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WASHINGTON NATIONAL GUARD

PAMPHLET



**THE OFFICIAL HISTORY
OF
THE WASHINGTON NATIONAL GUARD
VOLUME 6
WASHINGTON NATIONAL GUARD
IN WORLD WAR II**

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OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
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VOLUME 6

WASHINGTON NATIONAL GUARD IN WORLD WAR II

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CHAPTER I

UNITED STATES OPERATIONS IN EUROPE IN WORLD WAR I

In the last chapter of Volume 5, the story of the Washington National Guard's participation in World War I was emphasized and little information was provided on the overall participation by the United States Army. For this reason, it is believed that the reader will be interested in the part played by our great army in this epic war.

For this purpose, the final report of General John J. Pershing will be used. His report to the Secretary of War was dated September 1, 1919, part I of which covered the military situation in 1914, 1915, 1916, spring of 1917 organizational projects. American front line of communications, the General Staff, training, intelligence and the period from the summer of 1917 to the spring of 1918. Part II covered operations in 1917-18 and occupation in 1918-19.

His report was substantially as follows:

"I assumed the duties of this office on May 26, 1917, and, accompanied by a small staff, departed for Europe on board the S. S. Baltic, May 28, 1917. We arrived at London on June 9th and, after spending some days in consultation with the British authorities, reached Paris on June 13th.

"Following the rather earnest appeals of the Allies for American troops, it was decided to send to France, at once, 1 complete division and nine newly organized regiments of Engineers. The division was formed of regular regiments, necessary transfers of officers and men were made, and recruits were assigned to increase these units to the required strength.

"The offer by the Navy Department of one regiment of Marines to be reorganized as Infantry was accepted by the Secretary of War and it became temporarily a part of the First Division.

"Prior to our entrance into the war, the regiments of our small army were very much scattered, and we had no organized units, even approximating a division that could be sent overseas prepared to take the field. To meet the new conditions of warfare an entirely new organization was adopted in which our Infantry divisions were to consist of four regiments of Infantry of about treble their original size, three regiments of artillery, fourteen machine gun companies, one engineer regiment, one signal battalion, one troop of cavalry, and other auxiliary units, making a total strength of about 28,000 men.

"In order that the reasons for many important decisions reached in the early history of the American Expeditionary Forces may be more clearly understood and the true value of the American effort more clearly appreciated, it is desirable to have in mind the main events leading up to the time of our entry into the war.

"Although the German drive of 1914 had failed in its immediate purpose, yet her armies had made very important gains. German forces were in complete possession of Belgium and occupied rich industrial regions of Northern France, embracing one-fourteenth of her population and about three-fourths of her coal and iron. The German armies held a strongly fortified line 458 miles in length, stretching from the Swiss border to Newport on the English Channel; her troops were within 48 miles of Paris and the initiative remained in German hands.

"In the east the rapidity of the Russian mobilization forced Germany, even before the battle of the Marne, to send troops to that frontier, but the close of 1914 found the Russian armies ejected from East Prussia and driven back to Warsaw.

"The entry of Turkey into the war, because of the moral effect upon the Moslem world and the immediate constant threat created against Allied communication with the Far East, led to an effort by the Allies in the direction of the Dardanelles.

"Italy joined the Allies in May of 1915 and gave their cause new strength, but the effect was more or less offset when Bulgaria entered on the side of the Central Powers.

"The threatening situation on the Russian front and in the Balkans was still such that Germany was compelled to exert immediate offensive effort in those directions and maintain a defensive attitude on the western front. German arms achieved a striking series of successes in the vicinity of the Mazurian

Lakes and in Galicia, capturing Warsaw, Brest-Litovsk, and Vilnius. The Central powers overran Serbia and Montenegro. Meanwhile, the Italian armies forced Austria to use approximately one-half of her strength against them.

"In the West, the French and British launched offensives which cost the German armies considerable loss; but the objectives were limited and the effect was local.

"The Dardanelles expedition, having failed in its mission, was withdrawn in January 1916. In Mesopotamia the Allied operations had not yet been successful. Although the British fleet had established its superiority on the sea, yet the German submarine blockade had developed into a serious menace to Allied shipping.

"Germany no doubt believed that her advantage on the eastern front at the close of 1915 again warranted an offensive in the west, and her attack against Verdun was accordingly launched in the spring of 1916. But Russia was not yet beaten and early in June, aided at the same time by the threat of an Italian offensive in the west, she began the great drive in Galicia that proved so disastrous to Austria.

"Roumania, having entered on the side of the Allies, undertook a promising offensive against Austria. The British and French Armies attacked along the Somme. Germany quickly returned to the defensive in the west, and in September initiated a campaign in the east which, before the close of 1916, proved unfortunate for Russia as well as Roumania.

"In the spring of 1917, retaining on the eastern front the forces considered sufficient for the final conquest of Russia, Germany prepared to aid Austria in an offensive against Italy. Meanwhile, the Russian revolution was well under way and, by the midsummer of 1917, the final collapse of that government was almost certain.

"The relatively low strength of the German forces on the western front led the Allies with much confidence to attempt a decision on this front; but the losses were very heavy and the effort signally failed. The failure caused serious reaction especially on French morale, both in the Army and throughout the country, and attempts to carry out extensive or combined operations were indefinitely suspended.

"In the five Months ending June 30th, 1917, German submarines had accomplished the destruction of more than three and one-quarter million tons of Allied shipping. During three years Germany had seen practically all her offensives, except Verdun, crowned with success. Her battle lines were held on foreign soil and she had withstood every allied attack since the Marne. The German general staff could now foresee the complete elimination of Russia, the possibility of defeating Italy before the end of the year and, finally, the campaign of 1918 against the French and British on the western front, which might terminate the war.

"It can be said that German hopes of final victory were extravagant, either as viewed at that time or as viewed in the light of history. Financial problems of the Allies was difficult, supplies were becoming exhausted and their armies had suffered tremendous losses. Discouragement existed not only among the civil population but throughout the armies as well. Such was the Allied morale that, although their superiority on the western front during the last half of 1916 and during 1917 amounted to 20 percent, only local attacks could be undertaken and their effect proved wholly insufficient against the German defense. Allied resources in man power at home was low and there was little prospect of materially increasing their armed strength, even in the face of the possibility of having practically the whole strength of the Central Powers against them the spring of 1918.

This was the state of affairs that existed when we entered the war. While our action gave the Allies much encouragement yet this was temporary, and a review of conditions made it apparent that America must make a supreme material effort as soon as possible. After duly considering the tonnage possibilities I cabled the following to Washington on July 6, 1917:

"PLANS SHOULD CONTEMPLATE SENDING OVER AT LEAST 1,000,000 MEN BY NEXT MAY".

"A general organization project, covering as far as possible the personnel of all combat, staff, and administrative units, was forwarded to Washington on July 11th. This was prepared by the Operations Section of my staff and adopted in joint conference with the War Department Committee then in France. It embodied my conclusions on the military organization and effort required of America after a careful study of French and British experience. In forwarding the project I stated:

"IT IS EVIDENT THAT A FORCE OF ABOUT 1,000,000 IS THE SMALLEST UNIT WHICH IN MODERN WAR WILL BE A COMPLETE, WELL-BALANCED, AND INDEPENDENT FIGHTING ORGANIZATION. HOWEVER, IT MUST BE EQUALLY CLEAR THAT THE ADOPTION OF THIS SIZE FORCE AS A BASIS OF STUDY SHOULD NOT BE CONSTRUED AS REPRESENTING THE MAXIMUM FORCE WHICH SHOULD BE SENT TO OR WHICH WILL BE NEEDED IN FRANCE. IT IS TAKEN AS THE FORCE WHICH MAY BE EXPECTED TO REACH FRANCE IN TIME FOR AN OFFENSIVE IN 1918, AND AS A UNIT AND BASIS OF ORGANIZATION. PLANS FOR FUTURE SHOULD BE BASED, ESPECIALLY IN REFERENCE TO THE MANUFACTURE OF ARTILLERY, AVIATION, AND OTHER MATERIAL, ON THREE TIMES THIS FORCE - I.E., AT LEAST 3,000,000 MEN.

"The original project for organized combat units and its state of completion on November 11, 1918, with few minor changes, remained our guide until the end.

"While the general organization project provided for certain Services of Supply troops, which were an integral part of the larger combat units, it did not include the great body or troops and services required to maintain an army overseas. To disembark 2,000,000 men, move them to their training areas, shelter them, handle and store quantities of supplies and equipment they required called for extraordinary and immediate effort in construction. To provide the organization for this purpose a project for engineer services of the rear, including railways, was cabled to Washington August 5, 1917, following on September 18, 1917, by a complete service of the rear project, which listed item by item the troops necessary for the Services of Supply.

"In order that the War Department might have a clear-cut program to follow in the shipment or personnel and material to insure the gradual build up of a force at all times balanced and symmetrical, a comprehensive statement was prepared covering the order in which the troops and services enumerated in these two projects should arrive. The schedule of priority of shipments, forwarded to the War Department on October 7th, divided the initial force called for by the two projects into six phases corresponding to combatant corps of six divisions each.

"The importance of the three documents the general organization project, the service of the rear project, and the schedule of priority of shipments should be emphasized, because they formed the basic plan for providing an Army in France together with its material for combat, construction and supply.

"Before developing plans for a line of communications it was necessary to decide upon the probable sector of the front for the eventual employment of a distinctive American force. Our mission was offensive and it was essential to make plans for striking the enemy where a definite military decision could be gained.

"While the Allied armies had endeavored to maintain the offensive, the British, in order to guard the channel ports were committed to operations in Flanders and the French to the portion of the front protecting Paris. Both lacked troops to operate elsewhere on a large scale.

"To the east the great fortified district east of Verdun and around Metz menaced central France, protected the most exposed portion of the German line of communication, that being between Metz and Sedan, and covered the Briery iron region, from which the enemy obtained the greater part of the iron required for munitions and material. The coal fields east of Metz were also covered by these same defenses. A deep advance east of Metz, or the capture of the Briery region, by threatening the invasion of rich German territory in the Moselle Valley and the Saar Basin, thus curtailing her supply of iron and coal, would have the decisive effect in forcing a withdrawal of German troops from northern France. The

military and economic situation of the enemy, therefore, indicated Lorraine as the field promising the most fruitful results for the employment of our armies.

“The complexity of trench life had enormously increased the tonnage of supplies required by troops. Not only was it a question of providing food but enormous quantities of munitions and material were needed. Upon the railroads of France fell the burden of meeting the demands of the three and one-half million Allied combatants then engaged.

"The British were crowding the Channel ports and the French were exploiting the manufacturing center of Paris, so that the railroads of northern France were already much overtaxed. Even though the Channel ports might be used to a limited extent for shipments through England, the railroads leading eastward would have to cross British and French zones of operation, thus making the introduction of a line of communications based on ports and railways in that region quite impracticable. If the American army was to have an independent and flexible system it could not use the lines behind the British-Belgium front nor those in rear of the French front covering Paris.

"The problem confronting the American Expeditionary Forces was then to superimpose its rail communications on those of the French where there would be the least possible disturbance to the arteries of supply of the two great Allied armies already in the field. This would require the utmost use of these lines or the existing French railroad system that could bear an added burden. Double-track railroad lines from the ports of the Loire and the Gironde Rivers unite at Bourges, running thence via Nevers, Dijon, and Neufchateau, with lines radiating therefrom toward the right wing or the Allied front. It was estimated that these with the collateral lines available, after considerable improvement, could handle an additional 50,000 tons per day, required for an army of 2,000,000 men. The lines selected, therefore, were those leading from the comparatively unused south-Atlantic ports of France to the northeast where it was believed the American armies could be employed to the best advantage.

"In the location of our main depots of supply, while it was important that they should be accessible, yet they must also be at a safe distance, as we were to meet an aggressive enemy capable of taking the offensive in anyone of several directions. The area embracing Tours, Orleans, Montargis, Nevers and Chateauroux was chosen, as it was centrally located with regard to all points on the arc of the western front.

"The ports of St. Nazaire, LaPallice, and Bassens were designated for permanent use, while Nantes, Bordeaux, and Pauillac were for emergency use. Several smaller ports such as St. Malo, Sabers-d'Olonne, and Bayonne, were available chiefly for the importation of coal from England. From time to time, certain trans-Atlantic ships were sent to Le Havre and Cherbourg. In anticipation of a large increase in the amount of tonnage that might be required later, arrangements were made during the German offensive of 1918 to utilize the ports of Marseilles and Toulon as well as other smaller ports on the Mediterranean.

“For all practical purposes the American Expeditionary Forces were based on the American continent. Three thousand miles of ocean to cross with the growing submarine menace confronting us, the quantity of ship tonnage that would be available then unknown and a line of communication by land 400 miles long from French ports to our probable front presented difficulties that seemed almost insurmountable as compared to those of our allies.

“For purposes of local administration our line of communications in France was subdivided into districts or sections. The territory corresponding to and immediately surrounding the principal ports were, respectively, called base sections, with an intermediate section embracing the region of the great storage depots and an advance section extending to the zone of operations, within which the billeting and training areas for our earlier divisions was located.

In providing for the storage and distribution of reserve supplies an allowance of 45 days in the base sections was planned, with 30 days in the intermediate section and 15 days in the advance section. After the safety of our sea transport was practically assured, this was reduced to a total of 45 days, distributed proportionately. When the Armistice was signed all projects of construction had been

completed and supplies were on hand to meet the needs of 2,000,000 men, while further plans for necessary construction and for the supply of an additional 2,000,000 were well under way.

"The organization of the General Staff and supply services was one of the first matters to engage my attention. Our situation in this regard was wholly unlike that of our Allies. The French Army was at home and in close touch with its civil government and war department agencies. While the British were organized on an over-seas basis, they were within easy reach of their base or supplies in England. Their problems of supply and replacement were simple compared to ours. Their training could be carried out at home with the experience of the front at hand, while our troops must be sent as ships were provided and their training resumed in France where discontinued in the States. Our available tonnage was inadequate to meet all the initial demands, so that priority of material for combat and construction, as well as for supplies that could be purchased in Europe. must be established by those whose perspective included all the services and who were familiar with general plans For the proper direction and coordination of the details nr administration, intelligence, operations, supply, and training, a General Staff was an indispensable part of the Army.

"The functions of the General Staff at headquarters were finally allotted to the five sections, each under an Assistant Chief or Staff, as follows: To the First, or Administrative Section -ocean tonnage, priority of overseas shipments, replacement of man and animals, organization and types of equipment for troops, billeting, prisoners of war, military police, leaves and leave areas, welfare work and amusements; to the Second, or Intelligence Section - information regarding the enemy, including espionage and counterespionage, maps and censorship; to the Third, or Operations Section - strategic studies and plans and employment of combat troops; to the Fourth Section - coordination of supply services, including construction, transportation, and Medical Departments, and control of regulating stations for supply; to the Fifth, or Training Section - tactical training, schools, preparation of tactical manuals, and athletics. This same system was applied in the lower echelons or the command down to include divisions, except that in corps and divisions, the Fourth Section was merged with the first, and the Fifth Section with the Third.

"As the American Expeditionary Forces grew, it was considered advisable that, in matters or procurement transportation, and supply, the chiefs or the several supply services, who had hitherto been under the General Staff at my Headquarters, should be placed directly under the supervision of the commanding general, Services or Supply. At General Headquarters, a Deputy Chief or Staff to assist the Chief of Staff was provided, and the heads of the five General staff Section became Assistant Chiefs of Staff.

"The General Staff at my headquarters thereafter concerned itself with the broader phase of control. Under my general supervision and pursuant to clearly determined policies the assistant Chiefs of Staff, coordinated by the Chief of Staff, issued instructions and gave general direction to the great combat units and to the Services of Supply, keeping always in close touch with the manner and promptness of their fulfillment. Thus a system of direct responsibility was put into operation which contemplated secrecy in preparation, prompt, decision in emergency, and coordinated action in execution.

With the growth of our forces the demand for staff officers rapidly increased but the available number of officers trained for staff duty was very limited. To meet this deficiency, a General Staff College was organized at Langres on November 28, 1917, for the instruction of such officers as could be spared. An intensive course or study of three months was prescribed embracing the details or our staff organization and administration, and our system of supply, and teaching the combined employment of all arms and services in combat. Officers were carefully chosen for their suitability and, considering the short time available, graduates from this school returned well equipped for staff duties with a loyal spirit of common service much accentuated. The Staff College carried to completion four courses of three months each, graduating 537 staff officers.

"Soon after our arrival in Europe, careful study was made or the methods followed by our Allies in training combat troops. Both the French and British maintained continuously a great system of schools

and training centers, which provided for both theoretical and practical instruction of inexperienced officers and non-commissioned officers. These centers were required not only to train new troops but to prepare officers and soldiers for advancement by giving them a short course in the duties of their new grades. These school systems made it possible to spread rapidly a knowledge or the latest methods developed experience and at the same time counteract false notions. .

"A similar scheme was adopted in August, 1917, for our Armies in which the importance of teaching throughout our forces, a sound righting doctrine of our own was emphasized. It provided for troop training in all units up to include divisions. Corps 'centers of instruction for noncommissioned officers and unit commanders or all arms were also established. These centers also provided special training for the instructors needed at Corps Schools. Base training centers for replacement troops and special classes of soldiers, such as cooks and mechanics, were also designated. The army and corps schools were retained under the direct supervision of the Training Section, General Staff. The schools mentioned graduated 21,330 noncommissioned officers and 13, 916 officers.

"Particular care was taken to search the ranks for the most promising soldiers in order to develop leaders for the command of platoons and companies. There were graduated from these officer candidate schools in France 10,976 soldiers. It was planned to have 22,000 infantrymen under instruction by January 1919, graduating 5,000 to 6,000 each month. In addition, there were graduated monthly 800 artillerymen, 400 engineers, and 200 signalmen, making a total of about 7,000 soldiers each month. Prior to November 14, 1918, 12,732 soldiers were commissioned as officers.

"It must not be thought that such a system is ideal, but it represents a compromise between the demand for efficiency and the imperative and immediate necessity for trained replacement officers.

Every advantage was taken of the experience of our allies in training officers. It was early recommended to the War Department that French and British officers be asked for to assist in the instruction of troops in the United States. Pending the organization and development of our own schools a large number of our officers were sent to centers of instruction of the Allied armies. The training of our earlier divisions was begun in close association with the French divisions, under conditions set forth in the following paragraph of divisional training:

"FRENCH WARFARE NATURALLY GIVES PROMINENCE TO THE DEFENSIVE .AS OPPOSED TO THE OFFENSIVE TO GUARD AGAINST THIS, THE BASIS OF INSTRUCTION SHOULD BE ESSENTIALLY THE OFFENSIVE BOTH IN SPIRIT AND IN PRACTICE. THE DEFENSIVE IS ACCEPTED ONLY TO PREPARE FOR FUTURE OFFENSE.

"For training our Artillery units, special localities such as Valdahon, Coetquido, Meucon, and Souge, had to be sought, and the instruction was usually carried on in conjunction with French artillery, followed up later, as far as possible, with field practice in cooperation with our own infantry.

"The long period of trench warfare had so impressed itself upon the French and British that they had almost dispensed with training for open warfare. It was to avoid this result in our Army and to encourage the offensive spirit that the following was published in October, 1917:

"1. ***** (a) The above methods to be employed must remain or become strictly our own.

(b) All instruction must contemplate the assumption of a vigorous offensive .This purpose will be emphasized in every phase of training until it becomes a settled habit of thought.

(c) The general principles governing combat remain unchanged in their essence. This war has developed special features which involve special phases of training, but the fundamental ideas enunciated in our Drill Regulations, Small Arms Firing Manual, Field Service Regulations, and other service manuals remain the guide for both officers and soldiers and constitute the standard by which their efficiency is to be measured, except as modified in detail by instructions from these headquarters.

{d) The rifle and the bayonet are the principal weapons of the Infantry soldier. He will be trained to a high degree of skill as a marksman, both on the target range and in field firing. An aggressive spirit must be developed until the soldier feels himself , as a bayonet fighter, invincible in battle.

(e) All officers and soldiers should realize that at no time in our history has discipline been so important; therefore, discipline of the highest order must be exacted at all times. The standards for the

American Army will be those of West Point. The rigid attention, upright bearing, attention to detail, uncomplaining obedience to instructions required of the cadet will be required of every officer and soldier of our armies in France.

"Recommendations were cabled to Washington emphasizing the importance of target practice and musketry training, and recommended that instruction in open warfare be made the mission of troops in the United States, while the training in trench warfare, so far as necessary, be conducted in France. Succeeding divisions, whether serving temporarily with the British or French, were trained as thus indicated. The assistance of the French units was limited to demonstrations, and, in the beginning, French instructors taught the use of French arms and assisted in the preparation of elementary trench warfare problems .

"Assuming that divisions would arrive with their basic training completed in the United States, one month was allotted for the instruction of small units from battalions down, a second month or experience in quiet sectors by battalions, and a third month for field practice in open warfare tactics ~ division, including artillery. Unfortunately, many divisions did not receive the requisite amount of systematic training before leaving the States and complete preparation of such units for battle was thus often seriously delayed.

"The system of training profoundly influenced the combat efficiency of our troops by its determined insistence upon an offensive doctrine and upon training in warfare of movement. Instruction which had hitherto been haphazard, varying with the ideas and conceptions of inexperienced commanding officers and indifferent instructors, was brought under a system based upon correct principles. Approved and systematic methods were maintained and enforced largely by the continual presence of members of the Training Section with the troops both during the training period and in campaign.

"Before our entry into the war, European experience had shown that military operations can be carried out successfully and without unnecessary losses only in the light of complete and reliable information of the enemy. Warfare with battle lines separated by short distances only, made the early acquirement of information, such as that obtained through airplane photography, observation from balloons and planes sensitive instruments for detecting gun positions and raids to secure prisoners and documents. All such information, together with that from Allied sources, including military, political and economical, was collected, classified, and rapidly distributed where needed.

"From careful studies of the systems and actual participation by our officers in methods in use at various Allied headquarters, an intelligence service was evolved in our forces which operated successfully from its first organization in 1917.

"With us the simpler methods, such as observation from the air and ground and the exploitation of prisoners and documents, have proved more effective than the less direct means. Every unit from the battalion up had an intelligence detachment, but only in divisions and larger organizations did the intelligence agencies embrace all available means and sources, including radio interception stations and sound and flash-ranging detachments.

The subjects studied by the Intelligence Section embraced the location of the enemy's front line, his order of battle, the history and fighting value of his divisions, his manpower, his combat activities, circulation and movement, his defensive organizations, supply, construction and material, air service, radio service, strategy and tactics, and what he probably knew of our intentions. The political and economic conditions within the enemies countries were also of extreme importance.

"To disseminate conclusions, daily publications were necessary, such as Secret Summary of Intelligence containing information of the broadest scope, which concerned only General Headquarters; and a Summary or Information, distributed down to include divisions, giving information affecting the western front. A Press Review and a Summary of Air intelligence were also published. .

"Maps showing graphically the disposition and movement of enemy troops in our front were the best means for distributing information to our troops. At the base printing plant and at General Headquarters, base maps were prepared while mobile printing plants, mounted on trucks, accompanied corps and army headquarters. Combat troops were thus supplied with excellent maps distributed, just

before and during an attack, down to include company and platoon commanders, Between July 1 and November 11, 1918, over 5,000,000 maps were used.

"The secret service, espionage and counter-espionage, was organized in close cooperation with the French and British. To prevent indiscretions in the letters of officers and soldiers, as well as in articles written for the press, the Censorship Division was created. The Base Censor examined individual letters when the writer so desired, censored all mail written in foreign languages, of which there were over 50 used, and frequently checked up letters of entire organizations.

"The policy of press censorship adopted aimed to accomplish three broad results:

"To prevent the enemy from obtaining important information of our forces.

"To give the people of the United States the maximum information consistent with the limitations imposed by the first object.

"To cause to be presented to the American people the facts as they were known at the time."

There were with our forces 36 regularly accredited correspondents, while visiting correspondents reached a total of 411.

"In order to hinder the enemy's conquest of Russia and, if possible, prevent a German attack on Italy, or in the near east, the Allies sought to maintain the offensive on the western front as far as their diminished strength and morale would permit. On June 7, 1917, the British took Messines, while a succession of operations known as the Third Battle of Ypres began on July 31 and terminated with the capture of the Passchendaele Ridge, November 6-10. The British attack at Cambrai is of special interest, since it was here that American troops (Eleventh Engineers) first participated in active fighting.

"The French successfully attacked on a limited front near Verdun, capturing Fort Homme. On August 20 and advancing their lines to La Forge Brook. In another offensive, begun on October 23, they gained considerable ground on Chemin des Dames Ridge. These French attacks were characterized by most careful preparation to insure success in order to improve the morale of the troops.

"Notwithstanding these Allied attacks on the western front, the immense gains by the German armies in the east, culminating at Riga on September 3, precipitated the collapse of Russia. The following month the Austrians with German assistance surprised the Italians and broke through the lines of Caporetto, driving the Italian armies back to the Piave River, inflicting a loss of 300,000 men, 600,000 rifles, 3,000 guns and enormous stores. These serious crises compelled the withdrawal of 10 French and British Divisions from the Western Front to Italy. The German situation on all other theaters was so favorable that as early as November they began the movement of divisions toward the western front. If needed, their divisions could be withdrawn from the Italian front before the French and British dared recall their divisions.

"At first the Allies could hardly hope for a large American Army. Marshal Joffre during his visit to America had made special request that a combat division be sent at once to Europe as visual evidence of our purpose to participate actively in the war, and also asked for Engineer regiments and other special service units.

"The arrival of the First Division and the parade of certain of its elements in Paris on July 4, 1917, caused great enthusiasm and for the time being, French morale was stimulated. Still Allied apprehension was deep-seated and material assistance was imperative. The following extract is quoted from the cabled summary of an Allied conference held on July 26 with the French and Italian Commanders-in-Chief and the British and French Chiefs of Staff:

"GENERAL CONCLUSIONS REACHED WERE NECESSITY FOR ADOPTION OF PURELY DEFENSIVE ATTITUDE ON ALL SECONDARY FRONTS AND WITHDRAWING SURPLUS TROOPS FOR DUTY ON WESTERN FRONT. BY THUS STRENGTHENING WESTERN FRONT BELIEVED ALLIES COULD HOLD UNTIL AMERICAN FORCES ARRIVE IN NUMBERS SUFFICIENT TO GAIN ASCENDANCY".

"The Conference urged the immediate study of the tonnage situation with a view to accelerating the arrival of American troops. With the approach of winter, depression among the Allies over the

Russian collapse and the Italian crises was intensified by the conviction that the Germans would undertake a decisive offensive in the spring.

"A review of the situation showed that with Russia out of the war the Central Powers would be able to release a large number of divisions for service elsewhere, and that during the spring and summer of 1918, without interfering with the status quo at Salonica, they could concentrate on the western front a force much stronger than that of the Allies. In view of this, it was represented to the War Department in December as of the utmost importance that the Allied preparations be expedited.

"On December 31, 1917, there were 176,665 American troops in France and but one division had appeared on the front. Disappointment at the delay of the American effort soon began to develop. French and British authorities suggested the more rapid entry of our troops into the line and urged the amalgamation of our troops with their own, even insisting upon the curtailment of training to conform to the strict minimum of trench requirements they considered necessary.

"My conclusion was that, although the morale of the German people and the armies was better than it had been for two years, only an untoward combination of circumstances could give the enemy a decisive victory before American support as recommended could be effective, providing the Allies secured unity of action. However, a situation might arise which would necessitate the temporary use of all American troops in the units of our Allies for the defensive, but nothing in the situation justified the relinquishment of our firm purpose to form our own Army under our own flag.

"While the Germans were practicing for open warfare and concentrating their most aggressive personnel in shock divisions, of the Allies was still limited to trench warfare. As our troops were being trained for open warfare, there was every reason why we should not allow them to be scattered among our Allies, even by divisions, much less as replacements, except by pressure of sheer necessity. Any sort of permanent amalgamation would irrevocably commit America's fortunes to the hands of the Allies. Moreover, it was obvious that the lack of homogeneity would render these mixed divisions difficult to maneuver and almost certain to break up under stress of defeat, with the consequent mutual recrimination. Again, there was no doubt that the realization by the German people that independent American divisions, corps, or armies were in the field with determined purpose would be a severe blow to German morale and prestige .

"It was also certain that an early appearance of the larger American units on the front would be most beneficial to the morale of the Allies themselves .Accordingly, the First Division, on January 19, 1918, took over a sector north of Toul; the twenty-sixth Division went to the Soissons front early in February; the Forty-second Division entered the line near Luneville, February 21, and the Second Division near Verdun, March 18. Meanwhile, the First Army Corps Headquarters, Major General Hunter Liggett, commanding, was organized at Neufchateau on January 20, and the plan to create an independent American sector on the Lorraine front was taking shape .

"This was the situation when the great German offensive was launched on March 21, 1918.

"The War Department planned as early as July, 1917, to send to France by June 15, 1918, 21 divisions of the then strength of 20,000 men each, together with auxiliary and replacement troops, and those needed for the line of communications, amounting to over 200,000, making a total of some 650,000 men. Beginning with October, 6 divisions were to be sent during that quarter, 7 during the first quarter of 1918, and 8 in the second quarter. While these numbers fell short of my recommendation of July 6, 1917, which contemplated at least 1,000,000 men by May 1st of 1918, it should be borne in mind that the main factor in the problem was the amount of shipping to become available for military purposes, in which must be included tonnage required to supply the Allies With steel, coal and food.

"On December 2, 1917, an estimate of the situation was cabled to the War Department, with the following recommendation:

"PAR. 3. IN VIEW OF THESE CONDITIONS, IT IS OF THE UTMOST IMPORTANCE TO THE ALLIED CAUSE THAT WE MOVE SWIFTLY. THE MINIMUM NUMBER OF TROOPS WE SHOULD PLAN TO HAVE IN FRANCE BY END OF JUNE IS 4 ARMY CORPS OF 24 DIVISIONS

IN ADDITION TO TROOPS FOR SERVICE OF THE REAR. HAVE IMPRESSED THE PRESENT URGENCY UPON GENERAL BLISS AND OTHER AMERICAN MEMBERS OF CONFERENCE. GENERALS ROBERTSON, FOCH, AND BLISS AGREE WITH ME THAT THIS IS THE MINIMUM THAT SHOULD BE AIMED AT. THIS FIGURE IS GIVEN AS THE LOWEST WE SHOULD THINK OF AND IS PLACED NO HIGHER BECAUSE THE LIMIT OF AVAILABLE TRANSPORTATION WOULD SEEM TO WARRANT IT.

"PAR. 4. A STUDY OF TRANSPORTATION FACILITIES SHOWS SUFFICIENT AMERICAN TONNAGE TO BRING OVER THIS NUMBER OF TROOPS, BUT TO DO SO THERE MUST BE A REDUCTION IN THE TONNAGE ALLOTTED TO OTHER THAN ARMY NEEDS. IT IS ESTIMATED THAT THE SHIPPING NEEDED WILL HAVE TO BE RAPIDLY INCREASED UP TO 2,000,000 TONS BY MAY, IN ADDITION TO THE AMOUNT ALLOTTED. THE USE OF SHIPPING FOR COMMERCIAL PURPOSES MUST BE CURTAILED AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE .THE ALLIES ARE VERY WEAK AND WE MUST COME TO THEIR RELIEF THIS YEAR, 1918. THE YEAR AFTER MAY BE TOO LATE. IT IS VERY DOUBTFUL IF THEY CAN HOLD OUT UNTIL 1919 UNLESS WE GIVE THEM A LOT OF SUPPORT THIS YEAR. IT IS THEREFORE STRONGLY RECOMMENDED THAT A COMPLETE READJUSTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION BE MADE AND THAT THE NEEDS OF THE WAR DEPARTMENT AS SET FORTH ABOVE BE REGARDED AS IMMEDIATE. FURTHER DETAILS OF THESE REQUIREMENTS WILL BE SENT LATER.

and again on December 20, 1917:

UNDERSTOOD HERE THAT A SHIPPING PROGRAM BASED ON TONNAGE IN SIGHT PREPARED IN WAR COLLEGE DIVISION IN SEPTEMBER CONTEMPLATED THAT ENTIRE FIRST CORPS WITH ITS CORPS TROOPS AND SOME 32,000 AUXILIARIES WERE TO HAVE BEEN SHIPPED BY END OF NOVEMBER, AND THAT AN ADDITIONAL PROGRAM FOR DECEMBER, JANUARY AND FEBRUARY CONTEMPLATES THAT THE SHIPMENT OF THE SECOND CORPS AND OTHER AUXILIARIES SHOULD BE PRACTICALLY COMPLETED BY THE END OF FEBRUARY. SHOULD SUCH A PROGRAM BE CARRIED OUT AS PER SCHEDULE AND SHOULD SHIPMENTS CONTINUE AT CORRESPONDING RATE, IT WOULD NOT SUCCEED IN PLACING EVEN THREE COMPLETE CORPS, WITH PROPER PROPORTION OF ARMY TROOPS AND AUXILIARIES, IN FRANCE BY THE END OF MAY. THE ACTUAL FACTS ARE THAT SHIPMENTS ARE NOT EVEN KEEPING UP TO THAT SCHEDULE .IT IS NOW THE MIDDLE OF DECEMBER AND THE FIRST CORPS IS STILL INCOMPLETE BY OVER TWO ENTIRE DIVISIONS {REPLACEMENT AND DEPOT DIVISIONS) AND MANY CORPS TROOPS. IT CAN NOT BE TOO EMPHATICALLY DECLARED THAT WE SHOULD BE PREPARED TO TAKE THE FIELD WITH AT LEAST FOUR CORPS BY JUNE 30. IN VIEW OF PAST PERFORMANCES WITH TONNAGE HERETOFORE AVAILABLE SUCH A PROJECT IS IMPOSSIBLE OF FULFILLMENT, BUT ONLY BY MOST STRENUOUS ATTEMPTS TO ATTAIN SUCH RESULT WILL WE BE IN A POSITION TO TAKE A PROPER PART IN OPERATIONS IN 1918. IN VIEW OF THE FACT THAT AS THE NUMBER OF OUR TROOPS HERE INCREASES A CORRESPONDINGLY GREATER AMOUNT OF TONNAGE MUST BE PROVIDED FOR THEIR SUPPLY, AND ALSO IN VIEW OF THE SLOW RATE OF SHIPMENT WITH TONNAGE NOW AVAILABLE, IT IS MOST URGENT THAT MORE TONNAGE SHOULD BE OBTAINED AT ONCE AS ALREADY RECOMMENDED IN MY CABLES AND BY GENERAL BLISS.

“During January 1918, discussions were held with the British authorities that resulted in an agreement, which became known as the six-division plan and which provided for the transportation of six entire divisions in British tonnage, without interference with our own shipping program. High commanders, staff, infantry and auxiliary troops were to be given experience with British divisions,

beginning with battalions, the Artillery being trained under American direction, using French materiel. It was agreed that when sufficiently trained, these battalions were to be reformed into regiments and that when the Artillery was fully trained all of the units comprising such division were to be united for service under their own officers. It was planned that the period of training with the British should cover about 10 weeks. To supervise the administration and training of three divisions the Second Corps staff was organized February 20, 1918.

"In the latter part of January, Joint Note No. 12, presented by the Military Representatives with the Supreme Council, was approved by the Council. This note concluded that France would be safe during 1918 only under certain conditions, namely:

"(A) THAT THE STRENGTH OF THE BRITISH AND FRENCH TROOPS IN FRANCE ARE CONTINUOUSLY KEPT UP TO THEIR PRESENT TOTAL STRENGTH AND THAT THEY RECEIVE THE EXPECTED REINFORCEMENTS OF NOT LESS THAN TWO AMERICAN DIVISIONS PER MONTH."

"The first German offensive of 1918, beginning March 21, overran all resistance during the initial period of the attack. Within eight days the enemy had completely crossed the old Somme battlefield and had swept everything before him to a depth of some 56 kilometers (35 miles). For a few days the loss of the railroad center at Amiens appeared imminent. The offensive made such inroads upon French and British reserves that defeat stared them in the face unless the new American troops should prove more immediately available than even the most optimistic had dared to hope. On March 27 the Military Representatives with the supreme War Council prepared their Joint note No. 18. This note repeated the previously quoted statement from Joint Note No. 12, and continued:

"THE BATTLE WHICH IS DEVELOPING AT THE PRESENT MOMENT IN FRANCE AND WHICH CAN EXTEND TO THE OTHER FIELDS OF OPERATION, MAY VERY QUICKLY PLACE THE ALLIED ARMIES IN A SERIOUS SITUATION FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF EFFECTIVES, AND THE MILITARY REPRESENTATIVES ARE FROM THIS MOMENT OF THE OPINION THAT THE ABOVE DETAILED CONDITION CAN NO LONGER BE MAINTAINED, AND THEY CONSIDER AS A GENERAL PROPOSITION THAT THE NEW SITUATION REQUIRES NEW DECISIONS.

"THE MILITARY REPRESENTATIVES ARE OF THE OPINION THAT IT IS HIGHLY DESIRABLE THAT THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT SHOULD ASSIST THE ALLIED ARMIES AS SOON AS POSSIBLE BY PERMITTING IN PRINCIPLE TEMPORARY SERVICE OF AMERICAN UNITS IN ALLIED ARMY CORPS AND DIVISIONS. SUCH REINFORCEMENTS MUST, HOWEVER, BE OBTAINED FROM OTHER UNITS THAN THOSE AMERICAN DIVISIONS WHICH ARE NOW OPERATING WITH THE FRENCH, AND THE UNITS SO TEMPORARILY EMPLOYED MUST EVENTUALLY BE RETURNED TO THE AMERICAN ARMY. .

"THE MILITARY REPRESENTATIVES ARE OF THE OPINION THAT FROM THE PRESENT TIME, IN EXECUTION OF THE FOREGOING, AND UNTIL, OTHERWISE DIRECTED BY THE SUPREME WAR COUNCIL., ONLY AMERICAN INFANTRY AND MACHINE GUN UNITS, ORGANIZED AS THAT GOVERNMENT MAY DECIDE, BE BROUGHT TO FRANCE, AND THAT ALL AGREEMENTS OR CONVENTIONS HITHERTO MADE IN CONFLICT WITH THIS DECISION BE MODIFIED ACCORDINGLY".

"The Secretary of War, who was in France at this time, General Bliss, the American Military Representative with the Supreme War Council, and I at once conferred on the terms of this note, with the result that the Secretary recommended to the President that Joint Note No. 18 be approved in the following sense :

"THE PURPOSE OF THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT IS TO RENDER THE FULLEST COOPERATION AND AID, AND THEREFORE THE RECOMMENDATION OF THE MILITARY REPRESENTATIVES WITH REGARD TO THE PREFERENTIAL TRANSPORTATION OF AMERICAN INFANTRY AND MACHINE GUN UNITS IN THE PRESENT EMERGENCY IS APPROVED. SUCH UNITS, WHEN TRANSPORTED, WILL BE UNDER THE DIRECTION OF THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES , AND WILL BE ASSIGNED FOR TRAINING AND USE BY HIM IN HIS DISCRETION. HE WILL USE THESE AND ALL OTHER MILITARY FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES UNDER HIS COMMAND IN SUCH MANNER AS TO RENDER THE GREATEST MILITARY ASSISTANCE, KEEPING IN MIND ALWAYS THE DETERMINATION OF THIS GOVERNMENT TO HAVE ITS VARIOUS MILITARY FORCES COLLECTED, AS SPEEDILY AS THEIR TRAINING AND THE MILITARY SITUATION PERMITS, INTO AN INDEPENDENT AMERICAN ARMY, ACTING IN CONCERT WITH THE ARMIES OF GREAT BRITAIN AND FRANCE, AND ALL ARRANGEMENTS BY HIM FOR THEIR TEMPORARY TRAINING AND SERVICE WILL BE MADE WITH THAT END IN VIEW.

“While G. O. No. 18 was general in terms, the priority of shipments of infantry more especially pertained to those divisions that were to be trained in the British area, as that Government was to provide the additional shipping according to the six-division plan agreed upon even before the beginning of the March 21 offensive.

“On April 2, the War Department cabled that preferential transportation would be given to American infantry and machine-gun units during the existing emergency. Preliminary arrangements were made for training and early employment with the French of such infantry units as might be sent over by our own transportation. As for the British agreement, the six-division plan was to be modified to give priority to the infantry of those divisions. However, all the Allies were now urging the indefinite continuation of priority for the shipment of infantry and its complete incorporation in their units, which fact was earlier cabled to the War Department on April 3, with the specific recommendation that the total immediate priority of infantry be limited to four divisions, plus 45,500 replacements, and that the necessity for future priority be determined later.

"The Secretary of War and I held a conference with British authorities on April 7, during which it developed that the British had erroneously assumed that the preferential shipment of infantry was to be continued. It was agreed at this meeting that 60,000 infantry and machine-gun, with certain auxiliaries to be brought over by British tonnage during April, should go to the British area as part of the six-division plan, but that there should be further agreement as to subsequent troops to be brought over for the British. Consequently, a readjustment of the priority schedule was undertaken on the basis of postponing “shipment of all non-combatant troops” to the utmost to meet the present situation, and at the same time not make it impossible to build up our own Army.

"The battle line in the vicinity of Amiens had hardly stabilized when on April 9, the Germans made another successful attack against the British lines on a front of some 40 kilometers (25 miles) in the vicinity of Armentiers and along the Lys River. As a result of its being included in a salient formed by the German Advance, Passchendaele Ridge, the capture of which cost 80 dearly in 1917, was evacuated by the British on April 17.

"The losses had been heavy and the British were unable to replace them entirely. They were, therefore, making extraordinary efforts to increase the shipping available for our troops. On April 21, I went to London to clear up certain questions concerning the rate of shipment and to reach the further agreement provided for in the April 7 conference. The result of this London agreement was cabled to Washington April 24, as follows:

"(A) THAT ONLY THE INFANTRY, MACHINE GUNS, ENGINEERS, AND SIGNAL TROOPS OF AMERICAN DIVISIONS AND THE HEADQUARTERS OF DIVISIONS AND BRIGADES BE SENT OVER IN BRITISH AND AMERICAN SHIPPING DURING MAY FOR

TRAINING AND SERVICE WITH THE BRITISH ARMY IN FRANCE UP TO SIX DIVISIONS AND THAT ANY SHIPPING IN EXCESS OF THAT REQUIRED FOR THESE TROOPS BE UTILIZED TO TRANSPORT TROOPS NECESSARY TO MAKE THESE DIVISIONS COMPLETE. THE TRAINING AND SERVICE OF THESE TROOPS WILL BE CARRIED OUT IN ACCORDANCE WITH PLANS ALREADY AGREED UPON BETWEEN SIR DOUGLAS HAIG AND GENERAL PERSHING, WITH A VIEW AT AN EARLY DATE OF BUILDING UP AMERICAN DIVISIONS.

“(B) THAT THE AMERICAN PERSONNEL OF THE ARTILLERY OF THESE DIVISIONS AND SUCH CORPS TROOPS AS MAY BE REQUIRED TO BUILD UP AMERICAN CORPS ORGANIZATIONS FOLLOW IMMEDIATELY THEREAFTER, AND THAT AMERICAN ARTILLERY PERSONNEL BE TRAINED WITH FRENCH MATERIEL AND JOIN ITS PROPER DIVISION AS SOON AS THOROUGHLY TRAINED.

“(C) IF, WHEN THE PROGRAM OUTLINED IN PARAGRAPHS (A) AND (B) IS COMPLETED, THE MILITARY SITUATION MAKES ADVISABLE THE FURTHER SHIPMENT OF INFANTRY, ETC. , OF AMERICAN DIVISIONS, THEN ALL THE BRITISH AND AMERICAN SHIPPING AVAILABLE FOR TRANSPORT OF TROOPS SHALL BE USED FOR THAT PURPOSE UNDER SUCH ARRANGEMENT AS WILL INSURE IMMEDIATE AID TO THE ALLIES, AND AT THE SAME TIME PROVIDE AT THE EARLIEST MOMENT FOR BRINGING OVER AMERICAN ARTILLERY AND OTHER NECESSARY UNITS TO COMPLETE THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN DIVISIONS AND CORPS PROVIDED, THAT THE COMBATANT TROOPS MENTIONED IN (A) AND (B) ABOVE BE FOLLOWED BY SUCH SERVICE OF THE REAR AND OTHER TROOPS AS MAY BE CONSIDERED NECESSARY BY THE AMERICAN COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF.

“(D) THAT IT IS CONTEMPLATED AMERICAN DIVISIONS AND CORPS WHEN TRAINED AND ORGANIZED SHALL BE UTILIZED UNDER THE AMERICAN COMMANDER IN CHIEF IN AN AMERICAN GROUP.

“(E) THAT THE AMERICAN COMMANDER IN CHIEF SHALL ALLOT AMERICAN TROOPS TO THE FRENCH OR BRITISH FOR TRAINING OR TRAIN THEM WITH AMERICAN UNITS AT HIS DISCRETION, WITH THE UNDERSTANDING THAT ALREADY TRANSPORTED BY BRITISH SHIPPING OR INCLUDED IN THE SIX DIVISIONS MENTIONED IN PARAGRAPH (A) ARE TO BE TRAINED WITH THE BRITISH ARMY, DETAILS AS TO RATIONS, EQUIPMENT, AND TRANSPORT TO BE DETERMINED BY SPECIAL AGREEMENT.

"At a meeting of the Supreme War Council held at Abbeville May 1 and 2, the entire question of the amalgamation of Americans with the French and British was reopened. An urgent appeal came from both French and Italian representatives for American replacements or units to serve with their armies. After prolonged discussions regarding this question and that of priority generally the following agreement was reached, committing the Council to in independent American Army and providing for the immediate shipment of certain troops:

"IT IS THE OPINION OF THE SUPREME WAR COUNCIL THAT, IN ORDER TO CARRY THE WAR TO A SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION, AN AMERICAN ARMY SHOULD BE FORMED AS EARLY AS POSSIBLE UNDER ITS COMMANDER AND UNDER ITS OWN FLAG. IN ORDER TO MEET THE PRESENT EMERGENCY IT IS AGREED THAT AMERICAN TROOPS Should BE BROUGHT TO FRANCE AS RAPIDLY AS ALLIED TRANSPORTATION FACILITIES WILL PERMIT, AND THAT, AS FAR AS CONSISTENT WITH THE NECESSITY OF BUILDING UP AN AMERICAN ARMY , PREFERENCE WILL BE GIVEN TO INFANTRY AND MACHINE-GUN UNITS FOR TRAINING AND SERVICE WITH FRENCH AND BRITISH ARMIES; WITH THE UNDERSTANDING THAT SUCH INFANTRY AND MACHINE-GUN UNITS ARE TO BE WITHDRAWN AND UNITED WITH

ITS OWN ARTILLERY AND AUXILIARY TROOPS INTO DIVISIONS AND CORPS AT THE DIRECTION OF THE AMERICAN COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF AFTER CONSULTATION WITH THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE ALLIED ARMIES IN FRANCE.

"SUBPARAGRAPH A. IT IS ALSO AGREED THAT DURING THE MONTH OF MAY PREFERENCE SHOULD BE GIVEN TO THE TRANSPORTATION OF INFANTRY AND MACHINE GUN UNITS OF SIX DIVISIONS, AND THAT ANY EXCESS TONNAGE SHALL BE DEVOTED TO BRINGING OVER SUCH OTHER TROOPS AS MAY BE DETERMINED BY THE AMERICAN COMMANDER-IN- CHIEF.

"SUBPARAGRAPH B. IT IS FURTHER AGREED THAT THIS PROGRAM SHALL BE CONTINUED DURING THE MONTH OF JUNE UPON CONDITION THAT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT SHALL FURNISH TRANSPORTATION FOR A MINIMUM OF 130,000 MEN IN MAY AND 150,000 MEN IN JUNE, WITH THE UNDERSTANDING THAT THE FIRST SIX DIVISIONS OF INFANTRY SHALL GO TO THE BRITISH FOR TRAINING AND SERVICE, AND THAT TROOPS SENT OVER IN JUNE SHALL BE ALLOCATED FOR TRAINING AND SERVICE AS THE AMERICAN COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF MAY DETERMINE.

"SUBPARAGRAPH C. IT IS ALSO FURTHER AGREED THAT IF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT SHALL TRANSPORT AN EXCESS OF 150,000 MEN IN JUNE THAT SUCH EXCESS SHALL BE INFANTRY AND MACHINE GUN UNITS, AND THAT EARLY IN JUNE THERE SHALL BE A NEW REVIEW OF THE SITUATION TO DETERMINE FURTHER ACTION.

The gravity or the situation had brought the Allies to a realization of the necessity of providing all possible tonnage for the transportation of American troops. Although their views were accepted to the extent of giving a considerable priority to infantry and machine gunners, the priority agreed upon as to this class of troops was not as extensive as some of them deemed necessary, and the Abbeville conference was adjourned with the understanding that the question of further priority would be discussed at a conference to be held about the end of May.

"The next offensive of the enemy was made between the Oise and Berry-au-Bao against the French instead of against the British, as was generally expected, and it came as a complete surprise. The initial Aisne attack, covering a front of 35 kilometers (approx. 22 miles), met with remarkable success, as the German armies advanced no less than 50 kilometers (approx. 30 miles) in four days. On reaching the Marne, that river was used as a defensive flank and the German attack was directed toward Paris. During the first days of June something akin to panic seized the city and it is estimated that 1,000,000 left during the spring.

"The further conference which had been agreed upon at Abbeville was held at Versailles on June 1 and 2. The opinion of our Allies as to the existing situation and the urgency of their assistance upon further priority for infantry and machine gunners are shown by the following message prepared by the Prime Ministers of Great Britain, France and Italy, and agreed to by General Foch:

"THE PRIME MINISTERS OF FRANCE, ITALY AND GREAT BRITAIN, NOW MEETING AT VERSAILLES, DESIRE TO SEND THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES:

"WE DESIRE TO EXPRESS OUR WARMEST THANKS TO PRESIDENT WILSON FOR THE REMARKABLE PROMPTNESS WITH WHICH AMERICAN AID, IN EXCESS OF WHAT AT ONE TIME SEEMED PRACTICABLE, HAS BEEN RENDERED TO THE ALLIES DURING THE PAST MONTHS TO MEET A GREAT EMERGENCY. THE CRISIS, HOWEVER, STILL CONTINUES. GEN. FOCH HAS PRESENTED TO US A STATEMENT OF THE UTMOST GRAVITY, WHICH POINTS OUT THAT THE NUMERICAL

SUPERIORITY OF THE ENEMY IN FRANCE, WHERE 162 ALLIED DIVISIONS NOW OPPOSE 200 GERMAN DIVISIONS, IS VERY HEAVY, AND THAT, AS THERE IS NO POSSIBILITY OF BRITISH AND FRENCH INCREASING THE NUMBER OF THEIR DIVISIONS (ON THE CONTRARY, THEY ARE PUT TO EXTREME STRAITS TO KEEP THEM UP) THERE IS GREAT DANGER OF THE WAR BEING LOST UNLESS THE NUMERICAL INFERIORITY OF .THE ALLIES CAN BE REMEDIED AS RAPIDLY AS POSSIBLE BY THE ADVENT OF AMERICAN TROOPS. HE, THEREFORE, URGES THE UTMOST INSISTENCE THAT THE MAXIMUM POSSIBLE NUMBER OF INFANTRY AND MACHINE GUNNERS, IN WHICH RESPECT' THE SHORTAGE .OF MEN ON THE SIDE OF THE ALLIES IS MOST MARKED, .SHOULD CONTINUE TO BE SHIPPED FROM AMERICA IN THE MONTH OF JUNE AND JULY TO AVERT THE IMMEDIATE DANGER OF AN Allied DEFEAT IN THE PRESENT CAMPAIGN OWING TO THE ALLIED RESERVES BEING EXHAUSTED BEFORE THOSE OF THE ENEMY. IN ADDITION TO THIS, AND LOOKING TO THE FUTURE, HE REPRESENTS THAT IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO FORESEE ULTIMATE VICTORY IN THE WAR UNLESS AMERICA IS ABLE TO PROVIDE SUCH AN ARMY AS WILL ENABLE THE ALLIES ULTIMATELY TO ESTABLISH NUMERICAL SUPERIORITY. HE PLACES THE TOTAL AMERICAN FORCE REQUIRED FOR THIS AS NO LESS THAN 100 DIVISIONS, AND URGES THE CONTINUOUS RAISING OF FRESH AMERICAN LEVIES, WHICH, IN HIS OPINION, SHOULD NOT BE LESS THAN 300,000 A MONTH, WITH A VIEW TO ESTABLISHING A TOTAL AMERICAN FORCE OF 100 DIVISIONS AT AS EARLY A DATE AS THIS CAN POSSIBLY BE DONE.

