and out of balance with the contingency war plans. Obviously it makes no sense to maintain in a ready status forces that are not equipped and are not required.

“The equipment required for such a force along with the necessary supporting units would virtually double the present Army inventory, would add some \$10 billion to our already substantial equipment costs, and would present huge problems in terms of storage, care and maintenance, not to mention the continuing problem of modernization.

“Our second problem has to do with the management of the Reserve unit structure. Today, as you know, we have a dual and somewhat duplicating management system. The management line for National Guard units runs from the unit up through the State Headquarters, the National Guard Bureau, the Chief of Reserve Components at Department of the Army to the Chief of Staff, with CONARC and 21 Army Headquarters supervising training. The management line for Reserve units runs through the Reserve Corps Headquarters to 21 Army Headquarters to CONARC to Chief of Reserves at Department of the Army to the Chief of Staff.

“When USAR paid drill units with a complement of officer and enlisted personnel were created after World War II we had a substantial mobilization stockpile of useable military equipment. The public had a strong desire to reduce the size of the Active Army. Our war plans contemplated a deliberate World War II mobilization. In this situation, a latent Reserve force of over one million men was deemed necessary, a force larger than could be managed and supported by the National Guard's State organization. Thus, the USAR unit structure was expanded and a management system in addition to the National Guard was needed.

“Today with a 700,000 man force, neither management system operates at capacity. But of greater importance is the fact that is difficult, if not impossible, with two management systems to create out of the Reserve components a military force with the needed uniformity - - a force with uniform standards, rules, procedures and organization.

“Today the military need is radically different from what it was twenty or even ten years ago. We need a quick reaction force, a force which must be equipped with combat ready, as distinguished from left-over equipment. And the National Guard state organization, which must remain in being because of its natural disaster and civil disturbance missions, is quite capable of managing and supporting a force of size we need.

We have reached the conclusion that the solution to our two problems lies in the elimination of the low priority Guard and Reserve units and the merging of the high priority units under the management of the National Guard. We propose to add five more of the Independent Brigades which are so useful in our contingency plans. Under this concept, each of the existing high priority divisions, both Guard and Reserve, would be converted into one high priority brigade. Congress would be asked to appropriate money to buy equipment for this entire force.

“Under this concept, while all units of our Reserve components would be in the National Guard, individuals or non-reservists would remain in the USAR, and the individual pool and the programs for individuals would receive close attention from the Army Staff.

"I fully realize the unfortunate implications of these proposals as far as many individuals are concerned. So much hard work has gone into our Reserve Components in recent years and the loyalties which this effort generates are so strong that any major change in the Reserve Components will necessarily stir emotions and create controversy. But the essence of military preparedness is the willingness to change and change again in order to meet the threat we face. Inertia or any tendency to stay with the status quo because it was easier to do so cannot be tolerated.

"The Chief of Staff and I are convinced that these changes can significantly improve the military strength of the United States. It is important, however, that so far as possible we preserve the potential

military value of the high priority USAR units and the USAR Divisional units needed to form the Brigades. This can be done if these units go into the National Guard virtually intact. In all our planning for this reorganization, we have been cognizant of the importance of seeing to it that such a merger would not work to the disadvantage of Reservists or Reserve units who have made substantial contributions to the program and who wish to continue it. The leadership of the National Guard has solemnly assured me that USAR officers and men would be welcomed as comrades in arms into the National Guard and that fairness and equality of treatment will be the invariable rule. Be assured that, under this concept and to the extent feasible, every Reservist who wishes to continue to participate in a unit will be offered every reasonable opportunity to do so.

"I would appreciate it if you would discuss these matters with the other officers and the senior noncommissioned officers of your organization. You will, of course, receive official notification and appropriate instructions at the proper time through normal channels. I want to tell you myself, however, the reasoning underlying these changes and to solicit your cooperation. We will welcome your advice in planning for the execution of this important reorganization.

"I am personally of the view that all participants in the Reserve Components wish to see this organization strong and well equipped, lean, efficient and closely geared to the military requirement. Accordingly, I believe that all decisions in connection with this reorganization should be based on military consideration and the need for military efficiency. In this I am sure we have your complete support.

"I am attaching the official press release which was issued today.

"Sincerely (signed) Stephen Ailes, Secretary of the Army".

Official reaction to the foregoing plan on the reorganization by Reserve and National Guard officials was instantaneous. An article by Major General James F. Cantwell, President of the National Guard Association would appear to sum up the National Guard reaction and was published verbatim below:

"In any discussion of the plan recently advanced by Secretary of Defense McNamara to realign the Army's Reserve Forces and place the entire unit structure in the Army National Guard, only three questions have any real relevancy. They are:

(1) Will the reduced structure (6000 units instead of 8000 as at present, and 550,000 officers and men in units was compared with the 700,000 currently authorized) provide the Army with M Day forces that are sufficient to meet any foreseeable contingency?

(2) Does the single management system assure a more efficiently administered and trained reserve force at a reduced Federal expenditure?

(3) If so, why should the manager be the National Guard?

"Any answer to the first question necessarily includes a certain amount of "educated guessing", with judgment substituted for confirmable fact. National Guardsmen long have believed that the 700,000 man allocated to our Army Reserve Forces were none too many, and likewise that all 29 of the Combat Divisions in the Army National Guard and Army Reserve were necessary to the Nation's security.

"We are compelled to concede, however, that Divisions which cannot be supported with adequate amounts of modern equipment and fairly high strength levels simply cannot meet today's requirements for a highly-ready force.

"We likewise must agree that judgments as to force levels can best be made at the highest decision-making levels - at the White House, in the Congress, and in the upper echelons at the Pentagon. If the Nation's top leadership, military and civilian, are agreed that a force of 550,000 is adequate in today's inter- national atmosphere, and that eight rapid-reaction Divisions augmented by high priority Brigades are our best defense "buy" then we must accept their judgment.

"As to the Second Question, common sense tells us that, under the existing circumstances, the answer must be: "Yes, single management will produce better results for less cost." The present system, with dual administrative structures, has encouraged wasteful duplication, and energy-sapping

competition. A single organizational structure can turn out a better product and do it with greater efficiency and less waste.

In fact the Army National Guard was the Army's sole source of organized units up until the end of WW II. This was the role assigned to it by law, by tradition and by long-standing policy. The policy was reiterated after the war, with the proviso that units would be organized in the Army Reserve only if they could be provided and maintained by the Active Army and National Guard. In those days, though, the Army contemplated a Reserve structure of well over 1,000,000 men in organized units and this was regarded as beyond the capabilities of an all-volunteer organization like the National Guard. Since then, Reserve Force requirements have gradually been lowered, to the 550,000 that is currently envisioned, and there no longer is a need for a supplementary source of units.

"It is the Third Question to which I will address the rest of my article for it is this subject upon which a National Guardsman can speak with some authority

"If Defense Planners are agreed, as they seem to be, that a unified Reserve organization will better serve the cause of National Defense than the present system, then the National Guard must be that organization, and for many good and cogent reasons.

"As Defense and Army leaders have come to recognize since they were handed larger responsibilities for civil defense, the States must have their own military forces, available quickly to the Governors, to cope with disasters in endless variety. Rarely a week passes in which Guardsmen someplace aren't battling forest fires, blizzards, floods, earthquakes, civil disorders, and the widespread peril and suffering that such disasters bring in their wake. In the event of that ultimate in horrors, a nuclear attack, the availability of these trained, equipped and widely dispersed military units in towns and cities across the whole breadth of the nation could mean the difference between survival and extinction to tens of millions of Americans.

"Through their dual status, Federal and State, Guardsmen perform invaluable services today and every day, at the same time they provide a trained force to serve the nation's longer-range defense needs. Without such a force, the States would have to provide and maintain their own troops, thus duplicating the expense to American taxpayers.

"Moreover, no other system yet has been able to develop, for its units, the widespread feeling of community "ownership" and thus of community pride and support, that is almost universal in National Guard communities. National Guard organizations are a long-standing part of the State and regional, as well as national, tradition. They have been there, in many cases, as long as the communities themselves. The local possessiveness thus engendered translates itself into support of a most tangible nature, everything from recruits to new armories.

"By still another measurement, the quality of its actual performance, the National Guard likewise qualifies for the new responsibilities which the Army would hand to it under the proposed realignment of functions. Its accomplishments in the Nation's wars have been recounted so often that they need not be retold here. More pertinent to the present discussion is how well the Guard has managed to keep itself up-to-date in these days of rapid obsolescence and accelerated change.

"Twice in recent years, the Guard has realigned its organization to fit the Army's newest tactical structure, first to the Pentomic system and later to ROAD, and in both cases it won the praise of Army leaders for the speed and efficiency with which it carried out these difficult reorganizations.

"It likewise has introduced numerous training innovations on its own initiative each of them aimed at increased readiness. These range from the founding of a whole, nationwide network of State Officer Candidate Schools to an expanded program of outdoor weekend training in the field to expanded use of Air National Guard airlift in the training of Guardsmen from both sides of the Guard family. With assistance from the Active establishment, it likewise has started injecting its units into exercises and maneuvers, such as its participation last spring in Exercise DESERT STRIKE.

"It has accepted numerous FULLTIME missions, to shoulder a share of the burden borne by the Active forces. Thus, Guardsmen man approximately one-third of all the NIKE-HERCULES sites in the nation, fulltime. Others stand runway alert with fully-fueled and armed jet fighters, around the clock as

part of the NORAD system. Still others perform maintenance, year-around, on aircraft and vehicles of the Active Army Guard and Reserve alike. These, of course, are but a few examples of the many ways in which Guardsmen have striven to keep their force and as responsive to current needs as capable as its resources permit.

"Support for the McNamara realignment has been widespread. Only a few voices have been raised in dissent and of these, most have centered on certain features of the plan rather than on its overall concept. Two specific criticisms have aroused my concern, however. One is the allegation, repeated once again, that the National Guard is a "political creature" which somehow gets by through political machinations rather than by military effectiveness. The other is the avowal that the proposed consolidation will throw thousands of Army Reservists out in the cold, eliminating any opportunity for them to continue serving the nation in an active reserve capacity.

"Neither criticism has any basis in fact.

"We had hoped that the Guard's performance, in war, near-war, and twilight peace, had laid low the myth that the Guard is riddled with politics. The Constitution reserves to the States the right to appoint the Guard's officers. For many years, however, the professional standards which Guardsmen must meet, whether officer or enlisted men, have habitually been as high or higher than the standards imposed on members of the wholly Federal reserve components. These standards are established by the active military establishment and are the same today - educationally, mentally, physically and morally as those which members of other components of the armed forces must meet for enlistment, appointment or promotion.

"The National Guard has exerted influence in political quarters to obtain new armories, better equipment, and badly-needed training funds. So, too, have the other services and components, and this can hardly be regarded as unworthy since it has been aimed at obtaining adequate means for the proper performance of our mission.

"The performance of the Army and Air National Guard during the Berlin Crisis mobilization was widely-praised by U. S. military leaders for its "professional" caliber. Some of our training innovations since that time have been widely copied by the other reserve components for the increased military readiness they promise. These offer ample evidence, we believe, that Guardsmen are deeply committed to the cause they serve and that they are competent military men, not "political creatures".

"To answer the second, equally-erroneous criticism, the National Guard will need every Army Reservist who can be induced to accept a State enlistment if it is to meet the higher strength levels envisioned for all units by the McNamara realignment plan. On paper, there appears to be a surplus of 93,000 officers and men between the 643,000 now enrolled and the 550,000 proposed for the new structure. Normal attrition alone will wipe out the surplus by the time the realignment is completed, and virtually every Reservist who desires to continue his service can be assured of a place in a unit.

"It should be pointed out, too, lest it be overlooked, that National Guard units and individual members will be displaced in greater numbers than will Army Reservists in the forthcoming upheaval. Some 1,400 Army Guard units face abolition, according to an analysis by the Association of the U.S. Army, as compared with only 700 from the Reserve.

"This is a regrettable feature of the McNamara plan, for 21 historic Combat Divisions (15 from the Guard, 6 from the Reserve) will be inactivated, along with hundreds of smaller units whose traditions and past accomplishments mean much to their home States and to the Guard and Reserve.

"Finally, we want to emphasize that the Guard won't merely need but will want every qualified Reservist who is willing to accept a Guard enlistment or appointment. Their dedication and professional competency have been assets to the Army Reserve, and we know they will prove equally important to the continued vitality of the National Guard. We will be equally pleased if entire Reserve units can be transferred into the Guard structure, as units, for this will preserve their traditions and continuity as well as the teamwork they have developed through the long association.

"We intend for the forthcoming reorganization to be effected with the absolute minimum of turmoil, in order that the greatest possible degree of combat effectiveness can be maintained throughout the period of transition,

"We intend, with equal sincerity, to accomplish this massive blending of two forces with such fairness and honesty that the resultant single reserve component of the Army will be united in spirit as well as in body

Reaction by the Reserve Officers Association, through Its President, Rear Admiral Edgar H. Reeder, USNR, was resistance to the proposed Realignment. In an article in The Journal of the Armed Forces, Admiral Reeder stated:

"At the invitation of President Johnson, yesterday I went to the Pentagon with members of the ROA National Staff where we had a lengthy cordial and frank discussion with Deputy Defense Secretary Cyrus Vance and Army Secretary Stephen Ailes regarding the proposal for abolishing the United States Army Reserve unit structure and integrating the residue into the Army National Guard of the several states.

"The conference was highly illuminating.

"We were most gratified to learn that they fully acknowledged that the Army Reserve cannot be abolished without prior approval of the Congress.

"We are relieved to know that the Army Reserves "Day in Court" will not be postponed until after the hanging. It is fully within the power of Congress to set aside the conviction.

"Secretary Ailes asserted, among other things, that this concept, to merge the U. S. Army Reserves into the Army National Guard, was his alone. He said he fully recognized that it is a highly controversial issue.

"The effect of his plan would be to eliminate 21 back-up divisions and virtually discard approximately 150,000 Army Reservists who have valuable skills, and until this announcement, a high commitment to their duties. The Secretary said there is no military requirement for these units and men, even after commencement of any future hostilities.

"This means that there will be no plans to phase in trained personnel, organized into divisions, to man additional equipment after production lines become effective. The Secretary of the Army indicated that green personnel could be recruited and trained from scratch after the equipment becomes available.

"When this concept was discussed before the House Armed Services Committee in 1955, General Maxwell Taylor, then Army Chief of Staff, said this concept was totally unacceptable.

"We agree with General Maxwell Taylor.

"Such a concept seems to us completely contradictory. It seems a denial of what we are constantly reminded - that the speed of technology defies the imagination; and this must be related to national preparedness; and that an enemy potentially could arrive at our frontiers with supersonic speed.

"Further discussion revealed that the proposal had not fully taken into account the personnel composition of the Army Reserve Divisions. In our discussions, it was developed that the Reserve divisions have much higher level of experienced personnel with two or more years of service with the Army. This added to our convictions that the Army Reserve divisions should be retained and supported by strengthened and revitalized Army supervision and control.

"As a result of these and other explanations, we are more convinced than ever that this proposal is just a quick and easy solution to cure current transitory administrative problems. Long-range solutions have evidently not been fully explored. It is obviously a regression to a concept and organization that existed from the early 1920's until 1952 when the Armed Forces Reserve Act was enacted after long and exhaustive Congressional study to correct a hopelessly outmoded and inept Reserve organization and to establish a modern Reserve program.

"The framework of this law has been proved sound by experience. Such relatively minor deficiencies which exist can easily be corrected. The program is too valuable and means too much to our national security to be scrapped.

"We would not like to see the Department of the Army find itself in the position of the housewife who threw out the baby along with the bath water.

"After all of our various discussions, we have not been convinced that this proposal has had genuine and complete military study. It flies into the face of the Gray Board, whose members devoted a year to exhaustive and thorough study. It flies into the face of the Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952 and its subsequent amendments an act designed after lengthy study and deliberation to cure the gross deficiencies of the organization that existed prior to passage.

"The Armed Forces Reserve Act has given this nation the capability for developing a strong and modern reserve. It should not be casually abandoned.

"We believe the decision of the Secretary of the Army to return to the status it held in the early 1920's and to put all of the Army Reserve defense eggs into the National Guard basket under state training and supervision is fraught with danger and should be rejected."

On 18 January 1965, the Washington National Guard received from the Chief, National Guard Bureau a letter of instruction with regard to the planned reorganization. This directive required the States to continue the keeping of present logistical records, systems and procedures in order to expedite planning and execution; all equipment to be maintained at the highest possible level of mobilization readiness throughout the realignment period; Equipment to be ready for use for Annual Field Training, Calendar Year 1965; States authorized to continue the loan of equipment for week end training; Directed to discontinue the offering from other States of common type items of equipment in "as is" condition; authorized to accept new equipment for home station training requirements; directed the suspension of redistribution of heavy equipment between States; authorized the acceptance of clothing and other T/A items from Reserve Units after 1 July 1965; Directed that excess serviceable items not to be turned in until authorized by the National Guard Bureau. It also directed that ARNG Logistical Personnel on the State level establish liaison with appropriate Army Corps at an early date to facilitate development of logistical plans upon receipt of the realignment directive.

On 20 January 1965 it was announced by the Secretary of the Army the future Army Reserve enlistees would be required to sign an agreement that they will join the National Guard in the event the proposed Reserve-Guard merger become a reality. He further stated that "all future Army Reserve enlistees must agree to apply for enlistment in the National Guard when directed to do so."

Secretary Ailes further stated that a Department of the Army message had been sent to commanders explaining that enlistments will be accepted only from those young men who so agree.

The proposed Guard-Reserve merger is scheduled to be presented officially to Congress when Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara goes to Capitol Hill for the annual "military posture" hearings. The Army says that those now in the Army Reserve are eligible to join the Army Guard on a voluntary basis. Those who choose to enlist in the Guard will be assigned to pools and be eligible for call to active duty during a partial or full mobilization and for summer training.

With the change in the enlistment contract, one problem will be eliminated, Army officials says. Military observers point out that under the old process a young man could join the Army Reserve before the merger and elect to fulfill his entire military obligation there after serving the normal six months of active duty trainings.

The amendment to the previous agreement signed by each Army enlistee reads: "I understand that a merger of the U. S. Army reserve units into the Army National Guard is pending. Accordingly, I agree to complete my ready reserve service in either the U. S. Army Reserve or the Army National Guard as required. If so directed, I will apply for enlistment in the Army National Guard, and if accepted, will enlist therein."

Officials stressed that reservists, who sign the agreement, will only be required to switch to the Guard in the event there is a requirement for his MOS (Military Occupation Specialty) in the Army Guard. Officials said the signing of the agreement in no way removes the voluntary requirement of the Army Guard.

The foregoing decision by the Secretary of the Army would appear to leave no doubt of the intent to utilize the Army Reserve in the manner announced by the Secretary of Defense, despite the fight which is expected from the Reserve Officer's Association.

As stated by the Department of the Army in the Army Almanac (1950) the mission of the Organized Reserves is to supplement the Regular Army and the National Guard in the event of an emergency by furnishing units which have been trained and organized for rapid mobilization, expansion and deployment.

Historically, the Organized Reserves had their beginning on 28 July 1866 when the President signed an act which defined the Army as consisting of 45 regiments of Infantry, 10 regiments of Cavalry and 4 regiments of Artillery. Four of the infantry regiments were to be composed of men wounded in the service, constituting the VETERANS' RESERVE CORPS, to be used only for garrison duty but which was called into active service in the Spanish-American War. Since that time the Reserve Corps has been continually mentioned in our military history. Thus when the National Defense Act was approved on 3 June 1916 it included the National Guard, Officer's Reserve Corps and the Enlisted Reserve Corps. The former to be made up of civilians who qualified for commission and the latter from soldiers furloughed to the Reserve, the enlistment of the Regular soldier then being seven years, three years of active duty and four years, in the Reserves. The National Defense Act of 1920 affirmed these components and provided that Reserve Officers could be commissioned by the President for a term of 5 years; if during this period, Congress declared an emergency they could be called to active duty to remain until 6 months after the end of the emergency. In the early days of the Reserve program it was necessary for the War Department to deal with Reservists individually.

On 31 March 1933, the Civilian Conservation Corps was created by The Congress for the accomplishment of reforestation and other needful work throughout the country. The strength of the corps was initially 250,000 and was later increased to 300,000. Although it was initially set up under the jurisdiction of the Department of Labor it was later transferred to the jurisdiction of the Army. Obviously, hundreds of officers were required to administer some 1,450 camps and to supervise the Territorial Districts. To supplement available Regular Army personnel, the President authorized the use of a limited number of officers from the junior grades of the Officer's Reserve Corps. Of the 1,315 camps which were actually established some 1,774 reserve officers supplemented Regular Army, Navy and Marine Corps officers. By 1934 the reserve officer complement had increased to 4,400 and by August of 1935 to 9,300. Enrollment in these camps at this time was 506,000. In 1936 this strength dropped to approximately 350,000 men thereby reducing the reserve officers on CCC duty to 7,079. Between April 1933 and June 1939 a total of 3,008,184 men were enrolled and 2,784,745 separations from all causes, had taken place. This left 223,439 enrollees in the camps. At this time there were 115 regular army, 4,617 Army Reserve officers, 32 Marine Corps officers and 60 Warrant officers of the Coast Guard on CCC duty and the calling of further reservists to active duty with the CCC was suspended.

As of 30 June 1940: the ORC consisted of 104,228 officers and 3,233 enlisted men, although the units were largely "paper" organizations. By 7 December 1941, more than 77,000 Reserve officers had been called to extended active duty as individuals. This precluded the calling of Reserve units into the service.

Following World War II, on 30 June 1948, the Organized Reserve Corps totaled 752,271 of which 284,663 were officers and 467,608 were enlisted reservists. Of this total 746,787 were in the active Reserve in some 9,969 units. About this time the Office of the Executive for Reserve and ROTC Affairs was established and consisted of three branches, Ground Reserve Branch, ROTC Affairs Branch and the Public Relations and Information Branch.

The duplication which now exists in the administration of the National Guard and the Army Reserve in itself warrants a cut-back in Department of Defense spending. One or the other service can adequately administer the needs of all guardsmen and reservists. In view of the fact that States must

maintain such an organization it was obvious that the National Guard was the logical choice by the Department of Defense.

President Johnson in his Report to Congress on National Defense, dated 18 January 1965, regarding the realignment, stated "OUR CITIZEN SOLDIERS MUST BE THE BEST ORGANIZED, BEST EQUIPPED RESERVE FORCES IN THE WORLD .WE MUST MAKE CERTAIN THAT THIS FORCE WHICH HAS SERVED OUR COUNTRY SO WELL FROM THE TIME OF THE REVOLUTION TO THE BERLIN AND CUBAN CRISES OF RECENT YEARS, KEEP PACE WITH THE CHANGING DEMANDS OF OUR NATIONAL SECURITY." To this end we are taking steps to realign our Army Reserves and National Guard to improve significantly their combat-readiness and effectiveness in time of emergency. This realignment will bring our Army Reserve structure into balance with our contingency war plans and will place all remaining units of the Army Reserve forces in the National Guard. At the same time by eliminating units for which there is no military requirement, we will realize each year savings approximating \$150-million. Under our plan, all units will be fully equipped with combat ready equipment and will be given training in the form of monthly week-end drills that will greatly increase their readiness. Under the revised organization, both the old and the new units of the National Guard, as well as individual trainees who remain in the Reserves, will make a much greater and continuing contribution to our national security.