"WE ARE SATISFIED THAT GEN. FOCH , WHO IS CONDUCTING THE PRESENT CAMPAIGN WITH CONSUMMATE ABILITY, AND ON WHOSE MILITARY JUDGMENT WE CONTINUE TO PLACE THE MOST ABSOLUTE RELIANCE, IS NOT OVERESTIMATING THE NEEDS OF THE CASE, AND WE FEEL CONFIDENT THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES WILL DO EVERYTHING THAT CAN BE DONE, BOTH TO MEET THE NEEDS OF THE IMMEDIATE SITUATION AND TO PROCEED WITH THE CONTINUOUS RAISING OF FRESH LEVIES, CALCULATED TO PROVIDE, AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, THE NUMERICAL SUPERIORITY, WHICH THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE ALLIED ARMIES REGARDS AS ESSENTIAL TO ULTIMATE VICTORY".

"A SEPARATE TELEGRAM CONTAINS THE ARRANGEMENTS WHICH GEN. FOCH, GEN. PERSHING, AND LORD MILNER HAVE AGREED TO RECOMMEND TO THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT WITH REGARD TO THE DISPATCH OF AMERICAN TROOPS FOR THE MONTHS OF JUNE AND JULY.

(SIGNED) CLEMENCEAU,
D. LLOYD GEORGE
ORLANDO

“Such extensive priority had already been given to the transport of American infantry and machine gunners that the troops of these categories which had been received even partial training in the United States was practically exhausted. Moreover, the strain on our Services of Supply made essential that early relief be afforded by increasing its personnel. At the same time, the corresponding service of our Allies had in certain departments been equally overtaxed and their responsible heads were urgent in their representations that their needs must be relieved by bringing over American specialists. The final agreement was cabled to the War Department on June 5, as follows:

"THE FOLLOWING AGREEMENT HAS BEEN CONCLUDED BETWEEN GEN. FOCH, LORD MILNER, AND MYSELF WITH REFERENCE TO THE TRANSPORTATION OF AMERICAN TROOPS IN THE MONTHS OF JUNE AND JULY:

"(A) FOR THE MONTH OF JUNE (1) ABSOLUTE PRIORITY SHALL BE GIVEN TO THE TRANSPORTATION OF 170,000 COMBATANT TROOPS (VIZ: SIX DIVISIONS WITHOUT ARTILLERY, AMMUNITION TRAINS, OR SUPPLY TRAINS , AMOUNTING TO 126,000 MEN AND 44, 000 REPLACEMENTS FOR COMBAT TROOPS); (2) 25,400 MEN FOR THE SERVICE OF THE RAILWAYS, OF WHICH 13,400 HAVE BEEN .ASKED FOR BY THE FRENCH MINISTER OF TRANSPORTATION; (3) THE BALANCE TO BE TROOPS OF CATEGORIES TO BE DETERMINED BY THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES.

"(B) FOR THE MONTH OF JULY: (1) ABSOLUTE PRIORITY FOR THE SHIPMENT OF 140,000 COMBATANT TROOPS OF THE NATURE DEFINED ABOVE (FOUR DIVISIONS MINUS ARTILLERY "ET CETERA" _AMOUNTING TO 84,000 MEN, PLUS 56.000 REPLACEMENTS; {2) THE BALANCE OF THE 250,000 TO CONSIST OF TROOPS TO BE DESIGNATED BY THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES.

"{C) IT IS AGREED THAT IF AVAILABLE TONNAGE IN EITHER MONTH ALLOWS OF THE TRANSPORTATION OF A LARGER NUMBER OF MEN THAN 250,000, THE EXCESS TONNAGE WILL BE EMPLOYED IN THE TRANSPORTATION OF COMBAT TROOPS AS DEFINED ABOVE.

"{D) WE RECOGNIZE THAT THE COMBATANT TROOPS TO BE DISPATCHED IN JULY MAY HAVE TO INCLUDE TROOPS WHICH HAVE HAD INSUFFICIENT TRAINING, BUT WE CONSIDER THE PRESENT EMERGENCY IS SUCH .AS TO JUSTIFY A TEMPORARY AND EXCEPTIONAL DEPARTURE BY THE UNITED STATES FROM SOUND PRINCIPLES OF TRAINING, ESPECIALLY AS A SIMILAR COURSE IS BEING FOLLOWED BY FRANCE AND GREAT BRITAIN.

(SIGNED)

"FOCH"

"MILNER"

"PERSHING"

"The various proposals during these conferences regarding priority of shipment, often very insistent, raised questions that were not only most difficult but most delicate. On the one hand, there was a critical situation which must be met by immediate action, while, on the other hand, any priority accorded a particular arm necessarily postponed the formation of a distinctive American fighting force and the means to supply it. Such a force was, in my opinion, absolutely necessary to win the war. A few of the Allied representatives became convinced I that the American Services of Supply should not be neglected but should be developed in the common interest. The success of our Divisions during May and June demonstrated fully that it was necessary to draft Americans under foreign flags in order to utilize American manhood most effectively.

"When, on March 21, 1918, the German Army on the Western Front began its series of offensives, it was by far the most formidable force the world had ever seen. In fighting men and guns it had a great superiority, but this was of less importance than the advantage in morale, in experience, in training for mobile warfare, and in unity of command. Ever since the collapse or the Russian armies and the crisis on the Italian front in the fall of 1917, German were being assembles and trained for the great campaign which was to end the war before America's effort could be brought to bear. Germany's best troops, her most successful generals, and all the experience gained by three years of war were mobilized for the supreme effort

"The first blow fell on the right of the British armies, including the junction of the British and French forces. Only the prompt cooperation of the French and British general headquarters stemmed the

tide. The reason for this objective was obvious and strikingly illustrated the necessity having someone with sufficient authority over the Allied armies to meet such an emergency. The lack or complete cooperation among the Allies on the western front had been appreciated and the question of preparation to meet a crisis had already received attention by the Supreme War Council. A plan had been adopted by which each of the Allies would furnish a certain number of divisions for a general reserve to be under the direction of the military representative of the Supreme War Council of which Gen. Foch was then the senior member. But when the time came to meet the German offensive in March those reserves were not found available and the plan failed.

"This situation resulted in a conference for the immediate consideration of the question of having an Allied Commander-in-Chief. After much discussion during which my view favoring such action was clearly stated, an agreement was reached and Gen. Foch was selected .His appointment as such was made April 3 and was approved for the United States by the President on April 16. The terms of the agreement under which Gen. Foch exercised his authority were as follows:

BEAUVAIS, APRIL 3, 1918

"GENERAL FOCH IS CHARGED BY THE BRITISH, FRENCH , AND AMERICAN GOVERNMENTS WITH THE COORDINATION OF THE ACTION OF THE ALLIED ARMIES ON THE WESTERN FRONT; TO THIS END THERE IS CONFERRED ON HIM ALL THE POWERS NECESSARY FOR ITS EFFECTIVE REALIZATION. TO THE SAME END, THE BRITISH. FRENCH AND AMERICAN GOVERNMENTS CONFIDE IN GEN. FOCH THE STRATEGIC DIRECTION OF MILITARY OPERATIONS.

"THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE BRITISH, FRENCH, AND AMERICAN ARMIES WILL EXERCISE TO THE FULLEST EXTENT THE TACTICAL DIRECTION OF THEIR ARMIES. EACH COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF WILL HAVE THE RIGHT TO APPEAL TO HIS GOVERNMENT, IF IN HIS OPINION HIS ARMY IS PLACED IN DANGER BY THE INSTRUCTIONS RECEIVED FROM GEN. FOCH.

(SIGNED) Q .CLEMENCEAU
PETAIN
F. FOCH
LLOYD GEORGE
D. HAIG, F. M.
HENRY WILSON GENERAL
TASKER H. BLISS, GEN. & CHIEF OF STAFF
JOHN J. PERSHING, GENERAL, US ARMY

"The grave crisis precipitated by the first German offensive caused me to make a hurried visit to Gen. Foch's headquarters, at Bombon, during which all our combatant forces were placed at his disposal. The acceptance of this offer meant the dispersion of our troops along the Allied front and a consequent delay in building up a distinctive American force in Lorraine, but the serious situation of the Allies demanded this diversion from our plans.

"On March 21, approximately 3000,000 American troops had reached France. Four combat divisions, equivalent in strength to eight French or British divisions, were available - the First and Second then in line and the Twenty-sixth and Forty-second just withdrawn from line after one month's trench warfare training. The last two divisions at once began taking over quiet sectors to release divisions for the battle: the Twenty-sixth relieved the First Division, which was sent to northwest of Paris in reserve: the Forty-second relieved two French divisions from quiet sectors. In addition to these troops, approximately one regiment of the Ninety-third Division was with the French in the Argonne, the Forty-first Depot Division was in the Services of Supply, and three Divisions (Third, Thirty-second, and 5th) were arriving.

"April 25, the First Division relieved two French divisions on the front near Mondidier and on May 28 captured the important observation stations on the heights of Cantigney with splendid dash. French artillery, aviation, tanks, and flame throwers aided in the attack, but most of this French assistance was withdrawn before the completion of the operation in order to meet the enemy's new offensive launched May 27 toward Chateau-Thierry. The enemy reaction against our troops at Cantigny was extremely violent, and apparently he was determined at all costs to counter the most excellent effect the American success had produced. For three days his guns of all calibers were concentrated on our new position and counterattack succeeded counterattack. The desperate efforts of the Germans gave the fighting at Cantigny a seeming tactical importance entirely out of proportion to the numbers involved.

"Of the three divisions arriving in France when the first German offensive began, the Thirty-second, interned for replacements, had been temporarily employed in the Services of Supply to meet a shortage of personnel, but the critical situation caused it to be reassembled and by May 21 it was entering the line in the Vosges. At this time the Fifth division, though still incomplete, was also ordered into the line in the same region. The Third Division was assembling in its training area and the Third Corps staff had just been organized to administer these three divisions. In addition to the eight divisions already mentioned, the Twenty-eighth and Seventy-seventh had arrived in the British area, and the Fourth, Twenty-seventh, Thirtieth, Thirty-third, Thirty-fifth, and Eighty-second were arriving there. Following the agreements as to British shipping, our troops came so rapidly that at the end of May we had a force of 600,000 in France.

"The third German offensive on May 21, against the French on the Aisne, soon developed a desperate situation for the Allies. The Second Division, then in reserve northwest of Paris and preparing to relieve the First Division, was hastily diverted to the vicinity of Meaux on May 31, and, early on the morning of June 1, was deployed across the Chateau-Thierry-Paris road near Montreuil-aux-Lions in a gap in the French line, where it stopped the German advance on Paris. At the same time the partially trained Third Division was placed at French disposal to hold the crossings of the Marne, and its motorized machine-gun battalion succeeded in reaching Chateau-Thierry in time to assist in successfully defending the river crossing.

"The enemy having been halted, the Second Division commenced a series of vigorous attacks on June 4, which resulted in the capture of Belleau Woods after very severe fighting. The village of Bouresches was taken soon after, and on July 1, Vaux was captured. In these operations the Second Division met with the most desperate resistance by Germany's best troops.

"To meet the March offensive, the French had extended their front from the Oise to Amiens, about 60 kilometers (approximately 31.5 miles), and during the German drive along the Lys had also sent reinforcements to assist the British. The French lines had been further lengthened about 45 kilometers (approx. 28 miles) as a result of the Marne pocket made by the Aisne offensive. This increased frontage and the heavy fighting had reduced French reserves to an extremely low point.

"Our Second Corps, under Major General George W. Read, had been organized for the command of the 10 divisions with the British, which were held back in training areas or assigned to second-line defenses. After consultation with Field Marshal Haig on June 3, 5 American Divisions were relieved from the British area to support the French. The Seventy-seventh and Eighty-second divisions were moved south to release the Forty-second and Twenty-sixth for employment on a more active portion of the front; the Thirty-fifth division entered the line at Vosges and the Fourth and Twenty-eighth divisions were moved to the region of Meaux and Chateau-Thierry as reserves.

"On June 9 the Germans attacked the Mondidier-Noyon front in an effort to widen the Marne pocket and bring their lines nearer to Paris, but were stubbornly held by the French with comparatively little loss of ground. In view of the unexpected results of the three preceding attacks by the enemy this successful defense proved beneficial to the Allied morale, particularly as it was believed that the German losses were unusually heavy.

"On July 15, the date of the last German offensive, the First, Second, Third, and Twenty-sixth divisions were on the Chateau-Thierry front with the Fourth and Twenty-eighth in support, some small

units of the last two divisions gaining front-line experience with our troops or with the French; the Forty-second division was in support of the French east of Theims; and four colored regiments were with the French in the Argonne. On the Alsace-Lorraine front we had five divisions in the line. In our training areas four divisions were assembled and four were in process of arrival.

“The Marne salient was inherently weak and offered an opportunity for a counter offensive that was obvious. If successful, such an operation would afford immediate relief to the Allied defense, would remove the great threat to Paris, and free the Paris-Nancy Railroad. But, more important than all else, it would restore the morale of the Allies and remove the profound depression and fear then existing. Up to this time our units had been put in here and there at critical points as emergency troops to stop the terrific advance. In every trial, whether on the defensive or offensive, they had proven themselves equal to any troops in Europe. As early as June 23 and again on July 10 at Bombon, I have very strongly urged that our best divisions be concentrated under American command, if possible, for use as a striking force against the Marne salient. Although the prevailing view among the Allies was that American units were suitable only for the defensive, and that at all events they could be used to a better advantage under Allied Command, the suggestion was, accepted, in principle, and my estimate of their offensive fighting qualities was soon put to test.

"The enemy had encouraged his soldiers to believe that the July 15 attack would conclude the War with a German peace. Although he made elaborate plans for the operation, he failed to conceal fully his intentions, and the front of attack, was suspected at least one week ahead. On the Champagne front the actual hour for the assault was known and the enemy was checked with heavy losses. The Forty-second division entered the line near Somme Py immediately, and five of its infantry battalions and all its artillery became engaged. Southwest of Rheims and along the Marne to the east of Chateau-Thierry the Germans were at first somewhat successful, a penetration of 8 kilometers (approx. 5 miles) beyond the river being effected against the French immediately to the right of our Third Division. The following quotation from the report of the Commanding General, Third Division gives the result of the fighting on his fronts

"ALTHOUGH THE RUSH OF GERMAN TROOPS OVERWHELMED SOME OF THE FRONT LINE POSITIONS CAUSING THE INFANTRY AND MACHINE-GUN COMPANIES TO SUFFER, IN SOME CASES A 50 PERCENT LOSS, NO GERMANS CROSSED THE ROAD FROM FOSSOY TO CREZANCY, EXCEPT AS PRISONERS OF WAR, AND BY NOON OF THE FOLLOWING DAY (JULY 16) THERE WERE NO GERMANS IN THE FOREGROUND OF THE THIRD DIVISION SECTOR EXCEPT THE DEAD.

“On this occasion a single regiment of the Third Division wrote one of the most brilliant pages of our military annals. It prevented the at certain points on its front, while on either flank the Germans who had gained a footing pressed forward. Our men, firing in three directions, met the German attacks with counter-attacks at critical points and succeeded in throwing two German divisions into complete confusion, capturing 600 prisoners.

“The selection by the Germans of the Champagne sector and the eastern and southern faces of the Marne pocket on which to make their offensive was fortunate for the Allies as it favored the launching of the counter-attack already planned. There were now over 1,200,000 American troops in France. which provided a considerable force of reserves. Every American division with any sort of training was made available to use in a counter-offensive.

“General Petain’s initial plan for the counter-attack involved the entire western face of the Marne salient. The First and Second American divisions, with the first Moroccan division, between them, were employed as the spearhead of the main attack, driving eastward, through the most sensitive portion of the German lines, to the heights south of Soissons. The advance began on July 16, without the usual brief warning of preliminary bombardment, and these three divisions at a single bound broke through the enemy's infantry defenses and overran his artillery, cutting or interrupting the German communications

leading into the salient. A general withdrawal from the Marne was immediately begun by the enemy, who still fought stubbornly to prevent disaster.

"The First division, throughout 4 days of constant fighting, advanced 11 kilometers (approx. 6.5 miles) capturing Berzy-le-Sec and the heights above Soissons and taking some 3,500 prisoners and 68 field guns from the 7 German divisions employed against it. It was relieved by a British division. The Second division advanced 6 kilometers (5 miles) in the first 26 hours, and by the end of the second day was facing Tigny, having captured 3,000 prisoners and 66 field guns. It was relieved the night of the 19th by a French division. The result of this counter-offensive was of decisive importance. Due to the magnificent dash and power displayed on the field of Soissons by our First and Second Divisions, the tide of war was definitely turned in favor of the Allies.

"Other American divisions participated in the Marne counter-offensive. A little to the south of the Second division, the Fourth was in line with the French and was engaged until July 22. The First American Corps, Major General Hunter Liggett, commanding, with the Twenty-sixth division and a French division, acted as a pivot of the movement toward Soissons, capturing Torny on the 16th and reaching the Chateau-Thierry-Soissons road on the 21st. At the same time the Third Division crossed the Marne and took the heights of Mont St. Pere and the villages of Chartevès and Jaulgonne.

"In the First Corps, the Forty-second Division relieved the Twenty-sixth on July 25 and extended its front, on the 26th relieving the French division. From this time until August 2, it fought its way through the forest de Fere and across the Ourcq, advancing toward the Vesle until relieved by the Fourth Division on August 3. Early in this period elements of the Twenty-eighth division participated in the advance.

"Farther to the east the Third division forced the enemy back to Roncheres Wood, where it was relieved on July 30 by the Thirty-second division from the Vosges front. The Thirty-second, after relieving the Third and some elements of the Twenty-eighth on the line at the Ourcq River, advanced abreast of the Forty-second toward the Vesle. On August 3, it passed under control of our Third Corps. Major General Robert L. Ballard, commanding, which made its first appearance in battle at this time, while the Fourth Division took up the task of the Forty-second division and advanced with the Thirty-second to the Vesle and committed wholly to the defensive. The force of American arms had been brought to bear in time to enable the last offensive of the enemy to be crushed.

"The First and Third corps now held a continuous front of 11 kilometers (approx 7 miles) along the Vesle. On August 12, the Seventy-seventh division relieved the Fourth division on the First corps front, and the following day, the Twenty-eighth relieved the Thirty-second division in the Third corps, while from August 6 to August 10, the 6th Infantry Brigade of the Third Infantry division held a sector on the river line. The transfer of the First corps to the Woevre was ordered at this time, and the control of its front was turned over to the Third corps.

"On August 18, Gen. Petain began an offensive between Rheims and the Oise. Our Third corps participated in this operation, crossing the Vesle, on September 4 with the Twenty-eighth and Seventy-seventh divisions and overcoming stubborn opposition on the plateau south of the Aisne, which was reached by the Seventy-seventh on Sept. 6. The Twenty eighth was withdrawn from the line September 7. Two days later the Third corps was transferred to the region of Verdun, the Seventy-seventh remaining in line on the Aisne River until September 17.

"The Thirty-second Division, upon its relief from the battle on the Vesle, joined a French corps north of Soissons and attacked from August 29 to 31, capturing Juvigny after some particularly desperate fighting and reaching the Chauny-Soissons road.

"On the British front, two regiments of the Thirty-second division participated in an attack on Hamel July 4, and again on August 9 as an incident of the allied offensive against Amiens salient. One of these regiments took Gressaire Wood and Chipilly Ridge, capturing 700 prisoners and considerable materiel.

"In conference with Gen. Petain at Chantilly on May 19 it had been agreed that, the American Army would soon take complete charge of the sector of the Woevre. The Twenty-sixth division was

already in line in the Woevre north of Toul and was to be followed by other American divisions as they become available, with the understanding that the sector was to pass to our control when four divisions were in the line. But demands of the battle then going on farther west required the presence of our troops, and the agreement had no immediate result. Due to the presence of a number of our divisions northeast of Paris, the organization of an American Corps sector in the Chateau-Thierry region was taken up with Gen. Petain, and on July 4, the First corps assumed tactical control of a sector in that region. This was an important step, but it was by no means satisfactory, as only one American division at the moment was operating under the control of the First corps, while we had at this time eight American divisions in the front line serving in French Corps.

"The counter-offensives against the Marne salient in July, and against the Amiens salient in August had gained such an advantage that it was apparent that the emergency, which justified the dispersion of our divisions had passed. The moment was propitious for assembling our divisions scattered as they were along the Allied front, their supply had become very difficult. From every point of view the immediate organization of an independent American force was indicated. The formation of the Army in the Chateau-Thierry region and its early transfer to the sector of the Woevre, which was to extend to Nomeny, east of the Moselle, to north of St Mihiel, was therefore decided upon by Marshal Foch and myself on August 9, and the details arranged with General Petain later the same day.

"At Bombon on July 24, there was a conference of all the commanders-in-Chief for the purpose of considering Allied operations. Each presented proposals for the employment of the armies under his command and these formed the basis of future cooperation of the Allies. It was emphatically determined that the Allied attitude should be to maintain the offensive. As the first operation of the American Army, the reduction of the salient of St Mihiel was to be undertaken as soon as the necessary troops and material could be made available. On account of the swampy nature of the country it was especially important that the movement be undertaken and finished before the fall rains should begin, which was usually about the middle of September.

"Arrangements were concluded for successive relief of American divisions and the organization of the First American Army under my personal command was announced on August 10, with LaFortenous-Journe as headquarters. This Army nominally assumed control of a portion of the Vesle front, although at the same time directions were given for its secret concentration in the St Mihiel sector.

"The force of American soldiers in France at that moment was sufficient to carry out this offensive, but they were dispersed along the front from Switzerland to the Channel. The three Army Corps headquarters to participate in the St Mihiel attack were the First, Fourth and Fifth. The First was on the Vesle, the Fourth at Toul, and the 5th not yet completely organized. To assemble combat divisions and service troops and undertake a major operation within the short period available and with staffs so recently organized, was an extremely difficult task. Our deficiencies in Artillery, Aviation, and special troops caused by shipment of an undue proportion of Infantry and Machine Guns during the summer, were largely met by the French.

"The reduction of the St Mihiel salient was important, as it would prevent the enemy from interrupting traffic on the Paris-Nancy Railroad by artillery fire and would free the railroad leading north through St. Mihiel to Verdun. It would also provide us with an advantageous base of departure for an attack against the Metz-Sedan Railroad system which was vital to the German Armies west of Verdun, and against the Briey Iron Basin which was necessary for the production of German armament and munitions.

"The general plan was to make simultaneous attacks against the flanks of the salient. The ultimate objective was tentatively fixed as the general line Marieulles (east of Moselle) - heights south of Gorze-Mars La Tour-Etain. The operation contemplated the use of the western face of 3 or 4 American divisions, supported by the attack of the 6 divisions of the Second French army on their left, while 7 American divisions would attack on the southern face, and 3 French divisions would press the enemy at the tip of the salient. As the part to be taken by the Second French army would be closely related to the attack of the First American army, General Petain placed all the French troops involved under my personal command.

“By August 30, the concentration of the scattered divisions, corps, and army troops, of the quantities or supplies and munitions required, and the necessary construction of light railways and roads were well under way.

"In accordance with the previous general consideration of operations at Bombon on July 24, an Allied offensive extending practically along the entire active front was eventually to be carried out. After the reduction of the St Mihiel sector the Americans were to cooperate in the concerted effort of the Allied armies. It was the sense of the conference of July 24, that the extent to which different operations already planned might carry us could not then be foreseen, especially if the results expected were achieved before the season was far advanced. It seemed reasonable at that time to look forward to a combined offensive for the autumn, which would give no respite to the enemy and would increase our advantage for the inauguration of succeeding operations extending into 1919.

“On August 30, a further discussion with Marshal Foch was held at my headquarters at Ligny-en-Barrois. In view of the new successes of the French and British near Amiens and the continued favorable results toward the Chemin de Dames on the French front, it was now believed that the limited Allied offensive, which was to prepare for the campaign of 1919, might be carried further before the end of the year. At this meeting it was proposed by Marshal Foch that the general operation as far as the American Army was concerned should be carried out in detail by:

(a) An attack between the Meuse and the Argonne by the Second French Army, reinforced by from four to six American divisions.

(b) A French -American attack, extending from the Argonne west to the Souain Road, to be executed on the right by the American Army astride the Aisne and on the left by the French Fourth Army.

“To carry out these attacks, the 10 to 11 American divisions suggested for the St Mihiel operation and the 4 to 6 for the Second French army, would leave 8 to 10 divisions for an American Army on the Aisne. It was proposed that the St Mihiel operation should be initiated on September 10, and the other two on September 15 and 20, respectively.

"The plan suggested for the American participation in these operations was not acceptable to me because it would require the immediate separation of the recently formed First American army into several groups, mainly to assist the French armies. This was directly contrary to the principle of forming a distinct American Army, for which my contention has been insistent. An enormous amount of preparation had already been made in construction of roads, railroads, regulating stations, and other installations looking to the use and supply of our armies on a particular front. The inherent disinclination of our troops to serve under allied commanders would have grown and American morale would have suffered. My position was stated quite clearly that the strategical employment of the First Army as a unit would be undertaken where desired, but its disruption to carry out these proposals would not be entertained.

"A further conference at Marshal Foch's headquarters was held on September 2, at which Gen. Petain was present. After discussion the question of employing the American as a unit was conceded. The essentials of the strategical decision previously arrived at provided that the advantageous situation of the Allies should be exploited to the utmost by vigorously continuing the general battle and extending it eastward to the Meuse. All the Allied armies were to be employed in a converging action, the British armies, supported by the left of the French armies, were to pursue the attack in the direction of Cambrai; the center of the French armies, west of Rheims would continue the actions, already begun, to drive the enemy beyond the Aisne; and the American Army, supported by the right of the French armies, would direct its attack on Sedan and Mezieres.

"It should be recorded that although this general offensive was fully outlined at the conference no one present expressed the opinion that the final victory could be won in 1918. In fact, it was believed by the French high command that the Meuse-Argonne attack could not be pushed much beyond Montfaucon before the arrival of winter would force a cessation of operations.

"The choice between the two sectors, that east or the Aisne including the Argonne Forest, or the Champagne sector was left to me. In my opinion, no other Allied troops had the morale or the offensive spirit to overcome successfully the difficulties to be met in the Meuse-Argonne sector and our plans and

installations had been prepared for an expansion of operations in that direction. So the Meuse-Argonne front was chosen. The entire sector of 150 kilometers (approx. 93.5 miles) of front, extending from Port-sur-Seille, east of the Moselle, west to include the Argonne Forest, was accordingly placed under my command, including all French divisions then in that zone. The First American army was to proceed with the St Mihiel operation, after which the operation between the Meuse and the western edge of the Argonne Forest was to be prepared and launched not later than September 25.

"As a result of these decisions, the depth of the St Mihiel operation was limited to the line Vigneulles-Thiaucourt-Regnieville. The number of divisions to be used was reduced and the time shortened. 18 to 19 divisions were to be on the front line. There were 4 French and 15 American divisions available, 6 of which would be in reserve, while the two flank divisions of the front line were not to advance. Furthermore, 2 Army Corps Headquarters, with their Corps troops, practically all the Army artillery and Aviation, and the First, Second and Fourth Divisions, the first two destined to take a leading part in the St Mihiel attack, were all due to be withdrawn and started for the Meuse-Argonne by the 4th day of the battle.

On the night of September 11, the troops of the First Army were deployed in position. On the southern face of the salient was the First corps, Maj. Gen. Liggett, commanding, with the Eighty-second, Ninetieth, Fifth and Second divisions in line, extending from the Mosell westward. On its left was the Fourth Corps, Maj. Gen. Joseph T. Dickman, commanding; with the Eighty-ninth, Forty-second, and First divisions, the left of this corps being opposite Montsec. These two Army Corps were to deliver the principal attack, the line pivoting on the center division of the First corps. The First division on the left of the Fourth corps was charged with the double mission of covering its own flank while advancing some 20 kilometers (12.5 miles) due north toward the heart of the salient, where it was to make contact with the troops of the Fifth Corps, Maj. Gen. George H. Cameron, commanding, with the Twenty-sixth division, 15th French Colonial division, and the Fourth division in line, from Mouilly west to Les Eparges and north to Watronville. Of these three divisions, the Twenty-sixth alone was to make a deep advance directed toward Vigneulles. The French division was to make a short progression to the edge or the heights in order to cover the left of the Twenty-sixth. The Fourth division was not to advance. In the center, between our Fourth and Fifth Army corps, was the Second French Colonial Corps, Major General E. J. Blondat, commanding, covering a front of 40 kilometers (25 miles) with 3 small French divisions. These troops were to follow up the retirement of the enemy from the tip of the salient.

"The French independent air force was at my disposal which, together with the British bombing squadrons and our own air forces, gave us the largest assembly of aviation that had ever been engaged in one operation. Our heavy guns were able to reach Metz and to interfere seriously with German rail movements.

"At dawn on September 12, after four hours of violent artillery fire or preparation, and accompanied by small tanks, the Infantry of the First and Fourth corps advanced. The infantry of the Fifth corps commenced its advance at 8 A.M. The operation was carried out with entire precision. Just after daylight on September 13, elements of the First and Twenty-sixth divisions made a junction near Hattonchatel and Vigneulles, 18 kilometers (approx. 11 miles) northeast of St Mihiel. The rapidity with which our divisions advanced overwhelmed the enemy, and all objectives were reached by the afternoon of September 13. The enemy had apparently started to withdraw some of his troops from the tip of the salient on the eve of the attack, but had been unable to carry it through. We captured nearly 16,000 prisoners, 443 guns, and large stores of material and supplies. The energy and swiftness with which the operation was carried out enabled us to smother opposition to such an extent that we suffered less than 1,000 casualties during the period of the advance.

"During the next two days the right of our line west of the Meuse River was advanced beyond the objectives laid down by the original orders. This completed the operation for the time being and the line was stabilized to be held by the smallest practicable force.

"The material results of the victory achieved were very important. An American Army was an accomplished fact, and the enemy had felt its power. No form of propaganda could overcome the

depressing effect on the morale of the enemy of this demonstration of our ability to organize a large American force and drive it successfully through his defenses. It gave our troops implicit confidence in their superiority and raised their morale to the highest pitch. For the first time wire entanglements ceased to be regarded as impassable barriers and open-warfare training, which had been so urgently insisted upon, proved to be the correct doctrine. Our divisions concluded the attack with such small losses and in such high spirits that without the usual rest they were immediately available for employment in heavy fighting in a new theater of operations. The strength of the First Army in this battle totaled approximately 500,000 men, of whom about 70,000 were French.

“The definite decision for the Meuse-Argonne phase of the great allied convergent attack was agreed to in my conference with Marshal Foch and Gen. Petain on September 2nd. It was planned to use all available forces of the First Army, including such divisions and troops as we might be able to withdraw from the St Mihiel front. The Army was to break through the enemy’s successive fortified zones to include the Kriemhilde-Stelling, or Hindenburg Line, on the front Brioules-Romagne sous Montraucon-Orandpre, and thereafter, by developing pressure toward Meneres, was to insure the fall of the Hindenburg Line along the Aisne River in front of the Fourth French Army, which was to attack west of the Argonne Forest. A penetration of some 12 to 15 kilometers (approx. 7.5 to 9.5 miles) was required to reach the Hindenburg Line on our front and the enemy’s defenses were virtually continuous throughout that depth.

"The Meuse-Argonne front had been practically stabilized in September 1914, and except for minor fluctuations during the German attacks on Verdun in 1916, and the counter-offensive in August 1917, remained unchanged until the American advance in 1918. The net result of the four-years struggle on this ground was a German defensive system of unusual depth and strength and a wide zone of utter devastation, itself a serious obstacle to offensive operations.

“The strategical importance of this portion of the line was second to none on the Western Front. All supplies and evacuations of the German armies in Northern France were dependent upon two great railway systems - one in the north, passing through Liege, while the other in the south, with lines coming from Luxemburg, Thionville, and Metz had its vital section the line Carignan-Sedan-Mezieres. No other important lines were available to the enemy, as the mountainous masses of the Ardennes made the construction of east and west lines through the region impracticable. The Carignan-Sedan-Mezieres line was essential to the Germans for the rapid strategical movement of troops. Should this southern system be cut by the Allies before the enemy could withdraw his forces through the narrow neck between Mezieres and the Dutch frontier, the ruin at his armies in France and Belgium would be complete.

"From the Meuse-Argonne front the perpendicular distance of the Carignan-Mezieres railroad was 50 kilometers (approx. 31 miles). This region formed the pivot of German operations in Northern France, and the vital necessity of covering the great railroad line into Sedan resulted in the convergence on the Meuse-Argonne front of the successive German defensive positions. The effect of this convergence can be best understood through use of attached map. It will be seen, for example that the distance between “NO MAN’S LAND” and the third German withdrawal position in the vicinity of the Meuse River was approximately 18 kilometers (approx. 11 miles); the distance between the corresponding point near the tip of the great salient or the western front was about 65 kilometers (approx. 40 miles), and in the vicinity of Cambrai was over 30 kilometers (approx. 18 miles). The effect of a penetration of 18 kilometers by the American Army would be the equivalent to an advance of 65 kilometers farther west; furthermore, such an advance on our front was far more dangerous to enemy than an advance elsewhere. The vital importance of this portion of his position was fully appreciated by the enemy, who had suffered tremendous losses in 1916 in attempting to improve it by the reduction of Verdun. As a consequence, it had been elaborately fortified, and consisted of practically a continuous series of positions 20 kilometers (12.5 miles) or more in depth.

“In addition to the artificial defenses, the enemy was greatly aided by the natural features of the terrain. East of the Meuse the dominating heights not only protected his left but gave him positions from which powerful artillery could deliver an oblique fire on the western bank. Batteries located in the

elaborately fortified Argonne forest covered his right flank, and could cross their fire with that of the guns on the east bank of the Meuse. Midway between the Meuse and the forest, the heights of Montfaucon offered perfect observation and formed a strong natural position which had been heavily fortified. The east and west ridges abutting on the Meuse and Aire River valleys afforded the enemy excellent machine-gun positions for the desperate defense which the importance of the position would require him to make. North of Montfaucon densely wooded and rugged heights constituted natural features favorable to defensive fighting.

When the First Army became engaged in the simultaneous preparation for two major operations, an interval of 14 days separated the initiation of the two attacks. During this short period the movement of the immense number of troops and the amount of supplies involved in the Meuse-Argonne battle over the few roads available, and confined entirely to the hours of darkness, was one of the most delicate and difficult problems of the war. The concentration included 15 divisions, of which 7 were involved in the pending St Mihiel drive, 3 were in the sector of the Vosges, 3 in the neighborhood of Soissons, 1 in a training area, and 1 near Bar-le-Duc. Practically all the Artillery, Aviation, and other auxiliaries to be employed in the new operations were committed to the St Mihiel attack and therefore could not be moved until its success was assured. The concentration of all units not to be used at St Mihiel was commenced immediately, and on September 13, the second day of St Mihiel, reserve divisions and Army Artillery units were withdrawn and placed in motion toward the Argonne front.

"That part of the American sector from Fresnes-en-Woevre, southeast of Verdun, to the western edge of the Argonne Forest, while nominally under my control, did not actively become a part of my command until September 22, on which date my headquarters were established at Souilly, southwest of Verdun. Of French troops, in addition to the Second French Colonial Corps, composed of 3 divisions, there was also the Seventeenth French Corps of 3 divisions holding the front north and east of Verdun.

"At the moment of the opening of the Meuse-Argonne battle, the enemy had ten divisions in line and 10 in reserve on the front between Fresnes-en-Woevre and the Argonne Forest, inclusive. He had undoubtedly expected a continuation of our advance toward Metz. Successful ruses were carried out between the Meuse River and Luneville to deceive him as to our intentions, and French troops were maintained as a screen along our front until the night before the battle, so that the actual attack was a tactical surprise.

"The operations in the Meuse-Argonne battle really form a continuous whole, but they extended over such a long period of continuous fighting that they will here be considered in three phases, the first from September 26 to October 3, the second from October 4 to 31, and the third from November 1 to 11.

"FIRST PHASE: On the night of September 25, the 9 divisions to lead in the attack were deployed between the Meuse River and the western edge of the Argonne Forest. On the right was the Third corps, Major General Bullard, commanding, with the Thirty-third, Eightieth and Fourth divisions in line, next came the Fifth Corps, Major General Cameron, commanding, with the Seventy-ninth, Thirty-seventh, and Ninety-first divisions; on the left was the First corps, Major General Liggett commanding with the Thirty-fifth, Twenty-eighth and Seventy-seventh divisions. Each corps had 1 division in reserve and the Army held 3 divisions as a general reserve. About 2,700 guns, 189 small tanks, 142 manned by Americans and 821 airplanes, 604 manned by Americans were concentrated to support the attack of infantry. We thus had superiority in guns and Aviation and the enemy had no tanks.

"The axis of the attack was the line Montfaucon-Romagne-Buzancy, the purpose being to make the deepest penetration in the center, which, with the Fourth French Army advancing west of the Argonne, would force the enemy to evacuate that forest without our having to deliver the heavy attack in that difficult region.

"Following three hours of violent artillery fire of preparation, the infantry advanced at 5:30 AM on September 26, accompanied by tanks. During the first two days of the attack, before the enemy was

able to bring up his reserves, our troops made steady progress through the network of defenses. Montfaucon was held tenaciously by the enemy and was not captured until noon the second day.

"By the evening of the 28th, a maximum advance of 11 kilometers (approx. 7 miles) had been achieved and we had captured Baulny, Epinonville, Septsarges, and Dannevoux. The right had made a splendid advance into the woods south of Briulles-sur-Meuse, but, the extreme left was meeting strong resistance in the Argonne. The attack continued without interruption, meeting six new divisions which the enemy threw into first line before September 29. He developed a powerful machine-gun defense supported by heavy artillery fire, and made frequent counter-attacks with fresh troops, particularly on the front of the Twenty-eighth and Thirty-fifth divisions. These divisions had taken Varennes, Cheppy, Baulny, and Charpentry, and the line was within two kilometers of Apremont. We were no longer engaged in a maneuver for the pinching out of a salient, but were necessarily committed, generally speaking, to a direct frontal attack against strong, hostile positions fully manned by a determined enemy.

"By nightfall of the 29th, the First Army line was approximately Bois-de-la-Cote-Lemont-Nantillois-Apremont-southwest across the Argonne. Many divisions, especially those in the center were subjected to cross-fire of artillery, had suffered heavily. The severe fighting, the nature of the terrain over which they attacked, and the fog and darkness surely tried even the best divisions. On the night of the 29th, the Thirty-seventh and Seventy-ninth divisions were relieved by the Thirty-second and Third divisions, respectively, and on the following night the First Division relieved the Thirty-fifth division.

"The critical problem during the few days of the battle was the restoration of communications over "NO MAN'S LAND". There were but four roads available across this deep zone, and the violent artillery fire of the previous period had virtually destroyed them. But the splendid work of our Engineers and Pioneers soon made possible the movement of the troops, artillery, and supplies needed. By the afternoon of the 27th all the divisional artillery, except a few batteries of heavy guns, had effected a passage and was supporting the infantry action.

"SECOND PHASE. At 5:30 AM on October 4, the general attack was renewed. The enemy divisions on the front from Fresnes-en-Woevre to the Argonne had increased from 10 in first line to 16, and included some of his best divisions. The fighting was desperate, and only small advances were realized, except by the First division on the right of the First corps. By evening of the 5th, the line was approximately Bois-de-la-Cote-Lemont-Boise du Fays-Gesnes-Hill 240 Fleville-Chehary, southwest through the Argonne.

"It was especially desirable to drive the enemy from his commanding positions on the heights east of the Meuse, but it was even more important that we should force him to use his troops there and weaken his tenacious hold on positions in our immediate front. The further stabilization of the new St Mihiel line permitted the withdrawal of certain divisions for the extension of the Meuse-Argonne operation to the east bank of the Meuse River.

"On the 7th, the First corps, with the Eighty-second division added, launched a strong attack northwest toward Cornay, to draw attention from the movement east of the Meuse and at the same time outflank the German position in the Argonne. The following day the Seventeenth French Corps, Major General Claudel, commanding, initiated its attack east of the Meuse against the exact point on which the German armies must pivot in order to withdraw from Northern France. The troops encountered elaborate fortifications and stubborn resistance, but by nightfall had realized an advance of 6 kilometers (approx. 4 miles) to a line well within the Bois de Consenvaye, and including the villages of Beaumont and Haumont. Continuous fighting was maintained along our entire battle front, with especial success on the extreme left, where the capture of the greater part of the Argonne Forest was completed. The enemy contested every foot of ground on our front in order to make rapid retirements further west and withdraw his forces from Northern France before the interruption of his railroad communications through Sedan.

"We were confronted at this time by an insufficiency of replacements to build up exhausted divisions. Early in October combat units required some 90,000 replacements, and not more than 45,000 would be available before November 1 to fill the existing and prospective vacancies. We still had two divisions with the British and two with the French. A review of the situation, American and Allied,

especially as to our own resources in men for the next two months, convinced me that the attack of the First Army and of the Allied armies further west should be pushed to the limit. But if the First Army was to continue its aggressive tactics our Divisions with the French must be recalled, and replacements must be obtained by breaking up newly arrived divisions.

"In discussing the withdrawal of our divisions from the French with Marshal Foch and Gen. Petain, on October 10, the former expressed his appreciation of the fact that the First Army was striking the pivot of the German withdrawal, and also held the view that the Allied attack should continue. Gen. Petain agreed that the American divisions with the French were essential to us if we were to maintain our battle against the German pivot. The French, were, however, straining every nerve to keep up their attacks and, before those divisions with the French had been released it became necessary for us to send the Thirty-seventh and Ninety-first divisions from the First Army to assist the Sixth French Army in Flanders.

"At this time the First Army was holding a front of more than 120 kilometers - (approx. 60 miles); its strength exceeded 1,000,000 men; it was engaged in the most desperate battle of our history, and the burden of command was too heavy for a single commander and staff. Therefore, on October 12, that portion of our front extending from Port-sur-Seille east of Moselle, to Fresnes-en-Woevre southeast of Verdun, was transferred to the newly constituted. Second Army, Lieut. Gen. Robert L. Bullard, commanding, under whom it began preparations for the extension of operations to the east in the direction of Briey and Metz. On October 16 the command of the First Army was transferred to Lieut. Gen. Hunter Liggett, and my advance headquarters was established at Ligny-en-Barrois, from which the command of the Group of American Armies was exercised.

"Local attacks of the First Army were continued in order particularly to adjust positions preparatory to a renewed general assault. The First and Fifth divisions were relieved by the Forty-Second and Eightieth divisions, which were now fresh. An attack along the whole front was made on October 14. The resistance encountered was stubborn, but the stronghold on Cote Dame Marie was captured and the Hindenburg Line was broken. Cune1 and Romagne-Ious-Monfaucon were taken and the line advanced 2 kilometers north of Sonmerance. A Maximum advance of 17 kilometers (approx. 10. miles) had been made since September 26 and the enemy had been forced to throw into the fight a total of 15 reserve divisions.

"During the remainder of the month important local operations were carried out, which involved desperate fighting. The First Corps, Major General Dickman, commanding, advanced through Grandpre; the Fifth Corps, Major Gen. Charles P. Summerall, commanding, captured Boia-de-Bantheville; the Third Corps, Major General John L. Hines, commanding, completed the occupation of Cunel Height; and the 17th French Corps drove the enemy from the main ridge south of LaGrande Montagne. Particularly heavy fighting occurred east of Meuse on October 18, and in the further penetration of the Kriemhilde-Stellung on October 23, the Twenty-sixth division entered the battle at this time, relieving the 18th French division.

"Summarizing the material results which had been attained by the First Army by the end of October, we had met an increasing number of Germany's best divisions, rising from 20 in line and reserve; on September 26th, to 31 on October 31st; the enemy's elaborately prepared positions, including the Hindenburg Line, in our front had been broken; the almost impassable Argonne forest was in our hands; and advance of 20 kilometers (approx. 13 miles) had been effected; 18,600 prisoners, 370 cannon, 1,000 machine guns, and a mass of material captured; and the great railway artery through Carignan to Sedan was now seriously threatened.

"The demands of incessant battle which had been maintained day by day for more than a month had compelled our divisions to fight to the limit of their capacity. Combat troops were held in line and pushed to attack until deemed incapable of further effort because of casualties or exhaustion; artillery once engaged was seldom withdrawn and many batteries fought until practically all the animals were casualties and the guns were towed out of the line by motor trucks. The American soldier had shown unrivaled fortitude in his continuous fighting during most inclement weather and under disadvantages of

position. Through experience, the Army had developed into a powerful and smooth-running machine, and there was a supreme confidence in our ability to carry through the tasks successfully.

“While the high pressure of these dogged attacks was a great strain on our troops, it was calamitous to the enemy. His divisions had been thrown into confusion by our furious assaults, and his morale had been reduced until his will to resist and well nigh reached the breaking point. Once a German division was engaged in the right it became practically impossible to effect its relief. The enemy was forced to meet the constantly recurring crises by breaking up tactical organizations and sending hurried detachments to widely separated portions of the field.

“Every member of the American Expeditionary Forces, from the front line to the base ports, was straining every nerve. Magnificent efforts were exerted by the entire Services of Supply to meet the enormous demands made on it. Obstacles which seemed insurmountable were overcome daily in expediting the movement of replacements, ammunition and supplies to the front, and of sick and wounded to the rear. It was this spirit of determination animating every American soldier that made it impossible for the enemy to maintain the struggle until 1919.

“The detailed plans for the operation of the Allied Armies on the western front changed from time to time during the course of this great battle, but the mission of the First American Army to cut the great Carignan-Sedan-Mezieres Railroad remained unchanged. Marshal Foch coordinated the operations along the entire front, continuing persistently and unceasingly the attacks by an Allied armies; the Belgian Army, with a French Army and two American divisions, advancing eastward; the British Armies and two American divisions, with the First French Army on their right, toward the region north of Givet; the First American Army and Fourth French Army, toward Sedan and Mazieres.

“On the 21st of October, my instructions were issued to the First Army to prepare thoroughly for a general attack on October 28, that would be decisive, if possible. In order that the attack of the First Army and that of the Fourth French, on its left should be simultaneous our attack was delayed until November 1st. The immediate purpose of the First Army was to take Buzancy and the heights of Barricourt to turn the forest north of Grandpre, and to establish contact with the Fourth French Army near Boulton-aux-Bois in preparation for the drive toward Sedan. By strenuous effort all available artillery had been moved well forward to the heights previously occupied by the enemy, from which it could fully cover and support the initial advance of the Infantry.

“On this occasion and for the first time the Army prepared for its attack under normal conditions. We held the front of attack and were not under the necessity of taking over a new front, with its manifold installations and services. Our own personnel handled the communications, dumps, telegraph and water service; our divisions were either in line or close in rear; the French Artillery, aviation, and technical troops which had previously made up our deficiencies had been largely replaced by our own organizations; and our army, corps and division staffs were by actual experience second to none.

“On the morning of November 1, three Army corps were in line between the Meuse River and Bois-de-Bourgogne. On the right the Third corps had the Fifth and Ninetieth division; the Fifth corps occupied the center of the line, with the Eighty-ninth and Second divisions, and was to be the Wedge of the attack on the first day; and on the left the First corps deployed the Eightieth, Seventy-seventh and Seventy-eighth divisions.

“Preceded by two hours of violent artillery preparation, the Infantry advance closely followed by “Accompanying guns”. The artillery acquitted itself magnificently, the barrages being so well coordinated and so dense that the enemy was overwhelmed and quickly submerged by the rapid onslaught of the Infantry. By nightfall the Fifth corps, in the center had realized an advance of almost 9 kilometers (approx. 5 miles), to the Bois de la Folie, and had completed the capture of the heights of Barricourt, while the Third corps, on the right, had captured Aincreville and Andevanne. Our troops had broken through the enemy's last defense, captured his artillery positions, and had precipitated a retreat of the German forces about to be isolated in the forest north of Grandpre. On the 2nd and 3rd, we advanced rapidly against heavy fighting on the fronts of the right and center corps; to the left the troops of the rest of the corps hurried forward in pursuit, some by motor trucks, while the Artillery pressed along the country

roads close behind. Our heavy artillery was skillfully brought into position to fire upon the Carignan-Sedan Railroad and the junctions of Longuyon and Conflans. By the evening of the 4th, out troops had reached La Neuville, opposite Stenay, and had swept through the great Foret de Dieulet, reaching the outskirts of Beaumont, while on the left we were 8 kilometers (5 miles) north of Boulton-aux-Bois.

"The following day the advance continued toward Sedan with increasing swiftness. The Third corps, turning eastward, crossed the Meuse in a brilliant operation by the 5th division, driving the enemy from the heights of Dun-due-Meuse and forcing a general withdrawal from the strong positions he had so long held on the hills north of Verdun.

"By the 7th, the right of the Third. corps had exploited its river crossing to a distance of 10 kilometers (approx. 6 miles) east of the Meuse, completely ejecting the enemy from the wooded heights and driving him out into the swampy plains of the Woevre; the Fifth and First corps had reached the line of the Meuse River along their respective fronts and the left of the latter corps held the heights dominating Sedan, the strategic goal of the Meuse-Argonne operations, 41 kilometers (approx. 25 miles) from our point of departure on November 1st. We had cut the enemy's main line of communication. Recognizing that nothing but a cessation of hostilities could save his armies from complete disaster, he appealed for an immediate armistice on November 6th.

"Meanwhile general plans had been prepared for the further employment of American forces in an advance between the Meuse and the Moselle, to be directed toward Longwy by the First Army, while the Second was to assume the offensive toward the Briey Iron Basin. Orders directing the preparatory local operations involved in this enterprise were issued on November 5th.

"Between the 7th and 10th of November, the Third corps continued its advance eastward to Remoiville, while the 17th French corps on its right, with the Seventy-ninth, Twenty-sixth and Eighty-first American divisions, and 2 French divisions drove the enemy from his final foothold on the heights east of the Meuse. At 9 P.M. on November 9th, appropriate orders were sent to the First and Second Armies in accordance with the following telegram from Marshal Foch to the Commander of each of the Allied Armies:

"THE ENEMY, DISORGANIZED BY OUR REPEATED ATTACKS, RETREATS ALONG THE ENTIRE FRONT."

"IT IS IMPORTANT TO COORDINATE AND EXPEDITE OUR MOVEMENTS".

"I APPEAL TO THE ENEMY AND THE INITIATIVE OF THE COMMANDERS-IN-CHIEF AND OF THEIR ARMIES TO MAKE DECISIVE THE RESULTS OBTAINED".

"In consequence of the foregoing instructions, our Second Army pressed the enemy along its entire front. On the night of the 10th-11th and the morning of the 11th, the Fifth corps, in the First Army, forced a crossing of the Meuse east of Beaumont and gained the commanding heights within the re-entrant of the river, thus completing our control of the Meuse River line. At 6 AM on the 11th, notification was received from Marshal Foch's headquarters that the Armistice had been signed and that hostilities would cease at 11 A.M. Preparatory measures had already been taken to insure the prompt transmission to the troops of the announcement of an Armistice. However, the advance east of Beaumont on the morning of the 11th had been so rapid and communications across the river was so difficult that there was some fighting in isolated portions of that front after 11 AM.