"We shall continue to study and take whatever action is necessary to increase their combat effectiveness".

In submitting the Fiscal Year "66" Budget to Congress, President Johnson stated:

"We cannot afford second-best defense forces. Neither can we afford to be wasteful.

"Our defense forces have reached new levels of strength. With the rapid strides made in the past 4 years and the future gains already scheduled, our powerful modern forces will be adequate to their tasks for years to come. In cooperation with our allies, we have now provided for:

- a. Forces able to deter nuclear attack.
- b. Forces able to counter conventional aggression and prevent the piece-meal erosion of the free world.
- c. Forces, in short, able to promote peace.

"We still have improvements to make. We must maintain a strong research and development program to insure that our forces are always the most modern in the world.

"The 1966 budget fully provides for these needs.

"However, we are able to reduce our defense expenditures in 1966 because:

- a. The buildup of our forces which started in 1961 is nearly completed.
- b. The vigorous cost reduction program of the Department of Defense is producing large savings.
- c. Less effective and less economical forces are being retired or reduced as promptly as possible."

In an editorial in the "Journal Memo" it was pointed out that when Reserve Forces realignment was announced, top Pentagon officials said \$150-million in weapons modernization procurement would be required for vitalized National Guard units, and pointed out that Fiscal "66" Defense Budget seeks only about one-fourth this total.

The following article which appeared in the "Defense Forum" of the "Journal of the Armed Forces" is typical of many sent in by members of the Army Reserve:

"A couple of sad shocks in one day are pretty much for an old soldier to endure, but I cannot refrain from writing you after having read the editorial entitled "Reserve Shift Painful but Progressive" I am particularly impressed by the disparity of view expressed in that editorial as contrasted with the editorial starting on the first page and entitled "Congress Can Remove the Muzzle". It is obvious that the lack of effective protest in the Pentagon against the unwarranted and unauthorized assumption of legislative power by Secretary McNamara is a part of the muzzling to which reference is made.

"I am particularly shocked, however, as a long-time subscriber and reader of "THE JOURNAL", by both the sins of commission and of omission. The major sin of commission is the implicit condoning of the assumption of legislative power by an appointive official.

"The major sin of omission in your editorial is that you do not comment on the very pertinent and important views of Members of Congress, such as Representative Mendel Rivers, in opposition to this exhibition of gross attempted dictatorship on the part of the Secretary of Defense. Certainly the attitude of the Chairman of the House Subcommittee having to do with the Reserves, as well as the attitude of Senator Stennis, who holds a corresponding position in the Senate, is equally as newsworthy as expressions from the Secretary of Defense. Such an omission is difficult to understand save on the presumption that you are wholeheartedly placing yourself in the position as a protagonist in support of the Secretary, and before Congress has had a chance to weigh the evidence.

"It would also be useful illumination of the subject if you would quote the very different views from the present ones of Secretary McNamara, which both he and President Johnson have expressed within the last few months. For example, President Johnson on 24 October 64, said, "We rely heavily on the Army Reserve as a significant part of our country's defense team". An again he said, at the same time, "I am confident that the Nation can rely upon the Army Reserve today and in the future as it has so often in the past."

"Whatever may be the legislative requirements, if any, to improve our Reserve components, legislation is still, under the Constitution, a function of the Congress, and not the appointed officials."

In an editorial in the issue of 3 February 1965, the Army Times indicated that some Army Reservists who refused to volunteer for the National Guard to fulfill their Ready Reserve obligation after the proposed Guard-Reserve merger may be required to attend weekly drills. The total number of mandatory assignment could run into the thousands.

The Army further disclosed that plans are under study to assign reservists with remaining obligations to fill vacancies in under strength Army Guard units. The Army feels that not enough reservists will volunteer for the proposed 550,000 Guard to meet new manning requirements. Officials originally had planned to staff the new Guard structure only with volunteers. Reservists who didn't want to join the Army Guard were to be transferred to the Ready Reserve Reinforcement Pool, subject only to two weeks' summer camp. However, because of the possibility that there might be serious trouble in getting enough Reservists to volunteer for Guard units, the; Army plans to order Reservists with obligations to Guard units for weekly drill as well as summer camp.

The plan is to require these Reservists to drill with Guard units until the Guard is able to replace them with volunteers. The Army cannot force Reservists to join the Guard, but it can legally require them to drill in a capacity of Reservists "attached" to Guard units.

Most Reserve Officers, noncoms and some men in the ranks of the Reserve units slated for transfer to the Guard or abolition will want to continue their military careers and are expected to transfer to the Guard. But many enlisted men who were mandatorily assigned to Reserve units after two years' active duty or who joined Reserve units under the Reserve enlistment program (minimum four month tour) may not welcome such an opportunity.

Pentagon officials say they plan to mandatorily attach only Reservists who entered the civilian-soldier program through the six-month training program or REP-63. Men with two years Army service as draftees are to be transferred to the Ready Reserve obligation. "None of these men will be mandatorily assigned to Guard units for drills", officials told Army Times.

The Army Reserve is currently requiring all new enlistees to sign an additional agreement as an additional safe-guard that they'll join the Army Guard if and when the Reserve is merged with the Army Guard. Men who sign the new agreement and then fail to go into the Guard will be reported to Selective Service for priority induction in the active Army.

As previously indicated, the Reserve Officer's Association is very much opposed to the proposed merger, bringing up many reasons indicative of increased costs instead of a savings in the merger. The

following is atypical write up which appeared in the Army Times on 17 February 1965 and entitled "USAR SCHOOLS WOULD DOUBLE STATE NG STAFFS IN MERGER".

"State headquarters strength is to increase 50 percent to absorb the USAR schools system, both stateside and overseas, under the Pentagon's proposed realignment of the National Guard and Army Reserve. The Army said there are some 4000 guardsmen assigned to management and staff sections at the various state headquarters at the present time. This strength will soar to 8500 in a troop basis category with the merger of the USAR units into the Guard.

"The Army says that a large part of the increase will go to absorb the 4100 spaces of the USAR schools structure, presently a part of the unit structure of the Army Reserve. "These units are, and will continue to be, school units", the Army said.

"The Army statement is designed to counter charges by the ROA that the proposed merger will not save but will actually increase "management and staff personnel" assigned to run the Army's proposed one reserve force.

"ROA, in a recent White Paper of its own, said the plan "actually destroys the well thought out system established with Congressional approval in 1957 which gave direct control of the USAR to the Army Chief of Staff through his Corps commanders".

"It charged that the proposed merger would place the management of the only reserve force now left to the Army under the antiquated National Guard Bureau system which was established in 1933, which is state-oriented which operates through the governors of the states and depends mainly upon cooperation and the threat of withdrawal of federal funds instead of military discipline for effective management".

"ROA said that the elimination of the 14 reserve forces will save 2500 (the Pentagon says the total is 4000) management and staff personnel but the "stream- lining of the management structure as proposed will increase full time support personnel attached to state headquarters from 4000 to 8500 personnel".

"THE PENTAGON stressed that no large-scale increase in state headquarters staff would be needed to manage the "merged" Army Reserve-National Guard set-up. The headquarters staffs are merely being expanded to absorb the USAR schools which "heretofore have been carried in other categories". The new troop basis category will be entitled "State Hqs. and School Units", the Army said.

"The USAR schools staffs will not be used to perform any state headquarters functions. The Pentagon is uncertain just how it, can fit the overseas USAR schools setup into the Guard. One plan under consideration is to leave management control as is.

"In addition to the USAR school spaces that may be added to state headquarters rolls, the Army is also studying the possibility of transferring it's nearly 400 USAR Selective Service mobilization designees to state units. These are personnel who, on mobilization would go on active duty with the Selective Service.

"The Army also said that additional headquarters personnel may be needed to supervise the training of units transferred to the Guard which are not organic to a major element such as a division or brigade."

On 24 February 1965 it was announced in Washington, D.C., that reorganization timetables, released for the first time, called for the elimination of the low-priority National Guard and Army Reserve divisions on a "phased basis" beginning this September (1965) after summer field training.

Lt. Gen. W. H. S. Wright, in a letter of instruction to all Department of the Army reorganization committees, said the 15 Guard and 6 USAR divisions would be converted into brigades between September 1965 and March 1966. He said the six high-priority Guard divisions would not be realigned as part of the Army's proposed civilian-soldier reorganization until after the realignment of the 21 low priority divisions.

General Wright, Chief, Office Reserve Components, Department of the Army, said the division conversions are being phased as to permit the Army "to have at least six Guard divisions available at all times for mobilization at current readiness capability or better".

Under the proposed reorganization, the six high priority and two special divisions are to be split up through some 16 states. The parent divisions will keep only the division base (division headquarters and divisional support elements) and one brigade.

The 16 divisional brigades to be scattered will be manned by personnel now assigned to 16 of the to-be-eliminated low-priority divisions, the Army said. Present plans call for the divisional brigades to mobilize and go to summer camp with their parent division.

Wright said the proposed plan calls for minimum reorganizations before summer camps. Some units that can accomplish a simple conversion without hurting its summer camp-training may be realigned before it goes to field training, Wright told the working committees.

He also advised committees to not plan on converting the 13 training divisions before the end of summer camp. He said there will be no changes in training divisions which are located entirely within one state.

"Those split between two states should be retained in the proposed structure insofar as practicable. Those split among three or more states should be consolidated so as to bring them within one or two states,"

Wright said the proposed reorganization timetable calls for the new troop list to be ready for State approval by 1 March. The Army plans to call to the Pentagon small groups of adjutants general at a time to give them their proposed troop list. The Army was hopeful of having all of the states agreed on the new troop basis before June 30, the end of the fiscal year.

The state reorganizations begin July 1 and are to be completed by March 31, 1966 according to General Wright. July 1 is the earliest the Army can reorganize because of the appropriations mandate that the Guard and Reserve be maintained at 700,000 paid drill strength.

The 14 Reserve Corps headquarters, now responsible for supervising Army Reserve training as well as administering Reserve records, are due to be phased off the rolls between April and June 1966, according to General Wright.

General Wright also advised the Army steering groups to develop a technician manning plan that requires a maximum strength of 27,220 full-time civilian technicians, about the same number now on the rolls manning a 700,000 paid drill force.

An article in the Army Journal of 6 March 1965 indicated that the Army Chief of Staff, General Harold K. Johnson had lined up with Secretary of Defense McNamara in support of the Pentagon plan to merge the Army Reserve and the National Guard.

The article further stated that General Johnson had told the Senate Preparedness Subcommittee there are "persuasive strategic and related reasons why the realignment is a practical and desirable means of improving the capability to project U. S. military power" and that the merger will improve Army Combat readiness "as a whole".

Further action in the matter indicated that a Committee, chaired by Senator John Stennis (D-Miss), opened hearings on the controversial plan on 1 March, with Secretary McNamara, Army Secretary Stephen Ailes and General Johnson as the lead-off witnesses.

In the House, Representative F. Edward Hebert (D-La) disclosed that his Armed Services Subcommittee would also open a "comprehensive inquiry as soon as possible".

As the Senate hearings opened, Chairman Stennis observed that other changes in the Reserve Force structure over the years had been made "only after a full and deliberate study by both the military and Congress and an affirmative finding that the changes were necessary, proper and desirable". He said "If this change is to be effectuated it should be done in the same manner".