"Between September 26 and November 11, 22 American and 4 French divisions, on the front extending from southeast of Verdun to the Argonne Forest, had engaged and decisively beaten 47 different German divisions, representing 25% of the enemy's entire divisional strength on the western front. Of these enemy divisions, 20 had been drawn from the French front and 1 from the British front. Of the 22 American divisions, 12 had, at different times during this period, been engaged on fronts other than our own. The First Army suffered a loss of about 117,000 killed and wounded. (A total of 260,783 were wounded and killed in action of these, 224,089 were wounded; 36,694 killed in action; 13,691 died of

wounds. Total battle deaths 50,385). It captured 26,000 prisoners, 847 cannon, 3,000 machine guns and large quantities of material.

"The dispositions which the enemy made to meet the Meuse-Argonne offensive, both immediately before the opening of the attack and during the battle, demonstrated the importance which he ascribed to this section of the front and the extreme measures he was forced to take in its defense. From the moment the American offensive began until the Armistice, his defense was desperate and the flow of his divisions to our front was continuous.

"Under the instructions issued by me on November 5, for operations by the Second army in the direction of the Briey Iron Basin, the advance was undertaken along the entire front of the army and continued during the last three days of hostilities. In the face of stiff resistance offered by the enemy, and with the limited number of troops available to the Second army, the gains realized reflected great credit on the divisions concerned. On November 6, Marshal Foch requested that 6 American divisions be held in readiness to assist in an attack which the French were preparing to launch in the direction of Chateau-Salins. The plan was agreed to, but with the provision that our troops should be employed under the direction of the commanding general, Second Army .

"This combined attack was to be launched on November 14, and was to consist of 20 French divisions under General Mangin and the 6 American divisions under General Bullard. Of the divisions designated for this operation the Third, Fourth, Twenty-ninth, and Thirty-sixth were in Army reserve and were starting their march eastward on the Morning of November 11th, while the Twenty-eighth and Thirty-fifth were being withdrawn from line on the Second Army front.

"During the first phase of the Meuse-Argonne battle, American divisions were participating in important attacks on other portions of the front. The Second Army Corps, Major Gen. Read, commanding, with the Twenty-seventh and Thirtieth divisions on the British front, was assigned the task in cooperation with the Australian corps, breaking the Hindenburg Line at La Cateau where the St Quentin Canal passes through a tunnel under the ridge. In this attack, carried out on September 29 and October 1, the Thirtieth division speedily broke through the main line of defense and captured all its objectives, while the Twenty-seventh progressed until some of its elements reached Gouy. In this and later actions from October 6 to 19, our Second Corps captured over 6,000 prisoners and advanced about 24 kilometers (approx. 15 Miles).

"On October 2-9, our Second and Thirty-sixth divisions assisted the Fourth French Army in its advance between Rheims and the Argonne. The Second division completed its advance on this front by the assault of the wooded heights of Mont Blanc, the key point of the German position, which was captured with consummate dash and skill. The division here repulsed violent counter-attacks, and then carried our lines into the Village of St. Etienne, thus forcing the Germans to fall back before Rheims and yield positions which they had held since September, 1914. On October 10, the Thirty-sixth division relieved the Second, exploiting the latter's success, and in two days advanced, with the French, a distance of 21 kilometers (approx. 13 miles), the enemy retiring behind the Aisne River. .

"In the middle of October, while we were heavily engaged in the Meuse-Argonne, Marshal Foch requested that two American divisions be sent immediately to assist the Sixth French Army in Belgium, where slow progress was being made. The Thirty-seventh and Ninety-first divisions, the latter being accompanied by the artillery of the Twenty-eighth division, were hurriedly dispatched to the Belgian front. On October 30, in continuation of the Flanders offensive, these divisions entered the line and attacked. By November 3, the Thirty-seventh division had completed its mission by rapidly driving the enemy across the Escaut River and had firmly established itself on the east bank, while the Ninety-first, in a spirited advance, captured Spitaals Bosschen, reached the Scheldt, and entered Audenarde.

"The Italian Government early made request for American troops, but the critical situation on the western front made it necessary to concentrate our efforts there. When the Secretary of War was in Italy during April, 1918, he was urged to send American troops to Italy and show America's interest in the Italian situation and strengthen Italian morale. Similarly, a request was made by the Italian Prime Minister at the Abbeville conference. It was finally decided to send one regiment to Italy with the necessary

hospital and auxiliary services, and the Three hundred and Thirty-second Infantry was selected, reaching the Italian front in July, 1918. These troops participated in action against the Austrians in the fall of 1918 at the crossing of the Piave River and in the final pursuit of the Austrian Army.

"It was the opinion of the Supreme War Council that Allied troops should be sent to cooperate with the Russians, either at Murmansk or Archangel, against the Bolshevist forces, and the British Government, through its Ambassador at Washington, urged American participation in this undertaking. On July 23, 1918, the War Department directed the dispatch of three battalions of Infantry and three companies of Engineers to join the Allied expedition. In compliance with these instructions, the Three hundred and thirty-ninth Infantry, the first battalion, Three hundred tenth Engineers, Three hundred and thirty-seventh field Hospital and Three hundred thirty-seventh Ambulance Company were sent through England, whence they sailed on August 26, 1918.

"The mission of these troops was limited to guarding the ports and as much of the surrounding country as might develop threatening conditions. The Allied force operating under British command, through whose orders the small American contingent was spread over a front of about 450 miles. From September 1918 to May 1919, a series of minor engagements with the Bolshevist occurred, in which 82 Americans were killed and 7 died of wounds.

"In April 1919, two Companies of American Railroad troops were added to this contingent. The withdrawal of the American force commenced in the latter part of May, 1919, and on August 25th there was left only a small detachment of Graves Registration troops.

"In accordance with the terms of the Armistice, the Allies were to occupy all German territory west of the Rhine, with bridgeheads of 30 kilometer (approx. 19 miles) radius at Cologne, Coblenz, and Mayence. The Zone assigned to the Americans was the bridgehead of Coblenz and the district of Treves. This territory was to be occupied by an American Army, with its reserves held between the Moselle-Meuse Rivers and the Luxemburg frontier. -586-

The instructions of Marshal Foch, issued on November 16, contemplated that 2 French Infantry divisions and 1 French Cavalry division would be added to the American forces that occupied the Coblenz bridgehead, and that one American division would be added to the French force occupying the Mayence bridgehead. As this arrangement presented possibilities of misunderstanding due to difference in views regarding government of occupied territory, it was represented to the Marshal that each nation should be given a well-defined territory of occupation, employing within such territory only the troops of the commander responsible for the particular zone. On December 9, Marshal Foch accepted the principle of preserving the entity of command and troops, but reduced the American bridgehead by adding a portion of the eastern half to the French command at Mayence.

"Various reasons made it undesirable to employ either the First or Second Army as the Army of Occupation. Plans had been made before the Armistice to organize a Third Army and, on November 14, this Army, with Major General Joseph T. Dickman as commander, was designated as the Army of Occupation. The Third and Fourth Army corps staffs and troops, less artillery, the First, Second, Third, Fourth, Thirty-second, and Forty-second divisions, and the 66th Field Artillery Brigade (Washington unit) were assigned to the Third Army. This force was later increased by the addition of the Seventh Corps, Major General William H. Wright, commanding, with the Fifth, Eighty-ninth, and Ninetieth divisions.

"The advance toward German territory began on November 17 at 5 AM, six days after signing of the Armistice. All of the Allied forces from the North Sea to the Swiss border moved forward simultaneously in the wake of the retreating German Armies. Upon arrival at the frontier, a halt was made until December 1, when the leading elements of all Allied armies passed the line into Germany. The Third Army Headquarters were established at Coblenz and an Advance General Headquarters located at Treves. Steps were immediately taken to organize the bridgehead for defense, and dispositions were made to meet a possible renewal or hostilities.

"The advance to the Rhine required long arduous marches, through cold and inclement weather, with no opportunity for troops to rest, refit, and refresh themselves after their participation in the final

battle. The Army of Occupation bore itself splendidly and exhibited a fine state of discipline both during the advance and throughout the period of occupation.

"The zone of march of our troops into Germany and the line of communications of the Third Army after reaching the Rhine lay through Luxemburg, for the purpose of guarding our line of communications, was entrusted to the 5th and Thirty-third Divisions of the Second Army. The city of Luxemburg garrisoned by French troops and designated as the Headquarters of the Allied Commander-in-Chief, was excluded from our control.

"Upon entering the Duchy of Luxemburg in the advance, a policy of non-interference in the affairs of the Grand Duchy was announced. Therefore, when the French Commander in the city of Luxemburg was given charge of all troops in the Duchy, in so far as concerned the "Administration of the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg", my instructions were that our troops would not be subject to his control later, at my request, and in order to avoid possible friction, Marshal Foch placed the entire Duchy in the American zone.

"On the day the Armistice was signed, the problem of the return of our troops to the United States was taken up with the War Department and, on November 15, a policy recommended of sending certain auxiliaries so that we could begin to utilize all available shipping without delay. On December 21, the War Department announced by cable that it had been decided to begin immediately the return of our forces and continue as rapidly as transportation would permit. To carry this out a schedule for the constant flow of troops to the ports was established, having in mind our international obligations pending the signing of the treaty of peace.

"While more intimately to the functions of the Services of Supply, than to operations, it is logical to introduce here a brief recital of the organizations created for the return of our troops to America. Prior to the Armistice but 15,000 men had been returned home. Although the existing organizations were built for the efficient and rapid handling of the incoming forces, the embarkation of this small number presented no difficulties. But the Armistice suddenly and completely reversed the problems of the Services of Supply at the ports and the handling of troops. It became necessary immediately to reorganize the machinery of the ports, to construct large embarkation camps, and to create an extensive service for embarking the homeward-bound troops.

"Brest, St Nazaire, and Bordeaux became the principal embarkation ports, Marseilles and LeHavre being added later to utilize Italian and French liners. The construction of the embarkation camps during unseasonable winter weather was the most trying problem. These, with the billeting facilities available, gave accommodations for 55,000 at Brest, 44,000 at St Nazaire, and 130,000 at Bordeaux. Unfortunately, the largest ships had to be handled at Brest, where the least shelter was available.

"To maintain a suitable reservoir of men for Brest and St Nazaire, an Embarkation Center was organized around LeMans, which eventually accommodated 230,000 men. Here the troops and their records were prepared for the return voyage and immediate demobilization. As the troops arrived at the base ports, the embarkation service was charged with feeding, re-clothing, and equipping the hundreds of thousands who passed through, which required the maintenance of a form of hotel service on a scale not hitherto attempted.

"On November 16, all combat troops, except 30 divisions and a minimum of corps and army troops, were released for return to the United States. It was early evident that only limited use would be made of American divisions, and that the retention of 30 divisions was not necessary. Marshal Foch considered it indispensable to maintain under arms a total, including Italians, of 120 to 140 divisions and he proposed that we maintain 30 divisions in France until February 1st, 25 of which should be held in the zone of the Armies and that on March 1st, we should have 20 divisions in the Zone of Armies and 5 ready to embark. The plan for March 1st was satisfactory, but the restrictions as to the divisions that should be in France on February 1st could not be accepted, as it would seriously interfere with the now or troops homeward.

"In a communication dated December 24th, the Marshal set forth the minimum forces to be furnished by the several Allies, requesting the American Army to furnish 22 to 25 divisions of Infantry. In

the same note be estimated the force to be maintained after the signing of the preliminaries of peace at about 32 divisions, of which the American Army was to furnish 6.

"In reply, it was pointed out that our problems of repatriation of troops and their demobilization was quite different from that of France and Great Britain. On account of our long line of communications in France and the time consumed by the ocean voyage and travel in the United States, even with the maximum employment of our then available transportation, at least a year must elapse before we could complete our demobilization. Therefore, it was proposed by me that the number of American Combat Divisions to be maintained in the Zone of the Armies should be reduced on April 1st to 15 and on May 1st to 10 divisions, and that in the unexpected event that the preliminaries of peace should not be signed by May 1st we would continue to maintain 10 divisions in the Zone of the Armies until date of signature.

"The Allied Commander-in-Chief later revised his estimate, and, on January 24, stated to the Supreme War Council that the German demobilization would permit the reduction of the Allied forces to 100 divisions, of which the Americans were required to furnish 15. In reply, it was again pointed out that our problem was entirely one of transportation, and that such a promise was unnecessary, inasmuch as it would probably be the summer of 1919 before we could reduce our forces below the number asked. We were, therefore, able to keep our available ships filled, and by May 19th, all combat divisions, except 5 still in the Army of Occupation, were under orders to proceed to ports of embarkation. This provided sufficient troops to utilize all troop transports to include July 15th.

"The President had informed me that it would be necessary for us to have at least one regiment in occupied Germany, and left the details to be discussed by me with Marshal Foch. My cable of July 1st, summarizes the agreement reached:

"BY DIRECTION OF PRESIDENT I HAVE DISCUSSED WITH MARSHAL FOCH QUESTION OF FORCES TO BE LEFT ON THE RHINE, FOLLOWING AGREED UPON; THE FOURTH AND FIFTH DIVISIONS WILL BE SENT TO BASE PORTS IMMEDIATELY, THE SECOND DIVISION WILL COMMENCE MOVING TO BASE PORTS ON JULY 15TH, AND THE THIRD DIVISION ON AUGUST 15TH. DATE OF RELIEF OF THE FIRST DIVISION WILL BE DECIDED LATER. AGREEMENT CONTEMPLATES THAT AFTER COMPLIANCE BY GERMANY WITH MILITARY CONDITIONS TO BE COMPLETED. WITHIN THREE MONTHS AFTER GERMAN RATIFICATION OF TREATY, AMERICAN FORCES WILL BE REDUCED TO ONE REGIMENT OF INFANTRY AND CERTAIN AUXILIARIES. REQUEST PRESIDENT BE INFORMED OF AGREEMENT".

"As a result of a later conference with Marshal Foch, the Third division was released on August 3rd and the First Division on August 15th.

* * * * *

(SIGNED) J. J. Pershing
(TYPED) J. J. PERSHING
GENERAL, COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF
AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES

3 Incls-

1. Organization Chart
2. Map of France
3. 2nd Battle of the Marne

ORGANIZATION AND STATUS OF COMBAT TROOPS OF THE AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES Showing units in Europe, on Shipping Program and required to complete organization at the Period of the Signing of the Armistice

CHART G

COMBAT DIVISION

Divisional Headquarters
Headquarters Troop

DEPT DIVISION*

Divisional Headquarters
Headquarters Troop

DIVISIONAL TROOPS

DIVISIONAL TROOPS


SUMMARY

Commander-in-Chief and Staff	1
0 HQ Troops (See Chart D)	1
83 Combat Divisions	15, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th, 10th, 11th, 12th, 13th, 14th, 15th, 16th, 17th, 18th, 19th, 20th, 21st, 22nd, 23rd, 24th, 25th, 26th, 27th, 28th, 29th, 30th, 31st, 32nd, 33rd, 34th, 35th, 36th, 37th, 38th, 39th, 40th, 41st, 42nd, 43rd, 44th, 45th, 46th, 47th, 48th, 49th, 50th, 51st, 52nd, 53rd, 54th, 55th, 56th, 57th, 58th, 59th, 60th, 61st, 62nd, 63rd, 64th, 65th, 66th, 67th, 68th, 69th, 70th, 71st, 72nd, 73rd, 74th, 75th, 76th, 77th, 78th, 79th, 80th, 81st, 82nd, 83rd
2 Regional Replacement Depot Divisions	2
7 Staff Divisions	7
Divisional Headquarters assigned to J.O.I.	1
Marines: units temporarily assigned to J.O.I.	1
389th Inf Regt. HQ, 2nd Bn	1
310th Inf Train, HQ, 1st Bn	1
32nd Inf Regt. HQ, 1st Bn	1
308th Inf Train, HQ, 1st Bn	1
212nd and 213th Divisions, HQ, 1st Bn	2
54th Army Dep. HQ, 1st Bn	1

COMBAT DIVISION		DEPT DIVISION*	
Divisional Troops		Divisional Troops	
Infantry	Infantry	Infantry	Infantry
Artillery	Artillery	Artillery	Artillery
Engineers	Engineers	Engineers	Engineers
Signal Corps	Signal Corps	Signal Corps	Signal Corps
Trains	Trains	Trains	Trains
Mortar Bn	Mortar Bn	Mortar Bn	Mortar Bn
4 Field Co	4 Field Co	4 Field Co	4 Field Co
6 Truck Co	6 Truck Co	6 Truck Co	6 Truck Co
1st Bn	1st Bn	1st Bn	1st Bn
2nd Bn	2nd Bn	2nd Bn	2nd Bn
3rd Bn	3rd Bn	3rd Bn	3rd Bn
4th Bn	4th Bn	4th Bn	4th Bn
5th Bn	5th Bn	5th Bn	5th Bn
6th Bn	6th Bn	6th Bn	6th Bn
7th Bn	7th Bn	7th Bn	7th Bn
8th Bn	8th Bn	8th Bn	8th Bn
9th Bn	9th Bn	9th Bn	9th Bn
10th Bn	10th Bn	10th Bn	10th Bn
11th Bn	11th Bn	11th Bn	11th Bn
12th Bn	12th Bn	12th Bn	12th Bn
13th Bn	13th Bn	13th Bn	13th Bn
14th Bn	14th Bn	14th Bn	14th Bn
15th Bn	15th Bn	15th Bn	15th Bn
16th Bn	16th Bn	16th Bn	16th Bn
17th Bn	17th Bn	17th Bn	17th Bn
18th Bn	18th Bn	18th Bn	18th Bn
19th Bn	19th Bn	19th Bn	19th Bn
20th Bn	20th Bn	20th Bn	20th Bn
21st Bn	21st Bn	21st Bn	21st Bn
22nd Bn	22nd Bn	22nd Bn	22nd Bn
23rd Bn	23rd Bn	23rd Bn	23rd Bn
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37th Bn	37th Bn	37th Bn	37th Bn
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40th Bn	40th Bn	40th Bn	40th Bn
41st Bn	41st Bn	41st Bn	41st Bn
42nd Bn	42nd Bn	42nd Bn	42nd Bn
43rd Bn	43rd Bn	43rd Bn	43rd Bn
44th Bn	44th Bn	44th Bn	44th Bn
45th Bn	45th Bn	45th Bn	45th Bn
46th Bn	46th Bn	46th Bn	46th Bn
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72nd Bn	72nd Bn	72nd Bn	72nd Bn
73rd Bn	73rd Bn	73rd Bn	73rd Bn
74th Bn	74th Bn	74th Bn	74th Bn
75th Bn	75th Bn	75th Bn	75th Bn
76th Bn	76th Bn	76th Bn	76th Bn
77th Bn	77th Bn	77th Bn	77th Bn
78th Bn	78th Bn	78th Bn	78th Bn
79th Bn	79th Bn	79th Bn	79th Bn
80th Bn	80th Bn	80th Bn	80th Bn
81st Bn	81st Bn	81st Bn	81st Bn
82nd Bn	82nd Bn	82nd Bn	82nd Bn
83rd Bn	83rd Bn	83rd Bn	83rd Bn

Units necessary to complete quota according to Tables of Organization or Projects
 Units on shipping program to Jan. 1st, 1919 or in process of organization in France
 Units assigned as indicated
 Units available (in reserve, training or temporarily serving with other organizations)

* One Depot Division in each group of six Divisions, 1, 4, 7, 10, 13, 16, 19, 22, 25, 28, 31, 34, 37, 40, 43, 46, 49, 52, 55, 58, 61, 64, 67, 70, 73, 76, 79, 82, 85, 88, 91, 94, 97, 100, 103, 106, 109, 112, 115, 118, 121, 124, 127, 130, 133, 136, 139, 142, 145, 148, 151, 154, 157, 160, 163, 166, 169, 172, 175, 178, 181, 184, 187, 190, 193, 196, 199, 202, 205, 208, 211, 214, 217, 220, 223, 226, 229, 232, 235, 238, 241, 244, 247, 250, 253, 256, 259, 262, 265, 268, 271, 274, 277, 280, 283, 286, 289, 292, 295, 298, 301, 304, 307, 310, 313, 316, 319, 322, 325, 328, 331, 334, 337, 340, 343, 346, 349, 352, 355, 358, 361, 364, 367, 370, 373, 376, 379, 382, 385, 388, 391, 394, 397, 400, 403, 406, 409, 412, 415, 418, 421, 424, 427, 430, 433, 436, 439, 442, 445, 448, 451, 454, 457, 460, 463, 466, 469, 472, 475, 478, 481, 484, 487, 490, 493, 496, 499, 502, 505, 508, 511, 514, 517, 520, 523, 526, 529, 532, 535, 538, 541, 544, 547, 550, 553, 556, 559, 562, 565, 568, 571, 574, 577, 580, 583, 586, 589, 592, 595, 598, 601, 604, 607, 610, 613, 616, 619, 622, 625, 628, 631, 634, 637, 640, 643, 646, 649, 652, 655, 658, 661, 664, 667, 670, 673, 676, 679, 682, 685, 688, 691, 694, 697, 700, 703, 706, 709, 712, 715, 718, 721, 724, 727, 730, 733, 736, 739, 742, 745, 748, 751, 754, 757, 760, 763, 766, 769, 772, 775, 778, 781, 784, 787, 790, 793, 796, 799, 802, 805, 808, 811, 814, 817, 820, 823, 826, 829, 832, 835, 838, 841, 844, 847, 850, 853, 856, 859, 862, 865, 868, 871, 874, 877, 880, 883, 886, 889, 892, 895, 898, 901, 904, 907, 910, 913, 916, 919, 922, 925, 928, 931, 934, 937, 940, 943, 946, 949, 952, 955, 958, 961, 964, 967, 970, 973, 976, 979, 982, 985, 988, 991, 994, 997, 1000, 1003, 1006, 1009, 1012, 1015, 1018, 1021, 1024, 1027, 1030, 1033, 1036, 1039, 1042, 1045, 1048, 1051, 1054, 1057, 1060, 1063, 1066, 1069, 1072, 1075, 1078, 1081, 1084, 1087, 1090, 1093, 1096, 1099, 1102, 1105, 1108, 1111, 1114, 1117, 1120, 1123, 1126, 1129, 1132, 1135, 1138, 1141, 1144, 1147, 1150, 1153, 1156, 1159, 1162, 1165, 1168, 1171, 1174, 1177, 1180, 1183, 1186, 1189, 1192, 1195, 1198, 1201, 1204, 1207, 1210, 1213, 1216, 1219, 1222, 1225, 1228, 1231, 1234, 1237, 1240, 1243, 1246, 1249, 1252, 1255, 1258, 1261, 1264, 1267, 1270, 1273, 1276, 1279, 1282, 1285, 1288, 1291, 1294, 1297, 1300, 1303, 1306, 1309, 1312, 1315, 1318, 1321, 1324, 1327, 1330, 1333, 1336, 1339, 1342, 1345, 1348, 1351, 1354, 1357, 1360, 1363, 1366, 1369, 1372, 1375, 1378, 1381, 1384, 1387, 1390, 1393, 1396, 1399, 1402, 1405, 1408, 1411, 1414, 1417, 1420, 1423, 1426, 1429, 1432, 1435, 1438, 1441, 1444, 1447, 1450, 1453, 1456, 1459, 1462, 1465, 1468, 1471, 1474, 1477, 1480, 1483, 1486, 1489, 1492, 1495, 1498, 1501, 1504, 1507, 1510, 1513, 1516, 1519, 1522, 1525, 1528, 1531, 1534, 1537, 1540, 1543, 1546, 1549, 1552, 1555, 1558, 1561, 1564, 1567, 1570, 1573, 1576, 1579, 1582, 1585, 1588, 1591, 1594, 1597, 1600, 1603, 1606, 1609, 1612, 1615, 1618, 1621, 1624, 1627, 1630, 1633, 1636, 1639, 1642, 1645, 1648, 1651, 1654, 1657, 1660, 1663, 1666, 1669, 1672, 1675, 1678, 1681, 1684, 1687, 1690, 1693, 1696, 1699, 1702, 1705, 1708, 1711, 1714, 1717, 1720, 1723, 1726, 1729, 1732, 1735, 1738, 1741, 1744, 1747, 1750, 1753, 1756, 1759, 1762, 1765, 1768, 1771, 1774, 1777, 1780, 1783, 1786, 1789, 1792, 1795, 1798, 1801, 1804, 1807, 1810, 1813, 1816, 1819, 1822, 1825, 1828, 1831, 1834, 1837, 1840, 1843, 1846, 1849, 1852, 1855, 1858, 1861, 1864, 1867, 1870, 1873, 1876, 1879, 1882, 1885, 1888, 1891, 1894, 1897, 1900, 1903, 1906, 1909, 1912, 1915, 1918, 1921, 1924, 1927, 1930, 1933, 1936, 1939, 1942, 1945, 1948, 1951, 1954, 1957, 1960, 1963, 1966, 1969, 1972, 1975, 1978, 1981, 1984, 1987, 1990, 1993, 1996, 1999, 2002, 2005, 2008, 2011, 2014, 2017, 2020, 2023, 2026, 2029, 2032, 2035, 2038, 2041, 2044, 2047, 2050, 2053, 2056, 2059, 2062, 2065, 2068, 2071, 2074, 2077, 2080, 2083, 2086, 2089, 2092, 2095, 2098, 2101, 2104, 2107, 2110, 2113, 2116, 2119, 2122, 2125, 2128, 2131, 2134, 2137, 2140, 2143, 2146, 2149, 2152, 2155, 2158, 2161, 2164, 2167, 2170, 2173, 2176, 2179, 2182, 2185, 2188, 2191, 2194, 2197, 2200, 2203, 2206, 2209, 2212, 2215, 2218, 2221, 2224, 2227, 2230, 2233, 2236, 2239, 2242, 2245, 2248, 2251, 2254, 2257, 2260, 2263, 2266, 2269, 2272, 2275, 2278, 2281, 2284, 2287, 2290, 2293, 2296, 2299, 2302, 2305, 2308, 2311, 2314, 2317, 2320, 2323, 2326, 2329, 2332, 2335, 2338, 2341, 2344, 2347, 2350, 2353, 2356, 2359, 2362, 2365, 2368, 2371, 2374, 2377, 2380, 2383, 2386, 2389, 2392, 2395, 2398, 2401, 2404, 2407, 2410, 2413, 2416, 2419, 2422, 2425, 2428, 2431, 2434, 2437, 2440, 2443, 2446, 2449, 2452, 2455, 2458, 2461, 2464, 2467, 2470, 2473, 2476, 2479, 2482, 2485, 2488, 2491, 2494, 2497, 2500, 2503, 2506, 2509, 2512, 2515, 2518, 2521, 2524, 2527, 2530, 2533, 2536, 2539, 2542, 2545, 2548, 2551, 2554, 2557, 2560, 2563, 2566, 2569, 2572, 2575, 2578, 2581, 2584, 2587, 2590, 2593, 2596, 2599, 2602, 2605, 2608, 2611, 2614, 2617, 2620, 2623, 2626, 2629, 2632, 2635, 2638, 2641, 2644, 2647, 2650, 2653, 2656, 2659, 2662, 2665, 2668, 2671, 2674, 2677, 2680, 2683, 2686, 2689, 2692, 2695, 2698, 2701, 2704, 2707, 2710, 2713, 2716, 2719, 2722, 2725, 2728, 2731, 2734, 2737, 2740, 2743, 2746, 2749, 2752, 2755, 2758, 2761, 2764, 2767, 2770, 2773, 2776, 2779, 2782, 2785, 2788, 2791, 2794, 2797, 2800, 2803, 2806, 2809, 2812, 2815, 2818, 2821, 2824, 2827, 2830, 2833, 2836, 2839, 2842, 2845, 2848, 2851, 2854, 2857, 2860, 2863, 2866, 2869, 2872, 2875, 2878, 2881, 2884, 2887, 2890, 2893, 2896, 2899, 2902, 2905, 2908, 2911, 2914, 2917, 2920, 2923, 2926, 2929, 2932, 2935, 2938, 2941, 2944, 2947, 2950, 2953, 2956, 2959, 2962, 2965, 2968, 2971, 2974, 2977, 2980, 2983, 2986, 2989, 2992, 2995, 2998, 3001, 3004, 3007, 3010, 3013, 3016, 3019, 3022, 3025, 3028, 3031, 3034, 3037, 3040, 3043, 3046, 3049, 3052, 3055, 3058, 3061, 3064, 3067, 3070, 3073, 3076, 3079, 3082, 3085, 3088, 3091, 3094, 3097, 3100, 3103, 3106, 3109, 3112, 3115, 3118, 3121, 3124, 3127, 3130, 3133, 3136, 3139, 3142, 3145, 3148, 3151, 3154, 3157, 3160, 3163, 3166, 3169, 3172, 3175, 3178, 3181, 3184, 3187, 3190, 3193, 3196, 3199, 3202, 3205, 3208, 3211, 3214, 3217, 3220, 3223, 3226, 3229, 3232, 3235, 3238, 3241, 3244, 3247, 3250, 3253, 3256, 3259, 3262, 3265, 3268, 3271, 3274, 3277, 3280, 3283, 3286, 3289, 3292, 3295, 3298, 3301, 3304, 3307, 3310, 3313, 3316, 3319, 3322, 3325, 3328, 3331, 3334, 3337, 3340, 3343, 3346, 3349, 3352, 3355, 3358, 3361, 3364, 3367, 3370, 3373, 3376, 3379, 3382, 3385, 3388, 3391,



In connection with the foregoing report of General Pershing regarding the Divisions which made up the American Expeditionary Forces, it is believed that the story of the numbering of these Divisions and their component units, etc., might be of interest to the average reader.

As previously stated in Volume 5, at the outbreak of World War I, there were only twenty divisions, organized and composed of one third regular troops and two thirds National Guardsmen. With the advent of the 100 Division Plan in World War 1, it is readily apparent that a re-numbering of the divisions was necessary. Accordingly; the War Department decided that the first twenty five divisions would be as signed to the regular army units; the 26th to 42nd, plus the 93rd, were assigned to the National Guard; and the 43rd to 100th, less the 93rd, were assigned to the National Army or Reserve. These latter divisions were made up mostly of drafted men. This system of numbering divisions was also extended to component units of these divisions. The first 50 Infantry Brigades (2 per division) were assigned to the Regular Army Divisions as were the first 100 numbers for the regiments (4 per division). 50 artillery brigades were also reserved for regular army units. This provided for assignment of a series of numbers for the National Guard divisions. For example, the 26th Division was assigned the 51st and 52nd Infantry Brigades and the Fifty first artillery Brigade; Also the 101, 102, 103 and 104 Infantry regiments; the 101, 102, and 103 Field Artillery; the 101, 102 and 103rd Machine-gun battalions; the 101 Trench Mortar battery; the 101 Engineers; 101 Field Signal battalion; 101st Headquarters and Trains; 101 Ammunition Train; 101 Supply Train; 101 Sanitary Train 3 and 101 Engineer Train. This procedural assignment provided the following numbers to the 41st Infantry Division: The 161st, 162nd, 163rd and 164th Infantry Regiments; the 81st and 82nd Infantry Brigades; the 66th Field Artillery Brigade with the 146th, 147th and 148th Field Artillery regiments; the 116th, 147th and 148th Machine-gun battalions; 116th Trench Mortar Battery; 116th Engineer Regiment; 116th Field Signal Battalion; 116th Hq and Military Police; 116th Ammunition Train; 116th Supply Train; 116th Sanitary Train; and the 116th Engineer Train.

Thus the foregoing rather simple numbering plan provides an easy method of identification of units which comprise a Division. The present divisions still are composed of these same numbered units, although some of the types or units have been eliminated from our present pentomic divisions.

Also of interest in connection with the foregoing report are certain extracts from the Final report of the Provost Marshal General who was responsible to the Secretary of War for the operation of the Selective Service system.

During the period from April 26, 1917 to November 11, 1918, a total of 2,869,826 men were called up for the draft. Of these, 2,952,927 were inducted of which 2,702,687 were accepted by the Army. Total men rejected were 194,385 during this period, with 55,855 being rejected on the cancellation of the draft.

In Washington, a total of 31,580 men were called up; a total of 33,257 men were inducted of which 31,403 were accepted, leaving 1,722 rejected and 132 released upon cancellation of the draft. In Washington a total of 66 local boards handled the draft. Gray's Harbor County had two boards; Seattle and King County had 14; Spokane 6; Pierce County and Tacoma 6; the balance of the counties and larger cities had one each.

Captain Irvin W. Ziegus, Infantry, served as Military Aide to the Governor and as Disbursing Officer of the United States in Washington. All officers so assigned throughout the United States were under the direct command and supervision of the Provost Marshal General of the United States, Major General Enoch H. Crowder who served in that capacity from April 26, 1917 to July 15, 1919.

Just as Camp Lewis had served as a Mobilization point in 1917, it also served as a Demobilization point in 1919. Its first demobilization was the troops of the 13th Division which had received its training at Camp Lewis, but never left there due to the Armistice. The Mobilization Group in November 1919 was composed of a Medical Supply Depot; 355th Motor Transport Company; 349th Service Park Unit; 116th Ordnance Depot Company; 316th Fire Truck and Hose Company; 331st Auxiliary Remount Depot; A School for Baker's and Cook's. At that time the 31st Brigade and the 55th, 57th and 59th Regiments of Coast Artillery and 1st Infantry were also at Camp Lewis.

At this time the following troops were stationed at other points in Washington.

At Vancouver Barracks were Hq. and Staff and Companies C and E of the 44th Infantry; At Fort Lawton, the 1st Battalion, 44th Infantry, less Company C garrisoned that post; At Fort George Wright was the 21st Infantry, less 2nd and 3rd Battalions. No troops were at Fort Canby. Fort Casey had the 9th, 10th and 11th Coast Artillery Companies. The 4th CAC Company was at Fort Columbia. The 13th and 14th CA Companies were at Fort Flagler and at Fort Worden were the 6th C.A. Band and the 1st, 2nd, 4th and 17th Coast Artillery Companies.

General Orders No. 17, War Department, March 24, 1920 re-established the, territorial limits of the various Departments. The Western Department was composed of Washington, Oregon, Idaho, Montana, Wyoming, California, Utah, Nevada and the Territory of Alaska, under the command of Major General Hunter Liggett. Major General John F. Morrison commanded Camp Lewis. He was later transferred to the command of the Southern Department and was replaced by Major General Charles H. Muir, commander of the 4th Division.

General Orders No. 50, War Department, 20 August 1920 established Corps Areas to replace the Departments. Thus the Western Department became the 9th Corp Area and comprised the same States and the Territory of Alaska. Major General Hunter Liggett remained in command until March 21, 1921 when he was replaced by Major General Charles H. Muir. (Gen Muir was relieved by Major General William M. Wright on July 1, 1921.

On July 27, 1921, General Orders No. 33, War Department, ordered the 3rd Infantry Division from Camp Pike, Arkansas to Camp Lewis, Washington under the command of Major General William H. Johnston. The movement of this Division to Camp Lewis was accomplished by actual movement or some of the troops and others by redesignation of units already in Washington or other western states. Following their activation at Camp Lewis the following was a list of troops at the various installations in Washington:

COAST ARTILLERY -Caretaking Detachments at Forts Canby and Columbia and at Grays Harbor and Willapa Bay. At Fort Worden - Hq. & Hq Battery, 14th Coast Artillery and Hq. 1st and 3rd Battalions, 14th Coast Artillery. At Fort Casey - Hq. 2nd Battalion, 14th C. A. and Battery "D". Mine planter J. FRANKLIN BELL assigned to the Coast Defenses of Puget Sound.

Vancouver Barracks:	5th Infantry Brigade
Fort Douglas, Utah:	6th Infantry Brigade
Fort George Wright:	3rd Battalion, 4th Infantry
Fort Missoula, Montana:	1st Battalion, 4th Infantry
Camp Lewis, Wash:	3rd Battalion, 4th Infantry
	7th Infantry, less Hq. Co., 2nd Bn., and Companies E, F and G, which were in Alaska.
	Hq & Military Police Co., 3rd Div.
	Hq & Special Troops, 3rd Div., Maj Gen. Wm. H. Johnston, Comdg.
	3rd Tank Company (formerly the 328th Tank Co.)
	6th Engineers, less Company E.
	3rd Ordnance Company
	Hq & Hq Btry, 3rd F. A. Brigade
	10th Field Artillery (Horse drawn)
	Hq & Hq, 5th Infantry Brigade
	8th Signal Service Co.
	DEML., MED DEPT, ORD DEPT, & FINANCE DET.
	10th Motor Transport Company
	5th Motor Repair Section
	6th Wagon Company

Fort Lawton Hq., DEML., Dets., Med. Dept., Ord. Dept., and QMC.

30th Infantry, 3rd Division was at various stations in California

38th Infantry, 3rd Division was split between Fort Douglas, Utah and Fort Logan. Colorado. :

CHAPTER II

POST WAR REORGANIZATION OF THE WASHINGTON NATIONAL GUARD

In order to tell the story of the Post War Washington National Guard, it is believed that a review of the National Guard of the United States overall reorganization should first be told.

During the continuation of the World War all the energies of the Federal Government were devoted to its successful prosecution. The National Guard had been drafted into Federal Service, and incorporated into the United States Army, where it performed with "great fidelity and with marked credit".

There arose, however, in the course of the war a certain demand for the use of troops by the States for local protection and for the maintenance of law and order. In the majority of the states this demand was met by the organization of State Troops or Home Guards, which were not National Guard as contemplated by the National Defense Act. This class of troops was equipped under the provisions of the Act of Congress on June 14, 1917, which authorized the issue of certain arms and equipment. In several of the States the authorities thereof presented strong arguments for the organization and recognition of regular units of the National Guard, particularly setting forth the advantages accruing from the use of this class of troops for the maintenance of law and order, and their utility for State purpose. Inasmuch as the organization of National Guard units in certain sections of the country would provide the necessary local protection of industry, serve as a preventative of lawlessness, and would release United States troops for service overseas, as well as provide a force for service along the Mexican border, the Federal Government authorized the organization of certain National Guard units particularly designed for the above purposes. The Federal Government, however, authorized the organization of these National Guard units with the clear understanding that they were not formed for the purpose of service in the United States Army overseas, but for local protection within the borders of States in which they were organized or for protection of the Federal borders should such an emergency arise.

The War Department consented to the organization of two Brigades of National Guard cavalry in the State of Texas, in view of their utility as a relief for United States Cavalry stationed on the border, when the conditions of warfare overseas rendered it probable that Cavalry would be required in large numbers for the open warfare then in prospect. Under this program, as previously stated in Volume 5, Washington was authorized one regiment of Infantry, which was designated the 3rd Washington Infantry. In addition to Infantry, some States were authorized Cavalry, Field Artillery, Coast Artillery, Engineers, Signal Corps, Sanitary troops and Machine Gun units.

As of June 30, 1919, the strength of the National Guard, composed of 18 Infantry regiments, 6 cavalry regiments and other miscellaneous units, was 1,198 officers and 36,012 enlisted men.

Under War Department General Orders No. 162, dated December 22, 1917, and authority conferred by Section 2 of the Act of Congress, "authorize the President to increase temporarily the Military Establishment of the United States" approved May 18, 1917, the organization of the United States Guards, National Army, under the Chief of the Militia Bureau, was authorized. Under this authority, the organization of the United States Guards was placed in the hands of the several department commanders, but on January 8, 1918, the further organization was suspended. On April 15, 1918, the organization was again resumed, and continued until Nov. 11, 1918. During this period, 48 Battalions were authorized. **** with a strength of 1,492 officers and 28,800 men.

The Western Department was assigned Battalions 6, 23, 24, 25, 30, 37, 38, 43 and 44, which required 279 officers and 5,400 enlisted men. There were 183 officers and 2,851 enlisted men on duty in the Western Department on November 11, 1918.

This special force was used in carrying out the provisions of the President's proclamation pertaining to alien enemies and used for the purpose of preserving and protecting major utilities essential to the conduct of the war in Europe. The force permitted the withdrawal of Regular Army and National Guard troops engaged in guarding public utilities and property in order that they could be trained and

transported to positions in the European battle front. They were located as follows in the Western Department: Shipyards, docks and railroad terminals, arsenals, United States stores, Government buildings, Railroad bridges and tunnels, Canal locks and waterways, waterworks, reservoirs, dams and mines, and as Provost Guards.

During this period it was estimated by the Militia Bureau that the several States had approximately 79,000 Home Guards to which arms had been issued by the United States Government.

As of June 30, 1920 the authorized strength of the National Guard of the United States was 106,300. Actual strength was 1,198 officers and 36,012 enlisted men. The Chief of the National Guard Bureau, in commenting on this shortage, stated as follows:

"(a) The uncertainty as to what legislation would be adopted as Army reorganization.

"(b) Discontent with the service fostered by tales of unfair treatment by men with grievances, many of which found their way into the public press.

"(c) The male population in the country had been satiated with military service for the past two years.

"(d) The desire in a number of States to reorganize the National Guard upon old lines and delay in conforming to necessary requirements established for new units.

"(e) The usual antagonism of labor unions in many localities toward the organization of the National Guard.

The complaints of the members of the National Guard concerning unjust treatment while in our National Army, according to the Chief of the National Guard Bureau, could not be substantiated based upon a full and complete investigation. He further stated that there was conclusive proof that National Guard officers were not, as a class, discriminated against by Regular officers. Individual cases of injustice had been cited by members of Congress and by members of the National Guard to make it appear that unjust discrimination existed generally. As a general rule, the National Guard officers were treated with more consideration than were regular army officers under the same conditions. The number of National Guard officers who complained was very few compared with the whole number, but unfortunately they were much in evidence and by claims of unjust treatment materially impeded the reorganization of the National Guard. Fortunately, the hostility generated by these complaints had nearly disappeared by June 30, 1920, but undoubtedly had done much to retard the reorganization.

The Militia Bureau, in pursuance to the act of June 3, 1916, endeavored to enforce the law by requiring the strength of the National Guard companies, etc., to be the same as was prescribed for the "Regular Army before Federal recognition was extended. This policy was strongly opposed by some State Adjutants General, who, owing to difficulties of finding sufficient men in small towns, desired authority to organize smaller units, some even suggesting an enlisted strength of 35; but with three commissioned officers for each organization. The Militia Bureau suggested that instead of organizing a small company with three officers, platoons be organized with strength of 40 to 50 men each, and that two platoons in contiguous towns be considered a company and allowed three commissioned officers. This was not satisfactory to some of the Adjutants General, and a committee of Governors from the Governor's Assembly held in Salt Lake City, Utah, waited upon the Secretary at War with a request that the strength be reduced to approximately 50 men or less. This being in direct conflict with Statute Law had to be refused and those units of the National Guard which were formed previous to June 4, 1920, were organized as required by law, with the minimum strength as was prescribed for the Regular Army (100 men).

In planning for this reorganization, the Militia Bureau considered that the lessons taught by the World War had demonstrated the following great facts:

- (1) That on the field of battle the combatant unit was virtually limited to a platoon.
- (2) That the strength of our combatant units under the old organization was inadequate.
- (3) That the draft law to provide untrained men for any army was practicable and efficient.

In those cases where the full strength (100 men) could not be obtained in one community, authority was granted to organize platoons in two contiguous localities and combine them into one company. This plan magnified the training of the platoon and was a move much needed in the National Guard. The training of platoon commanders in actual command and in knowing and exercising their exact lawful authority is most valuable. It is too often the case that Lieutenants rarely gain command experience, yet at any time they may be thrown in command of a company where mistakes cost many lives.

In order to encourage the Adjutants General and state authorities to greater efforts to reorganize the National Guard. the assistance of United States Recruiting Officers were secured. The Militia Bureau furnished a monthly photo static sheet showing the progress made each month by the different states, grading them, according to the percentage of their allotment which they had already raised. This caused some revival of interest, am on June 30, 1920, the records showed the condition of the National Guard as follows:

Officer's Reserve Corps, not active	<u>742</u>
State Staff corps and departments	223
Officers with. organizations, active	1,866
Enlisted men	<u>54,017</u>
Total active strength 56,106	

During the year the gain had been as follows:

Infantry	(3 Regiments 74 companies)
Cavalry	58 troops
Field Artillery	(1 Regiment 14 batteries)
Coast Artillery	21 companies
Engineers	3 companies
Signal Corps	2 companies
Tank Corps	2 companies
Trains:	
Sanitary	2 companies
Ammunition	1 companies
Supply.....	2 companies

As of 30 June 1920, the Washington National Guard had a strength of 60 officers and 1,261 enlisted men and was organized as follows:

LIST OF OFFICERS AND ORGANIZATIONS OF THE WASHINGTON NATIONAL GUARD

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF - Acting Governor Louis F. Hart
Adjutant General - Brig. Gen. Maurice Thompson, Seattle

STATE STAFF CORPS AND DEPARTMENTS

Inspector General's Department - Major David A. Maurier, Spokane
Judge Advocate General's Dept.- Maj. Noah Shakespeare, Everett
Ordnance Department - Major Alvin H. Hankins, Seattle
Quartermaster Corps - Major Paul Edwards, Seattle
- Major Clarence R. Christie, Seattle
- Captain Walter F. Hoyer, Yakima
- Captain Harry G. Smart, Seattle

THIRD WASHINGTON INFANTRY (Headquarters -Seattle)

Colonel William T. Patten, Commanding, Seattle
Lieutenant Colonel Harry G. Winsor, Tacoma
Chaplain - Albert L. Knudson, Seattle
Adjutant - Captain John C. Coart, Seattle
Headquarters Company, Seattle - Captain John C. Coart, Comdg.
Supply Company, Tacoma - Captain Oliver C. Nelson. Comdg.
Second Lieut. Harold A.. Mallum

Machine Gun Company, - Captain Warren T. Bowman, Comdg.
Ellensburg First Lieut. Ralph O. Walton
Second Lieut. Charles A. Love
Second Lieut. George T. Morton

FIRST BATTALION, SEATTLE

Major Albert B. Beebe, Commanding, Seattle
Adjutant - First Lieut. Frederick M. Lash, Stevenson

Company A, Seattle Captain William G. Rogers, Comdg.
Second Lieut. Earl Polen

Company B, Seattle Captain Charles J. Hutchinson, Comdg.
First Lieut. Sam A. Wright
Second Lieut. Earle W. Allen

Company C, Seattle Captain Cyril Stutfield, Comdg.
Second Lieut. Charles D. Haynes

Company D, Seattle Captain Edwin J. Brown, Comdg.
First Lieut. Edwin S. Booth
Second Lieut. George F. White

WASHINGTON TANK CORPS

Company L, Centralia Captain David Livingstone, Comdg.
First Lieut. Archer S. Kresky
Second Lieut. Adrian F. Cormier
Second Lieut. Earl S. Abbott

WASHINGTON CAVALRY

Troop B, Tacoma Captain Joseph I. Middlesworth, Comdg.
First Lieut. Elmer E. Kohlstad
Second Lieut. _____

WASHINGTON MEDICAL CORPS

Major John G. Byrne, Acting State Surgeon, Seattle
First Lieut. Frederick C. Parker, Seattle

Third Washington Infantry Sanitary Detachment

Major John G. Byrne, Seattle
Captain Will G. Crosby, DC, Seattle
Captain Willis G. Hall, Seattle
First Lieut. Matthew T. Dalton, Seattle

In his Biennial Report for the period 1919-1920, the Adjutant General, in commenting on Armories, stated:

"The State Armories in Seattle, Tacoma, Spokane, Bellingham and Yakima, while each needing some minor repairs are, in general satisfactory, as to condition and equipment and provide the necessary facilities for the number of National Guard troops, quartered therein at the present time.

"Additional units to be formed in Spokane in the new future cannot be provided with quarters in the Spokane Armory until the addition thereto can be constructed.

"The Seattle Armory, while sufficiently large to meet the immediate needs of the National Guard forces in that city, must be enlarged at a later date, and definite plans for the extension of this building, first prepared in 1916, have been adopted as the basis upon which provisions can be made two years hence, for the increased number of National Guard units which the city of Seattle must maintain.

"The Armories in Tacoma, Bellingham and Yakima are sufficiently large to meet the ultimate requirements of the National Guard forces in those cities and will require no change in order to meet future demands for National Guard quarters.

"The State Legislature, in 1919, appropriated from the military fund \$125,000 for the construction, equipping and furnishing of an armory for the use of the National Guard at Everett.

"The Everett Armory Commission created, under Section 2. Chapter 21, Session Laws of 1919, for the purpose of erecting, completing and furnishing the Everett Armory selected Mr. Louis Swarz, of Seattle, as the designing and supervising architect, for the construction of the Everett Armory.

"Completed plans and specifications prepared by Mr. Swarz were approved on June 21, 1920.

"Contracts for the construction of the armory were awarded to the following concerns, they having submitted the lowest bid on the subdivision covered by their contract:

General contract, McRae Brothers	\$95,686.00
Heating & Ventilating, Hellenthal Htg & Plmg	8,000.00
Plumbing, A. P. Bassett Heating and Plumbing.....	5,600.00
Electrical wiring, NePage-McKenny Co.	1,745.00
Electrical fixtures, H. E. Gleason & Co.	575.00
Finish Hardware, Seattle Hardware Company	1,671.00

"The Everett Armory will be a two-story concrete and brick building .Actual construction of the Armory was begun September, 1920. Rapid progress is being made with the work and it is expected that it will be completed before March 29, 1921, this being the date for its completion as specified in the general contract.

"When completed the Armory will provide quarters for two organizations. It will have a drill hall 150 by 89 feet. A Veteran's hall and social hall have been provided for on the first floor and an indoor rifle range will be constructed in the basement of the building.

"The site on which the Armory was constructed was donated to the State by the City of Everett, and consists of lots 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20 and south 20 feet of block 627, Plat of Everett, with the vacated alley running through same.

"The State Legislature, in 1919, appropriated from the military fund \$100,000 for the purpose of constructing, equipping and furnishing an Armory for the use of the National Guard at Walla Walla.

"The Walla Walla Armory Commission, created under Section 2, Chapter 19, Session Laws of 1919, for the purpose of erecting, completing and furnishing the Walla Walla Armory, selected as a site for said armory on the northwest corner of East and Poplar streets, same being 273.6 feet on Poplar street and 160 feet on East Street. This property was then deeded to the State by the City of Walla Walla.

"The commission selected Messrs. Osterman and Seibert, of Walla Walla as designing and supervising architects.

"Completed plans and specifications, prepared by Messrs. Osterman and Seibert, were approved by the Commission July 14, 1920.

"Contracts for the construction of the armory were awarded to the following concerns, they having submitted the lowest bid on the subdivision covered by their contract:

General contract -Taylor and McLeod	\$78,010. 00
Heating and Ventilating -G. H. Sutherland & Co.	11,925.00
Plumbing -G. H. Sutherland	4,375.00

"The Walls Walla armory will be a two story cement and brick structure.

"Construction work started on the first of October, 1920. The Armory should be completed by September 1, 1921.

"When completed the armory will provide quarters for one National Guard company and have a drill hall 83 ~ 1)6.5 feet.

"A pistol range will be constructed in the basement.

"The building has been so constructed so as to provide room for quarters for one additional organization, but the space so provided will not be finished under the present appropriation.

"Plans for a very much needed gun shed, at the station, were prepared as a part of the Walla Walla armory construction plans, but lack of funds prevented the Armory commission from including the gun shed in the final plans.

"The State Legislature, in 1919, appropriated \$100,000 from the military fund for the constructing, equipping and furnishing of an Armory for the use of the National Guard at Aberdeen.

"At the present there are no National Guard organizations stationed at Aberdeen. The commission, therefore, deemed it advisable to delay construction of this armory.

"The present plans of this office, however, contemplate the organization of a coast artillery company at Aberdeen. The Aberdeen Armory Construction Commission will in the near future take definite steps toward construction of the armory in order to provide for this new organization.

"On the 5th day of May, 1920, a two-year lease was made with Peter Casassa for quarters for the Machine Gun Company, 3rd Washington Infantry, Ellensburg, at a rental of \$75.00 per month.

"A lease, from April 1, 1920, until March 30, 1921, was made with J. W. Wilson for the use of a building, in Walla Walla, for quarters of Battery A, 2nd Washington Field Artillery, at a rental of \$100.00 per month.

"A lease from October 20, 1920 until October 20, 1922, was made with Charles Martin for use of brick building, in Walla Walla, as gun shed and store house for artillery material for Battery A. 2nd Washington Field Artillery at a rental of \$150.00 per month.

"A lease from October 27, 1920 until April 27, 1921, was made with C. A. Burnham, for the use of the second floor of a building at Centralia, as quarters for Company L, Washington Tank Corps, at a rental of \$100.00 per month.

"This lease was made for a short time as arrangements have been made whereby the Military Department will be able to obtain the lease of a new structure being built in Centralia, so constructed as to provide for the immediate needs of the Tank Company at that station.

"Temporary quarters for Company M, 3rd Washington Infantry, at Everett, are being provided for at a rental of \$35.00 per month, under an extension or an expired lease, until the new Armory becomes available for permanent quarters.

"Temporary quarters for Company L, 3rd Washington Infantry, at Wenatchee are being provided for at a rental of \$75.00 per month, under the present lease. The quarters now in use are adequate and every effort is being made to obtain the use of a suitable building which may be used for Armory purposes.

In commenting upon the use of Armories for Civic purposes in his Biennial Report for 1919-20, the Adjutant General stated:

"As a joint Federal and State force, the National Guard receives a large degree of Federal financial aid and support. For the Fiscal year ending June 30, 1920, Congress appropriated more than \$28,000,000 to carry into effect for that period the National Guard provisions of the National Defense Act.

"These Federal funds are apportioned to the States upon the actual National Guard strength existing on June 30th each year.

"As a condition precedent to participation of this Federal aid, the Governor of a State must certify that the State has adequate Armory facilities for the in-door training of its National Guard troops, and that these Armories are of a character to afford safe storage for the arms, uniforms and equipage issued by the Federal government.

"The basic military equipment issued to a National Guard Company has a cost value of approximately \$75,000.00 and where several National Guard units are quartered in one Armory, the value of the Federal property stored therein will exceed \$500,000.00. The use of an Armory for civic purposes under these circumstances is a departure from the premises on which the certificate of the Governor is based, and Violation of the contractual relations between the State and the Federal government and their dual administration of the National Guard laws.

"As a practical proposition, however, it has been found that absolute adherence, upon the part of the State, to the express provisions of its contract with the government in regards to armory facilities; is precluded. To obtain the degree of civic support essential to the successful maintenance of a National Guard, force in a given community, the general public must be brought into close contact with these troops under favorable auspices, and public gatherings in a local armory from time to time afford an excellent means to this end. The policy has therefore been adopted, and is sanctioned by the War Department, to permit State Armories to be used for

"(1) Such social and athletic affairs as may, with the approval or the custodian of the armory, be given by the National Guard organizations occupying the building, and for which the officers thereof shall be fully responsible.

"(2) Social affairs under the auspices or veteran's organizations, Red Cross Chapters, and similar patriotic organizations.

"(J) State and National conferences of general public interest.

"(4) Public gatherings of importance or interest to the entire community in which the armory is situated: and,

"(5) Civic purposes in the event of fire, disturbance, or other public emergency.

"The use of a state armory to promote the interests of any private or corporate enterprise possesses none of these elements which in any way contribute to the success and welfare of the National Guard and is **pro** **ted**. No armory may be used for commercial purposes, or in any which will enable any individual, corporation, association, or enterprise to derive a financial profit therefrom, except to that extent embraced in the creation of a fund to further some recognized civic **head**.

"The officer of the National Guard assigned as the custodian of an armory is primarily the judge of propriety of permitting such armory to be used for any civic purpose, and without his approval having first been had, no armory can be made available for a public gathering".

In February, 1919, the general strike and attempted revolution in Seattle occurred and the Seattle organizations of the Washington National Guard were held in readiness, not, however, being ordered on active duty to quell any disturbances that might arise previous to the arrival of Federal troops. For a time there seemed to be more or less of a feeling of unrest and dissatisfaction because Federal troops were called into the State before the National Guard had been utilized to their fullest extent.

Threatened disturbances at Everett on October 8th, 1919, and in Spokane, Nov. 14th and 16th, 1919, inclusive, required the ordering on active duty of the organizations in their respective cities.

On the afternoon of November 11, 1919, as a peaceful parade, in celebration of Armistice Day, was progressing on the streets in Centralia the organization of the American Legion was fired into from several directions and positions and four ex-soldiers, citizens of Centralia, were killed, as a result of which Company "F", 3rd Washington Infantry, Tacoma, was immediately ordered on duty and dispatched to Centralia, remaining on duty until Sunday evening following. Lieut. Col. Harry G. Winsor, 3rd Washington Infantry, being in active charge of all the military work during the continuance of this tour of duty. He was heartily commended for his efficient management of affairs during this trying incident. The several organizations participating in those several duties acquitted themselves with credit, according to Adjutant General Thompson.

The annual encampment of the Third Washington Infantry Regiment and attached Sanitary troops was held on the State Militia Reservation at Camp Murray from July 11th to July 25th, 1920. This camp was designated Camp JAMES H. DENGAL in honor of James H. Dengal, formerly Major of Infantry, Washington National Guard, and later Captain, U.S. Army, whose death occurred at Wenatchee on April 18th, 1920. Colonel Arthur E. Campbell, 3rd Washington Infantry was Camp Commander. 51 officers and 893 enlisted men attended this encampment.

At the beginning of the period July 1, 1920, 14 states had no National Guard; At the end of the period, June 30, 1921, only 4 states had no National Guard. During this year, the following States commenced the re-organization of the National Guard: Arkansas, Delaware, Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Montana, Nebraska, New Mexico and North Dakota. New Hampshire and South Dakota were just beginning to reorganize and Nevada and West Virginia had at that date, taken no action to reorganize.

According to the Chief of the Militia Bureau, the conditions which retarded the reorganization during the previous year had been modified to a great extent. The act of June 4, 1920, fixed the status which was intended for the National Guard, which according to the scheme announced by the General Staff, was most gratifying to the National Guard. The policy as announced contemplated the separation of the territorial limits of the United States into nine corps areas and the organization of two complete

Infantry divisions in each Corps area from the National Guard and two or more cavalry divisions from the entire areas of the United States, with the necessary corps and army troops. This was double the anticipated strength of the Regular Army. The States, with one exception, joined the scheme of organization worked out by the General Staff and gradually converted their old organizations into new ones then prescribed for our military forces. The antagonism of labor toward the organization of the National Guard was denied.

The strength of the different branches of the National Guard of the United States on June 20, 1921, to whom Federal recognition had been extended was as follows:

Officers:

Infantry	3,016
Infantry (Tanks)	27
Engineers	156
Field Artillery	832
Coast Artillery	403
Signal Corps	48
Medical Corps	405
Trains, QM Corps.	37
Cavalry	533
Air Service.	20
State staff Corps & Departments	<u>366</u>
TOTAL	5,843

Enlisted Strength by branches:

Infantry	65,654
Infantry (Tanks)	496
Engineers	3,054
Field Artillery	14,867
Coast Artillery	8,450
Signal Corps	781
Medical Corps	2,768
Trains, QM Corps	866
Cavalry	10,490
Air Service	90
State Staff Personnel	<u>271</u>
TOTAL	107,787

The strength of the Washington National Guard at this time was 60 officers and 1,261 enlisted men, which was slightly below the minimum strength at that time by the National Guard provisions of the National Defense Act. The new allocation assigned by the Special Committee of the General Staff was as follows:

DIVISION TROOPS

Headquarters, 41st Infantry Division
Headquarters, 81st Infantry Brigade
Headquarters Company, 81st Infantry Brigade
161st Infantry Regiment
3rd Battalion, 186th Infantry Regiment
Brigade Headquarters, 66th Field Artillery Brigade
Headquarters Battery, 66th Field Artillery Brigade
146th Field Artillery Regiment
Headquarters, 148th Field Artillery Regiment
Headquarters Battery, 148th Field Artillery
Service Battery, 148th Field Artillery
Two Batteries, 148th Field Artillery
Second Battalion Combat Train, 148th Artillery
66th Field Artillery Brigade Ammunition Train
41st Division Air Service
Headquarters, 116th Medical Regiment
Ambulance Company No. 147, motorized
Sanitary Company No. 146
Medical Laboratory Section No. 116
Medical Supply Section No. 116
Veterinary Company No. 116
Special Division Troops, Headquarters
41st Signal Company
41st Tank Company

CORPS TROOPS

Battalion Headquarters, 196th Field Artillery (155 GPF)
Batteries A and B, 196th Field Artillery
One Anti-Aircraft Battery, 75mm
58th Machine Gun Squadron, 24th Cavalry Division
10 Companies of Coast Artillery

The foregoing forces, when fully organized, would give the State of Washington National Guard at 5,600 officers and enlisted men, the quota required under the National Defense Act, upon the basis of eight hundred officers and enlisted men for each Senator and Representative.

Adjutant General Maurice Thompson's Biennial Report for 1921-22 contained the following with respect to the reorganization required by the new allocations

"Immediately upon this allocation having been definitely approved by the Secretary of War, this office initiated plans for the expansion in the then existing forces required for the Fiscal Year ending June 30, 1921. A schedule of priorities governing the order in which the various units assigned to the State were to be created was worked out, and the conclusion reached to organize the 146th Field Artillery Regiment, two companies of Coast Artillery, and the Ambulance Company, during the six months remaining in which the necessary fifty per cent increase in strength must be made.

"In the distribution of the various units allocated to the State, the great majority of the Infantry had been assigned to stations in Eastern Washington, and the Field Artillery forces assigned to the cities of Seattle and Tacoma. It was therefore decided to immediately transfer the companies of Infantry then being

maintained in Seattle and Tacoma to Field Artillery and to replace these units with new companies. of Infantry, to be organized. at Spokane and other points in eastern Washington.

“During the period from January 1st, 1921 to June 30, 1921, an intensive organization and recruiting campaign was carried on. Captain Ralph A. Horr, Washington National Guard Reserve, an officer especially qualified as an organizer, was assigned to the duty of carrying on a comprehensive and energetic organization program in those localities selected for the formation of the new units. Although Many difficulties were encountered, the success of the work was very gratifying, and at the close of the Fiscal Year ending June 30, 1921, every new unit assigned for formation during the period had been organized, inspected by an officer of the Regular Army and extended Federal recognition as a legally constituted National Guard force. The transfer of the infantry companies selected for conversion to batteries of field artillery had been completed in an expeditious and systematic manner, and the new Field Artillery Regiment has received sufficient preliminary instruction to insure a successful field training encampment during the summer of 1921.

“The new Infantry companies had been officered in every instance by ex-service men of excellent character and qualifications to perform the duties devolving upon them, and the reconstructed Infantry Regiment was in very satisfactory state of readiness at the date set for its annual field training encampment..

“During the period in which the first expansion of the National Guard force of this State had been carried on it was round necessary to change the scheme of organization in the Adjutant General's office. in order to take care of the constantly increasing amount of work devolving upon employees. Experience had demonstrated that the approved General Staff plan of the Army insured a distribution of the various administrative details of a military headquarters, to the best advantage, it was decided to put into effect a general staff plan in the Adjutant General’s office. The officers on permanent duty were reassigned in accordance with the accepted General Staff plan, and the results thereafter achieved thoroughly justified the advisability of this reorganization.

"Subsequent to the field training encampments of 1921, plans were made for the further expansion of the National Guard to provide the fifty per cent increase required for the Fiscal Year ending June 30. 1922. but before any definite steps were taken for the formation of any new units. notification was received from the Militia Bureau of the War Department that owing to the lack of funds, no authority could he granted to those states which had completed their prescribed quotas for the Fiscal Year ending June 30, 1921, to form additional units until such time as all States had completed their 1921 quota. The State Military authorities being thus precluded from making any increase in the number of organizations then being maintained, turned their attention to recruiting existing units to their maximum peace strength, and to bring such units up to the highest point of Military efficiency obtainable. In many localities where National Guard companies were stationed, it had been somewhat difficult to make replacements as rapidly as losses occurred through discharges, and special attention was given to points where this situation occurred.

“The Military Department of the State occupies a peculiar position. It is the only department which must go out and sell itself to the general public and carry on a constant campaign of publicity in order to secure the personnel which constitutes the National Guard forces of the State .It selling something which is of vital importance to the State and yet which the young men to whom recruiting officer must appeal realize it involves a personal sacrifice on their part which receives little appreciation or reward. It has therefore been an ever-present problem to devise plans for recruiting which will be effective. Local company commanders are required to do a great deal of work and to devote practically all of their spare time in the ordinary administration, training and instruction of the companies which they command. It is impossible for them to personally solicit recruits and they must depend on receiving the support, backing and aid of local civic organizations, associations or business men, and the public generally, if a success is to be made of the National Guard units in the various communities. It is to be regretted that this support is not always easy to secure. There is a great deal of apathy and indifference on the part of business in generally toward the National Guard. They usually realize its importance, except

that an adequate and dependable National Guard force will be maintained by the State, but fail to consider that it is essential that the business interests should actively assist in recruiting and maintaining of the organization at the required strength.

During the month of May 1921, the State Armory in the City of Everett, for which the construction contract had been let in June 1920, was completed, inspected by the Armory Commission created by the legislature and formally accepted by the State.

The State Armory in the City of Walla Walla, upon which construction was started in August 1920, was completed during the month of September, 1921, with the exception of the gun shed, balcony in the drill hall and the interior finish in the room planned as an assembly place for Veteran's organizations, and one of the sets of Company quarters. These unfinished items were eliminated from the original contract owing to the fact that the appropriation for this armory was insufficient to provide a completed building under the original plans and specifications, owing to the high cost of labor and material prevailing at the time this building was under construction.

In August 1921, a contract was let for the construction of the State Armory in the City of Aberdeen, and immediate work started on this structure by the general contractor. This armory was completed in September, 1922, and formally accepted by the State. This building is adequate in every respect to meet all future requirements in the City of Aberdeen, having quarters for the ultimate force assigned for formation at that station.

The enlargement and remodeling of the Spokane Armory, for which provision was made at the last session of the Legislature, is now practically complete, giving the City of Spokane one of the best armories in the State, of sufficient capacity to provide quarters, storage facilities, and opportunities for indoor drill and instruction, for the entire quota of National Guard troops assigned to the City of Spokane.

The State Armory program in this State having been completed and there being no military necessity for the erection of any additional armories, it is the opinion of the Adjutant General that immediate provision should be made for additional buildings on the State Military Reservation at American Lake. At the present time the warehouse and storage facilities on the State reservation are entirely insufficient to provide proper shelter for a large amount of very essential and valuable equipment, particularly trucks, tractors and other motorized vehicles, and for guns, limbers and caissons, issued by the Federal Government to equip the 146th Field Artillery Regiment. It is also the opinion of the Adjutant General that the administrative offices of the Military Department of this State should be located on the State Military Reservation, and that the necessary office building and housing facilities for employees should be provided by the next session of the Legislature by appropriation from the military fund.

The gun-shed included in the original plan for the Walla Walla Armory should, be constructed, and the interior of the Veteran's room and additional Company quarters should be finished.

There is urgent need of some character of stable facilities in the Seattle and Tacoma armories in order that the State may be in position to requisition the authorized number of horses issued by the Federal Government to batteries of Field Artillery for home station training. These stable facilities should be provided with little difficulty if the necessary appropriations therefore can be made by the next legislature

On April 21, 1921, the Commander-in-Chief directed that a detail of one officer and fifteen enlisted men of the National Guard be furnished on May 1st for patrol duty to guard against the outbreak of fire in the storm swept area of the Olympic peninsula.

Immediately upon the receipt of this order the Adjutant General ordered a reconnaissance made of this area for the purpose of investigating conditions and securing requisite data as to what would be required in order to render efficient service. After a conference with Mr. O. F. Erickson, Deputy Supervisor, Olympic National Forest, it was decided that the following duties be delegated to this detachment:

To locate headquarters at Fairholm, Washington.

To check in all persons who enter the restricted area, issue permits, distribute special regulations and administer the office at Fairholm.

To check out all persons leaving the restricted area.

Immediately after the location of the camp had been decided upon steps were taken for the construction of necessary accommodations for this detachment which were completed prior to their arrival at Fairholm.

The detachment, consisting of two First Lieutenants, four sergeants, one corporal, two privates first class~ and nine privates, were assembled at Seattle and departed for Fairholm on April 30. 1921, arriving at 11:30 A.M., May 1, 1921.

First Lieutenant Charles E. Lohnes, 161st Infantry, Spokane, was designated as Officer in charge of this Detachment. It was decided that for the best interest of the service to also detail a medical officer for duty with this detachment and 1st Lieut. Victor S. Smith, MRC, was so detailed.

This camp was officially designated as Camp Frank H. Renick in honor of Hon. Frank H. Renick, who was a member of the State Senate Military Committee, and who died on May 6, 1921.

The daily routine of the camp was covered by daily reports issued by the Commanding Officer.

Under date of September 12, 1921, the Commander-in-Chief directed that this Detachment be relieved from further duty, which was accomplished by September 17, 1921.

In 1921, units of the Washington National Guard attended Summer Training as follows:

At Camp Lewis during the period June 12th to 30th - Company L, Wash. Tank Corps.

At Camp Murray during the period July 2nd to July 16th - 161st Infantry, Troop B, Washington Cavalry and the 147th Ambulance Company.

At Camp Murray during the period July 16th to July 30th - 146th F. A.

At Fort Worden during the period July 16th to 30th - 1st and 2nd Companies, Coast Artillery Corps Artillery (155 GPF)

Correspondence between the Militia Bureau and the Adjutant's General of the States indicated that the National Congress had again appropriated insufficient funds for the period ending June 30, 1922, but that authority would be granted from time to time for the formation of certain new units. A careful study was made by the Military Authorities of Washington regarding units yet to be formed. Taking into consideration the character of the organizations comprised within the ultimate quota which must be formed, it seemed most desirable to make further conversion of certain companies of the 161st Infantry located in western Washington, either by assigning such companies to the separate Battalion of the 186th Infantry, allocated to this state, or changing such companies to units of the Coast Artillery. As this plan involved changes which would radically affect the existing organization of the 161st Infantry, and could not be entirely carried out until provision could be made in the State Armory in the City of Spokane for more infantry companies than the armory would then accommodate, it was determined to defer any expansion in the National Guard of Washington until after July 1st, 1922.

As of January 1st, 1922, the National Guard of Washington was composed of the following organizations, all of which had been extended Federal recognition:

	Officers	Enlisted Men
State Staff Corps and Departments	8	2
Headquarters, Medical Department	2	-
Additional Infantry Officer	1	-
161st Infantry Regiment	58	1,120
146th Field Artillery Regiment	50	680
Battery A, 196th Field Artillery (155 GPF)	5	126
41st Tank Company	4	79
Troop B, 58th Machine Gun Squadron	4	95
489th Company, Coast Artillery	2	53
490th Company, Coast Artillery	3	58
491st Company, Coast Artillery	3	74
Ambulance Company No. 147	<u>2</u>	<u>42</u>
Totals	142	2,329

The Annual Report of the Chief of the Militia Bureau as of June 30, 1922 indicated the following aggregate strength of the National Guard of the United States as of that date:

Enrolled in 18 Infantry Divisions	113,350	
Enrolled in 4 Cavalry Divisions	12,066	
Enrolled in Inf. Regts., not asgd to Divisions	11,949	
Enrolled in Harbor Defense Troops (CAC & AA units)	<u>11,662</u>	
Total Divisions and Harbor Defense		149,027
Corps Troops	6,835	
Army Troops	1,843	
General Headquarters Troop	950	
State staff Corps and Departments	<u>1,003</u>	
		10,631
AGGREGATE		159,658

The minimum strength authorized for eventual enrollment in the National Guard organization under the act of June 3, 1916, was 435,800. This figure included the total 424,800 obtained by assuming and enrollment of 800 men for each of the 531 Members of Congress, the remaining difference of 11, 000 was made up of quotas assigned to the District of Colombia or to Island possessions and Territories not represented in Congress, 5,600; Puerto Rico 2,400; Hawaii 2,400 and Alaska 600.

Of this legal minimum the War Department has so far allotted to the National Guard service for eventual organization the following:

19 Infantry Divisions (2 to each Army Corps)	196,902	
4 Cavalry Divisions (1 to each Army Area)	23,216	
129 Companies of Coast Artillery (Harbor Defense)	<u>13,350</u>	
TOTAL		233,468
Corps Troops	82,221	
Army Troops (other than Cavalry)	24,215	
General Headquarters Troops	19,892	
Troops not included in 6 Field Armies	5,985	
Troops allotted to other than States	<u>4,384</u>	
AGGREGATE		370,165

The figures employed above are based on the Regular Army Tables of Organization, peace strength. With a legal minimum strength fixed at 435,800 officers and enlisted men, it will be seen that the National Guard service is still open for the assignment or organizations totaling 65,635 men.

A total of 226,406 troops has been assigned to date to the various States for immediate organization. This figure is made up of the unit strengths, based upon Regular Army peace-strength tables or 2,276 company units, 2027 of which pertain to Infantry and Cavalry divisions.

The organization of divisions having been stressed, the Militia Bureau looks forward to the early completion of not less than five Infantry Divisions and one Cavalry Division in addition to the two Infantry Divisions already Federally recognized.

The Twenty-seventh Division (New York) is now Federally recognized throughout, while the Twenty-eighth Division (Pennsylvania) is complete except for the Air Service. Following is a statement as to the stage or completion of the remaining Infantry Divisions, so far as the number of component units is concerned.

	Per Cent completed
Thirty-seventh (Ohio)	98
Thirty-second Division (Wisconsin and Michigan)	89
Thirty-eighth Division (Indiana, Kentucky and West Virginia).....	78
Thirty-fifth Division (Missouri, Nebraska, and Kansas	77
Twenty-Sixth Division (Massachusetts)	75
Thirty-ninth Division (Louisiana, Miss., Ala., & Florida)	75
Thirty-fourth Division (Iowa, Minn., N. D., & S. D.)	71
Forty-fourth Division (New York, Delaware & New Jersey)	69
Thirty-sixth Division. (Texas)	68
Twenty-ninth Division (Va., Md., & Dist. of Columbia).....	68
Thirtieth Division (Georgia, N.C., S.C., and Tenn.)	66
Forty-fifth Division (Ariz., Colo., N. M., & Okla.)	63
Thirty-third (Illinois).....	59
Forty-first Division (Wash., Ore., Ida., Mont., & Wyo.)	56
Forty-third Division (Ver., Conn., Me., & R.I.)	53
Fortieth Division , Calif., Utah and Nevada)	40

In the Summer of 1922. divisional units of the Washington National Guard trained during the period July 9th to 23rd At Camp Irving R. Connelly, Camp Murray , named in honor of Private Irving R. Connelly formerly a member of the Machine Gun Company, 161st Infantry, who was killed in action in France.

The 489th. 490th and 491st Coast Artillery companies trained at Fort Worden during the period July 9th to 23rd. During this same period Battery A, 196th F. A. (155) trained at Camp Levis. In 1921 the Washington National Guard Rifle Team placed 15th at the National Matches in a field of 70 teams. In 1922 they finished the matches with a score of 90.9 % surpassing all previous records and finished in 12th place in a field of 49 teams.

In 1922, units of the Washington National Guard were stationed in eighteen communities throughout the State in eight State-owned Armories and 10 rented armories as follows:

STATION	KIND	LEASE OR COMPLETED	CAPACITY	ORGANIZATIONS (COMPANIES)
Bellingham	State	1911	2	Co E, 161st Inf
Everett	State	1921	5	3rd Bn Hq. Co. & Cos L and K, 161st Inf
Seattle	State	1909	9	Hq Co. 161st Inf. & Btrys A, B, C and D, & San Det., 146th FA
Tacoma	State	1909	5	Trp B, 58th MG Sq. & Hq & Serv Btry and Btrys E & F, 146th FA
Aberdeen	State	1922	3	489th Co., CAC
Yakima	State	1914	3	2nd Bn Hq, Co., and Cos P & G, 161 Inf
Walla Walla	State	1921	2	Btry A., 196th FA
Spokane	State	1909	10	Hq. 161 Inf , 1st Bn, Hq Co and Cos A, B, C, & San Det, 161 Inf
Mt Vernon	Leased	1921	1	147th Ambulance Co.
Snohomish	Leased	1921	1	490th Co , CAC
Kent	Leased	1922	1	2nd Bn & C.T., 146 FA
Auburn	Leased	1921	1	1st Bn & C.T., 146 FA.
Olympia	Leased	1922	1	491st Co., CAC
Centralia	Leased	1921	1	41st Tank Co.
Ellensburg	Leased	1920	1	Co. H, 161 Inf
Prosser	Leased	1922	1	Co. I, 161 Inf
Pullman	Leased	1921	1	Co. K, 161 Inf
Wenatchee	Leased	1921	1	How. Co. , 161 Inf

ROSTER OF OFFICERS, WASH. N. G. AS OF NOVEMBER 1, 1922

HONORABLE LOUIS F. HART, GOVERNOR &
Commander- in- Chief

NAME	DUTY	STATION ADDRESS
Brig. Gen. Maurice Thompson	The Adjutant General	Camp Lewis, Wash.
Major Harry G. Smart	Asst. Adjutant Gen.	Camp Lewis, Wash.

OTHER DEPARTMENTS OR CORPS

Major Archie F. Logan	State Inspector	Camp Lewis, Wash.
Major Alfred W. McMorris	USP&DO	Murray Arsenal
Major Marmion D. Mills	State Quartermaster	Camp Lewis, Wash.
Capt. Orlo W. Brown	Asst. State Quartermaster	Camp Lewis, Wash.
1st Lt Joseph H. Souviney	Asst. State Quartermaster	Camp Lewis, Wash.
Major Paul Edwards	State Ordnance Officer	Seattle, Wash.
2nd Lt. Herman C. Terrine	Asst State Ordnance Officer	Murray Arsenal
Major George H. Crabtree	State Surgeon	Seattle, Wash.

STATE ADMINISTRATIVE STAFF

EX-OFFICIO CHIEF OF STAFF

Brig. Gen. Maurice Thompson	AGD	Camp Lewis, Wash.
Major Harry G. Smart	Executive officer	Camp Lewis, Wash.
Capt. Alfred. J. Hightower	G-1	Camp Lewis, Wash.
Major Elmer R. Brady	G-2	Camp Lewis, Wash.
Captain Thomas V. Scoones	Asst. G-2	Camp Lewis, Wash.
Major Archie F. Logan	G-3	Camp Lewis, Wash.
Major Marmion D. Mills	G-4	Camp Lewis, Wash.
Captain Orlo W. Brown	Asst. G-4	Camp Lewis, Wash.

ORGANIZATIONS

161st INFANTRY REGIMENT, 41st DIVISION

HEADQUARTERS

RANK	NAME	DUTY	STATION ADDRESS
Colonel	Thomas G. Aston	Commanding Regiment	Spokane -2215 S. Lincoln
Lt Col	Alvin H. Hankins	Executive officer	Seattle -1401-8th Ave. W.
Major	Krauth W. Thom	Machine Gun officer	Camp Lewis, Wash.
Captain	Joseph H. Smith	Supply officer	Everett - 608 Warren Ave.
Capt.	Chas. A. Orndorff	Adjutant.	Spokane - E 714 Sinto Ave.
Capt.	William C. Hicks	Chaplain	Spokane -1415 W. 8th Ave.

HEADQUARTERS COMPANY

Capt. Fayette D. Couden	Commanding Company	Seattle -2010 N 82nd St
2nd Lieut. Ivan F. Pierson	With Company	Seattle - 6538-10th N W

SERVICE COMPANY

Capt. Edward J. Robins	Commanding Company	Spokane - 1015 Sprague Ave
1st Lt Walter J. DeLong	With Company	Hillyard - 1502 H Reigel St.
1st Lt Thomas W. Weger	With Company	Spokane - 1005 3rd Ave.
2nd Lt Floyd R. Norgren	With Company	Spokane - 123 W 9th Ave.

RANK	NAME	DUTY	STATION ADDRESS
HOWITZER COMPANY			
Capt. Arthur J. Lavell		Commanding Company	Wenatchee - 212 Griggs Ave
1st Lt Jay J Vermilya		With Company	Wenatchee -109 Orondo Ave

HEADQUARTERS FIRST BATTALION 161st INFANTRY

HEADQUARTERS COMPANY

Major James A Sabiston		Battalion Commander	Spokane - N 3918 Calispel
1st Lt Cecil O. Wylder		Adjutant & Comdg Co.	Spokane - 2411 Fairview Ave

COMPANY "A"

Capt. Douglas G. Poland		Commanding Company	Spokane -1927 Riverside
1st Lt John G. Reinhardt		With Company	Spokane - E. 528 - 14th Ave
2nd Lt John A. Rabideau		With Company	Spokane - 1215 W. Stafford

COMPANY "B"

Capt. Malcolm F Sabiston		Commanding Company	Spokane - N 4504 Monroe
1st Lt Charles E. Lohnes		With Company	Spokane - E. 946 - 33rd Ave
Lt Kenneth D. Ross		With Company	Spokane - W 1828 Riverside

COMPANY "C"

Capt. Alfred V. Reinertsen		Commanding Company	Spokane - E 520-10th Ave
1st Lt John N Armfield		With Company	Spokane - 1028 Indiana Ave
2nd Lt Fred H. Shaw		With Company	Spokane - 1011 Maple St

COMPANY "D"

Capt. Ivan L. Morefield		Commanding Company	Spokane - E 2218 Gordon
1st Lt George L Siliman		With Company	Spokane - W. 203 -19th Ave
2nd Lt Harold M. Peters		With Company	Spokane - W. 25 Montgomery (At Inf Sch, Ft Benning, Ga.)

HEADQUARTERS SECOND BATTALION 161st INFANTRY

HEADQUARTERS COMPANY

Major Samuel W. C. Ham		Battalion Commander	Yakima - Selah
1st Lt Ray Haynes		Adjutant & Comdg Co.	Yakima - 208 So 7th St
2nd Lt Kenneth Hubbart		With Company	Yakima - Elks Club

COMPANY "E"

Capt. Victor H. Roth		Commanding Company	Bellingham - 2429 Elm St
1st Lt Edgar Macklin, Jr.		With Company	Bellingham - 2215 "A" St
2nd Lt Raymond L. Tallmadge		With Company	Bellingham - 2416 Broadway

COMPANY "F"

Capt George J. Benoit		Commanding Company	Yakima - 106 S 13th Ave
1st Lt Kenneth D McDermid		With Company	Yakima - 5 No 9th Ave
2nd Lt Charles W. Knight		With Company	Yakima - PO Box 1251

RANK	NAME	DUTY	STATION ADDRESS
COMPANY "G"			
Capt. Lloyd Y. Turnell		Commanding Company	Yakima -614 11th Ave
1st Lt George Rauscher		With Company	Yakima - PO Box 331, Rt R-4
2nd Lt Milton A Haueter		With Company	Yakima - Route No. 4

COMPANY "H"			
Capt. George T. Martin		Commanding Company	Ellensburg - 306 H Ruby
1st Lt Winfield S Gillard		With Company	Ellensburg - Kittitas

HEADQUARTERS THIRD BATTALION 161st INFANTRY

HEADQUARTERS COMPANY

Major Elmer R. Brady		Battalion Commander	Everett - Camp Lewis, Wash.
1st Lt Earl F. Clark		Adj & Comdg Co	Everett - Ball Court Apts
2nd Lt Donald M. Rigby		With Company	Everett -1818 Hoyt Ave

COMPANY "I"			
Capt John K. DePriest		Commanding Company	Prosser
1st Lt George O. Beardsley		With Company	Prosser
2nd Lt Ralph E. Wise		With Company	Prosser

COMPANY "K"			
Capt George H. Gannon		Commanding Company	Pullman -1700 Monroe St
1st Lt Stanton J. Hall		With Company	Pullman - 304 Howard St
2nd Lt Cecil E. Haasze		With Company	Pullman -1715 "A" St

COMPANY "L"			
Capt Russell L. Emerson		Commanding Company	Everett - Arlington
1st Lt Jack W. Kittrell		With Company	Everett - 721 Laurel Drive
2nd Lt George P. Rasmussen		With Company	Everett - 2612 Pacific St

COMPANY "M"			
Capt Clifford Newton		Commanding Company	Everett - Commerce Bldg
1st Lt Morris W. Stevens		With Company	Everett - 2613 Highland Ave

TANK CORPS

41st TANK COMPANY

Capt. David Livingstone		Commanding Company	Centralia - Stahl Bldg
1st Lt Archer .S. Kresky		With Company	Centralia - 714 W Pine St
1st Lt Earl S. Abbott		With Company	Centralia - 415 E Maple St
2nd Lt Marion F Samples		With Company	Centralia -1506 Oxford St

CAVALRY

58TH MACHINE GUN COMPANY

Capt Joe I. Middlesworth		Commanding Troop	Tacoma -The Armory
1st Lt Elmer E. Kohlstaad		With Troop	Tacoma - 4101 Division Ave
2nd Lt Charles T. Sweet		With Troop	Tacoma - 616 N Anderson
2nd Lt Paul J. Roberts		With Troop	Tacoma - 423 S 54th St

RANK	NAME	DUTY	STATION ADDRESS
146th FIELD ARTILLERY REGIMENT			
HEADQUARTERS & HEADQUARTERS BATTERY			
Colonel Harry G Winsor		Commanding Regiment	Tacoma - Bonneville Hotel
Lt Col Albert H Beebe		Executive Officer	Seattle - Richmond
Capt James Frank land		Adjutant	Tacoma - Day Island
Capt Fred S. Schmale		S-2 & S-3	Tacoma - Avalon Apts
Capt Albert Knudson		Chaplain	Seattle - 947 N 76th St
Capt Harold A Mallum		Comdg Btry & Regtl Comm Officer	Tacoma - 819 No 5th St
1st Lt Ross L Hevel		With Battery	Tacoma -1002 S 14th St
SERVICE BATTERY			
Capt. Oliver O. Nelson		Comdg Btry & Regtl Supply Officer	Tacoma - 2920 N 26th St
1st Lt Wesley B. Hamilton		Regtl Personnel Officer	Tacoma - 3709 So Tacoma Ave
2nd Lt John M. Weir		With Battery	Tacoma - 2801 Proctor
HEADQUARTERS FIRST BATTALION			
146TH FIELD ARTILLERY			
Major John C. Coart		Battalion Commander	Seattle - 1703 Madrona Drive
1st Lt Harold A. Lutz		Acting Adjutant	Seattle - 5333 - 7th Ave, NE
1st Lt Frederick M. Lash		S-2 & S-3	Seattle - Stevenson
1st Lt George T. Coart		Liaison Officer	Seattle - 1018 - 23rd Ave, N.
FIRST BATTALION, 146TH COMBAT TRAINS			
Capt James Y. Colvin		Commanding Train	Auburn
1st Lt Evan F. Lunn		With Train	Auburn
BATTERY "A"			
Capt Fred M. Fuecker		Commanding Battery	Seattle - 1807-8th Ave, W.
1st Lt Edward M. Stock land		With Battery	Seattle - 4219-15th Ave, NE
2nd Lt Virgil L. Anderson		With Battery	Seattle - 4554- 19th Ave, NE
BATTERY "B"			
Capt Charles J. Hutchinson		Commanding Battery	Seattle - 1620-32nd Ave
1st Lt Clarence M. Tuck		With Battery	Seattle - 4647 Rustic Place
2nd Lt Roy P. Turner		With Battery	Seattle - 4554 -19th Ave, NE
BATTERY "C"			
Capt Cyril Stutfield		Commanding Battery	Seattle - Medina
1st Lt Chauncey V. Hill		With Battery	Seattle - Wilkinson
1st Lt Ethan A. Peyser		With Battery	Seattle - 1715 Harvard Ave
2nd Lt Paul M Jewell		With Battery	Seattle - RFD 4, Box 2388
HEADQUARTERS SECOND BATTALION			
146TH FIELD ARTILLERY			
Major Thomas L. Shurtleff		Battalion Commander	Tacoma - 404 Broadway
Capt Harrison F. Anderson		Adjutant.	Tacoma -1502 Steele St
1st Lt Lowell O. Sargent		Liaison Officer	Tacoma - 3703 Tacoma Ave

RANK	NAME	DUTY	STATION ADDRESS
SECOND BATTALION, 146TH COMBAT TRAINS			
Capt Richard E. Wooden		Commanding Train	Kent
2nd Lt. Harry R. Pettit		With Train	Kent
BATTERY "D"			
Capt Edwin J. Brown		Commanding Battery	Seattle - 118 -18th Ave, N.
1st Lt John M. Stoddard		With Battery	Seattle - Montesano
1st Lt Charles L Stickney		With Battery	Seattle -1514 - 18th Ave
2nd Lt Peres A. Dix		With Battery	Seattle -1656 E Garfield
BATTERY "E"			
Capt George A. Conger		Commanding Battery	Tacoma - 827 So Prospect
1st Lt Herman T. Theil		With Battery	Tacoma - 4116 N 35th St
1st Lt Emil Remmen		With Battery	Tacoma -1312 So 35th St
2nd Lt Dillard C Salley		With Battery	Tacoma - 4315 So Tacoma Ave
BATTERY "F"			
Capt Howard Wright		Commanding Battery	Tacoma - Lakeside Club
Lt Clinton W. Stephens		With Battery	Tacoma -3854 East G St
2nd Lt Charles F. McManus		With Battery	Tacoma -1207 So 17th St
2nd Lt Anthony J. Bell		With Battery	Tacoma -1415 N 8th St
CORPS ARTILLERY			
196th Field Artillery			
BATTERY "A"			
Capt Jasper A Reynolds		Commanding Battery	Walla Walla -109 Pacific
1st Lt Frank G Mitchell, Jr.		With Battery	Walla Walla -125 Newell
1st Lt Lewis A. Corbett		With Battery	Walla Walla -527 E Chstfld
2nd Lt Griffith I. Jones		With Battery	Walla Walla -55 E Main St
COAST ARTILLERY			
489th Company			
Capt Francis H Partridge		Commanding Company	Aberdeen -409 No "K" St
490th Company			
Capt Sherman W. Bushnell		Commanding Company	Snohomish
1st Lt Thomas E. Dobbs		With Company	nohomish
2nd Lt James N. Mount		With Company	Snohomish
491st Company			
Capt Edward C. Dohm		Commanding Company	Olympia - Capitol Bldg
1st Lt William W Rogers		With Company	Olympia - Fire Dept.
2nd Lt Neil R. McKay		With Company	Olympia - City Hall

MEDICAL UNITS

Sanitary Detachment, attached to 161 Infantry

Major Robert H. Farley, MC	Regimental Surgeon	Spokane - The Annory
1st Lt Wm. S. Higgins, DC	With Detachment	Spokane 809 Paulson Bldg

Sanitary Detachment, attached to 146 Artillery

Major George W Beeler	Regimental Surgeon	Seattle -5726-29th Ave, NE
Capt Fred C. Parker, MC	With Detachment	Seattle -6103 Phinney Ave
1st Lt L. R. Quilliam, MC	With Detachment	Seattle -232-23rd Ave
Capt Will G. Crosby, DC	With Detachment	Seattle -2752-27th, SW
2nd Lt Otis G. Button, VC	With Detachment	Tacoma -2813 So. "I" St.

Samtary Detachment, attached to to CAC

Capt Willis H. Hall, MC	Surgeon	Seattle - 4216 W Alaska St
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AMBULANCE COMPANY NO 147

Capt. Harry T. D'Arc	Commanding Company	Mt Vernon Stevenson Blvd
1st Lt Irving E. Lloyd	With Company	Mt Vernon Stevenson Blvd

NATIONAL GUARD RESERVE

NAME	RANK	BRANCH	CITY
Howard A. Hanson	Colonel	CAC	Seattle
Paul L. Weyrauch	Colonel	FA	Walla Walla
William T. Patten	Colonel	Inf	Seattle
Harvey J. Moss	Colonel	AGD	Seattle
Lemuel L. Bones	Lt Col	QMC	Indianapolis, Ind
Seth W. Ellison	Major	CAC	Seattle
Enoch W. Bagshaw	Major	Inf	Seattle
Jesse W. Ingram	Major	MC	Walla Walla
John O. Byrne	Major	MC	Seattle
Samuel C. Lambert	Major	MC	Spokane
Richard E. Elvins	Major	MC	Spokane
Herbert J. Flagg	Captain	CAC	Olympia
Henry E. Zimmerman	Captain	Inf	Everett
Webley M. Vestal	Captain	CAC	Olympia
Archie K. Hahn	Captain	Inf	Spokane
Frank E. Burrows	Captain	Inf	Aberdeen
Sam A. Wright	1st Lieut	FA	Seattle
William E. Parker	2nd Lieut	QMC	Yakima
Glenn P. Porter	2nd Lieut	CAC	Seattle

UNASSIGNED OFFICER EXTENDED FEDERAL RECOGNITION

Joseph R. Neely	1st Lieut	Inf	Seattle
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NAME	RANK	BRANCH	CITY
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UNASSIGNED OFFICERS NOT EXTENDED FEDERAL RECOGNITION

Clarence B. Blethan	Brig Gen	FA	Seattle
Walter B. Beals	Lt Col	JAGD	Seattle
Cecil B. Bagley	Major	SC	Seattle
Albert B. Cutter	Major	Eng	Everett
Noah Shakespeare	Major	JAGD	Everett
Wimer B. Brinton	Major	QMC	Seattle
Ewing D. Colvin	Major	Inf	Seattle
Henry A. Wise	Major	Inf	Seattle
Jack A. Tinling	Captain	CAC	Seattle
Ralph A. Horr	Captain	Inf	Seattle
Thomas V. Scoones	Captain	Inf	Camp Lewis. Wash.
Lawrence W. Hopkinson	Captain	MC	Aberdeen
Martin J. Lacey	Captain	MC	Auburn
George E. Acret	Captain	CAC	Aberdeen
Fred J. Sharkey	Captain	Eng	Wenatchee
Kenneth L. Partlow	Captain	MC	Olympia
Willard G. Herron	Captain	CAC	Seattle
Cecil B. Morehouse	Captain	MC	Everett
Goodbar Jones	Captain	QMC	Aberdeen
Albert J. Hightower	Captain	AGD	Camp Lewis. Wash.
Walter F. Hoyer	Captain	QMC	Yakima
Henry J. Cole	1st Lieut	Inf	Pullman
Charles James	1st Lieut	MC	Tacoma
John F. Beatty	1st Lieut	MC	Everett
Highland Z. Dean	1st Lieut	MC	Ellensburg
Russell T. Condon	1st Lieut	MC	Wenatchee
Henry Storgaard	1st Lieut	MC	Yakima
Irven W. Kenney	1st Lieut	QMC	Murray Arsenal
Albert E. Doerr	2nd Lieut	Inf	Aberdeen

In his Biennial Report for 1923-24, Adjutant General Maurice Thompson had the following comments with regard to State Armories:

There is a pressing need for improvements, repairs and betterments to each of the eight (8) State Armories. Requirements in this respect vary greatly, according to the age of the building, city in which located, and the present and future requirements with respect to the number of units which the Armory must accommodate.

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The armory in Seattle was erected in 1908 and is no longer of sufficient capacity to provide locker rooms, quarters and store-rooms for the number of National Guard units which the City of Seattle should properly maintain. This armory is also in very bad state of repair.

"The situation with respect to the Tacoma Armory is similar to the case in Seattle. Additional facilities in the way of company quarters and store rooms are needed in the Tacoma Armory, and the building has deteriorated materially during the past two years.

The extension and remodeling of the Spokane Armory has placed that building in a very satisfactory condition.

It is necessary, however, to complete three unfinished sets of company quarters in this Armory before proper facilities can be provided for the new units assigned to Spokane for formation during the coming biennium.

"One set of company quarters and the Veteran's Room in Walla Walla Armory have never been completed, and a balcony should be constructed in the drill shed of that building.

"The Armories at Bellingham, Everett and Aberdeen are in satisfactory state of repair, with minor exceptions. The heating plant in the Bellingham Armory should be replaced with a more modern system as a measure of economy in operation. Some repair and additions are needed to the heating plant at the Everett Armory. Additional facilities are needed in the Aberdeen Armory which could not be provided within the original contract price, and there is a necessity for water-proofing the cement walls and copings of a portion of the building, which now causes trouble during periods of heavy rainfall. This condition could not be foreseen or anticipated in the construction of this Armory building".

During the period June 16 to June 30, 1923 elements of the Washington National Guard, with the exception of the Coast Artillery Units and the Cavalry Troop trained at Camp Murray. The Camp was named in honor of First Lieutenant Rufus J. Cassel who had served with the Washington National Guard Medical Corps, was a World War I veteran and died at Mount Vernon, Washington on February 12, 1923. The CAC companies trained during the same period at Fort Worden, while Troop B, 58th Machine Gun Squadron trained with the other troops of their squadron at Fort D. A. Russell, Wyoming.

The encampment of 1924 at Camp Murray was named Camp William J. A. McDonald in honor of First Lieut McDonald who was a former member of Company A, Second Washington Infantry and who was killed in action on October 14, 1918 at the taking of Cote, in the St Mihiel Drive. The camp was held during the period June 14-18, 1923, under the command of Brigadier General Clarence B. Blethan. The Coast Artillery trained during the same period at Fort Worden. According to the regular instructors, from the viewpoint of training, this encampment was the most successful ever held in the State.

During the Biennium 1923-24, several new units were organized as follows :

"81st Infantry Brigade Headquarters, with station at Seattle on February 23, 1924. Colonel Blethan was assigned to command the Brigade and as a result was promoted to Brigadier General.

"Motor Transport Company No. 161, with a strength of one officer and 44 men was organized in Seattle on April 15, 1924 under the command of 2nd Lieut. George W. Barber

"On November 13, 1923, a First Battalion and Battalion Headquarters Detachment, Coast Artillery Corps, was organized at Aberdeen, with a strength of 4 officers and twenty two men. Major Francis H. Partridge of Aberdeen was assigned to command this Battalion. This Battalion was redesignated on the same date as Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, First Battalion, 248th Coast Artillery Corps. The 489th Company was redesignated "A" Battery; the 490th Company as "K" Battery and the 491st Company as "D" Battery. These companies remained assigned to their former stations, Aberdeen, Snohomish and Olympia.

On May 1, 1924, the newly formed 248th Coast Artillery Corps redesignated the First Provisional Battalion. 248th Coast Artillery (Harbor Defense).

On May 27, 1924 Service Company, 116th Medical Regiment, 41st Division was organized at Seattle, Washington with a strength of 4 officers and 50 enlisted men. The unit's first commander was Captain William A. Millington of Seattle.

On 6 August 1924, the 116th Observation Squadron, Air Service, 41st Division was organized in Spokane, with a strength of 14 officers and 50 enlisted men under the command of Major John T. Fancher of Spokane.

Due to the inability to maintain three units at Yakima Station, Company F, 161st Infantry was disbanded on April 23, 1924 and reconstituted at Walla Walla on May 1, 1924 by conversion of Battery "A", 196th Field Artillery (115 GPF). This battery was officially disbanded the same day.

Shortly before the close of the 1923 session of the State Legislature, notification was received from the War Department that certain World War trophies had been allocated to the State of Washington.

These trophies were of a varied and miscellaneous nature and while all had a value for historical purposes, the Adjutant General stated there was some uncertainty as to whether any of the trophies were of a character to justify the expense of some \$8,000.00 for transporting of the items to Washington. The list included Bayonets, canteens, cartridge cases, helmets, machine guns, mortars, Rifles, sabers and a great variety of larger guns from 58 mm to 250 mm all of foreign make. Many items of personal clothing and equipment were also included. Records indicate that the equipment and armament was brought to Washington and donated to various historical societies, and the larger towns throughout the State.

The strength of the Washington National Guard at the end of 1924 was 168 officers, one warrant officer and 2,522 enlisted men for an aggregate of 2,691. The strength of the National Guard of the United States at that time was 189,605.

The development of the National Guard under the 250,000 manpower program as provided for by the General staff Committee of the War Department in January, 1923, except for a limited number of authorized adjustments of units within States, was virtually at a standstill from July, 1924, until January, 1926, in accordance with the announced policy of the War Department suspending Federal recognition of new units.

Under this policy the strength of the National Guard of the United States was limited to an aggregate of 183,519. On July 31, 1925, the Militia Bureau allotted each State a limited strength beyond which Federal support would not be extended.

Under date of January 26, 1926, a modification of this suspension was announced by the Secretary of War, authorizing the Chief, Militia Bureau, to extend Federal recognition to 18 new headquarters and 88 new units of the National Guard, with an increased strength of 2,211.

With this increase in strength of 2,211 the limiting aggregate strength of the National Guard as prescribed by the Secretary of War was 185,730.

Strength of the Washington National Guard due to the foregoing was as follows at the end of 1926: 175 officers, 3 warrant officers and 2,305 enlisted men for an aggregate of 2,483, or a decrease of 208 from the 1924 aggregate strength.

During 1925 the following Summer Camps were held: At Camp Murray Divisional troops attended Camp Harry G. O'Brien, named in honor of Captain O'Brien of the Signal Company from Seattle and who passed away on January 30, 1925. The 116th Observation squadron attended Camp Earl M. Hoisington (Felts Field) in Spokane; and the Coast Artillery trained again at Fort Worden. All three encampments were held during the period June 13-27, 1925.

In 1926, during the period June 16-30, divisional troops attended Camp Peter Richardson at Camp Murray, named in honor of a former Member of Troop B of Tacoma who died in France during the World War. Air service personnel attended camp during the same period at Felts field which was known as Camp John S. Avey; in honor of Lieut. Avey killed in an airplane accident at Felts Field on September 20, 1925. During the period June 12th to June 26th, the 248th Coast Artillery, under the command of Major Edward C. Dohm, trained at Fort Worden.

In commenting upon the Armories during this period the Adjutant General stated:

“There is still a vital need for further improvements, repairs, and betterments to each of the eight State-owned Armories. While it has been possible during the last twelve months to undertake certain improvements in some of these buildings with the limited appropriation made at the Special Session of the legislature, the funds provided were utterly inadequate to place these buildings in a proper condition. Additional funds are essential for this purpose at the earliest practicable date, as the deterioration in some instances has progressed so far that unless repairs are made at an early date, the portions of the building affected will have to be entirely renewed. Estimates have been secured from architects and contractors covering the work yet to be done in each of these armories, and these estimates have been submitted in the budget of this Department for the next biennium. The report of the State Finance and Property Officer, herewith submitted, sets forth in detail the repairs and replacements that have been made in the various armories during the past two years.

“The State Military Reservation at American Lake, and which is officially designated Camp Murray, has been greatly improved since the rendition of the last report of this Department. It is the policy of the Federal Government, in so far as Federal funds will permit, to establish permanent camp sites for the National Guard in each State. The State of Washington was particularly fortunate in this respect in owning its own military reservation, which the representatives of the War Department have repeatedly pronounced as the most ideal National Guard camp site in America. Sufficient Federal funds were allotted to completely rebuild all mess halls, kitchens on the camp site of the 146th Field Artillery, to construct excellent shower bath facilities for all troops participating in the field training encampment on the State reservation, and to erect or install numerous other facilities of a permanent character which added greatly to the advantage possessed by the State at Camp Murray. The report of the United States Property and Disbursing Officer, made a part, thereof, indicates the extent and character of these improvements.

"In connection with the report of the United States Property and Disbursing Officer, it should be observed that during the past two years the Federal Government has issued in supplies and equipment, and has disbursed in Federal aid to the National Guard of this State, more than one million, three hundred thousand dollars, or more than twice the State appropriation for the National Guard during the same period.

"The value of the National Guard of the State of Washington was expressly demonstrated on two occasions during the past two years. On September 5, 1925, at about 4:00 P.M., a cloudburst occurred in the hills south of the city limits of Wenatchee. A torrent of water twenty-five feet deep swept down a canyon and through the division terminals of the Great Northern Railway about one mile south of Wenatchee. A large property damage occurred, including the destruction of a number of residences. Fourteen persons, mostly women and children, lost their lives in the disaster.