To thousands of Army Reservists, the most important point made by Chairman Stennis was the concern he expressed for the effect of the merger, if implemented, will have upon those who have made a career of the Reserve. He said they must be provided "an adequate and appropriate opportunity to complete their retirement requirements".

General Johnson told the committee that approximately 69% of the officers and 12% of the enlisted men in Army Reserve are careerists. The Army Chief of Staff further testified that the proposed merger will meet the Army's requirements "for contingency plans and operations" not involving general nuclear war, and the "minimum" but not "maximum" requirements following a nuclear exchange. In the latter instance, however, he said the system of U. S. alliances, coupled with military assistance programs "provides for land forces that should more than meet the maximum requirements".

Secretary McNamara told the committee the merger "will not only increase the combat readiness, of the Army Reserve forces, but also, when completed, should produce recurring savings of at least \$150-million".

In the meantime, on 1 March 1965, at the invitation of the National Guard Bureau, the Adjutant General, Major General George M. Haskett and the Assistant Adjutant General, Army, Brigadier General Lyle E. Buchanan, attended a conference in Washington, D.C. where they were briefed on the forthcoming reorganization and presented with the proposed plan for integration of the Army Reserve into the Washington National Guard. The plan was based upon the present structure of both the Washington National Guard and the U. S. Army Reserve and gave both current and proposed structure.

The proposed plan for the State of Washington provided a total of 127 units with a strength of 8907 (4544 ARNG) and (4363 USAR). The current structure of the combined ARNG-USAR showed a strength of 10,536 in 180 units. Thus the plan initially proposed a reduction of 43 units and 1629 men.

On 12 March 1965 the Military Department of Washington in a Special Information Bulletin announced that Governor Daniel J. Evans had approved the tentative troop list of the New Washington Army National Guard with its merger with the US Army Reserve. In announcing his acceptance he

asked the Department of Defense to favorably consider two amendments to the troop list recommended by the Military Advisory Council. They were:

"That the accompanying troop list to the proposal is acceptable to the State of Washington with the reservations that it is approved by the 89th Congress and further:

1. That an Engineer Group Headquarters and Headquarters Company (Combat) be substituted for the Engineer Company (Panel Bridge)and
2. Request that an additional Field Artillery Battalion be added"

The Bulletin further stated that the proposal has not yet received the approval of Congress, and even if approved, a new stationing plan will have to be developed. As a result of the guidelines set forth by the Department of the Army, no assurance can be determined at this time that the units presently in being, will be retained in their same configuration. The Bulletin further stated that this headquarters would continue to keep commanders informed as the plans are developed. The following is the Department of the Army proposed troop list for Washington:

WashARNG Hq & Hq Det.	1- Army Band
3 - USAR Schools	3 -Trans Terminal Hq Units
1 - Infantry Brigade (Sep)	4 -Transportation Corps Companies
1 - Infantry Battalion	1 - Army Security Company
1 - Armor Battalion	1 - Medical Company (Air Ambulance)
1 - ADA Missile Battalion	1 - Signal Company (Sep)
1 - Artillery Battalion	3 - Training Regiments
2 - Engineer Battalions (Cbt)	3 - Medical Hospital Units
1 - Medical Battalion (Sep)	15- Miscellaneous Separate Detachments
1 - Special Forces Company	

In the meantime hearings on the proposed merger began in The Congress. The following is the typical reaction to the proponents for the retention of the Army Reserve of which Congressman Robert L. Sikes of Florida was one who stated: "The cut-back in the Reserves is not going to cripple our defenses, but it is a step in the wrong direction. It leaves a weakness and the Reds are going to exploit any weakness that they see in our posture. I am convinced this matter has not been thought through."

The foregoing was sent into the Defense Forum column of the Journal of the Armed Forces with the following statement by a member of the United States Army Reserve:

"The National Guard organization has always had the support of defense minded men. Its purpose is to give the Governors of the several states a military instrument to quell riots, maintain order and to police disasters. It should be of sufficient size for this purpose, and, of course, it should be available to the Federal Government that supports it, for national emergencies. Officers in the National Guard are appointed by the Governors.

"On the other hand, it has been historically established that the Services need a Reserve of their own, trained and equipped by them, regulated by them, controlled by them, free of political interference with a single purpose mission to expand their respective services in time of national emergency or war, to the degree needed. The Armed Forces Reserve Act is the law of the land and specifies the components of the several services and directs their maintenance.

"There is no reason to cannibalize the Reserve by passing its skin and bones to the National Guard. If the National Guard, under the Governors, is better equipped and better trained as the Secretary of Defense says, then he is admitting to a shocking condition of mal-administration on his part, since he has complete control in every respect over the Reserve forces. I don't think for one minute that anyone really believes this to be the truth, but rather a cover-up for false economy measures. As a matter of fact,

25% of the personnel in Army Reserve units have had 2 years of active duty training in the Army, and only 3% of the personnel in the Guard have served two years or more.

"Reducing the total Reserve forces of this country at a time of growing world tension when the increased tempo of Communist pressure in Southeast Asia and elsewhere is evident implies a dangerous calculated risk to the security of our country.

"The foundation of our national defense system is our active Armed Forces, and the foundation of our active Armed Forces is the Reserve. Since the early Revolutionary days of the minutemen, our Citizen Soldier has rallied to the defense of his country in time of need. President Johnson characterized the changes as prudent and wise, yet on October 24, 1964, President Johnson said, in a message to all members of the Army Reserve. "Defense of our great nation is every American's business. We rely heavily on the Army Reserve as a significant part of the country's defense team. I am confident that the nation can rely upon the Army Reserve today and in the future as it has so often in the past."

In early April during hearings on the merger. the Army Times reported that Representative Hebert of Louisiana called it a "further encroachment of the Executive Branch on Congressional responsibility." However, the Louisiana lawmaker further stated that he did not want to leave the impression "that I am committed to opposing the merger. Perhaps the Department (Pentagon) can present persuasive and cogent reasons which justify this radical departure from our reserve forces concept".

Meanwhile on the other side of Capitol Hill, senators questioned Defense witnesses closely about the effects of the merger on personnel.

Senator Cannon of Nevada expressed concern about the number of civilian technicians who might lose their jobs as a result of the merger. Technicians working for the Army Reserve units will be permitted to take similar jobs with the Guard, but they will have to become members of the Guard unit. Some won't qualify for membership because of age or physical condition. Others are women technicians and Cannon said he understood large numbers would not want to join the Guard in any event.

General Wilson, Chief of the National Guard Bureau, appeared before the Senate Preparedness subcommittee in early April and said he has indications that most technicians will come over to the Guard. But he conceded that many of them will face such problems such as loss of retirement rights.

Congress has been asked to pass legislation to establish a federal retirement system for Guard technicians. Only 21 States now have their own retirement rights and many legislators feel that reserve technicians won't take Guard Jobs because of the loss of their Civil Service stature.

Senator Saltonstall of Massachusetts estimated that perhaps 2000 technicians would lose their jobs in the transfer. The Guard employs about 22,000 technicians, the Army Reserve 5,000. Wilson said more technicians would be needed in later years as the new units receive their equipment.

Department of Defense is looking into placement rights for USAR Technicians. The Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel has been asked to furnish strength by command, grade range and reserve status for use in the study.

Congressman Hebert summarized his views at the hearing as follows:

"1. The proposed 1965 realignment of the Army Reserve Components for the purpose of achieving increased combat readiness and the elimination of all Reserve units for which there is no military requirement appears to enunciate the same objectives as that expressed in 1962. Therefore, since these objectives were apparently not achieved in 1962, I am understandably skeptical of both the purpose of the present realignment and the likelihood of its achieving the objectives outlined by the Department.

"2. This further reduction in the size of our Army Reserve Components raises a serious question in my mind as to the future ability of the Department of the Army to satisfy general mobilization requirements in the event of a major conventional war.

"3. Implementation of this-proposed realignment of the Army Reserve Components as contemplated by the Department of Defense and the Department of the Army would be accomplished in violation of existing law.

a. The requirement in existing law that there be drilling units in the Army Reserve would be ignored, and

b. The Department of the Army by its avowed intention to involuntarily assign Army Reservists to drill with National Guard units so as to insure the maintenance of personnel strengths in these State units assumes an authority not provided the Department by law and one which was specifically denied by the Congress in 1955.

"4. A major realignment of any of the Reserve Components requires the specific review and endorsement of the Congress before it can be implemented since, under the Constitution, the Congress is responsible for the "raising and maintaining of armies". Furthermore, a radical or major change in the composition of any of the Reserve Components almost inevitably requires legislative changes. For example, under the current proposal, if the Congress approves, it will require changes in the basic statutes relating to the organization of the Army Reserve Components. Furthermore, to make the proposed plan operate efficiently will require supporting legislative action involving the following subjects:

a. Reserve facilities.

b. Personnel strengths.

c. Administrative changes (retirement program for technicians, reenlistment incentives for voluntary participation in the Reserve, transfer of WAC personnel to the Guard, etc.)

"The criticisms and reservations which I have expressed in this statement are valid. They are not based on any desire on my part to inject sensationalism into this hearing or to attempt to obscure facts. My interest in this hearing, as well as every other member of this Subcommittee, and I trust the Departments, is to ascertain the facts and to resolve them in the best interest of the American people."

The foregoing no doubt was a rebuttal to a statement made earlier by Secretary McNamara when he told Congress there is no law to prevent him from putting into effect the proposed Army Reserve-National Guard merger, except for a provision in the soon-to-expire fiscal '65 Appropriations Act. The language of that Act stipulates that DoD shall "program" a 700,000-man Army Reserve Force.

"Now, if you want 700,000 men for 1966", Mr. McNamara said "you have the right under the Constitution to write that into the legislation, and frankly, we have no redress. You will have 700,000 men, and I think you and we will both know we don't need them".

Chairman Hebert also introduced a letter from General Hugh P. Harris, former CONARC Chief in which he criticized the Merger. The following is the text of his letter:

"Dear Mr. Hebert:

"I apologize for my tardiness in replying to your letter of 4 March. I left Ft. Monroe on 1 March on retirement leave before assuming presidency of The Citadel - so personal mail has just reached me here. I am, therefore, no longer the Commander of the Continental Army Command. General Paul Freeman will replace me and should arrive at Ft. Monroe in early-April. I know he, as have I, will have great interest in the problems arising from consolidation and reduction of our reserve forces. I suggest that he might wish to address a similar letter to him.

"My views on the Reserve consolidation - elimination - or adjustments have all been presented to the Army Chief of Staff and Secretary. I have stated, in substance, that I have no concern about the National Guard taking total responsibility for providing the immediate back-up units, (combat, combat support or service support) for the regular Army. I do have reservations as to whether the new proposed force structure is really adequate to insure flexibility and ability to react to unforeseen developments in what I consider is now a relatively hostile world. I do have reservations about the wide distribution of divisional units under the new program. I feel that training supervision, command interest, and assembly under stress will be difficult under the plan whereby an Infantry or Armored Division contains people and resources spread over at least 3 states.

"I DO NOT AGREE that the National Guard should take command of the Reserve Training Divisions. These are highly trained, technically qualified, cadre type unit that must handle any major mobilization training requirements. They have little except mental equipment and training aids. They

would be of limited value to state authorities in recovery from attack by air. They would move into training centers, use CONARC Training requirements, and be immediately responsive to the headquarters responsible for mobilization and training that would be needed. I think, then, that mobilization is a federal function and such mission should not be given to the National Guard.