"In conformity with standing regulations of this Department, forty-six men and two officers of the Howitzer Company assembled at their Armory in Wenatchee within fifteen minutes after this disaster occurred, and without waiting for orders from higher authority, proceeded to the scene of the flood, established the necessary guards, and for more than forty-eight hours searched for and recovered the victims. Members of the National Guard rescued several persons, including three children, pinned down by wreckage of dwelling houses.

“On September 3, 1926, a fire broke out in the main cell block of the State Penitentiary at Walla Walla at about 5:30 P.M. It became necessary to release all inmates of the penitentiary from the main buildings and assemble them in an open courtyard surrounded by a brick wall. The convicts immediately became unruly, threatened the regular penitentiary guards, and gave every evidence of preparing for a wholesale break for liberty.

"Immediately upon the occurrence of the fire, the members of Company F, 161st Infantry, assembled at their Armory in conformity with the standing mobilization regulations of the State Military Department, and proceeded to the State Penitentiary. In the opinion of the Warden of the penitentiary and the Sheriff of Walla Walla County, the appearance of these uniformed National Guardsmen on the walls surrounding the area in which the convicts were grouped, was all that prevented a desperate attempt to effect a general escape from the institution while the fire was in progress. This company remained on guard at the penitentiary throughout the night of the fire and for twenty-four hours thereafter, when conditions were sufficiently restored to permit the return of the convicts to the main cell block.

“Tentage was shipped from the State Arsenal at Camp Murray to the penitentiary at the request of the Department of Business Control, the morning following the fire, at a time when it did not appear possible to house the inmates of the penitentiary in any other manner for several weeks. It subsequently developed, however, that shelter could be provided in the penitentiary buildings, and this tentage was, therefore, returned to the State Arsenal unused. About three hundred blankets issued to the Military Department by the Federal Government were temporarily used at the penitentiary until other bedding could be secured to replace that destroyed or damaged in the fire.

The following changes in designation and stations of units occurred during this biennium (1925-26):

a. Troop B, 58th Machine Gun Squadron, 24th Cavalry Division was changed to Headquarters Troop, 24th Cavalry Division. This was effective as of November 1, 1924.

b. Company G, 161st Infantry, was converted from a rifle company to a machine gun company and was designated Company H, 161st Infantry on February 24, 1925.

c. Headquarters Detachments and Combat Trains, 146th Field Artillery were redesignated Headquarters Battery and Combat Trains. 146th Field Artillery on April 6, 1925.

d. For the purpose of effecting a permanent assignment of companies to battalions in accordance with geographical location, the following changes in designations of the 161st Infantry were made on April 13, 1925:

Old Designation	Station	New Designation
Company E	Bellingham	Company I
Company K	Pullman	Company E
Company I	Prosser	Company G

e. Company K, 161st Infantry, stationed at Pullman, whose designation was changed to Company E, 161st Infantry, was reorganized at Bellingham on April 15, 1925.

f. Headquarters Battery and Combat Train. 1st Bn., 146th F. A. (Auburn) was changed to Headquarters Battery and Combat Train, 2nd Bn., 146th F. A. and Headquarters and Combat Train, 2nd Bn., 146th F. A. (Kent) was changed to Headquarters Battery and Combat Train, 1st Bn., 146th F. A. on January 4, 1926.

g. Headquarters of the 146th F. A. were changed from Tacoma to Seattle in February, 1925, upon change of residence of Colonel Harry G. Winsor, commanding the regiment, from Tacoma to Seattle.

h. Headquarters of the 3rd Bn., 161st Infantry, were changed from Everett to Bellingham on April 30, 1926, the date of Federal recognition of Major Wallace K. Jordan, commanding 3rd Battalion, 161st Infantry.

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i. Headquarters of the 81st Infantry Brigade were changed from Seattle to Spokane on June 7, 1926, date of federal recognition of Brigadier General Paul H. Weyrauch, commanding the 81st Infantry Brigade.

j. Headquarters Detachment, 1st Provisional Battalion, 248th Coast Artillery (HD), with station at Aberdeen was disbanded on June 2, 1925, and was reorganized at Olympia on June 3, 1925.

k. Medical Detachment, 1st Provisional Battalion, 248th Coast Artillery, with station at Seattle was disbanded on February 2, 1926, and was reorganized at Olympia on February 3, 1926. .

l. Company H, 161st Infantry, with station in Ellensburg, was disbanded on January 31, 1925. Company H was again established in conversion of Company G from a rifle company to a machine gun company on February 14, 1926.

m. Ordnance Department, State staff, with station at Seattle, was disbanded on March 16, 1926, and was reorganized at Camp Lewis, on March 17, 1926.

n. Headquarters Company, 161st Infantry, with station at Seattle, was disbanded on March 1, 1925, by reason or change of station of unit to Spokane, and was reorganized at Spokane on March 2, 1925. By transfer of necessary commissioned and enlisted personnel from other units at that station. The officers and enlisted men of the company disbanded in Seattle were transferred to the 146th Field Artillery.

“In commenting on the Armories and other property owned by the State of Washington, the Adjutant General stated:

"In addition to the eight state-owned armories there are nine leased armories, one aviation field at Parkwater, Washington and two stables, including corrals. A third stable, located at Fort Lawton, is not under lease as it is the property at the Federal Government.

"Title to lots 5 and 8, Block 75, Sylvester's plot of the town, now city of Olympia, was acquired on April 28, 1926, from Alfred William Leach Post No. 3, American Legion, for a consideration of \$1.00, and a gun shed erected thereon at a cost of \$769.00. for housing of a 155 mm gun required for the training of the Coast Artillery units located at Olympia.

"The Parkwater Aviation Field, embracing approximately 40 acres (now Felts Field) near the Up-River Waterworks, and being a portion of the water shed of the City of Spokane, was leased from the City of Spokane without rental for a period of three years on the 15th day of November, 1924. Another lease for this same property, but including an additional area for a target range, was executed by the City of Spokane to cover a new three year period on October 15, 1926. This field, which is used by the 116th Observation Squadron, has been improved by the erection of two steel hangars each 66 ft by 120 feet; the construction of quarters and offices for the 116th Observation Squadron and the installation of the necessary sewerage, water and light systems. The material for the steel hangars and the installation of main portion of sewer system, water system and lighting system, was defrayed from a construction fund raised by the Military Affairs Committee of the Spokane Chamber of Commerce, consisting of \$2,500.00 donated by the City of Spokane, \$2,500.00 donated by Spokane County, and \$4,908.00 donated by individuals and business firms, such fund amounting to \$9,908.00. The construction of quarters for the 116 Observation Squadron, concrete floors for hangars, the purchase of small wooden buildings adjoining the hangars for the storage of motor vehicles and various other miscellaneous work, was all paid for from funds of the Military Department appropriated by the State Legislature for this purpose. To date a total of \$18,003.79 has been spent on this project. Of this amount \$8,115.99 was State Funds and \$9,887.80 was donated funds.

The Adjutant General also reported on the State Military Reservation at Camp Murray as follows: "The roof of the main arsenal building was re-coated, a new water pump was installed, canteen building for 146th F. A. erected, concrete platform for washing motor vehicles was constructed, Concrete bridge over Murray Creek, mess hall and latrines were erected for Camp Headquarters cleared area for gun park, provide a park for motor vehicles; improved roadways by grading and clearing; cleaned up underbrush on portion of reservation so as to eliminate fire hazard; constructed machine shop in one end of old gun shed; provided a combination shed covering fire apparatus and oil storage; and improved fire protection with materials furnished from the Federal funds. Miscellaneous painting and plumbing repairs were made to existing quarters used by employees, including replacement of septic tank for double cottage in rear of main Arsenal building.

"Animals issued to the National Guard of Washington are stabled as follows:
48 horses of Tacoma units, 146th F. A., and 15 horses of Headquarters Troop, 24th Cavalry Division at South Tacoma Stables.

16 horses, 24th Cavalry Division at the Tacoma Armory.

15 horses of Hq Btry & C. T. 2nd Bn., 146th F. A. at Auburn Armory.

15 horses of Hq Btry & C.T. 1st Bn., 146th F. A. at Kent Armory.

68 horses of Seattle Units, 146th F. A., at Fort Lawton stables.

8 horses of Seattle Units, 146th F. A., at Seattle Armory.

"During the present biennium, the animals of the 146th F. A. at Tacoma have been moved from the stables at Regent Park to a new stable located outside the city of Tacoma and about a quarter of a mile easterly from the Pacific Highway. These stables were built to meet the requirements of this Department and are under lease at an equitable rental. With the adjoining corral area which this Department has leased these stables now afford excellent facilities for the care of animals at the Tacoma station, and with the stable facilities available in the Tacoma Armory, afford opportunity for both indoor and outdoor training in equitation.

"The arrangement covering the use of stables formerly used at Kent terminated at the close of the last biennium, and since then much better stables located about a mile away from the Armory, have been secured. These stables are satisfactory for this station.

"The Auburn stables, since adequate drainage was installed, are satisfactory, but there is no corral for the exercise of animals. If animals are to be continued at this station, it will be necessary to lease space for a corral near the Armory.

"At Seattle, stable facilities for 8 animals have been provided in the Armory, which permits training in the fitting of harness there instead of at Fort Lawton where the remainder of the animals are stabled. Stable facilities at Fort Lawton are ample for the needs of the Seattle station.

The following is a report by the State Quartermaster on Camp Murray and Armories:

"During the past five years, the office of The Adjutant General has been located at Greene Park, Camp Lewis, Washington. The rental paid for the space occupied and the cost of heat, light and water consumed for the Maintenance of the building is most reasonable and from an economic standpoint, the quarters are excellent, but it is desired to point out that the building utilized is of frame construction and in case of fire it is doubtful whether many of the valuable records of this office could be saved. The location of the office at this point has proved most satisfactory due to the contact which has been maintained with the Regular Army at Camp Lewis, its close proximity to the State Military Reservation, and short distance from the State Capitol at Olympia. It is believed that these ideal conditions cannot be found in any other location in the State and that plans should accordingly be made to provide adequate fireproof quarters at Camp Murray, at which point is located the State Arsenal and Summer Training Camp areas for all troops of the state with the exception of the Coast Artillery Corps. Camp Murray is about 3 miles from Camp Lewis, and approximately eleven miles from Tacoma and twenty miles from Olympia. It is adjacent to the Pacific Highway and the Northern Pacific Railway and has both automobile, bus and street car transportation to Tacoma. As this is a project to which you have already given considerable study, it is not to elaborate further, other than to invite attention to the fact that the immediate expenditure of nearly a million dollars by the Federal Government for permanent construction at Camp Lewis and the recent press reports to the effect that the Secretary of War had announced a twenty-year building program for Camp Lewis, indicates that there is no question but that Camp Lewis is to be developed as a permanent post of considerable magnitude, thus insuring that THC advantages accruing by reason of contact with THC regular service at this post will continue indefinitely.

"According to reports from the Fire Marshal of Seattle, the condition of the wiring in the Seattle Armory constitutes a serious fire hazard and should be rewired at the earliest practicable date. To rewire this building will cost approximately \$6,000.00 and entail considerable cutting and patching of plaster. In view of the condition of the metal lath used, in this building, as ascertained during recent alterations which showed the metal lath badly eaten away by rust, it is recommended that the Armory be replastered when the new wiring is installed. This, with the wiring, will involve an expenditure of approximately \$20,000.00.

"The construction of additional quarters in the Tacoma Armory should be undertaken at an early date in order to provide adequate quarters for additional Field Artillery units.

"Unfinished quarters in both the Walla Walla and Spokane Armories have not been completed. It is contemplated that any additional units are to be organized at these stations during the next biennium. It will be necessary to complete these quarters before the organization of any new units can be initiated.

A. W. McMORRIS
Major, QMC, WNG

As of June 30, 1927, the strength of the National Guard of the United States was 12,010 officers, 182 Warrant Officers and 168,950 Enlisted men for a grand total of 181,142.

According to the Chief of the Militia Bureau, the efficiency and other lines of development had made excellent progress during the Fiscal Year 1927. In general, training had materially improved and in a logical and progressive manner in conformity with directives issued by the Bureau. The attitude of State authorities toward the present and future development of the National Guard was most encouraging and

its development to the 250,000 man-power objective in reasonable increments was limited only by appropriations and War Department policies.

“Increased care in the selection of localities to which organizations had been allotted was apparent from the decrease in the number of units disbanded or reorganized. Of those that have been so disbanded or reorganized many were at the insistence of the Militia Bureau, so recommended for the purpose of completing existing organizations and effecting a better tactical and geographical grouping of units.

"The character and supply of equipment were as satisfactory as available appropriations and use of war time stocks would permit. Property and Armory inspections disclosed a better knowledge and appreciation of the importance of initiating proper measures for the care and preservation of Federal property and the necessity on the part of the States of providing better Armory facilities, both for training purposes and storage of equipment. In some States, however, there was yet much to be desired in the way of care of property and in the character of armory and storage facilities provided.

In some cases involving the disbursement of Federal funds, there has been a lack or appreciation of the ethics surrounding expenditures of public money. In most of these Cases prompt disciplinary action was taken by State authorities concerned. In this connection it should be noted with but very few exceptions, there appeared to have been no criminal intent and no individual gain contemplated, the irregularities being only misconception of responsibility to the Federal Government and desire to find a quick method of providing organizations with increased benefits.

"There were also a few instances of fraudulent disposal of Federal property. In all such cases uncovered investigations were made by the inspector General's Department and by the Department of Justice and appropriate action taken.

He further stated that the yearly turnover in personnel, especially as it affected commissioned officers, although decreasing, continued to be an undesirable factor in the development of the National Guard. This apparently insolvable problem, which undoubtedly had a somewhat detrimental effect on the development of efficiency is largely due to the fact that military service is a secondary consideration with those who comprise the personnel of the National Guard and who, of necessity, must give major attention to their civil vocations, which frequently demand such application as to require their separation from the military service or removal from the station of the organization to which they belong. However, as stated in my report for last year, this factor, while not desirable, is not entirely without merit, since it provides training for some individuals whose services may be available at a future time.

The Chief of the Militia Bureau further stated that he was pleased to note the increasing desire on the part of both officers and enlisted men of the guard to attend the various Army Service Schools. The records made by those who had pursued such courses during the past year had been most gratifying and he regretted that the present facilities and appropriations did not permit of the attendance of all who applied for the privilege of receiving this important special training.

During the period covered by his report, for 1927, he indicated that National Guard Troops were utilized in 17 States to render aid in disasters. The most outstanding of these was their use in Florida following a disastrous hurricane in that State in September 1926. Other troops performed service in Arkansas, Illinois, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri and Tennessee during the great flood in the Mississippi River Valley during the spring of 1927. All troops participating received high praise for their efforts in these disasters.

During the period June 16-30, 1927, 41st Division troops, less Air and Division Staff trained at Camp Murray, the encampment being called Camp Henry J. Carey, in honor of Captain Carey who died at the United States Veteran's Hospital, Tacoma on March 21, 1927. He first joined the Washington National Guard in 1909 as a member of Company B, 2nd Infantry. The Coast Artillery units trained at Fort Worden from June 11th to 25th; the 41st Division Air Service at Camp Lewis from June 16th to 30th; and the 41st Division Staff at Camp Lewis during the period July 1st to 15th.

In 1928 the encampment at Camp Murray was named Camp Vermilya in honor of Captain Jay J. Vermilya who died at Wenatchee on March 16, 1927. All Divisional units except the 41st Division Staff trained during the period June 14th to June 28th; The Coast Artillery encampment was held at Fort

Worden during the period June 9th to 23rd; and the 41st Division staff at Camp Lewis from July 8th to 22nd. During the Fiscal Year 1927, the 41st Infantry Division attained 76.2 of its authorized strength. By June 30, 1928, the strength of the National Guard had increased to 181,221. Washington had 2,661 which represented understrength of only 13.

In his biennial report to the Governor for the period ending November 1, 1930, the Adjutant General stated as follows:

"A pressing need exists for a new Armory at Seattle. The existing armory does not afford satisfactory accommodations nor facilities for the number and type of units quartered therein. The building was originally constructed in 1909 to afford accommodations for six companies of infantry, two regimental headquarters, and the Adjutant General's office, and is now occupied by a portion of the Staff and enlisted detachment of the Headquarters of the 41st Division; the Headquarters, 66th F. A. Brigade; the 161st Motor Transport Company, and the 146th Field Artillery, consisting of a Regimental headquarters, two battalion headquarters, two combat trains, eight batteries and a medical detachment.

"As the building is now in need of such extensive repairs in order to preserve it from further deterioration, it has been advisable to include in the budget for the ensuing biennium an estimate covering the construction of a new Armory instead of requesting funds for the repair of the existing building, which would still be unsatisfactory notwithstanding such repairs.

"The desire of the City of Seattle to condemn twenty-eight feet of the Amory in connection with the procurement of a right-of-way for a proposed thoroughfare designated "Armory Way" is another factor which was considered in reaching the decision to request construction of a new armory as such action at this time will permit the City of Seattle to proceed with their street project and such funds as may be received by the State as damages for the property taken will offset, in part, the funds required for the construction of the new armory.

"October 15, 1929, a satisfactory lease was entered into with the City of Spokane covering the land utilized at Felts Field as an airport. The former lease on this land had but a few years to run and as the State had already erected hangars and an administrative building on this property for the use of the 41st Division Aviation and contemplated the addition of a photographic building, it appeared advisable to secure a twenty-year lease on the site before committing the State to any further improvements.

"A specific appropriation of \$6,000.00 was made by the 1929 Legislature for the construction of a photographic building at Felts Field. Initial bids received, for the construction of such a building were in excess of the amount of funds appropriated for its erection. In order to avoid delay in the construction of this addition to the airport facilities, the following donations were made available to The Adjutant General to augment funds appropriated for such purpose:

From the Spokane Chamber of Commerce. \$ 715.00

From American Legion Post No. 9 of Spokane \$1,000.00

"By utilizing \$1,713.95 of these donated funds, the photographic building as an addition to the administration building, was completed July 7, 1930 at a cost of \$7,713.95.

During February, 1930, the Federal Government provided a new roll collar melton uniform for issue to all enlisted men of the National Guard, and recently made available a new style "Pershing" cap. In the near future a leather dress belt will become available. These have a decided effect in increasing the Morale and pride in the personal appearance of the individual guardsman, as the cut and material of the new uniform is far superior to the old time war issues.

On October 1, 1930, five new O-38 Douglas observation planes were ready at Santa Monica, California, for delivery to the 116th Observation Squadron at Spokane and delivery was to be 621 consummated by the end of November. These planes, costing \$15,000.00 each, were powered by single motor 9-cylinder, 525 H. P. high compression Pratt and Whitney Hornet engines, and while the planes were of the same general type previously furnished, they had added to them all the latest improvements developed to date. They were the first planes with high compression engines which had been furnished the National Guard. That this State was placed on the first priority for the delivery of these planes was very gratifying to the State, according to The Adjutant General, and indicated that the 116th

Observation Squadron had been rated very high by the War Department in order to merit such consideration in the issue of new equipment. .

In 1929 the encampment at Camp Murray was known as Camp Alfred G. Hightower, In honor of Major Alfred G. Hightower, AGD, formerly of the Air Service who died on March 9, 1929. Elements of the 41st Division, except the Division Staff of the 41st Division. The 248th CAC attended encampment at Fort Worden during the period June 8th to 22nd, while the 41st Division staff held their encampment at Fort Lewis, Wash. during the period July 6th to 20th.

In 1930 the Divisional units attended Camp Dent (Camp Murray) named in honor of 1st Lieut. Gus O. Dent, 41st Tank Company who was killed by an explosion in a cleaning establishment at Centralia on Jan. 20, 1930. Camp for these troops and the 41st Division Aviation were held from June 14th to June 28th. The 248th was at Fort Worden during period June 7th to June 21st and the Division Staff at Fort Lewis from July 5th to 19th.

In 1931, Summer Encampments were held at Camp Murray during; the period June 13th to 27th; At Fort Worden from June 6th to 20th, and at Fort Lewis from July 11th to 25th. The encampment at Camp Murray was named Camp Norway in honor of Private David C. Norway, Company L, 161st Infantry, Everett, who died on April 10, 1930 from the effects of an injury received during a boxing Match at the Everett Armory.

In his report to the Governor on November 1, 1932 (1931-32 Biennium), The Adjutant General stated:

"The amount of funds appropriated by the State Legislature for the operating expenses of the Military Department during the current biennium was \$32,750.00 less than was appropriated for the prior biennium, and \$134,000.00 less than was appropriated four years ago. This makes the third successive reduction received in the last six years, and of course has necessitated the enforcement of drastic economies in our operations. This condition has precluded any effort being made to expand our forces in accordance with the National Defense Act, and we are indeed fortunate that we have not been forced to disband some of the existing organizations.

"General R. G. O'Brien in his report as Adjutant General of Washington Territory in October 1881, stated that if the members of the National Guard. "who say by their actions: I am ready to place myself between all harm, and the good order and happiness of the community, for the protection of life and property, and with my life answer for the preservation of these things most dear to every citizen are worth calling for this duty, then they are worthy of substantial recognition at the hands of the people and their representatives", and his observations are as true today as they were in the territorial days .

"In times like the present when there are thousand of people without gainful employment or other source or income, and there is known to exist groups of individuals organized for the express purpose of exciting this idle and discouraged population to deeds of violence by the unscrupulous haranguing of demagogues, the insurance afforded by a well organized and efficient National Guard should be increased. The small premium paid for its maintenance is insignificant in comparison with the loss of life and the thousands of dollars that often go up in smoke in the course of a few hours through the agency of unrestrained mobs .

"As indicated in my last Biennial Report there is a pressing need for a new Armory in Seattle, and favorable and early consideration should be given to its construction. In view of the fact that an early replacement of this building is contemplated, and faced with the problem of curtailing operating expenses, a decision was reached at the beginning of the biennium to confine repairs on the Seattle Armory to the barest necessities. Limited repairs, however, have been made to all other State-owned Armories and it is believed that funds budgeted for this purpose will care for all necessary repairs during the remainder of the fiscal year .

"At least a portion, if not all, of the drill hall floor of the Everett Armory should be replaced during the next biennium. The floor joists, beams and rough flooring have been weakened by dry-rot. The sort fir-finished flooring, due to normal wear, must be replaced in the near future and it is deemed advisable in

the interest of economy to make the repair of the beams and the replacement of the floors a combined project.

“Armory rentals constitute a third of the operating costs of the Military Department. In order to reduce our expenditures we have, through the cooperation of owners of the various Armory properties, made an appreciable cut in rental costs. This has been an important factor in aiding us in the retention of all existing National Guard units.

“The lease on the stables located at South Tacoma was terminated April 30, 1931, but by adding an addition to a warehouse constructed at Camp Murray from Federal funds, we have been able to provide stable facilities for the 32 animals issued the Headquarters Troop, 24th Cavalry Division, stationed in Tacoma.

“Facilities for the storage of tractors and trucks issued to the 146th Field Artillery have been provided by utilizing the old stables at Fort Lawton and by the construction adjacent thereto of an additional open storage shelter approximately 330 feet long and 30 feet wide. The funds for the construction of this additional shelter were generously donated by individuals and corporations through the efforts of the Commanding Officer and officers of the 146th Field Artillery, and is indicative of the genuine interest which is taken in the National Guard by the people of the communities in which National Guard units are located.

"At Felts Field, a wooden storehouse and garage for motor vehicles burned to the ground on July 14, 1932, and destroyed approximately \$15,000.00 worth of Federal and State property. After a thorough investigation the War Department relieved the State from any responsibility for the loss of the federal property, as every reasonable precaution for its protection had been provided by the military authorities of the State. To provide facilities for the storage of motor vehicles to replace those destroyed and to provide quarters of the Medical Detachment of the 116 Observation Squadron, formerly quartered in the building destroyed by fire, an addition is now being added to the Administration Building. This construction was made possible by the action of your excellency in authorizing the expenditure of not more than \$7,500.00 from the Governor's Emergency Appropriation.

“On April 15, 1931, the Horse-drawn Field Artillery organizations of this State were converted to Tractor Drawn Field Artillery. All animals, saddles, harness, and other materiel were returned to the Federal Government or otherwise disposed of in accordance with instructions issued by the War Department. To replace this materiel, tractors, trucks and trailers, with a value of approximately \$750,000.00 were issued to the State.

“The total value of federal property issued to this State by the War Department during the period ending November 1, 1932 amounted to \$1,054,551.21.

“Battery D, 148th Field Artillery, with station in Tacoma, was organized November 4, 1930, and Headquarters, 2nd Battalion, 148th Field Artillery, with station in Tacoma, was organized November 5, 1930. The expense incident to the organization of these two units was met from funds appropriated for the prior biennium. Except for motorization of the Field Artillery, there has been no change in the organization or strength of the National Guard of Washington during the biennium. The motorization of the Field Artillery has, however, proved most advantageous. It has reduced the maintenance cost to the Federal government, has eliminated a great deal of time and labor formerly required for the care of animals, which can now be devoted to training, has eliminated anticipated delays incident to the procurement and training of animals in the event of mobilization for federal service and has very materially added to its effectiveness should it be needed in connection with civic emergencies.

“As of October 31, 1930, the strength of the Washington National Guard was 210 officers, 3 warrant officers, 2,366 enlisted men, 637 enlisted reservists and 157 animals.

"As of October 31, 1932 the strength was 219 officers, 3 warrant officers, 2,416 enlisted men, 1,176 reservists and 31 animals. This was slightly below the authorized strength of 226 officers, 3 warrant officers and 2,490 enlisted men.

In 1932, troops of the Washington National Guard trained again at their usual encampments. The encampment at Camp Murray was named Camp Hoffman in honor of Lieut. Edward D. Hoffman a former

member of Hq. Troop, 24th Cavalry Division and who as a Lieut. of the Amy Air Corps disappeared while flying an army plane from San Francisco to Los Angeles on February 1, 1932. The Divisional troops trained from June 16th to 30th as did the 41st Division Aviation. The 248th CAC attended camp at Fort Worden during the period June 4th to June 18th, while the Division Staff trained at Fort Lewis during the period July 9-23.

In 1933 the divisional troop encampment at Camp Murray was designed Camp Standen in respect to Private Dwight M. Standen, Company I, 161st Infantry who was drowned in Puget Sound on January 21, 1932. Divisional units attended from June 16th to 30th; 248th at Fort Worden from June 10th to 24th; and Hq. 41st. Div. Dets. at Fort Lewis from July 8th to 22nd.

In 1934 Divisional units trained at Camp Draper at Camp Murray during the period June 16th to 30th. The Camp was named in honor of Major Sylvester Draper, former Inspector General of the Washington National Guard who died at Letterman General Hospital on October 18, 1933. The 248th Coast Artillery was at Fort Worden from June 9th to 23rd and 41st Division Hq. at Fort Lewis from July 7th to 21st. In his biennial report for 1933-34, Adjutant General Maurice Thompson stated:

“You are, of course, aware of the material reduction made in the amount of funds appropriated for the operation of the Military Department during the current biennial period. At the beginning of the biennium, serious consideration was given to the disbanding of some of our organizations in order to reduce operating expenses so as to come within the limitations imposed by the curtailed appropriations. Studies were prepared disclosing that by drastically curtailing expenses of every kind, by eliminating other expenses which, while desirable, could no longer be authorized, and by securing further reduction in the rentals paid for leased armories, we could continue to maintain our existing National Guard for at least the first half of the biennium, but at the end of the period, unless assistance materialized from some undetermined source, we would be forced to muster out at least two units.

“Fortunately, splendid cooperation of the entire National Guard and the owners of leased Armory properties permitted us to effect the economies contemplated. The assistance of the State Emergency Relief Administration and the Federal Emergency Relief Administration, through the media of the P.W.A. (Public Works Administration) in approving projects for the repair and maintenance of Armories, target ranges and camp facilities, permitted further unexpected savings in appropriated funds which otherwise might have been required for some of these purposes. Due to this aid it was found that practically enough funds were available at the end of the first year for the maintenance of existing organization for the balance of the biennium and it was believed that, by the initiation of certain additional economies, the slight deficiency could be absorbed. However, certain unforeseen and non-budgeted expenditures such as the expenses in connection with the aid of the civil authorities at Yakima, the furnishing of first aid service at the Coulee Dam on the occasion of the visit of President Roosevelt, and emergency measures taken for the security of property have adversely affected our estimates of April. The consequence of this unusual expense now appears that it will be necessary to secure approximately \$7,000.00 additional funds from the Governor’s Emergency Fund, or from some other source if the present organizations are to be maintained through the remainder of the current biennium. .

“To disband any unit will result in a most vigorous protest from the interested community. Probably at no time during recent years has the value of the National Guard as a real and vital asset to both the community and the State been as much appreciated by the public. Delegations from the various cities and towns have repeatedly urged the establishment of additional National Guard units in their localities.

Due to the limitation of appropriations it has of course been impossible to give favorable consideration to such requests, but it has been gratifying to note the keen interest in and the growth in the public appreciation of the National Guard indicated by the active efforts to secure the organization of such additional units.

“The cordial cooperation of the State and Federal Relief Administration in the consideration which has been given to projects sponsored by the Military Department, has been greatly appreciated. The

erection or the hangar at Felts Field, Parkwater, has in particular provided needed hangar facilities for the 116th Observation Squadron and a welcome employment relief to the citizens or the State, resident in the vicinity or Spokane. Likewise the authorization or \$450,000.00 of State Relief Funds for the construction of an Armory at Seattle, conditional upon certain Federal P.W.A. assistance, has given renewed encouragement to the citizens of Seattle and King County as well as to the membership of the local National Guard in the consummation or the project so urgently needed.

During this Biennium the following changes occurred in the organization or the Washington National Guard:

Headquarters, 66th Field Artillery Brigade, was converted from 75mm Horse-drawn organizations to a 75 mm Tractor-drawn organization on November 1, 1933.

Station of Headquarters, 81st Infantry Brigade, changed from Seattle to Spokane on June 21, 1933 and from Spokane to Camp Murray on July 24, 1934.

First Provisional Battalion, 248th Coast Artillery (HD) reorganized and redesignated the 248th Coast Artillery Battalion (HD) on October 1, 1933.

In the Biennial Report for the period ending October 31, 1934, the Adjutant General made the following comments on the dual Federal-State status of the National Guard:

"While this section is not actively concerned with the monies appropriated or expended in connection with the equipment and training of the National Guard, it seems not untimely to summarize briefly for the benefit of those who have no accurate information on the subject or who are misinformed thereon, the relative proportion or such expenses borne by the Federal Government and by the State, and to emphasize the benefits which the State as a whole derives from the dual affiliation.

"The State provides the men.

"The Federal Government pays them on the basis of one day's pay of their grade for each prescribed armory drill period.

"It provides the uniforms.

"It provides the equipment, individual or organization, prescribed for like units of the regular army.

"It provides the arms and furnishes the ammunition used in target practice or in emergencies, State or National.

"It leases ranges for necessary target practice when local ranges of the Regular Army are not available; furnishes the targets and other supplies required and pays range caretakers.

"It hires full-time mechanics to care for motor transport and heavy ordnance materiel.

"It pays for the transportation of all elements of the Guard to the summer training camps and for return to home stations. It pays, feeds and shelters them while at such camps.

"It provides qualified Regular Army instructors to supervise their training to the end that they may competently meet any situation, State or National, where their services may be required in the preservation of law and order, and it sends allotted quotas of selected officers and enlisted men of the Guard to service schools for higher specialized training in their branches and pays them while in attendance at such schools.

"The States as part of its obligation under Federal Laws, is responsible for providing and maintaining armories adequate to house the organizations allocated to each community, including necessary heating, lighting, janitor and custodial service. The State is also responsible for providing and maintaining adequate arsenal, warehouse and storage facilities for the protection and safeguarding of federal equipment.

"It provides the necessary armory and office furnishings, stationary and clerical and administrative staffs for armories, arsenals, and The Adjutant General's office used as administrative headquarters for the Guard and for the Military Department of the State. It is responsible for all expenses of Guard personnel used for emergencies within the state together with such other obligations as are or may be imposed by State laws or regulations.

“Relatively, however, the vastly preponderant portion of the cost of maintaining the Guard is borne by the Federal Government and the fact that all monies, State or Federal, expended on behalf of the Guard goes into circulation WITHIN THE STATE and wherever Guardsmen are stationed has been a very potent economic factor to several thousand of its citizens during the industrial crises of the past few years. The amounts of funds so allotted by the War Department, through the Chief of the National Guard Bureau, and those appropriated by the State Legislature, will be found under the appropriate sections of this report; they indicate that the Federal Government allotted to the State during the biennium a sum in excess of ONE MILLION, ONE HUNDRED TWENTY THOUSAND DOLLARS of which approximately three quarters of a million dollars were expended WITHIN THE STATE as pay or subsistence of individuals and purchase of necessary supplies from local merchants.

“During this same period, the State appropriated for housing, administration, operations and administrative supplies, the sum of TWO HUNDRED TWENTY SIX THOUSAND DOLLARS AND NINETY FIVE CENTS, OR A SUM APPROXIMATELY ONE-FIFTH of that made available by the Federal Government.

"From a dispassionate examination of the above figures, it becomes apparent that the National Guard pays its own way; that the appropriation made by the State for the necessary expenses of the Military Department is one that shows an ACTUAL PROFIT IN DOLLARS AND CENTS to the State and its people, and which in addition provides a well disciplined, highly trained and modernly equipped force that insures domestic freedom from serious riots and disorders. While fortunately such disturbances are infrequent and of relatively unimpressive proportions in this State, the fact must not be lost sight of that the immediate availability of an effective force for their suppression acts as a potent restraining factor on forces that might otherwise take more aggressive action; it represents that "ounce of prevention" which might well prevent situations with very serious consequences.

In commenting upon the Training Program, The Adjutant General, Brigadier General Maurice Thompson, had the following comments in his report ending October 31, 1934:

"The training program for each year has been based upon a coordinated schedule, conforming to an announced training policy of the Corps Area Commander. These schedules have been prepared by the brigade or separate unit commander in advance of the period they covered; have been approved at this headquarters and by the Corps Area Commander before becoming operative, and during the past biennium have had as an objective:

"The maintenance of every unit in a condition to function effectively at existing strength, without further training, in any emergency requiring the used of armed force to maintain law and order within the State.

“The provision of a well trained force, capable of rapid expansion to war strength, which in the event of a major emergency can be employed in first line defense as a component of the Army of the United States, and,

"The harmonization of training in all units of the division, necessary to insure coordinated "team work" between branches when acting in unison.”

“Following a normal seasonal sequence, the training year is divided into two periods: a Field Training period and a period of Armory training. As implied by its title the former is devoted to outdoor training during the summer and early autumn and embraces as its principal feature the annual Summer Training Camp, when 15 days are devoted to intensive field training under canvas, in joint maneuvers at Camp Murray, Fort Lewis, Washington, where all units of the National Guard of the State are assembled, except the Battalion of Coast Artillery (Harbor Defense) which assembles at Fort Worden, Washington, where they train in servicing the coast defense guns they might be required to man in actual service.

“These annual training camps are a feature in the national training schedule and are conducted essentially at Federal expense. The outdoor training period also includes target practice for the various arms on outdoor ranges.

“The period of Armory Training extends throughout the remainder of the year and is devoted to close order drill, tactical problems, study and use of arms and materiel incident to the branch,

administrative details and the various phases of military activities requiring concentrated, technical study rather than actual demonstration. It is the period devoted to theoretic instruction, the proving ground of which is the summer training camp.

"Coordinating, supervising and assisting in the entire instruction program is a group of instructors detailed from the Regular Army.

"This Instructor personnel represents the finest talent available, selected by reason of special fitness for the detail. It consists of commissioned and non-commissioned officers of long service and wide experience, who have completed the scholastic courses of their respective Service Schools and are familiar with the latest technical and tactical advances made in their respective branches. Many of the senior line instructors detailed for duty in the Guard are officers who have served as instructors at the various service schools for advanced studies and who are particularly well qualified to bring the officers of the Guard in intimate knowledge of the latest and most advanced technique in the employment both of manpower under their command and the materiel with which to make it effective. Such knowledge makes for the ability to utilize these two important elements with economy and effectiveness.

"Following is a list of the Regular Army Instructors, their stations and the organizations they serve:

NAME AND RANK	BRANCH	UNIT	STATION
Tack, Willis J. Major	Infantry	41st Division Hq.	Portland, Oregon
Patrick, Edwin D., Major	Infantry	161st Infantry	Spokane, Wash.
Ostrander, J. L., Major	Infantry	161st Infantry	Everett, Wash.
Alexander, William, Major	Artillery	66th F. A. Brigade	Seattle, Wash.
Conable, Morris E. Captain	Coast Artillery	248th CAC	Camp Murray, Wash.
Day, Robin A. Captain	Air Corps	116th Obs. Sq.	Felts Field, Wash.
Wimberly, Edward S., St Sgt.	DEML	161st Infantry	Spokane, Wash.
Townsend, Robert St Sgt	DEML	161st Infantry	Yakima, Wash.
Gutman, Manfred Sgt	DEML	161st Infantry	Everett, Wash.
Royal, Arthur E. St Sgt	DEML	Field Artillery	Tacoma, Wash.
Sterling, Thomas A. Sgt	DEML	Field Artillery	Seattle, Wash.
Safford, Thomas Sgt	DEML	Coast Artillery	Olympia, Wash.
Hatfield, Jacob St Sgt	DEML	Cavalry	Tacoma, Wash.
Simpson, John W. St Sgt	DEML	Air Corps	Felts Field

"The cost to the Federal Government of these Regular Army Instructors maintained in the State, aside from mileage and per diem expenses when traveling, approximates \$36,400.00 per annum.

CHAPTER III

PRE WORLD WAR II ACTIVITIES OF THE WASHINGTON NATIONAL GUARD

As of November 1, 1934, the strength of the Washington National Guard was 206 officers, 3 warrant officers, 2,391 enlisted men, 643 inactive enlisted men and 32 animals.

During the period June 11th to June 25th, a joint encampment of all troops of the Washington National Guard, except the 248th Coast Artillery, was held at Camp Murray. The 1st Battalion, 248th Coast Artillery trained at Fort Worden during the period June 8th to 22nd, 1935.

During the latter part of June, 1935, while the troops of the Washington National Guard were assembled for the annual field training encampment, a strike among the workers in the Mill and Lumber industry had assumed such threatening proportions as to jeopardize the safety of persons and of property. Violence had been resorted to; workers had been threatened and beaten, and the situation had become so serious that local and State peace officers were no longer able to restore or maintain law and order.

Upon the urgent solicitation of leading citizens, the advice of the constituted local authorities and the report of the Chief of the Washington State Patrol, that the situation was beyond their control, the Governor, on June 23rd, issued the following Proclamation:

A PROCLAMATION BY THE GOVERNOR:

WHEREAS, in the City of Tacoma, County of Pierce, State of Washington, contrary to the peace and dignity of the State of Washington, bodies of men, acting together by force with intent to commit felonies and crimes have offered violence to persons and property and by force and violence have broken and resisted laws of the State of Washington; and,

WHEREAS, the Mayor of the City of Tacoma has advised of the inability of local authorities to control the situation; and,

WHEREAS, the Chief of the Washington State Patrol has advised of inability to suppress acts of violence and to prevent threats and the intimidation of citizens who wish to engage in their regular and lawful employment; and,

WHEREAS, in my judgment, there is imminent danger of the further occurrence of such overt acts and of mob violence;

NOW, THEREFORE, I, CLARENCE D. MARTIN, Governor of the State of Washington, by virtue of authority in me vested, do hereby notify and direct persons participating in such unlawful acts to desist and refrain from unlawful assemblage, violence, intimidation, threats of bodily harm and damage to property, or committing any act contrary to the laws of the State of Washington; and,

FURTHERMORE, I direct the Adjutant General of the State of Washington to place on duty in the City of Tacoma such troops of the Washington National Guard as may be necessary to aid and assist the Civil authorities to execute the laws of the State of Washington; and,

FURTHERMORE, I call upon citizens to cooperate with the Washington State Patrol and the Washington National Guard in assisting the constituted civil authorities of Pierce County and the City of Tacoma to restore order and to protect the public peace and safety.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the State of Washington to be affixed at Olympia this twenty-third day of June, 1935.

By the Governor:

Governor of Washington

Secretary of State

The following is a Journal and Diary which was maintained by the Washington National Guard Commander during the period June 23, 1935 to August 10, 1935, including the General Situation existing at that time:

GENERAL SITUATION: Agitators have seriously interfered with the return to work of employees in the Mill and Lumber industry who had accepted their employer's terms and desired to resume employment. Violence has occurred and the destruction of property and severe bodily injury to workers has been threatened and has in some instances occurred. The Governor has promised protection to all employees desiring to return to work. He has been importuned alike by disinterested citizens and by employers to afford adequate protection to said workers. The local peace authorities assigned to this task have proven inadequate. The Governor has been in conference with the Adjutant General, the Chief of the State Highway Patrol and others prior to, and on, June 23, 1935.

JUNE 23rd:

8:30 P.M. -The Adjutant General assembled his Staff and principal commanders. Chief Cole was present as the senior peace officer in touch with the local situation and reported that same had gotten beyond his power to control with the forces now at his command. The Governor had authorized and directed the use of National Guard troops in the situation. The entire matter was discussed and the Adjutant General, at 10:30 P.M., issued Special Orders No. 85 outlining the situation and directing the Commanding Officer, 161st Infantry, to place immediately, one battalion of his regiment in Tacoma to aid the legally constituted peace authorities in suppressing acts of violence and maintaining law and order. Chief Cole was designated as the officer with whom to cooperate. The Adjutant General and his Judge Advocate Department Staff then drew up a tentative form of Proclamation to be issued by the Governor. (reproduced above).

The assembly was then, at 1:05 A.M., June 24th, dismissed.

JUNE 24th. Completed the calling of entire 161st Infantry to a duty status upon termination of Field Training period, June 25th at midnite. Also Headquarters Troop, 24th Cavalry Division for Guard Duty at Camp Murray. Reports of continued, "disorders came in during the afternoon from Major Hand, commanding the 2nd Battalion in Tacoma.

8:00 P.M. The Adjutant General called a conference of State and Brigade Staffs. Discussed advisability of designating a high command to take over the direction of National Guard forces in Tacoma.

9:10 P.M. Received message from Major Hand in Tacoma asking that one additional battalion of the 161st Infantry be held in readiness at Camp Murray for instant movement, with trucks ready at foot of Company streets. Also that a GAS car be sent him. Suggests that ambulance be sent also. Stated he believes he can handle the situation.

9:30 P.M. Stand-by orders issued the 3rd Battalion, 161st Infantry, and two ambulances with drivers and orderlies. The Adjutant General and General Penington departed for Olympia to confer with the Governor.

11:05 P.M. On telephonic instructions from Olympia (The Adjutant General) the Commanding Officer, 161st Infantry was ordered to speedily entruck the 3rd Battalion for Tacoma, passing them out through the main gate where a GAS car and two ambulances would join the column.

11:10 P.M. Major Dohm, Captains Carroll, Kresky, Dean and 1st Lieut. Hallen ordered to stand by for orders, ready with equipment, bedding, etc.

12:04 A.M. June 25th. 3rd Battalion, 161st Infantry, with GAS car and two ambulances attached to column, cleared Camp Murray for Tacoma. The Adjutant General and General Penington returned from Olympia. The Adjutant General announced General Penington as Commander of all National Guard forces operating in Tacoma. General Thompson designated the officers mentioned above as constituting General Penington's Staff and directed that he proceed with staff to Tacoma, take command and aid the civil authorities in establishing and maintaining law and order, cooperating with Chief Col~ of the State Highway Patrol.

12:10 A.M. General Penington called his staff in conference at 12:25; then soon after reported his departure on the mission assigned and announced he would establish his GHQ at the Winthrop Hotel, where his communications officer reported underground wires would guard against cut communications, whereas all wires at the State Armory were exposed overhead. The Adjutant General then re-assembled his State Staff, outlined general policies and prepared a plan for supply of the forces in Tacoma. State conference adjourned, to sleep on the premises, at 2:00 A.M.

8:30 A.M. June 25th. General Penington's Adjutant called up from Tacoma and reported a relatively quiet night. Minor disturbances at 11th and "A" Streets, cleaned up by use of gas. Patrols out along water front and lower business areas, functioning effectively in keeping crowds moving and preventing any large gatherings or concerted action. Several individual disturbers were arrested and taken to Armory for questioning by Intelligence Section. He reported that GHQ had been established in Room 702, Winthrop Hotel, Telephone Broadway 2141. Stated that General Penington would call later.

2:00 PM. Headquarters Company, 161st Infantry, complete with equipment and spare wire ordered to report to Commanding General, TACOMA EMERGENCY COMMAND; Cleared Camp Murray at hour named above. Direct telephone line at once established between GHQ in Tacoma and the Adjutant General's office at Camp Murray.

5:25 P.M. General Penington reported all quiet during the afternoon with no incidents worthy of note to report.

7:30 P.M. The Adjutant General visited GHQ, the Armory, and other points where troops were stationed in Tacoma; found all functioning efficiently, properly supplied, and returned to his office at 10:30 P.M., after conferring with the Troop Commander and Chief Cole.

9:00 P.M. In order that motor transport would be immediately available to the Emergency Command, for transportation of patrols, supplies, etc., a Motor Convoy Detachment consisting of Lieut. C. C. Holcomb, QMC, 39 enlisted men of the 161st Motor Transport Company and 8 enlisted men of the 41st Tank Company were ordered to Tacoma to report to the Commanding General for duty with his command. The Convoy cleared from Camp Murray at 9:25 P.M.

June 26, 1935

8:30 A.M. GHQ command reported a quiet night with no incidents worthy of note. Minor supply requirements noted and administrative details discussed.

9:00 A.M. Major F. J. Burns, Surgeon of the 161st Infantry at Camp Murray was instructed by The Adjutant General to make a thorough Sanitary Inspection of the Tacoma Armory and immediate surroundings, in order to insure that the housing and sleeping facilities of the command were sufficient in area and ventilation and other sanitary requirements such as to properly safeguard the health of the troops housed there. Such inspection to be made at 1:30 P.M. Major Wilder of the 1st Battalion, 161st Infantry at

Camp Murray, with his Adjutant, were also ordered to make the trip as observers of the operations being conducted, in order that they might be familiar with the situation should his battalion be sent in as replacements or as re-enforcements. The Authorities in Tacoma announced the arrest of leaders of the disturbing elements is being made from time to time as evidence is collected.

11:05 A.M. A scheduled messenger service was established to make three round trips daily, between the GHQ-TACOMA ARMORY -ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE AT MURRAY, arriving at the latter point at 10:45 A.M., 3:50 P.M. and 8:50 P.M., and returning to Tacoma 30 minutes later.

A report was received at this time of a meeting of the Young Communist League scheduled to be held at Fawcett Park at 1:00 P.M., permission for which assembly had been denied by the Mayor of Tacoma.

2:00 P.M. The Commanding General of the Tacoma Emergency Command was authorized to make emergency purchase of work-clothing outfits for a member of his intelligence group at not to exceed \$3.00 each. Also to detail a "Line of Duty" Board of Officers to investigate and report upon all cases of sickness or injury arising in his command during the period of the Emergency.

6:00 P.M. GHQ reported all quiet during the afternoon, and that only a few person congregated for the scheduled meeting at Fawcett Park, who at once dispersed, upon perceiving the presence of Guard troops.

JUNE 27. 1935

8:30 A.M. Usual Morning report from GHQ announced "All Quiet" during the night, a condition that continued throughout the day, with nothing occurring worthy of comment. The day was devoted to perfecting details of administration and supply, and coordinating the activities of the Emergency Command with those of the Headquarters and Troops at Camp Murray. An Administrative Order was prepared and issued at 3:00 P.M. covering all such details (Circular Nr. 11, 1935). No further events transpired during the day of June 27th worthy of record.

JUNE 28. 1935

9:00 A.M. Staff members from GHQ in Tacoma visited the Adjutant General's Office and reported an uneventful night.

Reports from time to time during the day indicated no activities by radical groups. A "Progress Report" of men returning to work in the mills was compiled from statistics furnished by 23 firms affected by the strike. On Monday, out of a total, normal payroll of 3,085,612 returned to work. This number, on Tuesday diminished to 600 due to activity of pickets on preceding day. As control of the situation was reestablished the number at work was slowly but steadily increased to 630 on Wednesday, 796 on Thursday and 852 today. No figures will be available for the half-day on Saturday the 29th.

9:10 A.M. Report that all is quiet and orderly.

JUNE 29.1935:

9:00 A.M. and 12 Noon. No change in the situation, all quiet.

2:00 P.M. General Penington and his Adjutant reported at the Adjutant General's office on their way to make a reconnaissance of conditions in the Grays Harbor district. Returned from Aberdeen at 8:00 P.M. Reported conditions not favorable to a peaceful resumption of work. Indications are that the dissatisfied element among the workers will resist efforts to re-open the mills that contemplate resumption of work.

10:00 P.M. Reports from GHQ at Tacoma that all is quiet.

JUNE 30th (SUNDAY)}

All quiet in Tacoma throughout the day.

General Penington and Captain Carroll left Tacoma for a reconnaissance of the situation at Longview, remaining overnight for the purpose of observing conditions when the mills opened for work Monday morning.

Captain Kresky made a reconnaissance of similar conditions at Aberdeen, remaining there overnight for the same purpose.

MONDAY JULY 1st

An improvement in the general condition at the mills in Tacoma was noted, with an increase of approximately 200 more employees returning to work than the figures for Friday showed. General Penington and Captain Carroll returned from Longview - Reported that the Weyerhaeuser and the Long-Bell mills had resumed work with fractional crew. There were only minor cases of interference by pickets, which were successfully handled by the State Patrol force on duty (approximately 20 men). Captain Kresky made a report of similar import on the Aberdeen situation where two mills (The Bay City and the Harbor Plywood Plant) opened with a partial crew. While the State Patrol force of approximately 20 men handled the situation without serious opposition, the crowds were greater than at Longview and appeared more sullen and with greater latent possibilities of subsequent trouble. Last reports from Tacoma indicated no active resistance being encountered.

TUESDAY JULY 2nd.

Conditions reported improving in Tacoma. An increase of 182 reported in the work crews, bringing the number now employed to 1278. The Weyerhaeuser and the Long-Bell mills at Longview, reported operating, but with reduced personnel - approximately 900 men working at the two plants. ABERDEEN: The Harbor Plywood mill operating with about 150 men. The Bay City plant reported open with a skeleton crew. Disorderly strikers dispersed by State Patrol by use of Tear Gas. Approximately 20 State Patrols reported in charge of situation at each city (Aberdeen and Longview). TACOMA: National Guard patrols extended to residence district of workers, due to threats and attempts at personal violence by striker's agents. The 1st Battalion, 161st Infantry was sent in to join the Tacoma Emergency Command during the afternoon replacing the 3rd Battalion which was withdrawn to Camp Murray. Movement completed at 5:40 P.M.

WEDNESDAY, JULY 3rd

Tacoma reported quiet; no further efforts at open intimidation. Workers in mills increased by 56, to a total of 1334. LONGVIEW situation reported favorable with no disturbances and 1100 men at work. No pickets permitted near mills by the State Patrol. ABERDEEN: Harbor Plywood mill reported an increase of workers to 180. Bay City plant still working with only a skeleton crew. Pickets attempted to increase their force, and sprinkled tacks on street, result: pickets not permitted by State Patrol in vicinity of this plant. Attorney L. Frank Morgan, retained to defend a striker had his residence at Hoquiam dynamited last night. No clue to perpetrators. After a conference with the Governor at Olympia, the Adjutant General had a conference with General Penington and Major Dohm regarding advisability of reducing the National Guard forces on duty, and decided to confer with Chief Cole on the situation as a whole before taking definite action. Information received from Everett during the day that all mills at that point intended to commence operations Monday, July 8th, in accordance with their agreement with Chief Cole. Advance reports indicate that approximately 60% of the Weyerhaeuser mill workmen; 70% of the Eclipse Mills and at least 50% of all other mill workers had agreed to return to work.