"I see no necessity for the National Guard to take over the Reserve school system. CONARC is the director of the army school system and, with the Army Headquarters, has the staffs to handle the schools. I have suggested that these schools stay under CONARC and the Continental Armies.

"If the plan now proposed is implemented, I see no major need for the Twelve Reserve Corps Headquarters. This elimination, however, will weaken supervision of the ROTC in our colleges. At the present time we have good General officer supervision. This will be lost, if the Corps Headquarters are not retained. Also, if the Corps Headquarters are not retained, the fine liaison between state authorities and Army Headquarters will be weakened since these Headquarters were activated to replace the old Military Districts in each state.

"I believe these comments will indicate to you that I think all facets of this matter should be carefully considered before adoption. I am confident, however, that the National Guard authorities will do all in their power to make this system effective if adopted."

After the foregoing letter had been read into the record, Chairman Hebert asked if General Wright had "any comment". In reply General Wright said "Yes, I do. These views of General Harris are well known to me and to the Chief of Staff, and have been ever since the plan was first presented to General Harris. We have carefully considered his views.

"I should like to go down his points one by one. He has reservations as to whether the proposed force is flexible enough to react to unforeseen situations. We feel it is far more flexible and far more ready to react than the force we had before in that all units will have 100% of their equipment and 80% of personnel, and can therefore attain a high level of training. The low priority divisions simply were not ready to react in less than 12 to 18 months after full mobilization is undertaken, as I pointed out in my opening statement.

"He also alludes to the wide distribution of the resulting structure as between the States. From our point of view, taking the six to eight high priority divisions which were formerly in eight States and now spreading them over 20 States is a plus.

"In the first place, in the event of a nuclear strike in this country, any one division would suffer far less damage. In the second place, the goose eggs which comprise these divisions are sufficiently close together so that they can be very rapidly assembled, particularly in an era of air plenty which we see coming up, they can be transported by air to a mobilization center.

"Also in the event of conflict, it is a bad thing to have all of any given divisions come from one State, because in case a division is hit hard in combat and should be, for example, the 26th Infantry Division of Massachusetts, all the casualties would be in Massachusetts. We have seen this happen in previous conflicts and we don't think it is good.

"We also would like to spread the privilege of serving in these high priority units out among more states instead of concentrating them, as we have in the past, in New England and two other States.

"As far as the training divisions are concerned, we believe the function of the training of the division can be discharged just as well under the Army National Guard as it can under the United States Army Reserve. These divisions are being transferred to the Army National Guard with a minimum of disruption and personnel turbulence, using, wherever possible, and in the majority of cases, the old experts from the Reserve division.

"The training divisions train Reservists as well as the Active Army personnel at Army training centers. They do an outstanding job. They can do it just as well in the Guard as they do in the Reserve.

"The same comments are also true of General Harris' point as to the Army Reserve schools. Actually, the attendance at these schools last year was 19,500, of whom only 500 are from National Guard units. The balance were from the Army Reserve, divided half from units and half from pool personnel. We think if these schools are put into the National Guard that more of the unit personnel of

the Guard will go to these very fine schools. We think they can be administered just as well under the Guard as they have been in the Reserve.

"He mentioned also doing away with the Corps and the Corps' role in the ROTC program. We are aware of the fact that the Corps has played a vital role. We think this role can be discharged by the Continental Army. In one Army, the Fourth Army, the Corps is not used in training of the ROTC; the Army Headquarters performs that task and there they do the job as well as or better than any other army in the United States.

"Furthermore, we are studying the management of the Reserve Officers training program with the view to strengthening and increasing the staff at Continental Army Command, also in the CONUS armies.

"As far as the Corps and State headquarters on liaison is concerned there is very close liaison between the Continental Army and the States, and they can carry on without the Corps".

In the meantime under date of 12 April 1965, the Final Proposed Allotment of Troop Units for the State of Washington was received from the National Guard Bureau.

The following shows the organization or separate unit and proposed strength:

UNIT	NO OF UNITS	PERCENT	
		FULL STRENGTH	AGGREGATE STRENGTH
<u>STATE HHD</u>			
HHD Washington ARNG	1	100	93
State Hq	(1)	100	(68)
Mob Des Sel Serv	(0)	100	(4)
Hqs Aug (B)	(0)	100	(21)
USAR SCH STF & FAC	(3)	100	99
<u>INFANTRY BRIGADE (SEP)</u>			
Sep Inf Bde	21	80	2708
HHC	(1)	80	(171)
Armd Cav Trp (w Mess			
Aug Det)	(1)	80	(125)
Aviation Co	(1)	80	(108)
Engineer Co	(1)	80	(161)
HHD, Spt Bn	(1)	80	(37)
Medical Co	(1)	80	(85)
Sup & Trans Co	(1)	80	(130)
Maintenance Co	(1)	80	(201)
Admin Co (w/various sections)	(1)	80	(90)
FA Bn. 105T	(3)	80	(403)
Infantry Bn (M)	(3)	80	(729)
Tank Bn	(3)	80	(468)
<u>AIR DEFENSE</u>			
ADA Bn, NH	3	80	262
HHB, ADA Bn, NH	(1)	34	(29)
ADA BTRY, NH	(1)	85	(117)
ADA BTRY, NH	(1)	85	(116)

UNIT	NO OF UNITS	PERCENT FULL STRENGTH	AGGREGATE STRENGTH
<u>ARTILLERY</u>			
FA How Bn 155T	5	80	459
<u>ENGINEER</u>			
Engr Cbt Bn, Army	4	80	494
Engr Cbt Bn, Army	4	80	494
Engr Panel Bridge	1	80	101
<u>SPECIAL FORCES</u>			
SF Co, Abn	1	80	142
<u>ADJUTANT GENERAL</u>			
Army Band (28pc)	1	100	29
Army Post Unit	1	100	16
<u>ARMY SECURITY AGENCY</u>			
AS Agcy Co (Scty)	1	80	106
<u>JUDGE ADVOCATE</u>			
JA Tm, Claims Invest	1	100	4
JA Tm, Claims Invest	1	100	4
JA Tm, Frauds (JC)	1	100	6
JA Tm, Fiscal Law (JE)	1	100	7
JA Tm, Hq (AB)	1	100	9
<u>MEDICAL</u>			
USA Hosp Aug 500 B	1	100	119
Evac Hosp	1	80	224
Med Det Dent (KJ)	1	80	31
Gen Hosp 100 B	1	80	432
USA Dent Svc Det	1	100	82
Med Air Amb Co	1	80	127
HHD Med Bn	1	80	28
Med Amb Co	1	80	77
Med Clearing Co	1	80	101
<u>SIGNAL</u>			
Signal Co, Small Hq	1	80	97
<u>MILITARY INTELLIGENCE</u>			
MI Det Sep Bde	1	80	25
MI Det AF Cnsship (NG)	1	80	30
<u>PUBLIC INFORMATION</u>			
PI Det, Fld Svc (FA)	1	100	13

UNIT	NO OF UNITS	PERCENT FULL STRENGTH	AGGREGATE STRENGTH
<u>QUARTERMASTER</u>			
QM Det, Ldry Semi Mob	1	100	12
<u>TRANSPORTATION</u>			
Trans Cgo Car. Co	1	80	147
Trans Co, Fltg Cft	1	80	197
Trans Co, Fltg Cft (Maint)	1	80	222
Trans Co, Med Boat	1	80	144
<u>DIVISION (TRAINING)</u>			
Tng Div Elements	52	100	1556
Regt (BCT) (plus)	(16)	100	(528)
Regt (AIT)	(16)	100	(537)
Regt (CST)	(20)	100	(491)
<u>MOBILIZATION BASE</u>			
USA Staging Sta.	1	100	58
USA Terminal	1	100	81
USA Tml Sta. Comp	1	100	50
NPTCO	1	100	15
TOTAL	127		8925

The directive accompanying the foregoing allotment of troops indicated that (a) reorganization of the Brigade should be made during the period 1 Jul - 30 Sep 1965. A foot note also indicated that the State of Washington's request to add a HHD, Engr Cbt Gp; FA Bn and delete: Engr Panel Bridge Co were under consideration and continuing efforts would be made by The National Guard Bureau to effect the desired adjustments requested by the State of Washington.

In the meantime in an article in the 17 April 1965 issue of the "Journal", Major General Winston P. Wilson, Chief of the National Guard Bureau answered the critics of the proposed merger as follows:

"Why -17 years later (referring to the "GRAY BOARD") - do the Secretary of the Army and the Secretary of Defense believe that the major elements of our Reserve forces should be under the management of the National Guard?"

"To a very great extent, the turnabout has come as a direct result of actions taken by the Congress.

"The possibility envisioned by the Gray Board that a Governor could withdraw State-owned armories from National Guard use was ended by the provisions of the National Defense Act of 1950. This provided that the States could not, except with the approval of the Secretary of Defense, permit any use of facilities constructed under the act which would interfere with the training of the reserve components, or other Federal use in time of war or national emergency.

"Under the Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952 and its amendments, more of the Gray Committee's recommendations were enacted into law. These included establishment of a Reserve Forces Policy Board and a considerable strengthening of Federal responsibility for supervision of Army and Air National Guard activities.

"The Gray Board's complaint that vacation of a State National Guard Appointment terminated an officer's Federal status was answered by this same act, which provided a common Reserve of the Army and Reserve of the Air Force appointment for Guardsmen and Reservists.

"Enactment of the Reserve Officer Personnel Act, in 1954, and its amendments have pretty well exploded the myth that the Federal authorities have only negative controls over the National Guard. Officers of the Army National Guard and the Air National Guard are considered for promotion and elimination by central Federal boards established by the Act. The shoe is now, in fact, on the other foot. The Federal Government says the individual will be promoted; the State must choose between promoting the officer, if a vacancy exists, or losing him.

"Under the Reserve Forces Act of 1955, as amended, all Army and Air National Guardsmen become available for immediate Federal service under the President's authority, now contained in Section 673 of Title 10, United States Code. This enables the President to order up to 1,000,000 members of the Ready Reserve to active in time of national emergency declared by him.

"The active duty basic training program contained in the Reserve Forces Act of 1955, as modified, and, in fact, made useful and workable by a "Memorandum of Understanding" worked out by the House Armed Services Committee in January, 1957, has enabled the Army National Guard to convert, for the first time in peacetime, from individual to full unit training.

"Progress has been equally extensive in terms of non-legislative agreements worked out between State and Federal military authorities, and in terms of directives from the National Guard Bureau established with the concurrence and cooperation of the States.

"A series of agreements, dating from the time of the Korean Conflict to the present has placed Army National Guard and Air National Guard missile and jet interceptor forces under the direct operational control of the North American Air Defense Command.

"On 1 July 1951, the National Guard Bureau established the first academic criteria set by any of the Armed services, active or reserve, for officer promotion,

"On 15 May 1957, an annual screening of all National Guard personnel, was made mandatory. This had the effect of reducing mobilization losses of personnel from 10 to 14 percent for the Korean Emergency to less than two percent in the Berlin Emergency of 1961- 62.

"Thanks, therefore, to the constructive work of the Congress and to the readiness of the States to cooperate to the fullest extent, the history of the National Guard since World War II has been exactly the opposite of the doleful future predicted in the Gray Board report.

"As early as 1954, both the Army National Guard and the Air National Guard were able to reach the point where they could offer to provide to the Army and Air Force fully qualified, full-time Air Defense missile and interceptor forces.

"No other reserve force prior to or since that time had been able to achieve a comparable level of professionalism in time of peace or without a large infusion of Regular personnel.

"More important, there were indications throughout the National Guard that the air defense forces were merely the "top of the iceberg" as an indicator or the potential for development of continuing functional missions in peace as well as in war and twilight zone between.