THURSDAY JULY 4th

The Adjutant General, after conferences of yesterday, decided to demobilize the 3rd Battalion, 161st Infantry and return it to home stations at Everett and Bellingham. Orders making this decision effective were issued and all details perfected to move the battalion home by truck transportation on the morning of July 5th.

No mills being open on the 4th, no disturbances attributable to the strike condition were reported during the day. The customary patrols were maintained and the day passed quietly.

FRIDAY JULY 5th

The 3rd Battalion, 161st Infantry departed by motor convoy for home stations, complete with baggage, equipment and all personnel. Cleared Camp Murray at 8:20 A.M. Everett group reported arrival at home station at 11:43 A.M. Bellingham group at 3:35 P.M. Motor convoys returned to Camp Murray same date. Orders issued directing return of 2nd Battalion, 161st Infantry, from duty with Tacoma Emergency command, to Camp Murray, at 8:00 A.M., Saturday the 6th. QUIET.

SATURDAY JULY 6th

Conditions quiet in the Tacoma Command. The 2nd Battalion and Headquarters Company (less 10 men), 161st Infantry returned to Camp Murray, with all personnel and equipment, leaving the 1st Battalion on duty at that station. Continued reports of minor disturbances at Longview and Aberdeen being quelled by the State Patrol, GAS having been resorted to at the latter place.

At 3:30 P.M., the Civil authorities at Aberdeen reported conditions as growing serious. The Governor directed that a battalion of Infantry be held in readiness for instant move. Tentative stand-by orders issued to 2nd Battalion, 161st Infantry to have all personnel in instant readiness and equipment for riot duty packed ready for entruckment.

Notice of a 5:00 P.M. conference of the conflicting forces caused movement of troops to be held in abeyance. Peace authorities undecided as to wisdom of sending military force in at that time caused such movement to be postponed pending further agreement among the peace authorities at Aberdeen and Hoquiam. Troops ordered into rest area for the night at 10:00 P.M. -

SUNDAY JULY 7th

Reports verified that mills at Everett would not attempt to open Monday. Conditions quiet in Tacoma. 9:30 A.M.

Captain Kresky returned from Aberdeen; reported conference between all peace agencies being held at 10:00 A.M.

12:00 Noon: Report received from Aberdeen that all peace authorities (civil) concerned had agreed that military aid was necessary and had petitioned the Governor that same be made available. Stand-by orders again issued the 2nd Battalion, and definite orders from Governor being awaited at 1:00 P.M., at which hour Lt. Col. Brown and the Regimental Supply Officer left for Aberdeen, to prepare Armory for reception of troops expected to move. Commanding Officer, 161st Infantry reported that Major Hand, the Battalion Commander, had already gone there to make an advance reconnaissance, of existing conditions with a view to placing his troops to the best advantage.

The Governor arrived at Camp Murray at 2:05 P.M. and conferred with the Adjutant General and General Penington. Orders for departure of Infantry Battalion issued at 2:15 P. M. All personnel and services enumerated in paragraph 2, Special Orders No. 96, AGO, Washington, July 7th, 1935 accompanied the Battalion. On request of the Battalion Commander, 6 additional reconnaissance cars were dispatched at 9:00 P.M. and two additional detached from the Convoy, leaving a total of 12 reconnaissance cars and 10 trucks at his disposal. The Battalion arrived at Aberdeen on schedule.

MONDAY. JULY 8th

Report from Western District Command Post, Tacoma, regarding the Aberdeen situation received at 8:30 A.M. Command Post established at Armory, telephone number ABERDEEN 4-1-28. Messenger service established this date, two daily passing through Camp Murray at 10:45 A. M. and 7:15 P.M., reaching

Aberdeen at 1:15 P.M. and 9:50 P.M., respectively and returning through Murray at 4:15 P.M. and 12:30 A.M., respectively. Report of current conditions: Approximately 2,500 strikers and pickets outside mills; mood ugly and trouble necessitating gas expected momentarily. All the Battalion, except Armory Guard and overhead on Patrol in City. 6 men and 3 women arrested and taken in. "Too busy with the situation to gather more news".

3:00 P.M. General Penington and Captain Carroll returned from Aberdeen; report situation well in hand. Approximately 2,500 strikers with about 60 women in line, marched at noon - no serious disturbance. Total of 21 men arrested.

LONGVIEW: Quiet. 1700 men at work on 8th.

TACOMA: 1485 men reported at work today, with situation still unchanged. Major Dohm and Captain Dean relieved from duty with command in Tacoma - replaced by Lt. Col. Orndorff, and Captain L. C. Aston, 161st Infantry.

Two airplanes and pilots of the 116th Observation Squadron, Washington National Guard, ordered on a duty status, and now available at Airdrome, Fort Lewis.

TUESDAY, JULY 9th

TACOMA: Report that driver from the Buffelin mill was beaten during the night. Patrols brought in witnesses, who will testify provided principals can be apprehended. Windows also broken by strikers in a car, but no arrests made. Otherwise, quiet in Tacoma, where the number of men returning to work had increased this date to approximately 1620. Some picketing reported during the morning, but patrols reported none during evening hours .

ABERDEEN: General Penington returned to Tacoma at 6:00 P.M. Had been in conference with representatives of the A. F of Labor and the Employers during the day.

TUESDAY, JULY 9th (CONT v D) ABERDEEN

No progress towards settlement of differences was made. The same groups will confer again tomorrow at which General Penington will again be present.

WEDNESDAY, JULY 10th

Morning reports not informative. General Penington and Staff officers leave for Aberdeen by Airplane at 11:30 A.M. for reconnaissance of situation and conference with representatives of the strikers and employers. Reports from Tacoma show a slight increase in workers, 1701 having been at work today. The situation in that city reported quiet during the entire day.

ABERDEEN: General Penington flew down at 11:30 A.M. from Seattle, where he had been in conference with operators, getting & line on their ideas as to settlement of the strike question. He took with him, for consideration by the Employees and Operators, copies of the "Seattle Statement of Policy", which, while no agreement was reached, was held out as a reasonable basis for final adjustment of the dispute.

The "POLICY" is briefly as follows: "(1) To pay 50 cents per hour basic scale for common labor, with adjustments in the higher brackets, effective from date of resumption of operations.

(2) 40-hour week with time and a half for overtime, and recognizing 5 holidays (Memorial Day, 4th of July, Labor Day, Thanksgiving and Christmas).

(3) Re-employment of all former employees who desire to return to work.

(4) Recognition of a committee of three, selected from employees for purpose of bargaining regarding wages, hours and work conditions. Members of such committee must be citizens of the United States who have been employed continuously at the plant for at least one year.

(5) The Committee and the Management pledge themselves to a sincere effort for proper adjustment of all questions of mutual interest".

General Penington and Captain Carroll returned at 5:15 P.M. While NO AGREEMENT has yet been reached, hope is entertained that one may be possible, along the above lines.

A workers' parade was staged at 10:30 A.M., starting with about 2,500 marchers, increasing to over 3,000. It was not strikers alone who marched, but workers in general, advocating a 6-hour day and improved conditions. The movement was good natured and orderly, showing several American Flags and a goodly percentage of women and children. It passed along into Hoquiam. The authorization for so-called "Special Deputies" of the lumber companies was revoked, their activities being regarded as provocative to the striking workmen

TACOMA AND LONGVIEW: All quiet during the day.

JULY 11th

No change in general situation reported before noon. Comparative quiet prevailed at all points during the night. The troops having been on a duty status for 15 days on July 10th, and many having families dependent upon them, pay-rolls were prepared and. payment is now being made for that period. A switch in vehicles has been made from Tacoma to Aberdeen, placing a total of 14 Reconnaissance cars in the latter city, due to the greater number of patrols to be maintained. Lieut. Dunlap of the 41st Tank Company called to duty as a motor transport officer, replacing Captain Storie, ordered home to Walla Walla. Verbal orders given during the afternoon, for the abandonment of the Armory at Tacoma as the base of operations for the 1st Battalion, 161st Infantry, and its withdrawal to Camp Murray, from which point necessary patrols will be sent out as required. Return of all units of the battalion not on patrol duty was completed without incident at 9:10 P.M. Minor disturbance between strikers and workers reported in Tacoma during the evening. Quiet was restored without recourse to arms or gas. The temper of some elements, however, gave evidence of the usefulness of alert patrols in maintaining order.

No further reports of events of special interest from the Aberdeen or Longview sectors during the afternoon.

JULY 12th (FRIDAY)

The number of men at work had increased in Tacoma to a total of 1756, a slight increase over past days. The number at work in the combined mills operating in Aberdeen was reported as 456, with the average daily pay-roll (normal) not yet ascertained. No disturbances were reported up to 4:30 P.M. at any point, although the attitude of the strikers at Aberdeen was regarded as sullen and threatening. Reports of probable trouble in Tacoma sector; earlier in the day, resulted in the Infantry patrols being sent out about 2:30 P.M., the entire 1st Battalion going on that duty. Shortly after 4:00 P.M., marchers formed a line and marched continuously around the square at 11th and A Streets, the crowd continuing to grow and the marchers became augmented to such an extent that traffic became blocked at the time the trucks carrying workers home from the mills came across the bridge, which added to the confusion and soon became a riot, in which the disorderly element throwing whatever came to hand at the patrols, who had great trouble in attempting to control the disorderly. Many were injured in minor or major degrees. Gas was used freely, but not so effectively as might be hoped. A misdirected gas bomb, ignited others in the gas car which caught fire and was consumed. Re-enforcements were at once rushed out from Camp Murray, approximately 90 men from the Howitzer and Service Companies responding. The crowd was steadily driven out of the congested area, and dispersed in a degree, until about 8:00 P.M., when the situation was again under control and the extra patrols were entrucked for return to Camp Murray. General Thompson arrived at the Armory in Tacoma at 8:15 P.M., and conferred throughout the night with General Penington and many of the representative citizens of Tacoma, all of whom insisted that it was mandatory that the Governor declare martial law and give the military forces full authority to restore law and order. As soon as all reserves had been sent to Tacoma from Camp Murray, the Adjutant General called Major Dohm at Olympia and directed him to mobilize all officers of his command (248th Coast Artillery),

together with the Battalion Headquarters Detachment and Battery "B", approximately 90 men. Major Dohm reported the order complied with at 9:15 P.M., the men standing by at the Armory, ready for orders.

General Thompson called from Tacoma at 10:15 P.M., and directed that the men at Olympia be permitted to return to their homes for the night and report back at the Armory at 9:00 A.M., 13 July, ready for service. These orders were transmitted to Major Dohm and put into execution at 10:30 P.M.

SATURDAY, JULY 13th

No recurrence of serious trouble was reported throughout the day, during which conferences were held between The Adjutant General, General Penington, their respective staffs and representative citizens, Mr. R. Hamilton, the Governor's Secretary being present, at which it was strongly urged by Mr. Frank Baker and Scott Henderson, and concurred in by General Penington and others of the Staff, that the Governor should and ought to declare martial law, and give the military forces authority to restore order. It was conclusively shown that such declaration would not impair the civil processes of government, which could function as usual, with the one exception that full authority to arrest and hold all disorderly elements would vest in the military, with the writ of habeas corpus suspended insofar as violators held by the military authorities were concerned. The Legal representatives of the Military authorities with other legal talent then drew up a tentative form of declaration, which if signed by the Governor, would make the condition described above effective and which would, in the opinion of those present, enable the military forces to function effectively in restoring conditions to their normal state. NO DISORDERS REPORTED UP TO 8:00 P.M.

Headquarters, complete, and Battery B, 248th Coast Artillery Battalion (H. D.), reported at Camp Murray, for duty, at, 8:00 P.M. This command, in instant readiness for field service, consisted of 90 officers and men, and are quartered in the Infantry area, in tentage of 'the, Infantry Battalion at Aberdeen.

SUNDAY, JULY 14th

Colonel Swale, of the Judge Advocate General's Department reported for duty at 9:00 A.M. General Penington and two staff officers left at 9:30 A. M.; first for conference with Governor and The Adjutant General at Olympia; later for Everett, to make a reconnaissance of the local set-up. No disturbances reported from any point during the night. No definite action taken by the Governor pending further developments. Orders issued mobilizing Battery "A", 248th Coast Artillery En., and the Medical Detachment; the former to move by truck to Camp Murray during the night of 14 July; the latter on the morning of July 15th.

MONDAY, JULY 15th

EVERETT: Telephone report at 9:00 A.M., that opening of mills was comparatively quiet. A small fight occurred at one mill where five (5) were arrested, including one known communist. The Robinson mill opened with 400 workmen, and expect to add 100 on Wednesday. The "plywood" mill reported 40 at work with 50 more expected Wednesday. Most mills report they have all the men they can use at this time. ABERDEEN: No report of any disturbance up to noon. .

TACOMA: All quiet at the bridge-head during the morning. Reports from Intelligence indicates a concerted attack will be staged on workers of the Dickman Lumber Company when mills close at 4:00 P.M. For purpose of meeting this situation, Tacoma has been divided into two sectors - NORTH from 13th Street, and SOUTH from same street. Major Dohm has been assigned command of the South Sector, Major Wilder the North. All troops except Howitzer Company (In reserve) will be in Tacoma at 3:00 P.M. to meet this threat. The City Council of Tacoma has passed an Ordinance prohibiting group congregations

of people in the streets in violation of said ordinance. Failure to disperse or move on when so told, subjects offenders

to a fine of \$300.00, or 90 days in jail, OR BOTH FINE AND IMPRISONMENT. The Mayor is also reported as having stated, or proclaimed, that if this ordinance did not prove effective, he would call on the Governor to proclaim Martial Law in the City. EVERETT: A total of 8 mills were operating at the close of the day. A large meeting being addressed by radical leaders was broken up by State Patrol forces, with use of gas. 24 were arrested during the day.

TACOMA: No disturbances developed during the afternoon or evening. 1750 at work. ABERDEEN: The situation is reported as tense, with a great deal of passive resistance; radical leaders bringing suits against military commanders for false arrest and detention. Over 100 strikers or radical leaders apprehended during the day but released after questioning.

TUESDAY, JULY 16th

Situation reported well under control at Tacoma and Everett. At meeting of agitators in latter city, one "Red" Johnson, a radical leader from the Timber and Sawmill Worker's Union at Aberdeen was arrested and is being held on open charge.

ABERDEEN: Generally quiet. Writs of habeas corpus filed by a group of prisoners, returnable at 2:00 P.M. Thursday. Restraining order served on Major S. W. C. Hand and other Guard officers and Mill owners, to prevent them from interfering with civil rights of certain named individuals to picket within 100 feet of mills and State property. Similar action against Attorney General on behalf of the Picketers in Lewis County (Longview). Major Hand, Commanding 2nd Battalion, 161st Infantry at Aberdeen directed the relief of Captain George Beardsley from Company duty and assign him as Judge Advocate of that command. Also to authorize him to reserve office space in the hotel, where he could work without serious interruption. No specific reports of further disturbances during the evening and night.

Workers in Aberdeen had increased 73 in two days to a total of 567 today. The bulk of this gain was at the Harbor Plywood Plant.

WEDNESDAY, JULY 17th

During July 17th, a canvas of available data of number of men at work, indicated a total of 1807 now employed in Tacoma in 16 mills, with 7 mills in Everett reporting 1060 men back to work. Longview reported approaching normal. Several reported cases of intimidation in Tacoma, but patrols have maintained order. No change in status at Aberdeen, where radical elements are seeking by court action to restrain interference by peace authorities with their efforts to prolong the strike and prevent willing workers from returning to employment. One Military airplane relieved from active duty.

THURSDAY, JULY 18th

Lieutenant Colonel Thomas N. Swale, J. A. G. Department, left for Aberdeen at 9:30 A.M., to assist National Guard officers in defending cases coming up for court hearings today. Reports from EVERETT, indicate that mills are working with full crews, 1600 being at work today, with men willing to work being turned away. TACOMA mills report 1833 men at work, showing a very slow but steady gain. Col. Swale returned from Aberdeen at 6:15 P. M.

The Injunction restraining peace authorities from interfering with picketing was granted by the Court, Judge J. M. Phillips, sitting.

While the general situation is quiet, there have been upward of twenty cases of intimidation reported in the Tacoma area, with at least one severe case of assault and battery, resulting in hospital treatment.

A resume of the Tacoma intimidations follows:

Total number of cases of intimidation & violence reported 200
 Cases of actual personal violence..... 70
 Number of bombings reported (cars and buildings)..... 12
 Number of prosecutions and convictions..... 1
 (A fine of \$5.00 was meted out in this case, one in which victim was badly injured)

No further reports on July 18th.

FRIDAY, JULY 19TH

The day passed without incident of note. No marked change in the situation at any point, except a gradual increase in the number of men at work in all sectors of the strike area, with Everett at normal capacity except as to the Shingle Weavers, who have not yet reached an agreement with the operators. A meeting between the Union representatives (New Union) and the operators at Aberdeen is scheduled for tonight, where military protection from opposing factions has been provided for. There has been no reports of any disturbance at that point up to 11:30 P.M., at which hour the Tacoma Command Post also reports all quiet.

SATURDAY, JULY 20th

Report from Aberdeen shows a total of 64 men at work yesterday; a gain of)) over the previous day and the largest number reported since the mills re-opened. The meeting scheduled for the night of July 19th, after consultation between the Unions concerned, adjourned without final action.

SUNDAY, JULY 21ST -No activities reported during the entire day.

MONDAY, JULY 22ND

An increase in the number of workers in the Tacoma mills during Monday was noted, 17 mills reporting a total of 1922 men at work.

No reports of disturbances from any sector during the day.

TUESDAY JULY 23rd

All Sectors continue quiet' throughout the day. The Adjutant General directed that Regimental Headquarters; Headquarters Company and the entire 1st Battalion of the 161st Infantry be ordered relieved from an active duty status and returned to their home station, Spokane. Warning order sent out and orders published directing the 248th Coast Artillery Battalion (HD) (less Battery C) to relieve the 1st Battalion from their duties in aid of the peace authorities of the State of Washington, Pierce County and all cities and towns in said county. This order was made effective on the morning of July 24, with Major Edward C. Dohm, C.A., Battalion Commander, announced as Commanding Officer of the forces assigned to duty.

WEDNESDAY JULY 24th

The day was quiet in all sectors, except in Hoquiam where the mood of the strikers continued sullen, with little headway towards a settlement being in evidence. The 1st Battalion, 161st Infantry entrained for home station at Spokane, and left Camp Murray at 5:45 P.M., Major Edward C. Dohm, 248th Coast Artillery taking over command of the local peace forces. Late reports showed all quiet in Tacoma, with situation rather tense in Aberdeen and Hoquiam.

THURSDAY, JULY 25th

No change reported in the situation at Aberdeen. There appeared to be a renewal of intimidation and threats between strikers, their pickets and workers in the Tacoma situation. Two brushes between the factions occurred during the day. In one altercation between pickets and representatives of the operators, the mixed group were taken into custody by the Guard patrol. Another disturbance at the Clear Fir Lumber Company at Day Island, resulted in 10 men engaged being taken in by the patrols. A serious clash occurred between workers and striker-sympathizers at Hoquiam during the preceding night, when a charge of bird-shot among the latter resulted in minor injuries to a few. Later a patrol attempted to maintain order were rather hard pressed by strikers and their sympathizers, but reinforcements restored a restrained order.

FRIDAY, JULY 26th

The result of a ballot taken by the strikers at Olympia, the men voted overwhelmingly to return to work, the ballot showing over 650 for returning, with only 49 "against". No reports of violence throughout the day.

SATURDAY JULY 27th

Continued quiet in the Tacoma area resulted in withdrawal of guard patrols over the week end, and the transfer of Western District Command Post to Aberdeen, where it opened at 12:00 Noon, with complete transfer of office staff and fixtures. Patrols at the latter point are still actively employed maintaining order. Three Plywood mills opened at Olympia; three large lumber mills plan to re-open Monday morning. All quiet in other sectors.

SUNDAY JULY 28th - No reports of activities from any sector.

MONDAY JULY 29th

Morning reports from Tacoma remain so favorable that no patrols are being sent there this A.M. Orders issued relieving Battery B, 248th Coast Artillery Battalion (HD) from further duty and sending them back to home station, Olympia, by motor transportation at 2:00 P.M., today. Colonel Swale (JAGD) and Lieutenant Van Wickle also relieved and sent home.

Situation in Tacoma remained quiet. Situation elsewhere than Aberdeen, normal.

TUESDAY JULY 30th

Situation in Tacoma and all points other than Aberdeen are reported as quiet and orderly. In Aberdeen it became necessary during the morning to use all patrols to control and disperse about 300 strikers, whose menacing attitude demanded restraint. The Headquarters Troop, 24th Cavalry Division was relieved from a duty status and returned to their home station, Tacoma, after lunch -local guard duties being taken over by the 248th Coast Artillery Battalion.

WEDNESDAY TO FRIDAY JULY 31 TO AUG. 2 -No change in the situation reported from any source.

SATURDAY AUGUST 3RD

Continued quiet in all areas resulted in orders being issued discontinuing the WESTERN DISTRICT COMMAND POST at Aberdeen, and ordering the relief from further duty of General Penington, the District Commander and his staff of four officers. Later in the day, on urgent representations to the

Governor on behalf of all sides of the question in Aberdeen, General Penington was sent back to assist the opposing forces of the strike situation in reaching an amicable agreement.

SUNDAY, AUGUST 4th - No change in any situation worthy of record.

MONDAY, AUGUST 5th

The situation remaining quiet, Companies E and G, 161st Infantry were withdrawn from Aberdeen, to Camp Murray, preparatory to return to their home stations and relief from further duty on August 7th, should no new complications arise in the meantime. There now remains on a duty status only Headquarters and Battery A, 248th Coast Artillery Battalion, the 3rd Battalion, 161st Infantry and motor convoy detachment.

All mills in Tacoma were operating at normal strength today, the strikers having voted 1391 to 97 to resume work, accepting the Operator's last agreement as to hours and wages, and the return of all former employees to work as quickly as Operator's provided places for them. A so called "riot roll" came at 5:00 P.M. from the Point Defiance "Old Tacoma" mills. No troops were used, as it was found to be purely "personal differences" between former employees, not yet re-engaged, and non-union workers who had taken their jobs. A matter that local police can easily handle, are they so disposed. One car was overturned in the melee, and one worker's garage was bombed. All such activities has as their sole object the discouraging of non-union workers from holding the old employee's jobs.

TUESDAY, AUGUST 6th

All quiet in Tacoma during morning. Idle Union workers, not yet re-employed, were still threatening non-union men holding their jobs. Purely local police work. During the afternoon, a meeting was in progress between Union heads and operators at Aberdeen. While an agreement was not reached, the conferees having recessed to re-write certain terms of the contemplated agreement, the situation gave the greatest promise of early settlement that has yet been observed. One Plywood plant resumed full operations, 140 men having returned to work under satisfactory agreement with the owners. The Pullman Company of the 161st Infantry (Company "E") entrained for home station at 7:00 P.M., terminating their ACTIVE DUTY status on August 7th.

WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 7th

Company "G", 161st Infantry, entrucked at Camp Murray at 6:00 A.M., and cleared for home station, PROSSER at 6:40 A.M. No reports from Aberdeen during the early part of the day. After a conference with the Governor and General Penington, the latter was re-called from Aberdeen and relieved from a duty status, effective at midnight, this date. Warning orders were issued for the return of remaining troops of the 2nd Battalion, 161st Infantry, from Aberdeen.

THURSDAY, AUGUST 8th

Companies H and F, 161st Infantry, the Medical Detachment and Motor Convoy Detachment, comprising the last troops on duty at Aberdeen, were brought into Camp Murray.

FRIDAY, AUGUST 9th

Companies F and H, 161st Infantry, entrucked for return to home stations, Yakima and Walla Walla and left Camp Murray at 7:00 A.M. The medical detachment of the 161st Infantry and the Service Section of Service Company, of same regiment, entrained for return to home stations at 7:00 P.M., being the last

elements of that regiment remaining on active duty. Orders issued for return of all elements of the 248th Coast Artillery Battalion to respective home stations of the units on August 10th.

SATURDAY. AUGUST 10th

Headquarters, Headquarters Detachment, Medical Department Detachment and Battery A, 248th Coast Artillery Battalion, entrucked for return to home stations, Olympia for Headquarters and Medical Detachment; Aberdeen for Battery A. left Camp Murray at 9:20 A.M. Lieut. Col. Brown, Acting Quartermaster and Captain Kyle, the Medical Officer on duty with Special Troops, relieved from further active duty this date. Orders issued relieving the 161st Motor Transport Company and the Detachment of 41st Tank Company, which has been acting during the emergency as the motor convoy detachment, effective at noon, August 11th, at which hour they will have returned to home stations of the respective units, Seattle and Centralia. Enlisted detachment of the State QM Detachment, relieved this date and returned to homes, Seattle and Tacoma. There remain on a duty status at the present time, two enlisted men of the State Detachment, Sergeant Wilson and Private Harlow, who are assisting in closing out the accounts for subsistence of the troops that have been subsisted while on a duty status at Camp Murray and Aberdeen. Upon completion of this duty, and after settlement of all such accounts, these enlisted men will be relieved and returned to their respective homes. This closes the first serious detail in which troops of the Washington National Guard have been called to aid the civil authorities in maintaining law and order, during the past decade. All officers and enlisted men ordered on this duty have responded in a splendid manner. The manner in which they have handled delicate situations; the forbearance, tact and good judgment shown by all, has been such as to merit the commendation of all citizens who have observed them, and fully justifies the confidence that has been, and will continue to be placed in them by the people of the State.

GEORGE E. McKENZIE
Major, Infantry, W.N.G,
Operations Officer

In his biennial report for the period November 1, 1934 to October 31, 1936, the Adjutant General had the following to say regarding National Guard Armories and the Reservation at Camp Murray:

“There has been no change in the number or location of State owned and leased armories since last biennial report. Application has been made to the Works progress Administration for the construction of a new armory at Seattle to replace the present building, which the City of Seattle is attempting to condemn for a street right-of-way. The site for the new building has been donated by the City at a cost of approximately \$70,000.00 W. P. A. funds to the amount of \$104,674.50 have been requested for the remodeling of the Tacoma armory to accommodate the increased number of units at that station.

“Applications have also been made to the same government agency for funds to construct armories, to replace leased buildings at Olympia, Centralia, Prosser and Pullman. In view of the fact that there is an uncertainty of being able to carry this construction program to a satisfactory completion under the restrictions imposed by the W. P. A., funds for this program have also been included in the Military Department budget to be submitted to the 1937 Legislature. There has also been included in the budget funds for the construction of a sixteen-truck garage and shop at Walla Walla to accommodate a Motor Truck Company.

“There is now under construction at Felts Field an addition to the Headquarters building for an officers' class room and radio control quarters. The necessary funds are being furnished by the Works Progress Administration and the Washington Emergency Relief Administration.

"Much needed interior decorations and repairs have been made to the Spokane, Yakima, Bellingham and Everett armories by labor furnished by the W. P. A. and materials purchased from Military Department funds. An additional set of quarters was completed in the Spokane Armory.

"There has been no new construction at Camp Murray since the last report. The W. P. A. has furnished the necessary labor to complete the clearing of the field camp for the 41st Division and to remove dead and down timber, clear underbrush and remove stumps to beautify the reservation. They have also constructed a corral for animals stabled at Camp Murray and have remodeled the thirteen old dry pit latrines in the 146th Field Artillery area, in accordance with the specifications of the United States Public Health Service.

"Improvements made in camp site facilities at the State Military Reservation during the past two years amounted to \$785.59 for Maintenance and repairs and \$16, 241.93 for construction.

The Chief of the National Guard Bureau in his report for 1937 stated:

"The plan for development of the National Guard approved by the Secretary of War in 1923, and modified in 1927, contemplates a National Guard peace strength of 210,000 officers and men. The National Guard units, active and inactive, which will compose this strength have been allocated to the various States since 1923.

"During the 10 year period 1926-36, the strength of the National Guard remained at approximately 190,000 officers and enlisted men, due to budgetary limitations, thereby causing a considerable number of National Guard units included in the original peace time development plan, to remain inactive.

"Congress has recently appropriated funds for increasing the strength of the National Guard in three increments of 5,000 officers and men each. The first increment was added in Fiscal Year 1936, the second increment was authorized in Fiscal Year 1937, and the third increment for the Fiscal Year 1938. These increments have been and will continue to be utilized for activating inactive National Guard units included in the aforementioned development plan. However, for none of these increments have the funds been appropriated sufficient to permit the activation of any of the inactive National Guard units until the last quarter of the Fiscal Year during which the increment became effective.

"All organizations authorized for activation in the first increment (FY 1936) have been organized, except one company of combat engineers. The activation of units authorized in the second increase is proceeding rapidly. Sixty-four of the seventy-seven units authorized for activation in the second increase have been activated and federally recognized. Most of these newly organized units are in the third battalions of the field artillery (155 mm howitzer) regiments, and in the Quartermaster regiments of the 18 National Guard infantry divisions, thereby conforming to the policy of the War Department, which provides that in organizing new National Guard units first priority will be given to divisional units of the National Guard infantry divisions.

"When all units included in the second and third increments have been organized and federally recognized, the total strength of the National Guard will be approximately 205,000 officers and enlisted men.

Washington's allotted strength on June 30, 1937 was 2,997. Actual strength was 2,833 or an understrength of 164.

Based upon the foregoing increase, the following units were organized in the Washington National Guard:

Headquarters, 1st Battalion and Company B, 116th Quartermaster Regiment, consisting of 4 officers and 46 enlisted men, organized April 1, 1937 at Walla Walla.

Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, Special Troops, 41st Division, 2 officers and 16 enlisted men, organized April 1, 1937 at Centralia.

Company A, 116th Medical Regiment, 2 officers and 66 enlisted men, organized May 18, 1937 at Kelso.

Headquarters, 116th Medical Regiment, consisting of a Colonel and Major of the Medical Corps and one Captain, Medical Administrative Corps, organized June 10, 1937 at Seattle.

During the period 1936-38, the following changes in station or in designation of the existing units of the Washington National Guard were made:

147th Ambulance Company, redesignated as Company "E", 116th Medical Regiment on January 1, 1937 with station at Mount Vernon.

Headquarters Battery and C. T., 2nd Bn., 146th F. A. disbanded at Kent, effective February 28, 1938 and reorganized March 1, 1938 with station in Tacoma.

Headquarters Company, 116th QM Regt., completed by adding the existing Division Hq. Platoon of 22 enlisted men from excess strength of other units of the State, and one officer allotted by NGB, May 25, 1938, with station in Seattle.

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The summer encampment of 1936 was held during the period June 13-27 at Camp Murray for Divisional units and at Fort Worden for the 1st Battalion of the 248th Coast Artillery. The 41st Division Aviation again trained at Gray Field at Fort Lewis. 215 officers and 2,505 enlisted men attended these camps.

In 1937 the 248th Coast Artillery trained at Fort Worden during the period June 12th to 26th under the command of Major E. C. Dohm. 241 attended this encampment. The Divisional troops of the Washington National Guard attended camp this year during the period August 17th to August 31st. The change in dates from June to August was due to the attendance of the entire 41st Division, some 7,000 officers and men, to participate with the regular army in Fourth Army Maneuvers on the Fort Lewis Reservation.

The Biennium of 1937-38 signaled the beginning of a large Armory rehabilitation and building program as follows:

LOCATION	TYPE	STATION OF	OCCUPIED	COST
Walla Walla	Garage	Co B and Bn Hq, 116th QM Regt	Mar 23, 1938	\$15,604.25
Centralia	Armory	41st Tank Co. Hq. Spec. Troops 41st Div Hq Det. Med Det, 41st Div	May 31, 1938	\$75,000.00
Pullman	Armory	Co. E, 161st Inf	Aug 15, 1938	\$55,000.00
Seattle	Armory	Hq & Hq Btry, 66 FA Brigade 146th F. A. 41st Div Hq Det	75% complete	\$850,000.00
Olympia	Armory	Hq. 248th C.A. 1st Bn Hq Btry Btry B, 248th Med Det, 248th	25% complete	\$150,000.00
Tacoma (Remodeling)	Armory	Hq. 148th F. A. Hq Btry, 148 FA Serv Btry, 148th FA 2nd Bn Hq, 148th FA Med Dept Det., 148th FA Hq Troop, 24th Cav Div	5%	\$100,000.00

Fifty-five per cent of the cost of the foregoing buildings was appropriated by the State Legislature and the balance was allotted by the Public Works Administration in the form of a grant.

It was estimated there would be required in addition to the funds already obligated and expended to complete the armories, as planned, would be as follows:

Pullman Armory	\$2,400.00
Seattle Armory	\$300,000.00
Olympia Armory	\$3,750.00
Tacoma Armory	\$60,000.00

On completion of this program the number of State-owned Armories was increased from eight to twelve, reducing the rented armories by four.

On March 30, 1937, a fire of undetermined origin damaged the Felts Field Armory. As there was no provision in the budget to restore fire damage, funds were secured for the repairs from the following sources:

Works Progress Administration	\$17,421.00
Dept. of Social Security(State)	4,980.00
Military Department Funds	22,511.45

The following was extracted from the Biennial Report for 1937-38 on additional building during that period:

"Application has been made to the Works Progress Administration for the necessary labor to construct a pistol, skeet, and 1,000 inch range at Felts Field. The National Guard Bureau allotted \$476.00 for materials.

"The City of Spokane, with the aid of the Works Progress Administration, has increased the landing facilities at Felts Field and installed a battery of flood lights at each end of the field, using the six lights that were on the National Guard hangar in this installation.

"There has been completed in the Everett Armory a club room, and canteen, facilities, for enlisted men, at a cost of \$1,034.00.

"The heating system in the Spokane Armory was improved by the installation of a coal stoker in one of the boilers and replacing the direct radiation in the drill hall with unit stokers, at a cost of \$2,888.00.

"The County Commissioners of Whatcom County donated to the State of Washington, for military purposes, a parcel of ground adjacent to the Bellingham Armory, consisting of four lots with a total of 49,500 square feet. This property will be used for parking space which will materially relieve the congestion when the armory is used for public gatherings.

"An unfinished portion of the Walla Walla Armory was completed as office space for the First Battalion Headquarters of the 116th Quartermaster Regiment and a new roof put on the building. The cost of these improvements were \$773.27 and \$793.75, respectively.

"The Works Progress Administration is landscaping the grounds of the Centralia Armory. The project includes leveling for lawn, parking lot and drill field, construction of roadways, seeding and planting of shrubbery.

"This Department prepared the estimates, supervised the preparation of the campsite, construction of temporary mess halls, kitchens, latrines and bath facilities and the construction of power lines and water mains for the troops of the States of Oregon, Idaho, Montana, and Wyoming that attended the 1937 concentration of the 41st Division at Camp Murray. The funds for this work were allotted by the National Guard Bureau and the Works Progress Administration.

"Several other projects, such as dry pit latrines, recreation buildings with auditoriums, stages, Chaplain's offices, etc., were also built at Camp Murray or adjacent areas with State and WPA funds in the amount of about \$44,000.00

In 1938 the troops of the 41st Division from Washington trained at Camp Murray during the period June 11th to 25th. As usual the 1st Battalion of the 248th Coast Artillery trained at Fort Worden during the same period. Attendance at both encampments totaled 2,929.

In 1939 the Washington National Guard trained at Camp Murray during the period June 10th to 24th. The 248th Coast Artillery trained during the same period at Fort Worden. A total of 2,841 attended these encampments.

On November 4, 1939, the first of several General Orders were issued by the Military Department disbanding, organizing and reorganizing units of the Washington National Guard. General Orders No. 10 covered the following:

- "1. Organized Battery G, 205th Coast Artillery (AA) effective 6 November 1939 with station at Tacoma, Washington.
- "2. Disbanded Company A, 116th Medical Regiment with station at Kelso effective November 6, 1939.
- "3. Reorganization Company A, 116th Medical Regiment effective November 7, 1939 with station at Seattle, Washington.
- "4. Organized Battery E, 205th Coast Artillery (AA) at Kelso, Washington, effective November 7, 1939, from personnel of Company A, 116th Medical Regiment.
- "5. Disbanded Battery B, 248th Coast Artillery, stationed at Olympia, effective November 7, 1939.
- "6. Disbanded Medical Department Detachment, 248th Coast Artillery with station at Olympia on November 7, 1939.
- "7. Organized Headquarters, 205th Coast Artillery (AA) at Olympia, Wash., on November 8, 1939 from personnel of Battery B, 248th Coast Artillery disbanded on November 7, 1939.
- "8. Organized Medical Department Detachment, 205th Coast Artillery (AA) on November 8, 1939 from personnel of the Medical Department Detachment, 248th C.A., disbanded on November 7, 1939. Station of this Detachment was Olympia, Wash.
- "9. Disbanded Company E, 116th Medical Regiment with station at Mt. Vernon, Washington effective November 8, 1939. ,
- "10. Reorganized Battery B, 248th Coast Artillery, with Station at Mt Vernon, on November 9, 1939, utilizing personnel of Company E, 116th Medical Regiment, disbanded at Mt Vernon on November 8, 1939.
- "11. Reorganized Company E, 116th Medical Regiment at Seattle] Washington, effective November 14, 1939.
- "12. Organized The Band, 205th Coast Artillery, with station at Olympia, Washington effective November 8, 1939. Unit was attached to Headquarters Battery, 205th Coast Artillery.

General Orders No. 11, Military Department, State of Washington, dated Nov. 13, 1939 announced the following:

- "1. Organized Battery F, 205th Coast Artillery with station at Centralia, Washington, effective November 15, 1939.
- "2. Organized Battery A, 205th Coast Artillery (AA) with station at Seattle, Washington, effective November 16, 1939.
- "3. Organized Battery B, 205th Coast Artillery (AA) with station at Seattle, Washington, effective November 16, 1939.
- "4. Organized Battery C. 205th Coast Artillery (AA) with station at Seattle, Washington. effective November 16, 1939.
- "5. Organized Battery D, 205th Coast Artillery (AA) with station at Seattle, effective November 30, 1939.
- "6. Organized Headquarters Detachment and Combat Train, 1st Battalion,. 205th Coast Artillery (AA) with station at Seattle, Washington, effective Nov. 16, 1939.
- "7. Organized Headquarters, First Battalion, 205th Coast Artillery (AA) with station in Seattle, Washington, effective November 30, 1939.

General Orders No. 12, Military Department, State of Washington, dated Nov. 14, 1939 announced the following:

- "1. Disbanded the Antitank Platoon of Headquarters Company, 161st Infantry with station at Wenatchee, Washington, effective November 20, 1939.
- "2. Redesignated Headquarters Company (less Antitank Platoon) 161st Infantry with station at Spokane, Washington, effective November 21, 1939.

"3. Organized Battery H, 205th Coast Artillery (AA) with station at Wenatchee, Washington, effective November 21, 1939.

"4. Disbanded Headquarters Battery, 1st Battalion, 248th Coast Artillery (HD) with station at Olympia, Washington, effective November 21, 1939.

"5. Organized Headquarters Detachment and Combat Train, 2nd Battalion, 205th Coast Artillery (AA) with station at Olympia, Washington, effective Nov. 22, 1939.

"6. Organized Headquarters, 2nd Battalion, 205th Coast Artillery (AA) with station at Olympia, Washington, effective November 22, 1939.

"7. Organized Regimental Headquarters, 205th Coast Artillery (AA) with station at Olympia, Washington, effective November 20, 1939, and under the command of Colonel Edward C. Dohm, former commander of the 248th Coast Artillery (HD). General Orders No. 16 1/2, dated August 21, 1940 announced the following changes in organization, effective September 1, 1940:

OLD ORGANIZATION

Headquarters, 148th Field Artillery
Headquarters, 248th Coast Artillery (HD)
Band, 148th Field Artillery
Headquarters, 2nd Bn., 148th F. A. Hq. 2nd Bn., 248th C. A. (M) (HD)
Headquarters Battery, 2nd Bn, 148th FA
Battery D, 148th Field Artillery
Battery E, 148th Field Artillery
Battery F, 148th Field Artillery
Med. Dept. Det., 148th Field Artillery

NEW ORGANIZATION

Headquarters Battery, 148th F. A.
Searchlight Battery, 248th Coast Arty(HD)
Band, 248th Coast Artillery (HD)
Headquarters Battery, 248th CA (AA) (HD)
Battery D, 248th Coast Artillery {HD)
Battery E, 248th Coast Artillery (HD)
Battery F, 248th Coast Artillery (HD)
Med Dept Det., 248th Coast Artillery (HD)

General Order-s No. 17, August 30, 1940 announced as follows:

"1. Disbanded Ned. Det., 248th Coast Artillery with station at Aberdeen, Washington, effective August 31, 1940.

"2. Organized Headquarters Battery, 1st Battalion, 248th Coast Artillery (HD) with station at Aberdeen, Washington, effective September 1, 1940.

General Orders No. 18, dated September 1, 1940 announced that the 41st Tank Company, 41st Division, with station at Centralia, Washington was redesignated Company D, 194th Tank Battalion, effective September 1, 1940.

General Orders No. 19, dated 5 September 1940 is reproduced in its entirety and read as follows:

GENERAL ORDERS NO. 19

Camp Murray, Fort Lewis, Washington
September 5, 1940

ORDERING CERTAIN ELEMENTS OF THE NATIONAL GUARD OF
WASHINGTON INTO THE ACTIVE MILITARY
SERVICE OF THE UNITED STATES

1. Under the authority of Public Resolution number 96, Seventy-sixth Congress, approved August 27, 1940, the President has given his signature to Executive Orders Number 8530, August 31, 1940, ordering all active elements of the following units of the National Guard of the United States of the State of Washington and all personnel of both the active and inactive National Guard assigned thereto, into the active military service of the United States effective September 16, 1940:

41st Division except 41st Tank Company
116th Observation Squadron
248th Coast Artillery (HD)

2. The Commanding Officers of all units of the 41st Division organized in the State of Washington, except the 41st Tank Company (in process of conversion), and the Commanding Officers of the 116th Observation Squadron and the 248th Coast Artillery (HD) will, in accordance with the orders of the President contained in paragraph 1, above, assemble all personnel, active and inactive, of their respective commands at the several armories of the units on September 16, 1940, hereby designated as "M-Day", and proceed as directed in Protective Mobilization Plans, 1940, and AR 130-10, and will then await further orders from the Commanding General, Ninth Corps Area.

BY ORDER OF CLARENCE D. MARTIN, Governor and Commander-in-Chief :

OFFICIAL:

MAURICE THOMPSON
Brigadier General, W. N.G.,
The Adjutant General

General Orders No. 23, dated September 16, 1940 redesignated Company D, 194th Tank Battalion (formerly 41st Tank Co) as Company C, 103rd Antitank Company, with station at Tacoma, Washington, effective September 19, 1940.

General Orders No. 24, dated September 19, 1940 announced the organization of the Medical Detachment, 103rd Antitank Battalion with station at Tacoma, Wash. effective September 19, 1940.

General Orders No. 25, dated 30 September 1940 announced the following changes in the organization of the Washington National Guard:

"1. Headquarters Troop, 24th Cavalry Division (Old Troop "B") was converted to Headquarters Company, 103rd Antitank Battalion, with station in Tacoma, Wash.,

"2. Organized Company A, 103rd Antitank Battalion with station at Tacoma, Washington effective September 30, 1940.

"3. Organized Company B, 103rd Antitank Battalion with station at Tacoma, Washington, effective September 30, 1940.

"4. Organized Headquarters, 103rd Anti-tank Battalion with station at Tacoma, Washington, effective September 31, 1940.

It may be recalled at the beginning of this Volume that the 3rd Infantry Division of the regular army was stationed at various army posts in the Northwest, and from 1921 until 1939, their organization remained more or less intact with few if any changes in station. The 10th Field Artillery was the principal unit at Camp Lewis, later Fort Lewis, the 7th Infantry was at Vancouver Barracks; the 6th Engineers at Fort Lewis and Fort Lawton and the 4th Infantry at Fort George Wright. The 14th Coast Artillery Corps was the parent unit to the 248th Coast Artillery throughout this period.

Just as the National Guard troops expanded prior to World War II, the regular Army began to increase its strength beginning in 1939. Cadres from the 9th and 10th Field Artillery units were picked for the 6th Division which was activated at Fort Lewis and later sent to the Midwest posts of Snelling and Des Moines. Some of the Division troops of the 3rd were transferred to the 2nd Division, while others such as the 3rd Tank Company and 3rd Ordnance Company were transferred to GHQ Reserve.

Headquarters, 3rd F. A. Brigade and both Infantry Brigades of the 3rd Division were disbanded with the streamlining of that Division from a "Square" to "Triangular" Division. The 80th Field Artillery made up of cadres from the artillery units at Fort Lewis was transferred also to Fort Des Moines, Iowa. The 6th Engineer Battalion went to Fort Lincoln, North Dakota; the balance of that Regiment which was redesignated the 10th Engineer Battalion was transferred to Fort Lawton. During this period, Fort Lewis and the 3rd Division was commanded by Major General Walter C. Sweeney.

On May 28, 1940, Headquarters, Ninth Corps Area, San Francisco, California issued General Orders No. 13 which created Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, IX Corps, with station at Fort Lewis, Washington. In the same order the 69th Topographical Engineers, the 60th Signal Battalion and the 2nd Battalion of the 99th Field Artillery (Pack) were assigned to Fort Lewis.

On August 1, 1940 Company D, 69th Quartermaster Battalion was assigned to Fort Lewis along with the 3rd Reconnaissance Troop.

Pursuant to General Orders No. 31, Hq. 9th C.A., 13 Sept. 1940 the following units were redesignated:

PRESENT DESIGNATION	NEW DESIGNATION	STATION
9th F. A. (155 MM)	9th Field Artillery Bn.	Ft Lewis, Wash.
10th F. A. (75 MM)	10th Field Artillery Bn.	Ft Lewis, Wash.
31st F. A. (75 MM)	31st F. A. Bn	Ft Ord, Calif.
Activated and Redesignated:		
39th Field Artillery	39th F. A. Battalion	Ft Lewis, Wash.
41st Field Artillery	41st F. A. Battalion	Ft Lewis, Wash.

Constituted on the Active List:

Hq & Hq Battery, 3rd Division Artillery at Fort Lewis, Wash.

Hq & Hq Battery, 7th Division Artillery, at Fort Ord, California.

General Orders No. 40, Hq. 9th C. A., dated December 5, 1940 established the Corps Area Service Commands throughout that command using the four digit number 1900 as the Headquarters Unit of that command and assigning numbers in the 1900 series to posts throughout the 9th Corps Area. Ft Lewis received 1907 & 1909.

General Orders No. 2, Hq. 9th Corps Area, dated January 20, 1941 activated the following additional units at Fort Lewis:

98th Field Artillery Battalion (75mm Howitzer, pack)

209th Military Police Company

56th Medical Battalion (Corps troops)

72nd Tank Battalion (Medium)

76th Tank Battalion (Light)

Co. D, 73rd QM Battalion (Light Maintenance)

20th Radio Intelligence Company

68th Evacuation Hospital

203rd General Hospital

Hq & Hq Det., 2nd Bn., 47th QM Regt. (Truck) (Colored)

Hq & Hq Det., 1st Bn., 58th QM Regt (Heavy Maint.)

Co. A, 58th QM Regt (Heavy Maint.)

2nd Signal Company (Depot)

Hq & Hq Btry., 3rd Bn., 14th Coast Artillery (HD) Harbor Defenses of Puget Sound,

Btrys F, H, I and K, 14th C.A., Harbor Defenses of Puget Sound

90th Engineer Battalion (Heavy pontoon)

73rd Engineer Company (Light Pontoon)

Company D, 58th QM Regiment (Heavy Maintenance)

Hq & Hq Det., 73rd QM Battalion (Light Maintenance)

Company A, 73rd QM Battalion (Light Maintenance)

2nd Platoon, 21st QM Company (Car)

Company B, 204th QM Battalion (Gas Supply)

89th QM Company; (Railhead) , ' . ,

55th Ordnance Company (Ammunition) (Colored)

On July 31, 1941, General orders No. 69, Hq. Ninth corps Area assigned Hq & Hq Det., 9th Ordnance Battalion to Fort Lewis as IX Corps Troops.

General Orders No. 80, dated September 24, 1941, Hq. 9th corps Area released the State Detachment of Washington National Guard from active military service.

General Orders, Hq Ninth Corps Area dated January 1, 1942 established that Headquarters at Fort Douglas, Utah as Corps Area Command Unit No. 1902.

General Orders No. 5, Headquarters Western Defense Command and Fourth Army, dated December 16, 1941 activated the 9th Ordnance Battalion at Fort Lewis. It was composed of - Hq & Hq Det., 48th Ordnance Company, 116th Ordnance Company, 26th Ordnance Company and the 83rd Ordnance Company. In the same order, the 55th Ordnance Company (Ammo)(Colored)and the 621st Ordnance Company(Ammo) (Colored) were also activated, at Fort Lewis.

In the meantime, during the period September 21 to November 13th, the following members of the State Staff were ordered to active duty for the period of one year:

Lieut. Col. John E. Lawlor, F. D., Camp Murray, Wash.	
Lieut. Col. Irvin W. Kenney, Ord. Dept., Camp Murray, Wash.	
Lieut. Col. Joseph H. Smith, JAGD, Everett, Wash.	
1st Lieut. Howard V. Judson, AGD, NGUS, Camp Murray, Wash.	
2nd Lieut. Theodore R. Knightlinger, AGD, NGUS, Camp Murray, Wash.	
Major Will G. Crosby, D.C., Seattle, Wash.	
Major Charles M. Toynbee, Chemical War Service, Tacoma, Wash.	
Mr Sgt Reginald Heafield	St Sgt Daniel A. Harlow
T Sgt William G. McNamara	St Sgt Robert H. Myers
T Sgt Donald C. Peterson	Sgt Donald R. Harvey
St Sgt Donald O. Brison	Sgt Glen A. Neuman

Private Eugene K. Pape

Pursuant to Executive Order No. 8530 dated August 31, 1940 the following units and members of the Washington National Guard were ordered to one year's active duty effective September 16, 1940. (Note: In these rosters the * indicated that the person was "Absent, not yet reported.")

DETACHMENT, HEADQUARTERS 41ST DIVISION

Col. Orlo W. Brown, QMC	Col. George W. Beeler, MC
Lt Col Cecil C. Bagley, QMC	Master Sgt Floyd D. Crane
Lt. Col. Walter J. DeLong, Inf	Master Sgt Jesse W. Douglas
Lt Col Lacey V. Murrow, AC	Staff Sgt George D. Harvey
Lt Col Archer S. Kresky, Inf	Staff Sgt Fred L. Mawer
Lt Col Thomas N. Swale, JAGD	Private First Class Harold J. Siegel
Capt Ward W. Roney, JAGD	Private Lennart G. Brown

HEADQUARTERS & HEADQUARTERS DET., SPECIAL TROOPS, 41ST DIV (Centralia)

Captain Edward L. Dunlap, Inf.	Corp Gordon K. Thompson
2nd Lieut. Matthias E. Spurgeon, Inf.	Private First Class Daniel M. Belcher
Staff Sgt Donald L. Ahern	Private First Class John W. Cobb
Staff Sgt Leslie M. Linbo	Private Robert D. Gorsuch
Sgt Bob E. Stiles	Private Joe J. Turner

MEDICAL DETACHMENT, SPECIAL TROOPS, 41ST DIV (Kelso)

Captain George W. King

STAFF SERGEANTS

Carl T. Lindsey

Clarence W. Daugherty

FIRST SERGEANT

Hiram E. Ogden

PRIVATES FIRST CLASS

Jack A. Flottrop
Daniel P. Hall

Max O. Hayes
Kenneth W. Pratt

PRIVATES

James L. Albertson
Edgar B. Baird
James W. Carroll
Maurice D. Crockett

William H. Crockett
Frank C. Howard
Kenneth C. King

Harry J. Mertsching*
Harold M. Olson
Darrell L. Spreadborough

Theodore Spreadborough
Clyde L. Shumway
Grant M. Wills

HEADQUARTERS & HEADQUARTERS Det., 81ST INFANTRY BRIGADE (Spokane)

Brigadier General Carlos A. Penington
Lt Col Walter E. Hallen
Capt. Louie C. Aston
Capt. Leon W. Walton
1st Lieut. George M. Reightly (attached)
2nd Lieut. Ralph E. Rose

Master Sgt Harry C. Roning

First Sgt Wayne R. Reeder

SERGEANTS

Albert O. Bartoletta
Robert V. Brown*

Clyde W. Gulliford
Fred J. Kruithof

Lee G. Rhodes

CORPORALS

James A. Marlin

LeMoyne A. Phillips

PRIVATE FIRST CLASS

Harold Bohlae
Jack L. Deets
Wendell L. Engeldinger
Clarence L. Fleming

James C. Harvey
John E. Juul
Morris H. Kalin
Virgil E. Leaf

Robert B. Naff
Raymond S. Porter
James M. Ryan

Roger F. Safford
Harold E. Smith
Ivan M. Tyree

PRIVATEES

Jack G. Bergman
Herbert C. Blomberg
Alex W. Bradley*
Roy E. Bradley
Clair W. Colegrove
Milton L. Cowles
Richard H. Curtiss

Charles W. Fisk*
John M. Graves*
Robert M. Jones
William D. Jennings*
Russell R. King*
Jack L. Larson
Hugh Lippert

Glenn N. Major
David E. Marlin
Howard V. Nims
Jeremiah H. O'Herin
George M. Peters
Richard H. Philips
Wallace F. Philips

Walter G. Pickelsimer
George A. Ulowetz
Cortlandt M. VanWinkle
Walter E. White
Francis C. Wibon
Harry O. Wogberg*

OFFICERS, 161ST INFANTRY REGIMENT

Colonel Clarence A. Orndorft Commanding

LIEUTENANT COLONELS

Kenneth C. Downing Samuel W. C. Hand Jerome D. Jones James A. Sabiston

MAJORS

Francis J. Burns Lew E. Morris Edward J. Robins

CAPTAINS

Stanley R. Denner, MC	Fred L. Harrison	Norton L. McDonald	Bert Vanderwilt
Francis H. Cariveau	Ralph A. Jackson	Sterling E. McPhail	James M. VanWickle
William R. Durand	Frank H. Jacobs	Robert R. Moore	Robert S. Watson
John R. Gee	Charles H. Johnson	Matthew F. Murphy	Raymond H. Weir
Harry Gibbons	Willis B. Johnson, MC	Lawrence E. Totten, DC	Byron C. Willett
Arnold R. Gilbertson	William E. Jones, MC		

FIRST LIEUTENANTS

Josef S. Blue	Riley A. Harper	Roy W. Marcy	George W. Shields
Gordon D. Cornell	Ray Haynes	Henry Mastro	Martin M. Staudacher
Murray P. Davidson	Hugh W. Huddleson	David C. Morse	Geoffrey J. Townley
Carl H. Faler	Farrell P. Hyatt	Donald F Reightley	Gaylord E. Treat
Ned R. Graves, Chaplain	Claire Langley	Donald M. Rigby	Charles E. Wilkerson
Robert F. Hamaker	Charles H. Mackoff	W. O. George P. Lucas	

SECOND LIEUTENANTS

William H. Bateman	John C. Hansen	Peter J. Limacher	Crosby Pendleton
Shirley B. Bollard	Harvey C. Hitch	Harry Linker	Roy A. Peterson
Clarence G. Castor	Clarence A. Howard	Jack A. Magney, QMC	William D. Pfeifer
Gerald B. Christian	Charles E. Hunt	Frank W. Moore	Ralph S. Phelps
Harold A. Day	Herbert L. Jacobs	Thomas F. Mortensen	Robert J. Speaks
Robert K. Dickey	Richard .L. James	Howard C. Murray	William C. Stevenson
Edward H. Dobelstein	Gordon W. Johnson	Edward I. Narboe	William R. Striker
Robert A. Dyer	Robert H. Kluckhohn	Robert L. Nessly	Cormac C. Thompson
Alfred R. Finck	Ora K. Knowlton, QMC	Carl H. Nydell	Wesley L. Veirs, F. D.
Otto E. Haaland	Charles E. La Mont	David P. Oswald	Glyn E. Wheeler
Joseph Hanrahan			

Commissioned, Federal Recognition not received

First Lieutenant Leland Blanchard AGD

Second Lieutenants

Donald C. Downen	Harold F. Erz	Arthur C. Needham
Carlos A. Ennis	Thorkle M. Haaland	

BAND, 161ST INFANTRY REGIMENT

Capt. Franklin W. Greenough

Tech. Sgt. Charles S. Derr	Sgt Walter P. Jackman	Corp Burleigh G. Brown
Staff Sgt Winston A. Turney	Sgt Lawrence R. Thompson	Corp James E. Cole
Sgt Donald G. Brewer	Sgt Eugene D. Weidner	

PRIVATES FIRST CLASS

Charles E. Haffey	Homer P. Lyberger	Theodore Tang
Walter C. Klaffenback	Kurt B. Shreiner	

PRIVATES

Wayne Adler	Victor Fisher	Arthur V. Kringle Jr.	Elmer H. Oas
Walter H. Ashley	Donald R. Force	Elwyn W. Lufkin	Earl J. Peterson
Jack W. Burchill	Donald E. Hand	Leslie R. McGee	Lloyd F. Stansbury
George H. Carter	Charles D. Havens	Roger G. Meltveldt	Verne A. Stone
Clair Crisp	Donald R. Johnson	Wilbur C. Middleton	Walter H. Wicks, Jr.
Lester A. Dechenne	Harry L. Jones	Paul A. Moriarty	Albert M. Wied
Kenneth C. Field			

HEADQUARTERS COMPANY, 161ST INFANTRY REGIMENT (Spokane)

Capt. Francis H. Cariveau

Master Sgt Albert L. Steel First Sgt Clifford N. Payne Tech Sgt Robert B. MacLaine

STAFF SERGEANTS

Lester B. Dixon Clyde T. Hensley Kenneth R. Olson Kenneth R. Sullivan

SERGEANTS

Earl Boothe Joseph D. Dubuque Fay E. McDowell Pat M. Stevens
Oliver J. Bouteller Clarence B. Hamaker Harold J. McCormick Francis J. VanGelder
Osburn Cooper*

CORPORALS

Harold E. Beckman Derald R. Lyman Joe B. Russell Walter A. Swanson
Dean E. Berry Albert W. Myers Sigurd J. Sampson Bruce J. Tart
Keith W. Kernkamp Albert F. Rathgeber Edward J. Schmidt William A. Thurston
Robert J. Laterdresse Charles H. Roscoe Thaddeus A. Snow Daniel J. Venziano
Earl H. LeVan

PRIVATE FIRST CLASS

Jack B. Apon Edward W. Dow Willard A. Kertson Keith A. Neighbors
Orle L. Bearddsley George W. Duran Joe C. Leibrecht George D. Pebles
Eugene B. Bryan James C. Ellis Leal B. Long Guy R. Salisbury
Bill B. Burns Alfred K. Fields Lynn R. Lyman Sherman S. Stoddard
Pat L. Cadby Vernon H. Finrow Edward C. Mescher Claud B. Sykes
Albert L. Caldwell Archie A. Hann John H. Montague Donald A. Whittaker*
Homer L. Calkins Richard E. Isitt

PRIVATE

Harold R. Ames Laurence J. Erb Donald Hooks* Donald W. Lewis
Alvin K. Anderson Harold J. Fleener Cyril D. Howard Harold D. Ludwig
Paul A. Anderson Frederick G. Floyd Hilton R. Iff John L. McCleary
James C. Ballard Melvin D. Foster Vivien L. Irvine* Hollard L. McCormick
William Birchard* Charles Frisbie Clifford C. Jensen Bernard K. McDonald
Steven J. Blackbird Woodford W. Frisbie Melvin H. Johnson Verne D. McDuffy *
Robert E. Bland John D. Glasson Melvin I. Johnson Harold D. McGraw *
Rudy L. Bradshaw Jack Greene John J. Jones* Warren G. KcKinlay.
Aloys Bueckers Bernard W. Hamel Louis A. Jones Richard M. McKissick
Troy P. Burton Ray W. Hamilton Walter I. Jones* Tranquil Miller
William O. Butz Jack H. Hanning William J. Jones* Robert M. Moon
Raymond E. Clark Wallace R. Banning Wesley D. Jones Walter L. Morrill
Horace B. Clayton Louie D. Harkness Edward C. Kautz* Thomas G. Morris
Robert C. Colburn George G. Harrison Don Kerr Charles J. Morrison
George Crane Clifford E. Hart Claire Kerns* Neal D. Moys
Don F. Crosby John R. Hayes Robert L. Kienbaum Hans A. Mumm
Lee J. Cummings Myron K. Hegge John C. Kreitzer Gerhardt H. Nissen
Harvey O. Day John W. P. Hicks Harry Krueger Orville R. Odell
Dick E. Dorsey Verl Hinshaw* Leland R. Lawson Wilber E. Ogle
Albert Eaton Ernest R. Hobbs Carl Lewis*

HEADQUARTERS COMPANY, 161ST INFANTRY REGIMENT (CONT'D)

PRIVATEES (CONT'D)

Melvin W. Olson	Conrad T. Sampson	Marvin P. Smith	Harry R. Treffry
Robert E. O'Rielly	Charles M. Schaefer	Darrell Snyder*	Clair H. Vandermeer
Kenneth A. Ostlund	John E. Sellers	William E. Spinnell	James R. Villars
Daniel E. Purtell	Karl L. Shannon	Harold J. Tanneberg	Hurley B. Wiles
Guy R. Radabaugh	Donald Shulkin	Edwin L. Taylor*	John D. Williams
Kenneth A. Reidt	Carl E. Sinclair	Raymond L. Thill	Paul H. Wolfe
Robert Repp*	James F. Sinclair	Reid W. Thomas	Joseph M. Woods
Harold Roemmick	Edward A Smith	Howard L. Thompson	Arleigh C. Zacker
Harry R. Rogers	Ray M. Smith	John P. Tracy	

SERVICE COMPANY, 161ST INFANTRY REGIMENT (Spokane)

Captain Harry Gibbons

MASTER SERGEANTS

Frank D. Brewbaker

Bruce Hickethier

Ward W. Miller

William H. Truman

FIRST SERGEANT

Karl E. Smith

STAFF SERGEANT

Magnus O. Benard

SERGEANTS

Edmond C. Brookel
Herman C. Gering

Leslie G. Herman
Edward S. Morin

John E. Slawson

CORPORALS

Tressler O. Cooper

Walter L. Decker

William E. Gulliford

Wesley A. Warren

PRIVATE FIRST CLASS

Eugene L. Benard
James A. Blair
William H. Clark.
Floyd P. Culver

Alvin W. Diehl
Wallace G. Gillie
James E. Hobbs
Lloyd S. Kurszewski

Richard D. Pearson
Harry G. Quinn
John R. Samson

Robert M. Sutherland
Robert B. Wallace
Fred H. Westerman

PRIVATEES

George C. Anderson*
Garland O. Atkinson
Raymond E Bard
Henry L. Beebe
Dale O. Bircher
Robert L. Bowdey
William G. Bradley
Charles F. Brennan
Lewis L. Busby
Robert J. Calkins
Wallace V. Calkins
Clarence C. Christenson.
Loris E. Crampton
Harry K. Davidson
Paul DeRoyck*

Earl B. Drewniak
Clark E. Dunn
William D. Dye
Walter W. Egbert
John W. Evans
Hiram T. Evens
Lewis G. Fristo
Delphino R. Gonzolez
Gevino F. Gonzolez
Donald V. Gropp
Patrick J. Haag
Walter R. Halm
Lester E. Hansen
Raymond W. Hayden
Carroll M. Hawley

Ralph D. Helme
James C. Herman
Joseph A. Hughes
Jay C. Johnson
Marvin W. Kelly
Elmor L. Law.
Pablo J. Lopez
Robert F. Low
Melvin J. Miano
Bruce R. Montgomery
William H. Montieth
John A. Mooers
John J. Moss*
Edward E. Mullenix
Kobel R Murphy

Eba F. Nagle
Lyle D. Nelson
Homer M. Olmstead
Harold C. Probert
Arthur J. Richardson
Sam T. Sasei
Carl V. Shoots
Ernest V. Slonaker
Malcolm F. Storoe
John A. Swanson
Clyde E. Swinehart
Albert J. Thomas
David M. Wood
Edgar W. Wheeler
Craig S. Whitford*

MEDICAL DETACHMENT, 161ST INFANTRY REGIMENT (Spokane)

Major Francis J. Burns

SERGEANTS

W. Johnathon Gesche

William H. Lesley

Hubert E. Richter

CORPORALS

Creodo R. Weir

PRIVATE FIRST CLASS

Ralph E. Allbright
Clyde W. Evans
Bertie E. Galusha

David B. Height
Robert L. Jones
Arthur C. Lewis

Cecil F. Klise
James E. Lyberger
Ralph D. Moody

Thomas C. Rogers
Donald E. Swanson

PRIVATEES

Raymond A. Arndt
Zedrick C. Aschenbrenner
William A. Blackman
Vaughn E. Bryant
Thomas R. Burrier
Donald C. Calvert
Wheeler Cowen

Oliver C. Crooks
Hubert L. Dickinson
Alonzo W. Gerke
Lee B. Goodrich
Royal W. Hunter
Robert R. Kinsel
William H. Lesley

Charles Q. Lewis
Loren G. Martin
Patrick J. McKeever
Donald E. Nesbitt
Carl W. Olson
John W. Osborne
Verden E. Partridge

Roger L. Pickett
John B. Reagan, Jr.
George J. Ridgway
John L. Toner
Alex R. Vance
Orville C. Whipple
Burrel D. Wilson

HEADQUARTERS DETACHMENT, 1ST BN
161ST INFANTRY REGIMENT (Spokane)

1st Lieut Riley A. Harper
Tech. Sgt. Larch G. Cody

CORPORALS

John C. Mabbett

Walter M. Shaft*

Donald J. Snyder

PRIVATE FIRST CLASS

Herbert W. Newman Arthur G. Trattry

PRIVATEES

Homer B. Amey*
Ellis J. Blackburn
Richard E. Bodwell
James T. Caswell
Richard C. Clute*
Robert D. Collingham
Walter I. Cook

Kenneth G. Fontaine*
Robert B. Haas
Kenneth K. Hamilton*
Virgil A. Johnson
Howard K. Jones
Richard E. Knipe*

William C. Lockhart
Melvin A. Luders
Ben H. Oberg
Roy L. Mycon
Karl B. Oberg
Buell F. Payne

Marvin E. Sackett*
Earl A. Smith*
Lloyd J. Swisher
Guy N. Urquhart*
Edwin C. White
Leo E. White*

COMPANY A, 161ST INFANTRY REGIMENT (Spokane)

Captain Ralph A. Jackson

FIRST SERGEANT

Orville J. Cummins

SERGEANTS

Wilfred C. Dumas	James P. McClenahan	George Spark	Lowell W. Thompson
Walt O. Knowles	Thomas R. Russell	George W. Staeheli	

CORPORALS

William C. Aris	Raymond V. Deno	Hubert W. Sholaas	Paul M. Thornton
Jack R. Dean	Harold I. Peebles	Lawrence D. Sutton	

PRIVATES FIRST CLASS

Joseph L. Bendix	Robert L. Dewey	John O. Groo	Dale E. Nichols
Richard W. Borton	Owen D. Gaskell	John D. Kelly	Harry L. Shoultz
Robert M. Connery	Charles R. Grinnell	Edward S. Kingrey	Harry A. Young

PRIVATES

Lester V. Arderson	George W. Green	Elmer W. McGlynn	Andrew K. Reynolds
Leonard L. Arbon*	Robert M. Hagen	John A. McGuire	Howard M. Roberts
Leland O. Bennett	James W. Hayes	Donald L. McKennett	Luciano A. Sanchez*
Eugene M. Billings	Albert B. Hesseltine	Louis F. Menke	Clifford D. Scherette
Jay A. Brundage	Robert G. Iseman	Robert C. Meyers	Calvin M. Shuck
Harry C. Budke*	Adolph H. Jaeger*	Henrik K. Mikkelson	Clarence .D. Shuck
Don R. Campbell	Jack W. James	Folmar L. Miller	Richard G. Shuck
Wesley J. Carnegie*	James L. Johnson*	James C. Mounce	Norman W. Skadan*
Jack M. Cook	Vernon G. Johnson	Marshall B. Millsap	William G. Smith
Richard A. DeChenne	Cliff M. Jungers	Roy R. Pease	Leonard .J .Stickelmeyer
Edgar W. Douglas	Ray J. Kettman	Fred I. Pierce	Elmer C. Tiegs
Gordon W. Drury	Ervin J. Larson	Henry J. Pieroni	Kenneth W. Thornburg
John P. Dube	Sidney A. Leifer	Warren H. Read	Theodore E. Voigt*
John A. Gallant	James A. Mann	Vernon C. Rees	George A. Withee, Jr.
Donald O. Gardner	Mickey McFarling	Joseph J. Rekofke	Orville J. Wooddell
Clarence J. Garrett			

COMPANY B, 161ST INFANTRY REGIMENT (Spokane)

Captain John R. Gee

FIRST SERGEANT

James P. Lyons (DS Cp Perry)

SERGEANTS

James H. Edmonds
Roy L. Pearson

Robert A. Shulkin
Jack K. Spoerhase

Robert G. Walsh
Gail E. Werner

CORPORALS

Albert J. Beller
Donald H. Brown
Kenneth E. Davies

Eugene R. Gardner
Robert E. Haraldson
George W. Hayden

Merritt A. Johnson
Shirley R. Landon

Raymond F. Ranney
Glen E. Uhlig

PRIVATE FIRST CLASS

Willard R. Beverly
Jack C. Brennan
Mac M Bullock

Darel D. Denney
Burton D. Eronson
Harold H. Johnson

Robert W. Peel
John E. Poffenroth
Frederick A. Sprinkel

Wayne J. Walker
Frederick E. Wallace
Kenneth E. Wilson

PRIVATE

Monte B. Adams
Genrge B. Baker
Robert J. Brandon*
Thomas G. Brown*
Albert G. Camm
Hennan M. Carlson
John M. Chestnut
Gene Clark
Robert C. Cooper
John D. Costigan
Dan J. Coyle
Edward C. Dacy
Albert Dietzman
Spurgeon DuBuc
Delbert R. Edwards
Jack H. Elan
Adrian G. Engstrom
Conrad J. Eronson

Maurice J. Field
Charles H. Fortier
Glen C. Gaffaney
Leonard T. Garrick
Richard J. Giakovmis
Charles L. Gifford
Donald E. Gifford
Howard L. Gifford
Roy W. Goodsall
Maurice D. Greenlee
James A. Gruber
Kent C. Hall
Leslie V. Hallock
Edwin G. Hamilton
David O. Hardin
Richard I. Hashagen
Bernard F. Heinen
Kenneth A. Hill

Clifford A. Hollis
James E. Howland
John L. Kralman
Ronald A. McDonald
George W. McGee*
Thomas G. McLaughlin
Hubert M. Martin
Kenneth B. Modesitt
Clyde E. Mohr
Roy A. Nelson*
Clark A. Parkin
Albert E. Pazer
Rene A. Peltier
Frank C. Pickell
Joseph M. Ranney
Howard A. Reightley
George W. Rodrick
Melvin W. Roth

Ivin H. Schmitt
Eugene J. Schmitt
William R. Scully
Harold V. Seavey
Wayne Shellman
Armour L. Smith
Stanley R. Smolkowski
Lester W. Stark
Paul C. Stroebel*
Oresti P. Torri
Ward A. Turner*
William E. Wellman
Alfred L. White
James M. White
Charles W. Whitney
Lyal E. Williamson
Harold E. Zurbrugg

COMPANY C, 161ST INFANTRY REGIMENT (Spokane)

Captain Arnold R. Gilbertson

SERGEANTS

Wallace K. LeGro

Arnold C. Neerman

Forrest D. Taft

CORPORALS

Theodore G. Beamis
Roderick C. Hill

Dale W. Howard
Donald F. Hulin

George S. Jacobsen
William H. Schoen, Jr.

Wilson B. Weber

PRIVATE FIRST CLASS

Robert J. Bare
Daniel A. Carter
Joseph A. Crosby
Robert M. Linden

Earl S. McCanna
Raymond G. Murphy
Arthur H. Pachernegg
John L. Phillipson

Claire A. Pickel
Jay W. Robideaux
Bill E. Stevens

Glenn E. Taft
Donald G. Triplett
Charles M. Yarroh

PRIVATE

Howard D. Abbott
Ivan D. Armstrong
Wayne E. Bartel
Herbert A. Blowers
Hubert L. Blowers
Robert J. Bruno*
Jack P. Compton
Delmar A. Conrow
George F. Davis
Frank J. Dechant

Francis S. Disotell
Norman E. Ellis
Francis J. Ellor
John Ferraro
Lute A. Foster
Herman C. Gallaher
John E. Geisbush
Norman H. Goss
Stephen F. Graves
Ralph R. Gunning

Edward H. Hahn
Jess J. Hall*
Robert Harrington
Dewey Hollingsworth*
Stanley H. Humphreys
Robert A. Johnson
Howard D. Kirkendorfer
Richard Larson
William G. Moody
Edgar B. Nord

Maurice L. Patterson
Bob F. Payne
Edward L. Quaschnick
Joseph E. Rartis
Harold E. Rogers
Robert L. Saunders
Edwin V. Theimer
Lewis W. Turnbull
Walter C. Wolfrum
Lee R. Zerba

COMPANY D, 161ST INFANTRY REGIMENT (Spokane)

Captain Raymond H. Weir

FIRST SERGEANT

Thomas A. Clemmens

SERGEANTS

Joffre A. Dubois
Felix M. Entermann

James A. Force
Amzie A McCoy

Nels J. Nelson
Brock M. Weir

Jack E. Wilson

CORPORALS

Thomas C. Anderson
Raymond L. Davis

Edgar L. Miller
Robert L. McCoy

Albert H. Rawlings
Rudolph C. Shaw

Alexander W. Winston

PRIVATES FIRST CLASS

Richard T. Byrnes
Russell D. Garber
Robert W. Gipson
Robert T. Gerlach

Fritz T. Grant
Robert M. Kongsgaari
Archie W. Lauritzen
John E. McGrath

Robert J. Morris
Alvin J Opp
Henry G. Ramsey

John G. Reed
Arthur C. Smith
Malvin R. Stai

PRIVATES

Everett H. Anyan
Jack F. Bertsch
Fred J. Birk *
Leslie G. Box
Donald C. Brown
Robert W. Brown
Donald F. Cline
Clair C. Clopton
Pat R. Cosgrove
Edward L. Cowden
Charles R. Dana
John J. Disotell
Clifford J. Doolittle
Roy R. Eakle
William L. Field
William D. Fraser

Lloyd H. Frodsham
William F. Fry
Harold L. Gendreaux
Calvin Graedel, Jr.
Clarence G. Gregerson
Lester E. Gutridge
Donald F. Helm
Quentin M. Holderby
Lloyd W. Hose
Clare E. L. Houck
Patrick A. Hutchinson
Earl F. Lamb
James R. Latusky
Don K. Lewis
Edwin O. Long
Avery A. Lueck

Gordon E. Lueck
Gerald M. Monroe
Donald G. Moss
Irvin L. Motycka
John W. O'Connell
Cecil F. O'Conner
Virgil W. Olsen
Brinton R. Owens
Raymond E. Paeper
Leon F. Parr
Wayne. B. Parr
Robert R. Richardson
Leroy R. Rowe
George C. Severson
Robert G. Smith

Morris E. Southarrd
Clifford E. Stangeland
Richard W. Steele
Vernon Z. Summerlin
Darel M. Swenson
Merrill S. Trapp
Robert E. Van Sickle
Lewis M. Vingo
Elmer R. Wailes
Charles R. Wallace
Elmer E. Wheeler
Merle J. Williams
Cedric W. Wilson
David A. Wright
Jack Young

HEADQUARTERS DETACHMENT 2ND BN 161ST INFANTRY (Yakima)

1st Lieut. Ray Haynes

TECHNICAL SERGEANT

Robert Hand

STAFF SERGEANT

Leonard D. Violette

CORPORALS

Clarence C. Barnett

John B. Dunbar

Robert F. Sick

PRIVATES FIRST CLASS

Ralph I. Perry

PRIVATES

George A. Allen, Jr.

Lester H. Besancon

Orvil E. Boche

Walter N. Coe

William E. Collins

David E. Cyr

Gordon L. Ellis

Roy W. Ellis

Reed J. Gross

Robert R. Johnson

Woodford W. Strother

Charles E. Williams

LeRoy M. Willoughby

COMPANY E, 161ST INFANTRY REGIMENT (Pullman)

Captain Frank H. Jacobs

FIRST SERGEANT

Louis K. Christian

SERGEANTS

James E. Barbeo	Kenneth P. French	Robert W. McCaldor	Erwin G. Park, Jr. (DS Camp Perry)
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CORPORALS

Cleo F. Ailor	Don H. Gannon	George K. Grant	Jim E. McIntyre
Burton L. Bishop	William L. Gannon	Edwin J. Johnson	Eugene G. Patterson

PRIVATES FIRST CLASS

Richard L. Allert	Chester H. Dissmore	Raymond C. Lord	Everett D. Stover
Robert C. Barton	Francis I. Dresslar	Glenn A. Martin	Daryl D. Vincent
Marion F. Busby	George W. Gatos	Fred F. Perin	Frank L. Winters
Virgil C. Delegans	William W. Hall	Robert W. Shaw	Donald D. Youngman
Robert C. Brenner	Richard S. Hammond	Allan O. Shellenburger	

PRIVATES

Lowell A. Adams	Robert H. Dane	James E. Kirkebo	Joseph W. Pomada
Jack W. Allured	Jim D. Davis	John R. Klundt	George T. Prindiville
Robert N. Allured	Bruce W. Doerner	Donald L. Knapp	Carlyle E. Ragsdale
Karl E. Andrew	Henry V. Fori	Jack B. Kuehl	Earl A. Rasmusson
Lyle M. Arbuckle	Bruce S. Fultz	Donald J. Land	Floyd H. Reed
John W. Arrasmith	Clarence E. Fultz	Homer G. Littleton	Kenneth E. Repp
Oscar S. Babb	Glenn H. Gass	Hilliary W. Lloyd	Ralph A. Robacher
Paul L. Baker	Harold L. Gass	Clarence A. Lockhart	Robert E. Rogers
Byron C. Baldwin	Virgil J. Gass	Dalbert E. Logsdon	Richard H. Shriver
Bob B. Barbee	William D. Gray	Edwin J. Machen	Wilbur K. Smawley
Archie F. Barry	Kenneth W. Hall	Gerald O. Mael	William H. Smith
Ernest W. Bartlett	Herman E. Hansen	Vernon C. Martin	Willis J. Smith
Robert J. Bartow	Donald J. Harms	Richard J. McDonald	Boyd S. Stover
Lester B. Bishop	Delbert A. Hastings	Charles A. Meck	Richard C. Sylvester
John O. Borgen	Albert Helm	Forrest E. Meyers	Carl L. Taylor
Robert W. Burnett	Victor Herth	Hubert I. Needham	Frank S. Trenery
Benjamin F. Burns	Donald F. Hewitt	Wesley S. Nearing	Rolland W. Tueth
Darwin J. Carroll	John H. Hollreigh	James F. Olson	William Q. Umbach
Dale B. Christian	Edward E. Jacobsen	Glenn E. Oman	Bill L. Walter
Harry E. Clark	Charles C. Jones	Harlin Owens	Elmer K. Watson
Jack R. Cooper	Sam A. Jennings	Glen Ousley	James E. Webber
Jack W. Cowan*	Frederick J. Kaylor	Robert R. Peterson	Edwin C. Wexler
Robert J. Curran	Mark E. Kenoyer	Glenn F. Parr	Arnold M. Wiggum
Max R. Cutler	Melvin G. Kimble	Raymond C. Pfiefer	Casper W. Wolf
Floyd O. Davidson	Clyde A. King	George M. Poler	

COMPANY F, 161ST INFANTRY REGIMENT (Walla Walla)

Captain Robert S. Watson

FIRST SERGEANT

LeRoy A. Bastron

SERGEANTS

Paul Deccio	Charles J. Hastings	Eugene J. O'Brien	Paul Riggs
Billy E. Dickey	Herbert W. Hawkins	Arthur B. Parsons	Hubert R. Webber

CORPORALS

Wilbur B. Burgoon	Rudolph Entze	Irwin C. Mortamor	Joe E. Schafer
Jim E. Cherry	Warren G. Harding	Fred C. Rice	Woodrow Wilson
Howard M. DeLong	Robert L. Hutsell		

PRIVATE FIRST CLASS

Edward M. Bates	Joseph T. Cavalli	Lewis Gettman	Frank Raguso
Allen F. Baslee	Dale W. Colton	Arthur G. Isitt	Archie L. Stephens
John W. Baslee	Robert G. Eggers	Harold E. Mere	Charles H. Stonesifer
Stanley F. Bates	John J. Erdman	Esburn D. Otis	Sam E. Stordahl
Arthur Butherus	Gordon J. Gettman	Chesley H. Perry	Richard D. Streck

PRIVATE

Bryce D. Abraham.	Donald E. Cushing	Byron J. Mickelson	Floyd E. Startin
Homer W. Adams	Donald H. Daniels	Raymond H. Mills	Bruce V. Stedman
Floyd E. Adcock	Roger L. Davis	Orville B. Moffitt	Glenn I. Supan
Howard E. Adcock	Walter F. Dickerson	James L. Morris	John R. Sutton
Charles C. Akins	Howard L. Dix	Elmer M. McClenny	Merle A. Tate
Lloyd J. Akins	Lyman N. Dix	James H. McCoy	Arthur C. Thomas
Max M. Axtman	Ray A. Dye	Llewellyn E. O'Lay	Lyle F. Torpey*
Charles W. Barton	Harold F. Forrest	William G. Oldridge	George F. Updyke*
Floyd E. Bayos	George Frank	Wallace E. Paramore	George E. Thomas
Alan J. Benedict	Johnny W. Gordon	William G. Patterson	Harold A. Veun
Jacob H. Benzel	Raymond R. Harding	Donald W. Phillips	Bob A. Wais
Everett H. Borley	Vern A. Heath	Calvin T. Poole	LeRoy B. Walter
Raymond Branson*	Harry G. Heft	Charles H. Ray	Roxye E. Warren
Freddie V. Bridgham	Henry Huguenin	Lawrence V. Reimers	Charles M. Weaver
George W. Brock*	Thomas R. Kenneke	Frank P. Richmond	Everett H. Whitney
Thomas H. Cochran	Paul P. Kinsfather	George E. Ray	LeRoy Whitney
Russell J. Conn	Clarence D. Knight	Gary N. Sams	Glenn L. Williams
Armond W. Connery	Don F. McCaw	LeRoy H. Samsel	Billy D. Wolfe
Veryl R. Cox	Robert C. McEvoy	Harold G. Schoesler	Eugene Wood
Dale D. Cradit*	Bill W. Maynard	Raymond L. Snyder*	

COMPANY F, 161ST INFANTRY REGIMENT (Prosser)

1st Lieut. Robert R. Moore

FIRST SERGEANT

Maynard Strading

SERGEANTS

Donald E. Benjamin
Lloyd J. Orton

Jack Berghouse
Homer D. Reed?

George A. Cox
Raoy A. Taylor ?

CORPORALS

Finch A. Brownell
Don R. Cross

Cecil M. Jones
Laurence D. Nessly

Donald D. Orton
Homer D. Reed ?

Roy A. Taylor?

PRIVATES FIRST CLASS

Kenneth E. Burr
Wilbur J. Burr
Norman G. Cable
James C. Conatser
Lowell A. Dunford

Alton B. Korsvik
Edward F. J. Letourneau
Vernon J. Madison
Earl D. McKibben

Joseph M. Nelson
Marvin A. Price
Jack Schmidt
Arthur E. Smith

Gordon C. Weber
Lorren G. Weber
Clyde D. Wescott
Charles A. Wyckoff

PRIVATES

Rom Z. Adams
Marion F. Adcock*
Walter R. Armantrout
Raymond S. Baddeley
Henry Bauer
Walter Bauer
Joe W. Benn
Frank L. Boers
Paul Bogue
Howard E. Boling
Frank W. Braden
Verna Brotherton
Homer L. Butler
Ray L. Campbell
Frank Church
George W. Clark
Robert R. Clark
Carroll F. Cline M
Marvin L. Coats
Gurley D. Cole

Kermit U. Cole
Orville E. Collins*
Norman E. Collins
Albert G. Combs
Joseph W. Corfield
Gale H. Craft
Joseph O. Deatherage
Robert G. Dollarhide
Zeal E. Durkee
Richard J. Dye
Elbert P. Eakin
Charles M. Edwards*
Harley H. England
Ernest P. Everts
Marvin N. Everts
Edgar R. Flory
Wayne S. George
Jerry V Garski
David G. Goshorn
Edward J. Goulet

Robert R. Goulet
Eugene F. Graham
Rex H. Harding
Charles H. Henderson
Clarence C. Hibner
Raymond M. Johnson
George E. Jones
Goss M. Keller*
Harold E. Kosbab
Jay E. Layman
Raymond W. Lindsay
Roy O. Lloyd
Howard E. Madsen
Harry D. Malstrom
William V. Meachem
Marshal E. Miland
Harold J. Miller*
Ray A. Morgan
Joseph A. Mullin
William T. Nagel*

Clinton H. Nisely
Oliver W. Peterson
Garvin L. Piland*
Eugene C. Polf
Harold R. Price*
Robert W. Ramsey
Lester L. Roark
George E. Ruchty
Arthur W. Schael
Max B. Scott
Raymond L. Shockley
George W. Smith
Victor L. Smith
Edward R. Triesch
Jess W. Van Horn
Vernon W. VanWechel
Benjamin F. Wallace
Alpheue D. Widdows
Elliott T. Williams
John J. Wingenbach

COMPANY H, 161ST INFANTRY REGIMENT (Yakima)

Captain Byron C. Willet

FIRST SERGEANT

John R. Mosebar

SERGEANTS

Walter E. Breeding	Andy C. Jarrard	Arthur J. Newman	Wallace E. Obert
Eugene W. Christianson	Oscar T. Narboo	John I. Norris	James C. Woods

CORPORALS

Dale T. Badgley	Fred Frueh	Rudolph W. Klundt	Thomas A. Rousseau
Herbert J. Beaudry	John S. Ham	Albert E. Kulhank	Phillip D. Sandoz
Dan Frueh	Irvin L. Hill	John C. Lust	Lloyd E. VanHoy

PRIVATE FIRST CLASS

Harlow P. Adams	Thomas B. Irwin	Charles R. Purdon	Leonard C. Smith
Donald W. Bozarth	Norman R. Janke	Howard D. Rinehart	William B. Vanderford
John W. Cliett	Ronald L. Jones	John A. Roberts	Louie R. VanHoy
William H. Cooper	Charles H. LaReviere	James W. Russell	Jack T. Walls
Vincent Hagel	Richard D. Plette	Paul B. Sherry	Bob F. Weaver
Joseph E. Heneghen			

PRIVATE

Alvin Arnett	Daniel W. Davis	Vernon D. Kepple	Clayton E. Pratt
Edward J. Adams	David J. Davis	Joseph L. Kneifel	August V. Rathke
Dolph Barnett, Jr.	Gordon L. Drake	Eddy Krein	Webster M. Roberts
Martin E. Bartley	Joseph Egg	Herbert E. Lane	Albert A. Schell
John T. Beaudry	Frank A. Engkraf*	Donald R. Lindsey	Gerald F. Schumacher
Harry A. Benthin	Daniel B. Fauth	Richard A. Lunceford	James A. Sellers
Archie M. Blair	Chester R. Gardner	Joseph D. Matterson	William E. Sherman*
Paul R. Brazzell	William R. Hanson	James S. McConnell	Charles E. Short
James R. Brierly	Ervin Harper	Kenneth M. McCoy	Lee A. Temple
Alvin M. Bozarth	Howard E. Batten	James E. McFadden	Wallace J. Tyacke
Carol W. Campbell	Lawrence A. Hill	Victor W. McGuire	Donald J. Vale
William O. Carter	William A. Hughes	Al Michaelis	Cyril A. Walter
Wilbur E. Chesnut	Clayton L. Ireland	Fred E. Miller	Phillip J. Waters
Ward L. Clark	James L. Jamison	Marvin G. Olson	Maurice W. Winkler
Frederick E. Collins	Raymond G. Jamison	Paul L. Pendergreat	Kenton E. Yoder
Bernie H. Cutts	Robert C. Jennings	Basil M. Polf	James Zybura
Jimmy Darby	Winston E. Kean		

HEADQUARTERS DETACHMENT 3RD BN 161ST INFANTRY (Everett)

1st Lieut Donald M. Rigby

TECHNICAL SERGEANT

Dan L. Horn *

STAFF SERGEANT

Wilburn Lowe *

SERGEANTS

Ernest E. Turk (DS at Camp Perry, Ohio)

CORPORALS

Vernon L. Chandler

Bedford M. Hertel*

John D. Williams

PRIVATES FIRST CLASS

Stuart C. French

Charles E. Watters

PRIVATES

Walter M. Flynn

Richard R. Geyer

Robert L. Herriott

Jack E. Kindrachuck

Howard E. Otis

Ford G. Richards

Merl W. Stidham

Theodore E. Stoddard

Floyd B. Tallman

Vance Tiffany

Earl W. Wren

COMPANY I, 161ST INFANTRY REGIMENT (Bellingham)

Captain Sterling E. McPhail

FIRST SERGEANT

Eugene H. Bruaw

SERGEANTS

George H. Block
Robert J. Brown

Hugh M. Cory
Leo A. Logan

Lew A. Mortimer
Paul Peringer

George H. Russell

CORPORALS

Roy C. Baker
Carl R. Loop
Robert L. Page

Ernest G. Schenck
Irwin W. Schenck

Milton P. Sickles
Thomas R. Waters

Winfred D. Wheeler
Thomas A. Williams

PRIVATES FIRST CLASS

William D. Alexander
Donald W. Bye
John N. Davis
Sidney C. Davis

Robert D. Frazier
Duane I. Gabrielson
Fred W. Larson
Charles E. Miles

Clarence E. Naul
Guy B. Rogers
George C. Roland
John N. VanHorn

LeRoy F. Whipple
Robert V. Woods
Norman G. Yount

PRIVATES

Lloyd C. Anderson
James R. Alexander
Fred L. Barker
Edwin E. Baxter
Loyal D. Benjamin
Alastair D. Bennett
Gerald H. Blunt
Raymond L. Bussing
Henry Brouwer
Gilbert B. Brynildsen
Albino B. Cavali
John A. Clark
Clair Crossman

Gordon L. Christensen
Wiebe DeJong
James F. Erickson
Robert E. Fritz
Arthur E. Haickel
John W. Horman
Rommie W. Johnson
Richard H. Keehen
Raymond W. Johnson
Arthur E. Kehr
Fred W. Kinderman Jr.
Willard L. Knapton
Raymond W. LaFayette

Gerald Larsen
Gene Larson
Fred E. Laube Jr.
Robert E. Leibbrand
John F. Manus
Charles L. McPherson
Vernon McGinnis
Marvin S. Myers
Eugene H. Olmstead
Armond D. Pearson
Charles A. Plaster
Vernon L. Porter
Fred E. Quimby

George M. Reid
Bernard J. Reynolds
Jack L. Riddel
John H. Setzer
Lawrence W. Schenck
Robert Schenck
Robert F. Schenck. Jr.
James R. Staggers
John Steenmeyer Jr.
Kenneth M. Stone
Lester C. Strickler
Arthur S. Toothman

COMPANY K, 161ST INFANTRY REGIMENT (Bellingham)

Captain James M. Van Wickle

FIRST SERGEANT

Edgar Macklin

SERGEANTS

Grant O. Browne
Orville S. Camp

Edward C. Folmsbee Alfred B. Loop
Ralph L. Hilton

Homer L. Markhart

CORPORALS

Ray W. Akin
William H. Anderson
Allen L. Becker

Robert E. Campbell Harold P. Chevalley
James W. Cary William E. Hughes

Lauren C. Mehl
Albert A. Melton

PRIVATE FIRST CLASS

Arthur M. Austin
George R. Barnett
Gordon V. Cameron
Claud W. Campbell
Earl L. Christe

Aaron C. Clausen LeRoy C. Grunhurd
Robert E. Dunn Harvey E. Jewett
Duncan E. Duvall Delbert H. Johnson
Robert A. Fackler Laurin A. Lyon
Robert G. Granger Robert E. McClellan

Buell E. Nims
Kenneth M. Smithey
Eugene D. Tallmadge
Leo P. Urbick

PRIVATE

Russell C. Arthurs
Jacob B. Ashburn
Lawrence L. Benedict
Carl E. Benson
Arthur C. Berquist
Maynard R. Bjerke
Darold W. Bliss
Floyd C. Bowen
Claude H. Brown
Victor B. Buckley
Palmer H. Carlson
David W. Carpenter
William L. Case
Clarence E. Christie

Jack B. Cory Merle F. Johnson
Eugene L. Curtis William D. Judge
Jack V. Curtis Karl V. Kertson
James D. Darmody Cecil B. Klein
Alphonso J. Dodge Robert L. Kline
Wayne Y. Ensign Arthur H. Kuney
John S. Falk Melvin LaHammer
Jack S. Ford Karl F. Lind
Raymond D. Fullner Alan J. Lindstedt
William H. Gnadt John W. Lyon
Earl D. Granger Everett H. Marsh
Frank Hawley Richard B. McGinnis
Joseph C. Hodgson Gerald L. Mercer
David S. Johnson William G. Morse

Joe L. Nelle
Galen E. Parker
Eugene R. Pike
Joseph W. Provost
Glenn C. Reynolds
Clarence E. Roedell
Marion E. Thomas
Robert F. Thon
Robert D. Todd
Thomas B. Tubbs
Robert L. VanGohren
Jerry C. Worthen
Thomas W. Wilson*

COMPANY L, 161ST INFANTRY REGIMENT (Everett)

Captain William R. Duram

SERGEANTS

Donald W. Burt	Ross D. Hoagland	James R. Showers	Robert J. Mathison
Ernest W. Dickman	John A. Johnson	Leslie G. Trotter	

CORPORALS

John E. Brearley	David C. Hartley	Donald M. Oars	David B. Ritchie
Ernest W. Dickman	Loren B. Laridon	Robert M. O'Brien	Duane H. Wildey
Max K. Estes	John F. Lee	Duane L. Pepple	

PRIVATES FIRST CLASS

Alvin M. Egee	Frederick N. Keay	Harvey D. Piper*	Thomas A. Sourwine
Jay J. Elliott	Warren L. Kirkland	George J. Peterson, Jr.	George R. Startup
Merlin R. Gilbertson	Ray H. Knutson	Kenneth J. Randall	Penley A. Wold
Howard F. Gray	George L. Larson	Justin R. Schillinger	Robert L. Woodburn
John N. Jolgen	James A. Moore	Roger M. Sherman	

PRIVATES

Theodore W. Alverson	Fred R. Keeles*	John F. Kinchcliffe	John H. Smith
Earl E. Aney	Dean C. English	Arnold O. Kvenild	George W. Snow
Mervin E. Bailey	George W. Farnsworth	Herman T. Lacoursiere	Frank A. Stoffen
William R. Bailey	Cecil D. Ferguson	Lester E. LeSoine	Ralph E. Thompson
Emery W. Beels	Frank W. Fleenor	Robert J. Marchland	Clarence W. Tilforth
William J. Britt	Bill E. Goen	Robert L. Mathias	Theron L. Tucker
Michael C. Brumbaugh	Donald D. Goodrich	Peter J. McKahon	Marion O. Vanderberg
Vernon C. Bull	Lawrence L. Gradke	Arthur D. Mitchell	Gene T. Vloni
Tom Campbell	Jack P. Haggart	Harold O. Olsen	Roy G. White
Russell E. Collins	Carl P. Halverson	Percy E. Olsen	Dare D. Williams
Eugene C. Countryman	Earl J. Halverson	Wesley D. Olsen	Behring R. Wilson
Ralph G. Curtis	Benjamin R. Harris	William G. Raynor	Benham R. Wilson
Joseph J. Davis	Ralph A. Hayes	Forrest V. Russell	Herman Wittman
Walter A. Deebach	Raymond A. Hayes	Kenneth W. Sarff	John S. Wright
Ronald E. Dow	Howard F. Heinzen	Robert E. Schwarzmiller	Harold D. Yerian
Wilfred F. Eberle	Stanley W. Henrickson	James W. Schwerzrock	

COMPANY M, 161ST INFANTRY REGIMENT (Everett)

Captain Bert Vanderwilt

SERGEANTS

Richard R. Gilbert	Charles W. Jorian	Robert M. Murray	Donald J. Solle
Donald S. Grant	Henry F T Monteiro	Walter M. Rude	John L. White

CORPORALS

Harry C. Blackburn	Kenneth J. McCullough	Robert N. Rasmussen	Herbert Wicken
John R. Howitt	Elmer C. Olsen	Merrill E. Stevens	Thomas E. Wynne
Edward B. Hunter	Gordon A. Puffer		

PRIVATES FIRST CLASS

Richard F. Baldwin	George A. Grant	William O. Lutz	Winslow J. Stevens
Wallace I. Carmichael	William Haferkorn, Jr.	William R. Nelson	Robert J. Thacker
Stewart A. Cremer	Wayland D. Hewitt	Patrick E. Pilon	John W. Thornton
James W. Fisk	Frank E. Keith	John F. Sheraton	Vernon L. Woods
William N. Granger	Alvin J. Larson	Harry Spencer	

PRIVATES

Ephriam M. Adams	Gerald M. Dowty	George B. Ibsen	Byron A. Peterson
Charles C. Atkins	Dean H. Dragoo	James A. Ivy	Ward W. Puffer
Arthur .C. Daer	Bruno D. Dunning	Allen F. Johnson	George L. Rasmussen, Jr.
George A. Baker *	Gail M. Egelstad	Frank E. Kelley	Myron A. Reagon
Desmond L. Baker *	Howard C. Erickson	Maynard R. LeCocq	Roy S. Ream
Bradley C. Bartlett	Donald C. Ferguson	Delbert E. Luse	Eugene A. Reed*
Richard H. Becker*	Daryl F. Gemmer	Gordon W. Marquardt	James F. Riecken
Floyd E. Bicksteen	Ernest A. Gilliam	Mickey L. McGuire	Elmore R. Snyder
Robert W. Blackmore	Arie H. Goudsward	John D. McGregor	Erling S. Sola
Virgil L. Bowman	Edward R. Grant	Wilbur C. Meir	Melvin A. Staerber
Bennie D. Bourasaw	William S. Grimm	Bennie O. Moe	Gaylord F. Stidham
Lester E. Brantner	Lyman J. Hagen	Donald M. Muckey	Earl W. Sweet
Robert M. Burpee	John H. Hall	Fred J. Murray	Edward A. Taylor
Phillip J. Claymore, Jr.	James S. Hann	Everett D. Osburn	John D. Van Natter
Alvin V. Clayton*	Donald W. Hansen	Raymond D. Osburn	John H. Walsh
Eugene N. Currie	Dale H. Hecht	John D. Osterman	Robert W. Wells
Herbert G. DeRyke	George Heichel	William M. Palmer	Harold L. Wilkins
Marvin F. DeRyke	David H. Hofbeck	Elmer N. Pedigo	Herrett S. Wilson

HEADQUARTERS & HEADQUARTERS BATTERY, 66TH F. A. BRIGADE (Seattle)

Brigadier General Albert H. Beebe

Lieutenant Colonel Virgil L. Anderson

CAPTAINS

Ivan W. Meyer Carleton W. Dark

FIRST LIEUTENANTS

William H. Nelson, Jr. Francis P. Stodman

SECOND LIEUTENANTS

George W. Reitz John D. Roberts

MASTER SERGEANT Darrell D. Campbell

FIRST SERGEANT William C. Silvers

STAFF SERGEANT James H. Lynch

SERGEANTS

William R Schleiffers Robert J. Schull Henry G. Schulte Hiram L. Tuttle

CORPORALS

Robert H. Carlaw Walter E. Kober Wilfred D. Petit John E. Stephens
Clarence V. Hall Joseph F. Longan Edward J. Schaffer

PRIVATES FIRST CLASS

Frank A. Bartell Carl H. Howe Roger O. Loken Robert H. E. Schmidt
William M. Bright John H. Kelly Tom S. Parks Raymond H. Thomas
Jack C. Heflin Frank W. Kerr

PRIVATES

Eugene C. Alexander	Harold J. Carpenter	John A. Nave	Carl L. Shute
Bruce E. Balint	Ralph L. DeJarlais	Arthur O. Olson ¹	Jim F. Smart
Owen C. Beardslee	Ralph L. Dillon	George A. Ogilvie	Charles B. Smith
Alfred W. Bramstrom	John W. Florin	James Penrod	Marshall Sohl, Jr.
Claude M. Bridges	Donald J. Hailstone	James R. Pettelle	James C. Sutton
Alfred W. Buckman	Martin R. Henum	Ivan A. Reitz	Forrest L. Todd
Donald J. Brown	Jacob J. Mason	James E. Schneider	Forrest C. Tucker
Emall A. Caessens	Eugene F. Mink	Henry E. Seat	Bill D. Ulmer
Cloyd O. Campbell	Robert R. Mitchell	Gerald J. Selling	Adam L. Zack
Allen G. Carlaw	Lawrence E. Morrison	Duncan M. Shearer	

¹ Enroute to join from Dutch Harbor, Alaska

ROSTER OF OFFICERS, 146TH FIELD ARTILLERY (Seattle)

Colonel Henry A. Wise

LIEUTENANT COLONEL

Charles W Hendrickson Barry L. Phillips Pearl Roundy

MAJOR

Donald H. Henderson

CAPTAINS

Walter P. Barclay	Grant S. Green	Irvine M. Marr	Nicholas S. Ross
George M. Dean	John D. Harrigan	Weston A. McCormac	Albert H. Swift
Louis W. Dennie	Lawrence R. Hennings	Waldo E. McKinney	Jesse T. Wilkins
William P. French	Frank Lucas	Jean C. Prins	

FIRST LIEUTENANTS

Huch Baird, Jr.	Omar J Humphrey, Jr.	Cyril A. Millson	John E. Ramstad
Walter H. Crich	Orland O. Hunt	Elmer W. Myers	Kenneth H. Robinson
Will C. Gipple	Edward S. Melsom	Horace W. Port	James C. Thompson
Marvin J .Hubbard			

SECOND LIEUTENANTS

Charles G. DeBoer	Louis K. Lambrecht	Frank M J O'Laughlin	John A. Smith
Wayne R. Devenny	Jack D. Maze	Theodore E Pennington	William F. Stone
Harold W. Hansen	Robert S. McCallum	Ronald W. Pratt	Jesse T. Wilkins, Jr.
Joseph H. Harrison	Neil A. McDougall	Albert A. Rudd	Henry T. Wise
Russell C. Knobbs	Griffith C. Murray	Charles A. Rue	

Warrant Officer Joseph E. Rausch

Attached for duty Chaplain
Major Edgar R. Attebery

Attached for duty Medical Corps
Major William A. Millington, MC
Captains

William R. Bros, MC Raymond J .Laige, MC
First Lieutenant James F. Rogers DC

Attached for duty Inactive National Guard
Major George A. Conger, FA
Captain Kiah Wampler, FA
First Lieutenant Bennett H. Saunders FA

Second Lieutenants

Wilfred A DelPlaine Elery N. Jensen Glen B. Keith*

BAND, 146TH FIELD ARTILLERY

Captain Lawrence R. Hennings

Technical Sergeant Alvin H. Schardt

Staff Sergeant Alphonse H. Nachbar

Sergeant Ernest W. Morris

Corporal Del Degan Caesar

PRIVATES FIRST CLASS

Ernest Christensen

William Falkenstein

Joseph H. Jolin

George W. Hutchins

PRIVATES

Howard D. Bennett

William T. Bubke

George J. Brediger

Dean A. Curtiss

Charles Dimond

Robert W. Freund

Carle P. Grafrunder

Michael Kearney*

David W. Larson

Thomas W. Lauer

Allen L. Manning*

Donald J. McGowen

Wells R. Meyer

Lloyd O. Nelson

Otis G. Nordstrom

Bond Seltzer

Murray F. Sennett

John P. Sherry

Curtiss H. Skinner

Kryl S. Thorlakson

Earl Urquhart

Willard G. Winquist*

Clarence F. Wuichet

HEADQUARTERS BATTERY, 146TH FIELD ARTILLERY (Seattle)

Captain George M. Dean

MASTER SERGEANTS

Howard R. Crowe George D. Rove Barnett I. Williams

FIRST SERGEANT

Keith K. Turner

TECHNICAL SERGEANT

Earl H. Senn

STAFF SERGEANTS

William E. Cornwell James D. Mudge Rama F. Tripp Eugene J. Zielinski
Herbert J. Lewis Frank A. Nichol

SERGEANTS

Cecil H. Henry Nemours E. Patterson Fred A. Rundle Robert I. Wigen
Wilbert Northey

CORPORALS

Don C. Ambrose Bob M. Schoenberg Robert C. Sparks James R. Thompson
Lorn L. Loesell

PRIVATES FIRST CLASS

William F. Blinn Wayne E. Gourlay Harold J. Lipetz Norbert H. Miller
Charles H. Ouster Doval O. Hickox Harlan A. Loesell William J. O'Brien
William deVoss Chester D. Hoag Lee M. Martz Grant C. Skellonger
Robert J. Diltz Alfred C. Joyce John F. Melrose Dwight Turner
Charles A. Eschbach Herb A Leaf Clarence W. Miller William H. Whiteside
Riley T. Gilmore William F. Leopold

PRIVATES

Edward G. Allen George J. Gill Kenneth W. McClure Fielden S. Phipps
Lloyd G. Brightman Walter E. Gilseth Jerome E. McDermott Frank A. Primoau
Donald M. Brown Collin W. Gibb Darold McDonald Brownlee T. Rostron
Harold G. Cahill* Frederick R. Graf Donald A McDonald William H. Sibley
Bernard S. Chivers Arger C. Hewes Herman E. Merrell Orlando B. Santi
John A. Collins Charles R. Henton John I. Miller Klaus C. Sundin
Edgar Combs Hurshell R. Hoskins* Gordon H. Millspaugh Lloyd E. Smith
Robert A. Courtney Ralph N. Jacobson Einar A. Moe Melvin E. Smith*
Floyd L. Decker Maurice R. Johnson Denny Moore* Jack B. Thompson
Fred J. Dunham Leonard W Klingenpeel* William H. Morris John W. VanDyke
George T. Duncan Kenneth H. Knight George A. Mosher David Warwick
Russell G. Duncan Donald H. Kuzaro Edward B. Osborn Robert E. Welch
Howard S. Eager Leonard G. Kuzaro Henry T. Paro J ames J. White
Gardner C Ellingsworth Robert G. Landaas Victor A. Pederson Edelbert G. Yeager
Arthur I. Fannan Lloyd R. Loe Arnold V. Peterson Vernon B. Yourston
Earl E. Fetterley

MEDICAL DETACHMENT, 146TH FIELD ARTILLERY (Seattle)

Major William A. Millington

STAFF SERGEANT

Clifford D. Barker

SERGEANTS

John J. Jacoby Marvin Sullivan

CORPORALS

William A. Kelly

PRIVATES FIRST CLASS

Bertram W Arensberg
Fred D. Brockway

Sumner Brooke
Robert P. Kelly

James D. Kirk
Bert F. Nichols

Ken G. White

PRIVATES

Russell Adams
Clinton M. Anderson
Thomas A. Attleson
Quentin Bagley
Jack J. Bechtel
Marshall Beldon

Bruce A. Camp
Robert C. DeWild
Albert Dorsett
Condon, Elhardt
Milton Druck
Nelson Dungan

Roth C. Ferber
Henry A. Force
Martin Fuller
Richard T. S. Kelly
Max B. Klein
Stephen Lambert

Ray Mongrain
Gordon Sandell
Jack W. Schaefer
Frank W. Sieffeman
Ralph A. Spencer
David Stephens

HEADQUARTERS BATTERY, 1ST BN. 146TH FIELD ARTILLERY (Seattle)

Captain Louis W. Dennie

FIRST SERGEANT

Carl V. Thatcher

TECHNICAL SERGEANT

Donald B. Crane

STAFF SERGEANTS

James R. Bayne John F. Crage Theodore F. Senff

SERGEANTS

Bob H. Adelman Robert L. Cox James L. Doran Robert E. Green
John L. Briggs

CORPORALS

Bill J. Allen James E. Campbell Rodney McCourtie

PRIVATES FIRST CLASS

James G. Bilodeaux Frank W. Cockle Harry T. Hoover James Q. Paull
Marvin A. Brooks Arthur E. Haw Daniel L. Jenns Frank L. Scott

PRIVATES

Leslie O. Axling	Charles O. Ferguson	Siegfried S. Kahn	Harry S. Protheroe
Douglas A. Ayres	Herman E. Freeman	George H. Karja	George F. Rains
Joseph Brazeal	Paul R. Gibson*	Daniel J. Kenny	Walter E. Rash
Donald E. Brooks	Frank McD Glantz	Joseph L. Lambert	James T. Spellman
Galvin N. Campbell	Arthur G. Gough	Lauren L. Main	Charles P. Spencer
James J. Compton	Alan A. Granstrom	Benny McCormick	Jack E. Sterner
Clarence E. Cook	Leslie H. Hall	Malcolm G. McLaren	Newton L. Storm
Roy F. Dailey	Walter T. Hamblin	James D. Millikan	Greenleaf L. Thornton
Donald E. Dennis	Ray R. Holt	George Murphy	Richard T. Watson
Archie E. Edmundson	Robert D. Isharo	William C. Murphy	Wayne R. Webb
Joel T. Evans	Harold F. Jackson	Henry M. Mutu	Robert E. Whitmer
Earl R. Ferdon	Erik L. Jensen		

BATTERY A, 146TH FIELD ARTILLERY (Seattle)

Captain Jesse T. Wilkins

FIRST SERGEANT

Richard K. Erickson

STAFF SERGEANT

Robert W. McGrath

SERGEANTS

Henry Brinsmead
Marion Elmore

Howard I. Gile
Harold J. Harp

Clayton C. Larkin
Frank J. McHugh, Jr.