"In 1948, a considerable number of officers in the United States Army and Air Force sincerely believed the Gray Board recommendations to be the soundest approach to reserve forces policy.

"The moment that it became apparent that the National Guard did not fit the picture of conflict and inefficiency painted in the Gray Board report, many of these same officers acted to provide the funds, the support and organizational concepts necessary to reinforce and to exploit success.

"In 1962, under the SNAP (Short Notice Annual Practice) program in which all Active Army and National Guard missile batteries compete for commander's trophies and plaques, National Guard units won:

- A. All three of the major missile firing trophies;
- B. Ten of the 11 plaques awarded by, the Commander of the Army Air Defense Command to outstanding air defense artillery units.

"In 1963, the 146th Fighter Interceptor Squadron of the Pennsylvania Air National Guard walked off with all honors in the Air Force's "world series" of aerial marksmanship known as "William Tell",

winning over 13 active Air Force Squadrons selected as the outstanding representatives of active Air Force commands, world wide.

"In short the National Guard has demonstrated that administrative control by the States - written into the Constitution to reinforce the concept of civilian control of the military - interposes no obstacle whatever to effective, in fact, instantaneous operational control by the Federal military authorities in time of clear and serious danger.

"The assumption, stated in both the Gray Board report and on a number of occasions in recent weeks, that the Governors have "no responsibility for national defense" is absurd both in fact and theory.

"The Governors are directed by the Constitution to organize and train their respective Militia organizations "according to the discipline prescribed by Congress"

"To a greater extent than is generally realized, the Governors have been concerned for years with the implications of Nagasaki and Hiroshima. They are well aware that a nuclear explosion over New York, New Orleans or Los Angeles means disaster in only slightly less vivid terms in Ohio, Oklahoma and Oregon.

"A very considerable part of the Governors' concern for the soundness, professionalism and state of equipment of the National Guard stems from a realization that in a time of chaos, the organization, equipment and state of training of both Army and Air National Guard units will be crucial to relief and recovery.

"It would, of course, be militarily and economically foolish to remove the National Guard from the jurisdiction of the States and to place it under complete Federal management at a time when the States are faced with the threat of enormous destruction from direct enemy attack.

"Once determined that it was no longer necessary or possible to provide a reserve force in excess of that which could be equipped by the Federal government and organized and administered by the States, there could be no justification for continued maintenance of a Federal Reserve system lacking of flexibility of the National Guard system, but competing in every way with the National Guard for funds, manpower and equipment.

"The dire predictions of the Gray Board have been proved by events to have been the proverbial "dream of a shadow of smoke".

"Whether in the Berlin Mobilization; the very severe tests of discipline, responsiveness and loyalty incident to recent domestic disturbances, or in the performance of an increasing number of Army and Air Force functional missions, the National Guard has demonstrated that it is an effective reserve force because of its State status and its resultant widespread State and community support.

"I believe, therefore, that the plan announced by the Secretary of Defense constitutes a reasonable and effective solution within the context of the national goals and resources, the requirements of national defense, the needs of the States and the responsibilities of the Nation to the officers and men who have built our reserve forces from virtually nothing in 1946, to an already unprecedented level of readiness."

In a rebuttal to the foregoing, the Executive Director of the Reserve Officers Association, Colonel John T. Carlton presented the following in the "Journal of the Armed Forces" on 5 June 1965:

"House and Senate hearings on the Pentagon plan to abolish the historic Army Reserve and then merge the USAR and the National Guard under control of 52 Guard jurisdictions have demonstrated fully that this proposal was not carefully thought out, that it is producing great turmoil at a time when national unity is required, and that it is fraught with dangers to the national security.

"Both the National Guard and the Reserve are being dealt substantive blows; yet the most disquieting effect is that inevitable fight which ensued has created disunity throughout the Army's components and has for all practical purposes destroyed the "One Army" concept so painstakingly built up as an integral part of the Reserve Forces program.

"Those who have been present at Congressional hearings have heard members of both committees - most with long experience in dealing with complex military matters - rather fully discredit this proposal. Official witnesses, who have presented their side first, gave frequently evasive and

sometimes contradictory answers to questions, and engaged in dispute with counsel over points of law and the responsibility of the Pentagon to abide by the law.

"Like many other aspects of the controversy, ROA's stand has been distorted. This Association's sole purpose of existence is "to support a military policy which will provide adequate national defense". ROA's conviction is that this proposal - to reduce the Reserves by 150,000 and to place the remainder of the combined Reserve - Guard strength under the fragmented command of the 52 governors - is basically unsound; that the military leaders know it is unsound; and that carefully expressed views in support of the Secretary of Defense - views that were instructed to hold - are deceptive of the real purpose and effect.

"Although the plan obviously is a military one - or at least should be - ROA has every reason to believe it was born in the DoD comptroller's office and more specifically in that office's cost effectiveness analysis section. All the plan does, and all it is intended to do, is eliminate 21 low priority divisions and from them salvage five brigades to be put in high priority status.

"Every subsequent action was to rationalize the plan in order that it could be sold.

"Whether the plan is a product of the Secretary of Defense, as he told his 12 December press conference, or the Secretary of the Army as he later testified before Congress, or indeed whether it emerged from the electric womb of a computer is of little import.

"But presumably it was fathered by the novel theory of logistical balance, i.e., that equipment on hand and trained personnel must be in balance. It follows then that if trained personnel on hand are in excess of equipment, you liquidate the personnel rather than go out and get the equipment. Ergo, you establish a condition which assures that trained men will never exceed equipment on hand.

"Another way of putting this singular rationale is to guarantee that on M-Day the Army must gear its combat capability to equipment only. You already have disposed of the personnel and, at that point, mobilization consequently is paralyzed.

"When Army Secretary Ailes ordered his three-member merger team to go into action it was inevitable that they would almost at once come face to face with the unpalatable fact that when the 21 low priority divisions had been axed 15 of them would be, of all things, National Guard divisions. This, in turn, meant not a single Guard division would remain west of the Mississippi.

"Consequently the planners saw they must reorganize the entire high priority force into the National Guard, otherwise there would be wholesome (and proper) rebellion from every Western governor.

"One feature of the plan is the claim that it will increase combat readiness. However, there are really but four ways to achieve this goal:

"Increase manning levels.

"Increase intensity of training.

"Increase quality of training.

"Increase quality and experience of the personnel structure.

"And if early deployment capability also is considered to be a desirable goal administrative procedures must be streamlined in order to convert inactive duty status units to active duty status. Improved and preplanned rail and air lift to get these units to their active duty stations is also necessary and, finally, equipment quantities must be increased.

"And what does the merger plan call for with respect to the foregoing?

"According to DoD's own figures, the manning levels of the units in each line item remain precisely the same with the exception of the two special purpose divisions, which receive only a 10% increase. Yet personnel in the state headquarters, strictly an administrative activity, are more than doubled.

"The only real solution to increasing combat readiness is to increase manning levels of the high priority units to 100%. It is no accident that Reserve planners in the Navy, Marine Corps, Coast Guard and Air Force have recognized this fundamental precept and aim at a 100% M-Day manning level. Yet

the Pentagon merger plan provides for no significant increase in manning levels of any of the high priority units.

"Insofar as intensification of training is concerned, ROA has searched the appropriations request for FY 66 and is shocked to find there is no change whatsoever from the current year; 48 drills annually and two weeks of active duty training annually, precisely what it has been every year since the post-war establishment of the USAR.

"By this time it comes as no surprise to learn that the plan has no provision for increasing the quality of training. Instead, training responsibility would be diffused into 52 separate state and territorial jurisdictions, controlled and administered by politically-appointed adjutants general. Presently, Army Reserve units are under the direct supervision and control of 14 general officers of the Regular Army who, in turn, work directly under the Continental Army Command. It seems obvious, therefore, that training can only deteriorate under the Pentagon proposal.

"Turning to personnel structure, ROA submits that the quality and experience of the persons who man any combat organization is of overriding import and requires a proper blend of non-commissioned officers with extensive active duty experience with troops. Only 4% of the National Guard today is made up of such persons. The others are in USAR because they are federally oriented and have little, if any, desire to turnout to sandbag levees, police demonstrators or shovel snow from state capitol parking lots. This is why the most intensive recruiting campaigns by the Guard have attracted only 4% of their numbers.

"It should be noted at this point that 36% of the enlisted men in the Army Reserve have had two or more years of active duty.

"The Army, through the Secretary of the Army, has reluctantly accepted the fact, as the transcript of the hearing bears out; that only 16% of enlisted personnel will transfer to the Guard. Eighty-six per cent have indicated preference for duty in the Reserve pool which, of course, is not real duty at all. Yet both the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff have testified that the key to the whole merger is the willingness of Reservists to transfer to the Guard.

"For reasons best known to itself, the Army is unique among the services for having a built-in delay in mobilizing its immediate Reserve by keeping their units at 80% manning level and depending upon fillers to flesh them out. It has been amply demonstrated in the recent past that fillers create problems and are not susceptible to immediate mobilization. For example, should a filler die the Army would know nothing about his demise unless some member of the family happened to advise the Army of that fact.

"Consequently, talk of early deployment capability is nonsense. There is no substitute for full manning levels in the immediate reserve when we talk of early deployment capability.

"Based on the pronouncements of the Secretaries of Defense and Army, there is nothing but the most hopeless sort of confusion in the equipment situation should the merger go through.

"For example, Mr. McNamara told the Senate He would supply six complete packages of equipment to the six high priority divisions. Then along came Mr. Ailes with the statement to the House that under no circumstances would the Army issue 100% of the TOE equipment to these units.

"Going back to Mr. McNamara, he testified that the PEMA buy was \$1.8 billion and that it would all be spent on equipment for the six priority divisions. Later he said half that figure would be earmarked for the priority divisions. Finally he said the Army, actually distributes the equipment and he did not know how it would be distributed.

"This, no doubt, is what Congressman F. Edward Hebert had reference to when he twice described the merger plan in public hearings as "half-baked" and (once only) "what a mess this whole proposition is."

"ROA pauses at this point to shed a tear for the National Guard, long a splendid organization as a state militia. Nor is it a crocodile tear, for the National Guard would pay a tragic price if the merger should be effected. Not only would the Guard lose 15 Divisions, but it would come more and more under the control of the Secretary of Defense who sat in the Senate and said:

"The Army is running the Guard, for the very good reason that it has legislative authority to do it, because I have directed it to do it, and because we pay 90% of the total cost of the Guard and we have a tremendous bludgeon over it as a result".

"As Mr. Hebert put it in the hearings, "They have been promised more sugar, but you pay for the sugar in the end.

"And he also said: "This is the tragedy of our times, and that is the thing that concerns me more about the National Guard right now.

"Up until the time this sugar was held out to them and butter put on the bread, they were ordering like we are ordering, but immediately when you came and offered them what I call Eve's apple, they have changed.

"Now they will probably ask, "What do I do after I get the apple! This is what is going on, and this is what concerns me. They will find out down the road when their usefulness has ended."

"Returning to the specifics of the merger plan, Mr. McNamara initially attempted to sell as an annual \$150 million savings to the taxpayer. But on 25 Feb 65, Lt Gen W. H. S. Wright, Chief of Reserve Components, told a public meeting of our Association in Washington, D.C.:

"Actually, calling this a savings is something of a misnomer, as I tried to point out in my presentation. It is not a saving to the taxpayer. It is a redistribution of funds within our program".

"Of course the nation's press seized on the so-called savings factor and many newspapers editorialized for the merger on this basis alone. They mistakenly assumed that we were talking about savings and not about redistribution of funds. Mark one up for Pentagon Press Chief Arthur Sylvester.

"As Congressman Hebert put it when he had Secretary Sylvester in the witness chair in mid-April, "I never saw a Department that tried its case so effectively in the newspapers".

"Another catchword used to sell the merger is the magic phrase "contingency war plans". The merger, it is claimed, fits in with the contingency war plans. But the artful job of confusing contingency plans with mobilization plans has been attempted, and this neat device must be put in proper perspective.

"Contingency plans, of necessity, are based on available equipment, whereas mobilization plans must be based on available equipment and on the use of new equipment when the production lines are accelerated. ROA applauds the procurement of additional equipment but brands as unacceptably dangerous any plan limiting mobilization to contingencies based on the enemy's supposed intentions rather than capabilities.

"Indeed, it was General Wright who, in an address to the Adjutants General Association in New Orleans a year ago, said:

"It is not militarily sound to tailor our forces based on enemy intentions although smaller forces would possibly be needed if we did. We must base our forces on capabilities and thus be ready for any eventuality. This is the only prudent course, and the present enemy capabilities are such that we need all of our Guard units whether in the immediate reserves or reinforcing reserves."

"And it was General Wright who also acknowledged before the Hebert Subcommittee that in April of 1964 he called for a total of 45 active and reserve divisions.

"General Wright's explanation as to why, in April 1964, he thought we needed 45 divisions and a year later saw fit to revise this figure to 24 was reserved for executive session.

"Not every uniformed witness has bought the Pentagon merger plan. No less an authority than Major General W. J. Sutton, Chief of Army Reserve, forthrightly announced in the hearings he was personally apposed to the plan.

"General Sutton advanced three alternative plans, all of which would satisfy the combat readiness and early deployment goals, all of which would save money, and all of which would still retain the integrity of the USAR. Unfortunately, under the one-man rule prevailing in the Pentagon, no one in authority troubled to appraise the Sutton alternatives, their feeling being that it would not be unlike setting off firecrackers in a thunderstorm.

"There is little point at this date in belaboring the method - or rather the lack of method - that prevailed as the merger plan took shape. Suffice to say that the initial planning was conducted by three

officers, "locked in a room", to use Secretary Ailes' own words, and that neither General Sutton, who runs the Army Reserve, nor Major General Winston P. Wilson, Chief of the National Guard Bureau, knew anything about the study until, it had been underway for a whole month. This was testified to by Brigadier General Thomas A. Kenan, Deputy Chief of the Office of Reserve Components, who chaired the three-member study group.

"That General Sutton was kept in the dark came as no great surprise to those well versed in Pentagon machinations; but that General Wilson, the officer who would have to implement the merger plan, also was kept totally ignorant of the study is so astounding as to border on the unbelievable.

"It is not, and never has been, ROA's position to simply call attention to the many gross inadequacies of the proposed merger and let the matter rest there. ROA has already presented a counter-proposal calling for the revitalization of the Army Reserve instead of its abolishment. We have outlined new legislation that would increase the Army Reserve's combat readiness and deployment capability on a year-to-year basis to meet changing world conditions.

"The plan calls for retaining the 21 divisions now in the reinforcement reserve and to reorganize them into ROAD concept to retain the essential elements of the ROAD Division, and to maintain these elements at 100% manning levels.

"The ROA proposal would create no disruptive effect on the Immediate Reserve and it remains the divisional organization so fundamental in any mobilization. It also provides for a geographical spread that would enable each state to maintain adequate forces.

"Inherent in the ROA plan is a highly flexible response. Should the need for jungle or guerilla-type organizations arise (hardly and unlikely prospect) these units would be ready immediately as light infantry divisions

"Whatever path is eventually followed, ROA fervently hopes that it is not the dangerous and reckless one that is represented by the merger plan. There is a wealth of alternatives, anyone of which is preferable to the merger concept advanced by the Department of Defense. We have every confidence that in the final analysis the democratic process will prevail and that the U. S. Army Reserve will remain intact and brought up to genuine readiness".

In the meantime the following stationing plan was proposed by the Military Department of Washington for the merged ARNG and Reserve Units:

ABERDEEN

HHC TRNG BN (AIT), 104th DIV
2 CO's INF (AIT), 104th, DIV
ENGR CO (-), 167 ENGR BN

ANACORTES

ENGR CO, 161st ENGR BN

BELLINGHAM

HHC TRNG BN (AIT), 104th DIV
2 CO's INF (AIT), 104th DIV
ENGR CO, 161st ENGR BN

BREMERTON

HHC TRNG BN (CST), 104th DIV
3 CO's (CST) 104th DIV
TK CO, 41st INF BDE

CAMAS

ENGR CO, 167 ENGR BN

REDMOND

HHC MSL BN 205th ARTY
BTRY 205th ARTY

RENTON

TRNG BN ENGR (AIT) 104th DIV

SEATTLE

ARMY BAND
HHC (-) 104th DIV
REGT (-) (CST) 104th DIV
2 MI DETS
3 JAG DETS
ASA CO
NTPOC
2 CML DETS (CBR)
STAG STATION
ARMY POST UNIT

CAMP MURRAY
HHD WASH ARNG
PI DET
2 CO's INF (AIT), 104th DIV
MED CO (AIR AMB)
AVN CO 41st INF BDE
AVN MAINT SEC, MAINT CO 41st INF BDE
CENTRALIA
HHC TK BN (-) 41st INF BDE
COLVILLE
RIFLE CO (M) 41st INF BDE
ELLENSBURG
CO (TRNG) (BCT), 104th DIV
EPHRATA
CO (TRNG) (BCT), 104th DIV.
2 PLATS TRANS CO (CCT)
EVERETT
HHC 161st ENGR BN
ENGR CO 161ST ENGR BN
LONGVIEW
CAV TRP, 41st INF BDE
MIDWAY
HHB 146th ARTY, 41st INF BDE
2 BTRYS 146th ARTY, 41st INF BDE
OKANOGAN
TRAN CO (-) (CCT)
OLYMPIA
HHC TRNG REGT (AIT) 104th DIV
CO ARMOR (AIT) 104th DIV
ENGR CO (TOPO)
PASCO
TRNG REGT (BCT) 104th DIV
CO TRNG (BCT) 104th DIV
2 BTRYS 205th ARTY
PORT ANGELES
PLAT ENGR CO 167 ENGR BN
PORT ORCHARD
TK CO 41st INF BDE
POULSBO
TK CO 41st INF BDE
PULLMAN
2 CO'S TRNG (BCT) 104th DIV
PUYALLUP
BTRY 146th ARTY, 41st INF BDE
WALLA WALLA
HHC TRNG BN (BCT) 104th DIV
CO TRNG (BCT) 104th DIV
ENGR CO (PANEL BRIDGE)
WENATCHEE
RIFLE CO (M) 41st INF BDE

GENERAL HOSP (1000 BED)
USAR SCHOOL
MED DENTAL DET
QM DET
HHC MED BN
MED CO (CLR)
SPECIAL FORCES CO
HHC 41st INF BDE
ENGR CO 41st INF BDE
HHD SPT BN 41st INF BDE
MED CO 41st INF BDE
ADMIN CO 41st INF BDE
S & T CO 41st INF BDE
MAINT CO (-) 41st INF BDE
SHELTON
CO ARMOR (AIT) 104th DIV
SNOHOMISH
MED CO (AMB)
SPOKANE
USAR SCHOOLS
HQ AUG WASH ARNG
2 JAG DETS
HHC INF BN (M) 41st INF BDE
2 PLATS RIFLE CO (M)
41st INF BDE EVAC HOSP
TRNG BN (BCT) 104th DIV
TACOMA
USAR SCHOOL
HOSP (500 BED)
DENT DET
ARMY TERMINAL
ARMY TERM STA COMP
TRANS CO (MED BOAT)
TRANS CO (DEPOT MAINT)
TRANS CO (FLTG CRAFT)
TOPPENISH
BTRY 205th ARTY
TUMWATER
3 PLATS HHC TANK BN 41st INF BDE
VANCOUVER
HHC 167 ENGR BN
ENGR CO 167 ENGR
VASHON
BTRY (MSL) 205th ARTY
YAKIMA
HHC TRNG BN (BCT) 104th DIV
2 CO's TRNG (BCT) 104th DIV
HHB 205th ARTY
SVC BTRY 205th ARTY
RIFLE CO (M) 41st INF EDE

On 6 July 1965, the National Guard Bureau in a letter to The Adjutants General of all States advised as follows:

"In a joint press conference with Congressman Hebert on 15 May, the Secretary of Defense indicated that the DOD was submitting to the Congress for its consideration certain legislation which was necessary if the realignment plan is to achieve fully the ultimate objectives intended. The Secretary also noted that DOD would not execute the plan while the legislative proposals were being considered by the Congress. Congressman Hebert predicted that about six or seven weeks would be required for Congressional consideration of the legislative proposals.

"In order to be in a position to execute promptly the proposed reorganization, should the decision be made in favor thereof, it is desirable that a number of preliminary actions be taken well in advance of the proposed reorganization date. For that reason, it is necessary to distinguish between planning actions, preparatory actions, and executing actions. Further, there are certain actions which have been integrated into the overall proposed reorganization but which will be executed regardless of whether or not the reorganization plan is executed. For example, the plan for the centralization of the non-unit Ready Reserve records at the U. S. Army Administration Center at St. Louis has been meshed with, and integrated into, the overall reorganization plan. This centralization plan will be executed regardless of whether or not the Reserve Component reorganization plan is executed.

"In differentiating between preparatory actions and executing actions, the guiding rule should be that actions which cannot be reversed once undertaken or which involve the expenditure of substantial sums of money on projects which would be essentially wasted in the event the reorganization does not take place, should be construed as executing actions.

"It appears unlikely that definite Congressional action will be received prior to 15 July, and possibly not before 15 August. Accordingly, those States which have indicated their desire to begin unit reorganization actions prior to 1 September 1965 are requested to plan reorganization actions to begin after 1 September 1965.

"U. S. Army Corps Headquarters will continue in existence for a period of 30 days after all of the USAR units for which it is responsible have been transferred to the Army National Guard or inactivated or its records have been centralized - whichever occurs later.

"It is considered essential that States have a minimum of 30 days planning time between the time a firm go-ahead instruction is issued and the time unit reorganization actions occur. Dependent upon final Congressional action on the DOD proposed legislative package and the Appropriations Act, it may be necessary to adjust the effective dates requested by the State by a month or more. If reorganization authority has not been issued by the National Guard Bureau before 1 August, the concept of a floating execution date with 30 days advance notice will be employed thereafter with the execution date being delayed in increments of two weeks.

"It is emphasized that Reserve Component training throughout FY 66 will continue to be conducted in accordance with appropriate CONARC directives pending receipt of the reorganization authority referred to above."

In the meantime the Army Times in its issue of 21 July announced that the following proposals for call up in the Viet Nam crises was under study in the Pentagon:

"Mobilization of up to two Army Guard divisions, the 32d Infantry Division of Wisconsin, and the 49th Armored Division of Texas, and one USAR training division - the 100th of Kentucky - were mobilized during the Berlin crisis. In addition, two Army Guard divisions, the 28th Infantry of Pennsylvania, and the 26th Infantry of Massachusetts, were put through an accelerated training program in non active duty status to get ready for a possible mobilization. They never were called. Because of the type of fighting involving U.S. troops in Vietnam, the call-up of divisions - if ordered -will probably be limited to infantry .

"Mobilization of a separate brigade to replace that pulled from the Big Red One (1st Inf Div) at Fort Riley, Kansas, for Vietnam duty, plus a larger number of smaller type units

"Mobilize a large number of battalions from units across the country to replace those of the active Army divisions already deployed or being deployed to Southeast Asia. The civilian-soldiers would be blended with the active Army divisions to bring them up to full combat strength again.

"There has been some speculation as to the two Guard divisions that would be called. One of the possibilities could be Indiana's 38th Infantry Division, one of the eight high-priority Guard divisions with a mobilization role for Panama in the event of need.

"Two of the three brigades of the division have already pulled two week active duty stints in Puerto Rico. But this training was pulled in the desert and not in the jungle, the type of environment they would encounter as part of their mobilization mission.

"While it's not known for sure, the list of call-up options presented to General Johnson presumably contains Army Reserve as well as Army Guard units. The overwhelming majority of the reserve component high-priority support units are in the Army Reserve.

"A call-up would probably force the Pentagon to halt, at least temporarily, plans to merge the Guard and Reserve. It would also force it to drop any plans to cut the size of the two forces."

In an article in the Army Times of 28 July 1965 it was announced that long- delayed hearings would be resumed the following week. The article further indicated that "Observers were predicting that while some kind of reserve reorganization would take place, the proposed elimination of all drill units in the Army Reserve is no longer likely. The article continued as follows:

"Despite denials by President Johnson and others, it is believed in Congress that the increasing seriousness of the Vietnam situation and the resulting threatened call-up of reserve forces make it extremely unlikely that Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara will be able to carry out his original plan.

"Predicting a call of military reservists for active duty in Vietnam the Defense subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee this week recommended a rejection of the National Guard-Army Reserve merger plan."

* * * * *

On 2 August 1965, Deputy Secretary of Defense Cyrus R. Vance testified before the House Armed Services Committee on the proposed realignment of the Army's reserve components. The following is a digest of these discussions as reported by the Washington Post newspaper on Tuesday, August 3, 1965.

"Pentagon plans for the expansion of both active and reserve Army forces to cope with the Viet-Nam War were presented to Congress yesterday. "They will add one division and three independent brigades with full supporting forces to the Regular Army and put three National Guard divisions, six independent brigades and support forces into an advanced status of combat readiness.

"In presenting the Pentagon program before a House armed forces subcommittee, Deputy Secretary of Defense urged immediate adoption of the Administration's controversial plan to merge the Army National Guard and Army Reserve and drop lower priority units.

"Several influential members of Congress have said that Defense Secretary McNamara's reserve merger plan should be deferred until after the Viet-Nam crisis is over.

"But Vance contended the merger plan would strengthen, rather than weaken, the Nation's defenses. He said the skilled manpower released by dropping 21 lower priority Guard and Reserve divisions could be used to beef up the super-high priority units to 100 per cent of authorized strength.

"Furthermore, Vance testified, weapons now assigned to the low priority forces scheduled to be deactivated are needed to equip the new Regular Army forces to be created.

"Representative Porter Hardy (D-Va) questioned whether the older arms and equipment in the hands of the low priority forces would not be obsolete.

"But Vance indicated belief it would be adequate for combat in Southeast Asia.

"Vance appeared before a House subcommittee headed by Representative F. Edward Hebert (D-La). The group earlier held hearings on the McNamara reserve organization plan but had been in recess

since May. Members heard Vance challenge suggestions that the reorganization be deferred because it would curtail reserve readiness.

"Vance said that both the Secretary of the Army, Stanley K. Resor, and Army Chief of Staff, General Harold K. Johnson, have reviewed the plan in light of the Vietnamese situation. They recommend that it be put into effect "as soon as possible", he added.

"We believe that the realigned force will suffer no significant short-term loss of readiness and over a somewhat long term will achieve a significant improvement in readiness", Vance stated.

"He sought to amend an earlier Defense Department legislative proposal to reorganize the reserve forces. When McNamara first announced the plan, he took the view that it required only action in the annual defense appropriation bill and not substantive legislation. Later, the Secretary conceded that the latter was needed and submitted a proposed bill authorizing not only the Army Reserve reorganization but also providing for merger of the Air National Guard and Air Reserve.

"Yesterday Vance asked that the question of the Air Guard and Reserve be deferred. But Hebert said the subcommittee intended to act on the entire plan one way or the other.

"During two hours of questioning, subcommittee members indicated strong doubt about the Pentagon plan. Questioning of Vance will continue this morning.

"Vance told the group that the Pentagon planned a "temporary augmentation" of the active Army "by activating one division force, three brigade forces, additional helicopter companies and combat support units, "which will require a major expansion of the Army's training establishment as well as the doubling of draft calls. In referring to division and brigade "forces", he meant that artillery, signal, engineer and other supporting units will also be created for them.

"The three reserve divisions, six independent brigades and other units to be given advance readiness status, will be built up to 100 percent of the authorized strength, be authorized six instead of four monthly drills and may be called for two weeks training during the next several months instead of waiting until next summer .

"This will shorten the period it will take such units to be ready after mobilization by two to four weeks, it was said.

"Vance said that during the transition period of the reorganization, all present members of the Guard and Reserve can continue in drill pay status. Those who do not join a paid unit can earn retirement and promotion points by going into the Ready Reserve pool and taking training duty and extension courses. Also, he said, new non-pay units will be organized for specialists who can earn retirement and promotion points."

In a letter dated 12 August 1965 to The Adjutants General of all States, Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and District of Columbia, the Chief of the National Guard Bureau Major General Winston P. Wilson advised as follows:

"Reference: DA Plan for the Reorganization and Merger of Reserve Components of the Army, 1 March 1965.

"1. The subject is the proposed plan for the reorganization of the Army's Reserve Components.

"2. Subcommittee No. 2 of the House Armed Services Committee, chaired by Congressman Hebert, which has been conducting hearings on the controversial proposal of the Department of Defense to merge the Army Reserve Components.

The statement, issued by the Subcommittee Chairman, the Honorable F. Edward Hebert (D-La) was concurred in by the Chairman of the full Committee on Armed Services, the Honorable L. Mendel Rivers (D-SC) and the ranking minority member, the Honorable William H. Bates (R-Mass). Congressman Hebert said:

"Our Subcommittee has unanimously agreed to conclude its current hearings on the proposed merger of the Army Reserve Components. On the basis of extensive testimony received since March 15 by the Subcommittee in both open and closed sessions, the Subcommittee believes that the present proposal of the Department of Defense to merge the Army Reserve Components is not in our

national interest. The merger, as proposed by the Department of Defense, would result in an immediate and serious loss in the combat readiness of the affected Reserve units.

“The Subcommittee is also strongly opposed to any Departmental action which would, for practical purposes, destroy the Army Reserve by transferring all of its organized training functions to the 50 state National Guard organizations. Therefore, it will not support the proposal to "merge" the Army Reserve into the National Guard as presented by the Department of Defense.

“In addition, the Subcommittee has very serious reservations concerning those aspects of the Department's proposal which would drastically reduce our mobilization base from the present 29 Division, 11 Brigade structure to an 8 Division, 16 Brigade structure. The Subcommittee strongly urges the Department of Defense to carefully restudy and reevaluate these important features of the Army Reserve reorganization proposal.

“In any event, the Armed Services Committee will continue discussions with the Department of Defense on this subject and is determined to resolve the question of future reorganizations of the Reserve Components by recommending the enactment of positive legislation on the subject. Enactment of such legislation will prevent a repetition of the unfortunate turmoil and confusion that has occurred in both the Army Reserve and National Guard as a result of the Department's premature announcement to merge the Army Reserve Components. (Signed by Committee Members)

"3. Shortly thereafter, the Department of Defense issued the following press release:

“The Department of Defense regrets the action of the House Armed Services Subcommittee in not supporting at this time the realignment of Army National Guard and Reserve units which the Department of the Army has recommended.

Both the Secretary of the Army, Stanley R. Resor, and the Chief of Staff, General Harold K. Johnson, firmly believe that adoption of the proposed realignment is in the national interest. They are concerned that failure to realign the structure now will compel the Army to retain nonessential units at the expense of forces which are required by our current contingency plans. They see no military justification for diverting to non-essential units the personnel which could be used to raise the readiness of units for which there is a clear and established need. Moreover, failure to go forward with the realignment will necessarily result in more men being taken out of civilian life into the Armed Forces.

“The Army's proposed realignment would increase usable combat power markedly, with consequent improvement in our ability to carry out existing war plans. It would add over 50,000 men to our usable unit strength, provide full allowances of equipment for all units, and reduce unit readiness goals to eight weeks or less. These are advantages the nation can ill afford to forego.

To preserve combat readiness during the realignment process, the reorganization would be accomplished on a phased basis with only a minor portion of the total force affected after the first month. Upon completion of the reorganization, combat readiness of all retained units would be increased significantly and permanently.

Under the Army's plan, the Reserve will continue to fill a critical need as a pool of trained officers and men whose services can be called upon in any period of crisis.

The Army is convinced that the realigned structure provides an adequate base for mobilization. Should it be necessary to mobilize more forces than our plans contemplate, they can be formed from scratch in less time than it would take to produce their equipment.

The Defense Department welcomes the Subcommittee's expression of interest in further consideration of the realignment of the Army Reserve Components and is prepared to continue discussions immediately.

“4. In view of the foregoing, further planning for the proposed reorganization and the inactivation of the Corps will be held in abeyance. As soon as possible, further instructions will be issued regarding:

- a. The intensified training program and the units to participate therein.
- b. The Army Reserve Components Program for the remainder of FY 66 and for future years.
- c. Further planning for the proposed realignment.

“5. Actions currently under way to centralize the records of non-unit Ready Reserve personnel will continue. Further instructions concerning appropriate civilian space adjustments will be the subject of a separate communication.

“6. You are authorized to disseminate the substance of the foregoing to your subordinate commands and to the commanders of USAR units. It should be emphasized, however, that some reorganizations, activations and inactivations may be required in connection with the intensified training program referred to above.”

3. Foregoing furnished for your guidance. You will be kept informed as future developments occur, including prompt notification of units selected for intensified training, any reorganization actions which may be required and special instructions in connection therewith. It is suggested that substance of this message be disseminated to your ARNG commanders.

4. Reorganization plans which have been received from States will be held in abeyance by the National Guard Bureau pending future developments. Plans which have not been forwarded should be held by Adjutants General pending further instructions .

(Signed) WINSTON P. WILSON
Major General
Chief, National Guard Bureau

Under date line of 15 September 1965, the following article on the merger plan was published in the New York Times:

"CONFEREES KILL GUARD MERGER PLAN"

Washington, Sept 15 - Members of a House and Senate Conference Committee agreed today, after weeks of delay over a side issue, on a \$46.8 billion military appropriations bill.

The side-issue was the administration's controversial proposal to merge organized Army reserve units with the Army National Guard. The conferees killed the plan for this year.

THE EXACT amount in the defense appropriations measure was \$46,887,163,000 and did not differ essentially from administration requests.

It included the \$1.7 billion President Johnson had asked Congress on August 4 to cover increased military commitments for the war in Viet Nam.

The money bill covers the fiscal year 1966 that began July 1. Barring a serious floor fight, which is not likely, the bill is expected to be passed swiftly. It is due to go to the floor of the House on Friday (17 Sept)

THE REJECTION of the reserve forces merger plan, although not surprising, represented a major setback to the administration, particularly to Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara.

Based upon the foregoing to hold the proposed merger in abeyance, it is possible that the proposed merger may never materialize, therefore, this would appear to be the logical time to bring to a close, Volume 7 of our history. Due to my planned second retirement upon reaching my 65th birthday in 1967, the writing of Volume 8 of the History of the Washington National Guard will be left to my successor or successors.

VIRGIL F. FIELD
Colonel, U. S. Army, Retired
Archivist and Historian