William J. Phelps
Russell A. Simpson

CORPORALS

Stuart D. Barton
Duke R. Boyett

Calvin G. Dunlap
Richard L. Luce

Frank E. Moran
Lear G. Thomas

Clyde E. Waldron
Raider A. Wick

PRIVATES FIRST CLASS

Francis Boyett
Harry F. Brewster
George H. Carter
James L. Duff
Lawrence P. Forsythe

Edward G. Hampton
Robert W. Kaufman
David F. Kruse
Arthur R. Lane
William H. Parris, Jr.

John F. Petri
Raymond Q. Roseth
Donald W. Schroeder
John M. Shanks
Elmer A. Wheeler

LeRoy J. Wheeler
Rick E. Winlund
Lloyd H. Zachau
Walter J. Zombro

PRIVATES

Byron B. Allred
Neil M. Allred
Oliver B. Anderson
Basil A. Boyd
Edwin W. Bruton
Scott V. Cady
Ben Cashman
Harry Cashman
Ra1ph J. Chenowith
Bill C. Coons
Gilbert A. Darwin*
Claude O. Dehnhoff
Robert B. Dow*
Leland C. Earl*

Robert Edgar
Olyn E. Foard
Walter L. Foard
Donald A. Gage
Gerald A. Griffen
Chauncey A. Grover
Richard J. Hegre
Joe E. Hough
Darby B. Huntington
Ronald O. Jensen
Jack Johnson
Henry V. Landry
Glen W. Long
Arne N. M. Lyster

Walter R McCurdy, Jr.
Glen W. Martin
Lloyd G. Mize
Edward F. O'Flynn
Robert D. Orsucci
James R. Packard
Dick E. Paynet, Jr.
Clarence E. Perry*
Maylon D. Price
Robert A. Roney
William E. Russell
George D. Sargent
Paul E. Shumway

Jack G. Sparks
Harold Strom, Jr.
Henry L. Sylvester
William G. Thomsen
Fred M. Tobin
Logan E. Vermillion
Ross H. Warnock
Milton R. Weller
Brock F. Wells
Jack H. Wheelock
Horace R. Winder*
Charles W. Winger
Chester Yates

BATTERY B, 146TH FIELD ARTILLERY (Seattle)

Captain Walter P. Barclay

FIRST SERGEANT

William H. Aye

STAFF SERGEANT

Richard A. Fowler

SERGEANTS

Jack M. Crich
Robert M. Dore

Alwin G. Koch
William K Lawrence

Walter R. Lonski

William H. Siem

CORPORALS

Kenneth R. Bissett
Charles W. Day

Kelton Diesel
David F. Evans

Orville R. Ergeson
Kenneth H. Hansen

Robert M. Hanscom

PRIVATES FIRST CLASS

Louis N. Barkau
Donald P. Bissett
Dennis B. Casey
Morris B. Cook
Forrest A. Evenson

Louis W. Fenton
Glen N. Hansen
Robert B. Horsely
George L. Goodyard

Richard A. Mecartca
Howard B. Padgett
Harry K. Powers
Edgar A. Schroeder

Taddy E. Srzedzinski
Edward B. Strong
Harland W. Westerman
Edward O. Woolbert

PRIVATES

Erdman E. Anderson
Arnold M. Austad
John A. Barrett *
Curtis E. Beery
Hugh S. Boyce
John H. Brannon
Randall W. Cannon
Louis DeBortole
Elden E. DeMoss*
Phillip J. Dixon

Ray M. Forza
Joe A. Gatzka*
John P. Girten
Harold L. Glover
Hugh Harrah
Walter C. Hinman
William T. Howard*
Erwin L. Jackson
Eugene V. Jordan
Eddie M. King

George R. King
Charles T. Lee
Milton W. McAvoy
Michael P. McGuire
John L. Mecartea
John D. Orr
Charles H. Owens
Wayne L. Pahud
Bert H. Park
Curtis E. Raper

William H. Reed*
William C. Stewart
John M. Sweeney
Don N. Turner
Marvin L. Waley
Bud Warden
Dale S. Wyman
David Zeckman*
Don J. Zupan*

BATTERY C, 146TH FIELD ARTILLERY (Seattle)

Captain Waldo E. McKinney

FIRST SERGEANT

Gordon W. Baxter

STAFF SERGEANT

Eugene J. Skinner

SERGEANTS

Gilbert C. Field Kenneth C. Griesel Marvan J. Morefield Robert R. Musselman

CORPORALS

Leonard M. Carlson Robert E. Graham Philip T. Migliore William W. Whalen
Robert E. Eastling James L. McAllister Orville L. Tobiason Walter T. Young

PRIVATES FIRST CLASS

Donald D. Champion Barnnan T. Harrison* Albert D. McKean John Murray
Warren C. Connolly Robert J. Hawkins Melburn C. Millar Edwin A. Rienaas
James T. Flynn Charles E. Henry Eugene G. Morefield Alvin C. Smallfield
Chester V. Good Wilbur E. Hubbard

PRIVATES

Bruce O. Arnold Charles R. Good Jay G. McCrary Gerald P. Shapley
Patrick F. Balland Gordon C. Gilleland Clarence R. McFarland Frank H. Shea
Clifford W. Bantz Richard A. Granger Vern N. McNulty Benjamin H. Shields
James L. Beaupied Howard H. Hafer Raymond L. Morken Ray G. Sprague
Arthur D. Borgford Bernie H. Hanson Jack C. Murray William A. Stream
James F. Brabon Morris A. Haugen Eugene L. Oberg* Willis A. Swanson
Lawrence M. Brown Wayne D. Hickman Robert P. Owen James R. Taylor
William N. Brown John G. Hilden Steve M. Pede Robert H. Taylor
Bengar B. Connelly Carl P. Hoff * Carl L. Peters William E. Tulloch
John D. Cratty Don R. Houghton Jack L. Peterson John Varder Hoek
Edmond S. Dabrowski George C. Howard Eddie S. Picardo Wilbur B. Warren
Fred E. Edwards Owen M. Jackson Bernard Primmer Oleg V. Warnek
Jack F. Farrington William E. Johnson Robert M. Richards Kenneth P. Wass
Robert E. Fickes Frank L. Kinton Robert J. Roach Ernest K. Watson
Fred E. Frank Frank W. Kuempel Frederick A. Rodd Robert J. Wingfield
Douglas F. Garrison

HEADQUARTERS BATTERY, 2ND BN. 146TH FIELD ARTILLERY (Seattle)

Captain John E. Harrigan

FIRST SERGEANT

Max D. Wood

TECHNICAL SERGEANT

Perry W. Benson

STAFF SERGEANT

Paul C. Camichael Odell E. Fearn Frank L. Peterson

SERGEANTS

David F. Buchholz Roland L. Fyock Donald E. Gillngly Donald E. McArthur Glenn
L. Whittaker

CORPORALS

William A. Cline Glenn A. Diere Richard B. Gaston

PRIVATE FIRST CLASS

Melvin A. Dewar Mark F. Hone, Jr. William C. Rundle Kenneth W. Terry
Alan V. Duclos Richard W. Kemp Harold O. Simmons Robert L. Whiting
Leon I. Halela George H. Lindley Ben H. Snowdon

PRIVATE

James C. Accetturo Robert C. Campbell Robert W. Lee William F. Russell
Hilding W. Anderson Dean E. Christian Jon V. McKenzie James L. Searing
Harvey R. Baker Nicalay Christiansen Roy M. Ness Archie C. Smith
Leroy E. Barnard John W. Freeman Bill R. Parfitt Edward A. Soper
Stanley W. Bever Isaac D. Funis Delbert F. Peabody George J. Stromme
Harold W. Bishoff Langdon C. Hedrick Donald w. Randolph Lewis D. Tenny
Richard A. Breshears Frank P. Huntley Marvin J. Robbins Earl J. Thibeau
Robert J. Broderick James M. Jeffery Jack D. Roberson Maurice D. Weber*
William M. Butts Calvin E. LaJune Howard J. Robinson Dexter D. Whittle

BATTERY D, 146TH FIELD ARTILLERY (Seattle)

Captain Grant S. Green

FIRST SERGEANT

Ralph A. Pennington

STAFF SERGEANT

Edward J. Pennington

SERGEANTS

Edwin J Benckert, Jr.	John B. Fleury	Palmer J. Haugland	Ralph E. Herrick
Nils D. Berg	Lyle C. Grunkemeier	John M. Hayward	John M. Murphy

CORPORALS

Robert Beinke	Charles C. Redeker	William A. Sobieralski	Norman A. Wilcox
John P. Greenwald	Robert A. Rottweiler	Andrew J. Wargo	

PRIVATES FIRST CLASS

Dave H. Adams	Harvey Gordon	Perry O Klinefelter	George W. Mitchell
Warren J. Adkins	Bernard R. Hein	William R. Knowles	Custin C. Palmer
William P. Bean	Ralph H. Ingerson	Paul F. Martin	Nick Russo
Walt J. Campbell	Harry F. Johnson	John T. McNamara	Christy L. Sorensen
Harry W. Carlson	Forrest F. Keyes		

PRIVATES

Ernest Alexander	John E. Craver	Chester P. Heath	John M. Miller
Michael M. Alfonso	Melvin R. Davis	Charles R. Hickey	William P. Miller
Kenneth H Anderson	Weston R. Eldridge	Merlin W. Hieronymous	John L. Murphy
Robert O. Baker	Herbert H. Everson	Frank W. Jenkins	Milton B. Olson
Bob E. Bennett	Robert L. Fulton	Ralph C. Jenkins*	Robert G. Overholt
Clifford R. Berlin	Jim W. Gantz	John H. Kaczor	Stanley L. Pearce
William D. Bernard	John A. Givens	Milford K. Kingsbury	John A Peterman
Roger L. Brown	Raymond Y. Goetz	John O. Lockhart	Jerry L Pierce
Stuart D. Brown	Arthur R. Groth*	Albert R. Marshall	Bryan D Shaughnessy
Clifton L. Buck*	Wayne A. Guinn	Ian R. Martin	Lloyd C Smith
Donald G. Buck	Clelland Hager	Darrell N. Martineau	Bill G Taylor*
Jerry J. Campbell*	Judd T. Harris	Frank E. Mason	Robert P. VanAntwerp
Dan Carmichael	Russell P. Harris	Paul E. Mason	Howard G. Williamson*
James T. Chafin	David W. Barter	William J .McKee	Buckey R. Wilson
Eric P. Christianson	Harvey C. Harter	Phillip W. McLeod	Elmer E. Wohler
Bob J. Clement	Lewis K. Hatcher	John E. McManus	Joseph Wurzel

BATTERY E, 146TH FIELD ARTILLERY (Seattle)

Captain William P. French

FIRST SERGEANT

Harold A. Ritter

STAFF SERGEANT

Jack R. Eichmann

SERGEANTS

Charles F. Barttley
Frank J. Claire

Herbert H. Helseth
Archie W. Moore

Leo S. Morhaim
Mario P. Mozzone

John H. Peters
Almiron L. Segar

CORPORALS

Kenneth L. Binkley
Everett E. Christensen
Ben M. Cohen

Donald W. Dunham
Harvey W. Dunham, Jr.

Robert J. Little
Sam J. Losk

Albert C. Secrest
Harold E. Springer

PRIVATES FIRST CLASS

Dan B. Almoslino
Ernest Budschat
Thomas M. Caffee
Lester A. Cattren
Charles L. Cliff

Richard E. Cuthbert, Jr.
Alvin E. Gidlof
Paul E. Goetting
Richard A. Grantham
James W. Hammond

Morton J. Larson
Donald W. Moeckel
James P. Pohsl
Bill P. Salmon

Joe S. Schwetz
Richard D. Soone
Alton C. Stout
Jack M. Williams

PRIVATES

Irving Adatto
Israel N. Almoslino
Sol M. Altabet
Donald E. Amsberry
Vincent A. Anconetani
Robert E. Auken
Gunnar K. Backman
Joseph A. Benezra
Jack K. Bigelow
Jack A. Bonnifield
Arthur D. Bulmer
John E. Butler
Harold W. Caffee
Richard R. Carstensen
Joseph W. Cedor
Kaare L. Dahlbert
Russell E. Feroe

David I. Fisse
Samuel W. Franco
Albert B. Galanti
Fred P. Geyer
Neal Gordon
Charles L. Grigg
Sam J. Hanan
Sam A. Hasson
Charles Harrison
John F. Hill
Albert M. Israel
Albert A. Ingham
Jewell W. Jesper
Robert E. Johns
Clarence E. Johnson
L. Walter Johnson
Richard Jones

Robert B. Knowles
Bob Lambeth
Glenn S. Lee
Hugh H. Levenson
Ralph W. Liming
Dave M. Marcus
Charles E. Mackay
George W. Maynard
James E. Matnard
Ival L. Morelock
Isaac S. Morhaim
George W. Moyer
Bernard M. McCormick
Robert H. Newport
Sprague C. Parker
Alan B. Phillips
Carl M. Ross

James H. Skeel
Clarence G. Simpson*
Edmund N. Schumann
Loon G. Soreana
Forrest G. Snelson
Cecil L. Sprague
Robert I. Tate
John T. Thomason
Richard W. Thornton
Glenn E. Tollenaar
Albert Weber
Alan Wesley
Frank West, Jr.
Hammit B. Willson
Louis R. Wright, Jr.
John J. Zornes, Jr.

BATTERY F, 146TH FIELD ARTILLERY (Seattle)

Captain Irvine Marr

FIRST SERGEANT

Laurance E Harrington

STAFF SERGEANT

Paul A. Ruebush

SERGEANTS

Thomas A. Coles
Ray W. Hansen

William C. Hanserd
Dick H. Keenan

Charles A. Kerr
Howard C. Scott

William E Thompsnn

CORPORALS

Bashford F. Atwood
Gerald W. Coffman
Delain H. Jorgensen

Edwin H. Millson
Robert L. Nelson

Robert H. Peters
David N. Porteous

Marvin H. Robinson
John E. Wright

PRIVATES FIRST CLASS

Sol Adelson
Ray C. Aurelio
David A. Ballard
Herbert A. Bannerman
William E. Bell

Paul W. Conner
Russell D. Duvall
Jack M. Faulkner
Thomas M. Florio

Bud Martin
Oakland P. Rhodes
William E. Richfield
Wilson H. Robbins

Edward J. Stich
Reuben B. Swanson
Joseph B. Wamba
Ray Williamson

PRIVATES

Victor Alexander
Robert K. Allen
Robert G. Allison
Kenneth G. Anderson
Walter J. Anderson
Argyle E. Armstrong
Antonio L. Aquino
Warner Bair
Jack A. Bennett*
Vernon L. Berg
Jack Berger
Neil D. Brown
William H. Coen
John E. Costa
Robert E. Corkins
Ralph M. Dehnert
Elmer R. Dodge
David W. Donahue
Kenneth E. Duda
Clyde O. Dunn
Jack B. Flanagan

Reavis S. Ford
Edward W. Fullerton
Eugene R. Goff
George A. Guilmet
John R. Guilmot
Victor B. Hawkins
William B. Herth
Malcolm E. Hertz
George J. Hill
Clarence F. Hover
Vernal H. Johnson
Roland E. Jonason
Boris D. Karsanoff
Ellis O. Kelly
John W. Kelly
Harold A. Leonard*
John A. Lucas
Lawrence B Lundgaard
Donald G. Lynn
Jack J. Lytle

Donald A. Marsaw
George W. McCrea
Bruce R. McQuarrie
Kenneth E. Michaelis
Bud I. Mitchell
Edwin J. Morschin
Henry J. Mullins
Walter H. Munk
Alex W. Neilson
Robert J. Nelson
Victor V. Norton
Harvey D. Ohrman
John P. Omspoch*
Robert C. Perkins
Daniel Picini
William R. Plemons
Thomas C. Pettifer
John R. Priestman
Joseph A. Reardon
Edward D. Roberts

Mischa E. Robinson
John Russeff
Arnold L. Saulsbury*
Harry J. Segeler
Harvey S. Smith
George R. Snider
William D. Snider
Robert G Spence
Preston H. Stoop
Clarence E. St. Peter
William B. Stubbins
Alvin L. Thompson
James H. Thompson
Gordon R. Toon
Bill L. Van Court
Hugh G. Van Dusen*
Ray M. Van Pelt
Don C. Van Wey
Billie J. Wheeler
Gordon E. Wilson

HEADQUARTERS & SERVICE COMPANY, 116TH MEDICAL REGIMENT (Seattle)

Colonel George W. Boeler, MC

MAJORS

Floyd W. Baugh, MC Paul A. Reed, VC Chester A. Taylor, Ch C Kenneth G. White, MC
John W. Darraough, MC

CAPTAINS

Glen O. Bishop, MAC Ronald P. Carter, MC Lewis R. Hutchins, MC Richard R. Miller, MC
Carol E. Butterworth, MAC Francis W. Franz, MC Albert D. MacArthur, MAC
Percy C. McNaught, MAC (Comdg Hq & Serv. Co.)

FIRST LIEUTENANTS

Irving E. Kaveney, MC Paul C. Tsapralis, MC Harold C. Cole, MC Lester F. Osborne

SECOND LIEUTENANT

Ronald J. W. Tighe

MASTER SERGEANT

Leon F. Aller, Sr.

FIRST SERGEANT

Leon F. Aller, Jr.

TECHNICAL SERGEANTS

Robert S. Burchard Nathaniel L. Hope

STAFF SERGEANTS

Stanley J. Hough Asa C. Hudson Donald B. McGrath

SERGEANTS

Lawrence J. Hebert Frarik A. Tenuta Valentine G. Tenuta

PRIVATES FIRST CLASS

Alfred F. Carmony Merle G. Carr David W. Janecke James A. G. Schoenmaker
Joe M. Datin Harvey W. Hudson Casey J. Schoenmaker

PRIVATES

Robert L. Baucom Harmon W Farringer, Jr. Jack Holder Charles H. Sawyer
John S. Churchill Harold A. Freedman James D. Lappin James K. Smith
Walter F. Carlson James R. Gleason Frank L. Moore John H. Schneider
Lynn A. Deming Martin W. Grefnes Francis C. Petty Robert J. Thomas
John E. Deno T Thomas O. Geist Donald A. Olson Morris J. Vanderweghe
Warren A. Erlwein George Hebert Galon E. Prater Edwin A. Woodiing

COMPANY A, 116TH MEDICAL REGIMENT (Seattle)

Captain Francis W. Franz

FIRST LIEUTENANT

Harold C. Cole

FIRST SERGEANT

Milton K. Grave

STAFF SERGEANTS

Robert B. Logan

James J. Poole

SERGEANTS

Leonard J. Gove

Edward J. Hanna

Jake A. Kinder

Julian N. Robarge

CORPORALS

Robert H. Burns

Berkley A. Lamb

Robert R. Zirk

PRIVATES FIRST CLASS

Randal R. Balch

Harold B. Johnson

Warren A. Loutit

Alden T. Nelson

Roland N. Carey

Harold J. Kenne

Robert E. McAlpine

Samuel A. Sather

James G. Cunningham

Harold E. Kenny

Nace F. McHugh

Glenn W. Winters, Jr.

Bill L. Hilliker

Robert E. Lee

Edward C. Mermod

Ardon S. Weibel

PRIVATES

Gordon G. Ayres

Ned G. Field

John M. Myers

David C. Shepardson

Bernard R. Bailey

Neil A. Goldberg

Robert H. Nelson

Edward L. Stephens

Gerald N. Bergh

Albert Hermann

Bertell L. Nord*

Russell R. Stephens

Roy E. Brown

Dale K. Jackson

Lynn W. Norris*

Carleton G. Sumner*

Jack H. Beymer*

William J. Keene

Raymond M. Philpott

Charles W. Switzer

Kenneth D. Cottrell

John F. Kennedy

Pelernon L. Regudon*

Everett S. Tallman

Theodore E. Davis

Earl N. Legge

George F. Richardson

Robert E. Truman

Laurence H. DeWitt

Albert D. Linden

Ralph W. Rimple

Jack E. Tyson

Robert E. Donnell

Roy C. Marrs

Kelly A. Scott*

Bill H. Worcester

Herbert A. Eichhorn*

Robert G. Marshall

Richard C. Seaburg

Albert R. Zirk

Robert F. Elder

William E. Morrill*

COMPANY B, 116TH MEDICAL REGIMENT (Seattle)

Captain Richard R. Miller

FIRST SERGEANT

Elmer W. Gamble

SERGEANTS

Ernest W. Brown

Victor T. Marvis

George W. Poitras

John S. Williams

CORPORAL

Glenn E. Kingsbury

PRIVATES FIRST CLASS

Paul F. Schneider
Floyd F. Root

Thomas D. Sullivan

Jim B. Thurmond

Albert L. Robinson

PRIVATES

Malcolm W. Anderson
Ted A. Bartron
Kearney Bardon
Maurice N. Bingham
Walter E. Boyd
Robert B. Bushnell
Johnny Brown
Wilbur V. Carr
Richard H. Clark
Tay H. Craig, Jr.
Jerry W. Doyle
Bernard N. Earling
Thomas N. Earling
Thomas L. Eddy
William B. Eddy

Harold X. Etter
James L. Faber
Harold L. Flack
Dean A. Fraker
Elliott L. Gadd
Clarence S. Gilman
Wesley R. Gilman
Roy J. Girganoff
Walter E. Hanna
Ray F. Harris
Newell B. Hawkinson
James O. Healey
George L. Jackson
William G. Johnson

William D. Jones
Robert L. Juttelstad
Charles O. Wilson
William F. Liening
Richard L. Long
Herbert Larson
Kenneth J. Meenach
Richard J. Myhre
Glen Morgan
Joseph H. McCoy
Paul A. McWilliams
Edward E. Misenar
Loyal L. Polston
Malcolm W. Reynolds

Oliver C. Rouse
Raymond F. Ruppert
James W. Scrimgeour
Frank E. Seeley
James A. Sevener
Sherman L. Smith
Albert J. Sokyitis
Ross F. Swall
John C. Tsapralis
Grover H. Turner
Robert R. Walters
Wilbur C. Willis
Glenn H. Wilgus
Raymond W. Young

COMPANY E, 116TH MEDICAL REGIMENT (Seattle)

Captain Carol E. Butterworth

FIRST SERGEANT

Curtis W. Spillers

STAFF SERGEANTS

Joseph R. McKay

Jess M. Sherman

Norman H. Zell

SERGEANTS

John A. Asmus

Charles A. Jackson

Virgil N. Wilson

CORPORALS

Bert Butterworth

Charles E. Conner

PRIVATES FIRST CLASS

Vincent N. Bergman

Frank T. Fenton

Charles B. Puke

Hugh I. Williams

William J. Childers, Jr.

Kenneth L. Lundstead

George F. Riggs

Dale B. Witherbee

Ole F. Erickson

Arthur S. McConnell

William C. Slator

Lewis C. Weatherbee

PRIVATES

Garland Anderson

Perry Dahl

Robert L. Kennedy

Oren P. Robinson

Milton J. Benson

Albert F. Dressler

Clavin J. Martin

Edward F. Rudolph

Conrad L. Berg

John A. Featherstone

Jack L. Moore

Aldo A. Samboni

David V. Brauer

John B. Gleason

Don A. Northrop

Gustav Samson

David E. Brier

Jack Hendricks

Albert L. Paine, Jr.

Richard G. Stevens

Lynn W. Cook

George R. Hetu

Charles E. Pearl

Robert D. Strellauer

William H. Cosgrove

John T. Humphries

Lawrence H. Robinson

Arnold W. Vikan

William J. Curran

James B. Kaldal

DIVISION SURGEON'S OFFICE, 116TH MEDICAL REGIMENT (Seattle)

Captain Glen O. Bishop, MAC

STAFF SERGEANT

Roland H. Burke

SERGEANT

Joseph H. Noyes

CORPORALS

Wilfred L. Bergman

PRIVATES

Perley W. Coombs

Russell E. Noyes

HEADQUARTERS & HEADQUARTERS COMPANY, 116TH QUARTERMASTER REGIMENT
(Seattle)

Colonel Orlo W. Brown

Lt Col Frederick C Roecker

MAJORS

Cornelius C Holcomb

Elmer H. Storie

CAPTAINS

Herbert E. Gerfen
Gilbert E. Goodman
Arthur J. Hudson

Jacob P. Jacky
Louis L. Jordan

Riley Kuehn
Clarence E. Reid

Orrie A. Richardson
Frank J. Walsh

FIRST LIEUTENANTS

William H. Lambert
Lane A. Dodge
Loren T. Keely

Darrell E. Mapes
Harold A. Linstad

Gordon L. Sprague
Wayne A. Saltmarsh

SECOND LIEUTENANTS

David L. Abshire
William R. Bell

Henry B. Cary
William K. Mantz

Robert C. Royce

William G. Williamson

ATTACHED

Major Philip C Kyle, KC

Capt. Ernest B. Parmalee, MC

1st Lieut. John B. Youngs, Ch C

CAPTAIN

Arthur J. Hudson (Comdg Hq Co)

MASTER SERGEANT

Elvin C. Wilson

FIRST SERGEANT

Howard E Kirkpatrick

TECHNICAL SERGEANTS

William D. Kelly

James W. McBee

Leo D. Redburn

William E. Roar

HEADQUARTERS & HEADQUARTERS COMPANY, 116TH QUARTERMASTER REGIMENT
CONT'D (Seattle)

SERGEANTS

Jerry G. Carter	Joseph B. Garrett	Harry R McReynolds	Walter N. Olesen
William R. Elgin	Henry H. Hewitt		

CORPORALS

William L. Finn	James M. Johnson
-----------------	------------------

PRIVATE FIRST CLASS

Harry H. Armstrong	Harry P. Mears	Paul G. Patterson	Clifford F. Roy
--------------------	----------------	-------------------	-----------------

PRIVATE

Lawson T. Blackmer*	Chester E. Jackson	Ralph F. Neilson	Thomas W. Tate, Jr.
Erwin C. Blohm	Harvey G. Johnson	Harold E. Oleson	Neil S. Thomas
John R. Burton	Robert W. Klien	Gene F. Paige	Leonard H. Timmel
John H. Bowen	William N. Knapman	Thurlow C. Rabun	Glen H. Turner
Lewis H. Cody	John M. Koreski	Edward G. Rebman	George Van Dusen
David Ho Erickson	Floyd F. Luckenbihl	Jasper M. Roark	Paul A. Winkelmann
Harold J. Evans	Donald L. Manes	George C. Sawyer	John H. Winn
Bill N. Gibbs	Henry J. Martin	Royal C. Sawyer	Keith W. Woodruff
Clifford U. Glazier	Orvis R. Miller	Joseph F. Shields	

SERVICE COMPANY, 116TH QUARTERMASTER REGIMENT (Seattle)

1st Lieut. Lane A. Dodge

FIRST SERGEANT

Gordon Young

SERGEANTS

Lawrene L. Shuck George D. Springsteen Thomas J. Walker

CORPORALS

Francis H. Alexander James A. Farrington

PRIVATES FIRST CLASS

Boyd L. Ankarberg	Oscar E. Houbartly	Leslie D. Martin	Leonard H. Reid
Hubert Carlson	Joseph W. LaVelley	Arne E. Niemi	Harold N. Shuck
Harry Crouch	Clarence V. Leach	Gino J. Nonis	Walter C. West
Joseph H. Gallegher			

PRIVATES

Franklin W. Atkinson	Ralph A. Forcier	Fred R. Long	William D. Prideaux
Thomas V. Baumann	Joseph J. Forgue, Jr.	Harry J. Long	Albert Rishworth
Walter E. Baumann	William L. Franks	Robert G. Long	George P. Rogers
Raymond W. Beardsley	Charles L. Fuge	Willis H. McClure	Robert E. Vangemert
John E. Behey	Peter F. Griffis	Thomas H. Newell	Lyle S. Voss
Franklin B. Brown	Floyd A. Harris	Ralph G. Parker	Eff C. Walker
Melvin E. Burnham	Charles C. Lewis*	Robert S. Poli	Robert P. Wilkinson
John L. Couture			

MEDICAL DEPARTMENT DETACHMENT, 116TH QUARTER MASTER REGIMENT (Seattle)

Major Philip C. Kyle

FIRST SERGEANT

Merle A. Prideaux

SERGEANTS

Lucian A. Dawson

Don R. Ulrich

PRIVATES FIRST CLASS

Omer R. Moore

Harry W. Shoup

PRIVATES

Kenneth O. Amerson
Robert E. Dugan

Francis I. Kendall
Robert B. Lazenby

William E. Shoup
Gilbert R. Swets

Robert C. Ulrich
Fred H. Wolf

COMPANY A, 116TH QUARTERMASTER REGIMENT (Seattle)

Captain Orrie H. Richardson

FIRST SERGEANT

George A. Barth

SERGEANTS

Alfred R. Corcy
Thomas J. Kelly

John L. Kenney
William F. Pells

Harry C. Rockwell
Constance O. Schmidt

Everett A. Stafford

CORPORALS

Brooks U. Atchison
James L. Dougherty

Edward T. Conlon

Ward P. Furness

David C. Gamble

PRIVATES FIRST CLASS

Edward W. Airth
William J. Atchinson

David W. Buher
Gay E. DeVine

August M. Engel
Fred O. Engel

Thomas E. McGinitie
Robert G. Simmerman

PRIVATES

Paul B. Argyle
George M. Besherse
Richard C. Bonthius*
Harry D. Burgess
Virgil E. Brimer
Francis M. Brown
Jerry D. Bryan
Donald W. Buttz*
Nathan D. Cameron
Robert L. Cannon
Malcolm P. Christensoninn
Myron G. Cochran
Gale W. Cook
Clarence L. Cullup
William C. Daggert
Charles M. Ellis
Bud A. Gommill
George K. Giakovmis

Jack C. Godfrey
James W. Gordon
Thomas W. Giles*
George J. Graham
Harold C. Gramson
John Z. Grundhoffer
Louis F. Heidonrick
Willis W. Hillman
Lee D Hodin
Conrad A. Hovland
John A. Hutchins
David A. Jones
Earl L. Kalk
Walter D. Kelley
Richard L. Kessler
Robert B. Kinlead
Theodore C. Klise

William W. Maloy
Raymond L. Manns
Paul H. Marshall
Roy H. Lea
Merle F. HcCoskery
Kenneth J. McLaren
Robert E. McNeal
Butler K. McVicar
Ben O. Michel
Melvin A. Moe
Louis R. Morin
Glen C. Murhead
Hollis E. Nelson
Nick L. Nelson
Richard E. O'Boyle
Henry F. Orman
Louis L. Perkins

Leslie L. Park
Albert L. Peterson
Edwin E. Pierce
Clyde C. Reece
James K. Robinson
Harry J. Rock
James W. Rock
John C. Rock
Walt H. Smith
Ole Spelda
Thomas D. Taylor
George A. Thomas
Norris M. Telnes*
William J. Weir
Hobart R. Winchester
Oliver J. Wilson
Howard L. Womer

COMPANY B, 116TH QUARTERMASTER REGIMENT (Walla Walla)

Captain Jacob P. Jacky

FIRST SERGEANT

Alexander Cilk

SERGEANTS

Jay B. Argo
Donald R. Brower

Walter D. Onstot

Marcus A. Petterson

Joe A. Shelton

CORPORALS

Rodney L. Brown
Minnard F. Hawks

Tom Huff

Frank S. Sanderson

Joe A. Shelton

PRIVATES FIRST CLASS

Phillip B. Chernis
John B. Daggett
Harold C. Hanson

Wendell Kenworthy
Lalwrence Lovell
Kenneth G. McCaw

John D. Neuman
Harold S. Pratt

Walter Sooter
Robert E VanBuskirk

PRIVATES

John E. Anderson
Donald D. Altman
Darrel G. Barclay
Howard M. Barr
Howard C. Beach
Elvis Blankenship
Ray D. Brown
Walter L. Brown
William B. Buckman
Dale C. Callahan
Roy F. Cooper
Robert W. Culver
Walter F. Cummings
Dale C. Daudt
Theodore L. Delay
Clarence W. Digh

Harve W. Driskell
William H. Fetter
Archie W. Fields
Arthur Geist
Donald L. Hall
Leonard Hayes
Jule J. Howard
Joe V. Huck
Arthur V. Huggins
Joe M. Hussey
Lawrence W. James
Marvin E. James
George Jilg
Theodore W. Maskelyne
Fay A. May
Stanley R. May

Robert L. McDonald
Eugene J. McLaughlin
Lyle R. Miles
Wayne S. Miller
Delbert L. Morris
Paul T. Morton
Leslie V. Patterson
Robert F. Patterson
Dale W. Pershall
Harvey J. Pool
Hal L. Ramey
Louis R. Rogers
Francis R. Russell
Albert H. Schoenrock
Pete M. Schwindt
Thomas W. Simpson, Jr.

Earland C. Smith
Dewitt Stinnett
Dorven Stinnett
Eugene V. Suti
Glen L. Teal
Frederick H. Vincent
Harold T. Watson
Samuel Weber
Frank S. Wells
LaVerne O. Williams
Percy C. Wrigley
George E. Wright
Walter O. Wright
John E. Zandell
Alvin J. Zimmer

Attached for duty
From other Organization
Private Maurice J. Fields, Co .B, 161st Inf

HEADQUARTERS DETACHMENT, 116TH QUARTERMASTER REGIMENT (Seattle)

1st Lieut Gordon L. Sprague

TECHNICAL SERGEANT

Julius Schmidt

SERGEANT

Jack C. Burdick

CORPORAL

David H. Southwick

PRIVATE FIRST CLASS

Theodore R. Bardue

PRIVATES

Earl D. Allen

Winston A. Johnson

COMPANY E, 116TH QUARTERMASTER REGIMENT (Seattle)

Captain Louis L. Jordan

FIRST SERGEANT

Raymond R. Lane

TECHNICAL SERGEANTS

Samuel P. Rankin

SERGEANTS

William W. Boag Earl Franklin

CORPORALS

Karl J. Korshaven Loe H. Rodgers

PRIVATES FIRST CLASS

John A. Bailey	Orville L. DeFoi	Herbert M. Gravell	William H. Runyan
Donald F Bentler	Everett E. Edwards	Arthur W. Paulsen	Buck W. Whitman

PRIVATES

Andrew J. Berube	Richard J. Fagan	James L. Jordan	James D. Stege
Clyde L. Boag	Elmer J. Fisher	Charles E. Klinner	Leonard H. Theros
James E. Burns	Herbert K Gravell, Jr.	Harry C. Mash	William W. West
Harry E. Congdon	John W. Gravell	George F. Miller	Frank E. White
Clyde E. Cornman	Lawrence M. Hickey	Owen G. Mortensen	Ralph R. White
Leo D Echelbarger	Lowell S. James	Robert B. Patterson	Clarence T Wunderlich
Gordon A. Fagan	Ernest J. Janet		

COMPANY F, 116TH QUARTERMASTER REGIMENT (Seattle)

Captain Herbert E. Gerren

1st Lieut Robert .J .Russell
(DS Camp Perry, Ohio)

SERGEANTS

Donald W. Oliver

Richard E. Russell
(DS Camp Perry, Ohio)

William H. Russell
(DS Camp Perry, Ohio)

CORPORALS

Ralph L. Osness

Frank H. F. White

PRIVATES FIRST CLASS

Elmcr E. Ahola

Robert E. Humberger

Glen A. Hodson

George P. Madsen

PRIVATES

Edwin W. Beach
James J. Brady
Leonard L. Carey
Jack W. Colly
Hugh R. Darby
Thomas J. Ely
James H. Given*
Herbert L. Graff

Leslie O. Gustafson
William R. Hansen
Joseph L. Hendry
James R. Henry
John Hutchinson
Elmer F. Kerns
Roy A. Miller
Edwin A. Mudge

Richard W. Olney
Sidney K. Riser
Joseph P. St Peter
Charles D. Scrivner
William H. Sieloff*
Theodore J. Soderback
Harold F. Sprinkle
Edward J. Stair

Sidney D. Thomsen
Reuel N. Updike
John R. Wall
Henry J. Watkins
Glen H. Williams
Lewis E. Williams
Alfred I. Wilson

116TH OBSERVATION SQUADRON (Felts Field)

Major Hillford R. Wallace

CAPTAINS

William G. Foster
Ellsworth C. French

Charles O. Holter

Claude A. Owen

Robert W. Owen

FIRST LIEUTENANTS

Ira Bortles
Homer C. Burns
Dean H. Eshelman

Robert A. Gardner
Harold R. Hansen
Lloyd A. Hardesty*

Ray V. Jones
William C. Lindsay
Eirier A. Malmstrom

Lester W. Nicol*
Dale A. Swarts

SECOND LIEUTENANTS

Sam P. Bakshas
Roland A. Campbell
Kent E. Eiohonberger
Joseph W. Fanazick

Frank W. Frost
John E. Gay
Robert L. Jones

George W. Nelson
Richard C. Reed
Ray E. Schrock

Everett L. Taylor
Samuel G. Ward
Warren A. Fackenthal
(Attached)

MASTER SERGEANTS

John E. Dean

William E. Finch

FIRST SERGEANT

Halbert B. Hewitt

TECHNICAL SERGEANTS

Milo W. Banskotter

David R. Tinling

STAFF SERGEANTS

Durward J. Anderson
Rodney O. Beaudette
Loyal L. Brunton
Kenneth E. Carter

Elmer E. Erickson
William P. Evans
Allen H. Fackenthal
Aloysius G. Hylent

Jack M. James
Frank B. Kavanaugh
Carl G. Larson
William C. Sands

William F. Schilling
Earl Wade
Andrew W. Ward

SERGEANTS

Richard C. Carter
Donald W. Endicott
Dewey J. Ferry

Gordon W. Kirkerdall
Lloyd G. Massender
Laurin A. Mueller

Marlon W. Neuman
Robert A. Owen
Charles L. Pray

Donald G. Ritchie
Robert D. Zat

116TH OBSERVATION SQUADRON CONT'D (Felts Field)

CORPORALS

Howard W. Carter	Donald E. Ressler	Francis R Smolkowsky	Keith S. Wilson
Robert C. Nevell	Arthur H Rider	Roy J. Werner	Leslie W Worthington
John B. Porta			

PRIVATES FIRST CLASS

Robert L. Doty	James F. Hawley	William A. Rathgeber	Harry L. Smith
Don F. Godfrey	Glenn H. Luce	Warren E. Saltz	Theron B. Smith
Wallace B. Goetz	Raymond K. Olsen	John H. Schultz	Dickson K. Taylor
Chester W. Graham	Milton C. Poirier	Stanley L. Seehorn	Fred J. Thompeon
Harold H. Hardesty	Robert N. Rabideau		

PRIVATES

William S. Alfstad	William P. Davis	Sheldon E. Kilham	Oscar C. Panther
Edgar P. Allen	George M. Dinnetz	George R. Kimmel	John R. Panther
James H. Anderson	John J. Doharty	Owen F. Ladd	Delmar H. Partch
Jess H. Anderson	James H. Ege	Bruce K. Lamb	Agne V. Pearson
Leonard W. Anderson	Robert P. Ehrardt	Charles A. Largent	Robert W. Peters
Marvin M. Arthurs	Kenneth Q. Finley	Roger C. Larson	Claire D. Porter
Paul B. Baldwin	Tom K. Foster	Richard B. Lee	Lewis B. Porter
Alrreti C. Bevan	Marvin W. Fritz	Arthur L. Lewis	James E. Powell
Harry D. Becker	Boyd H. Gallaher	Percy W. Lynch	John A. Rothwell
AlfreJ W. Berntson	Jim L. Goble	Frederick C. Lyons	Doyle W. Severson
Alfred Bevacqua	Joseph E. Hall	Anthony J. Martello	Robert C. Sims
Jack Bradford	Robert H. Hoegh	Keith L. Mattausch	Raymond B. Smart
Colin G. Cameron	Harold R. Huey	Lawrence A. Mayer	Norman P. Sterner
Richard N. Carroll	Raymond Y. Irby	Edward E. McClure	Melvin G. Swanson
Wesley Calkins	Woodrow W. Jackson	Alton R. McCoy	Donald D. Triplett
Glen A. Chambers	Oscar L. Johnson	Amos H. McKee	Crady Triplett
Gordon W. Chapman	Robert C. Jones	John C. McKinney	Paul D. Tynan
Albert J. Charboneau	Donald D. Lienholz	John R. Morris	arry H. Wegeleben
Tyler B. Coplen	James W. Kenney	John H. Morse	Victor H. Westrand
William D. Courtright	Gerald C. Kenyon	Ruben H. Okert	David L. Williams
Harold W. Cromwell	Robert E. Keyser	Walter D. Ormsby	John C. Seeley
Robert D. Crosier			

ATTACHED

Curtis W. Davison	Frank J. Prudents	Benjamin R. Spray*	John C. Seeley*
Owen D. Hoisington	Sanders Shank		

MEDICAL DEPARTMENT DETACHMENT, 116TH OBSERVATION SQUADRON (Felts Field)

Captain John W. Epton

SERGEANT

John D. Wollaston

CORPORALS

Robert. R. Kroske

PRIVATE FIRST CLASS

Conrad D. Jarvis

PRIVATE

William A. Maye

PRIVATES ATTACHED

George Solberg*
Carl A. Suriano

Carmine J. Suriano*

Floyd P. Taylor

Thomas W. White

248TH COAST ARTILLERY (HARBOR DEFENSE) (Tacoma)
ROSTER OF OFFICERS

Colonel Alfred W. Mciorris

LIEUTENANT COLONELS

Robert W. Forbes

William E. Patrick.

Howard Wright

MAJORS

Scott S. Jones, MC

Robert O. Stone

CAPTAINS

Joe L. Aprill
Galvin A. Arpke
Neville R. Benoit
Walter E. Blacksmith

Myron L. Carr
Sigurd Grondahl
Clifford Halvorsen, MC

Robert E. L. Knapp
Richard B. Link, MC
John P. Pence

Miles A. Putnam
Walter V. Uhler
Walter F. Winters

FIRST LIEUTENANTS

Glenn W. Alderson
Charles W. Aufang
George L. Bell
Everett J. Cassell
Neil M. Cochran

Ralph E. Dever¹
Anderson R. Dunn, Jr.
Melvin A. Erickson
Errol O. Gehri
James F. Hamilton

Robert W. Harnott
Edward M. Keys
Melvin T. Leach
Albert Michel

Herbert W. Pollock
Donald O. Spoon
Malcolm P. Thomson
Carl W. Wood

SECOND LIEUTENANTS

Donald E. Davies
Walter E. Freeman
Paul I. Gamble

William N. Goodwin
Joseph C. Howard

Paul G. James
George B. Maxwell

Eustace A. Rustad
Melvin R. White

WARRANT OFFICER

Guy L. Stone

¹ DS Camp Perry, Ohio

HEADQUARTERS BATTERY, 248TH COAST ARTILLERY (HARBOR DEFENSE) (Aberdeen)

First Lieutenant Melvin A. Erickson

MASTER SERGEANTS

Paul W. King James E. Smith

FIRST SERGEANT

Howard M. Hoag

TECHICAL SERGEANTS

Lyle B. Kenyron Stanley S. Smith Gordnn E. Williams

STAFF SERGEANTS

Allan W. Grant Henry L. Kalinowski George Millen Samuel R. Pearsall
Kenneth G. Horton Norman I. Mehus

SERGEANTS

Robert P. Bocek Beauford C. Johnson Frederick B. Morill Robert W. Waterston, Jr.
Duane H. Cheney Rolland M. McDonald John D. Vekich

CORPORALS

Edgar L. Bedell William Martin Leslie E. Rowe Gordon Q. Smith
James T. Jones Fred E. McFeely Wenceslaus C. Sevcik Michael H. Zabiaka
Ralph F. Krantz Donald W. Murphy

PRIVATE FIRST CLASS

Harry E. Bacchus William E. Davis Jack D. Napper Edward M. Orkney
William E. Barker George O. Gidland Theodore D. Nielson Howard S. Ranum
Robert A. Bixler Walter F. Hall James R. Oleson Alexander W. Rosefrantz
Oscar P. Brunstad Dale R. Miller Richard V. O'Neill Harold B. Sherry
Henry C. Clayton

HEADQUARTERS. BATTERY, 248TH COAST ARTILLERY (HARBOR DEFENSE) CONT'D
(Aberdeen)

PRIVATES

David D. Auer	Kenneth E. Ford	Donald R. Kitchin	Per R. Rosen
Kenneth A. Baker	Donald Fosburg	Alfred Leohner*	Joe J. Salituro
Dewey W. Balcombe	Leslie Gill	Frank Lupo John	W. Schumacher
Forrest W. Balcombe	Joseph B. Ginsberg	John E. McGuire	Willis B. Selezenne
Herbert A. Brinker	Henry L. Goodman	Russell W. McMillan	Everett H. Sheppard
Albert N. Bruneau	John L. Graham	Earl L. McMinn*	Edward J. Silva
Charles L. Bunch	William W. Harris*	Machael A. McPhee	Merl C. Snyder*
Rayand Callaghan	Clifford E. Hawkins	Steve J. Millen	William H Soller, Jr.
John P. Chemeres	Bruno R. Henke	Leonard R. Monte	Arvard L. Stolp
Clarence Chessman	Dan A. Hogberg	John W. Morrison	Lionel V. Thomas
Robert W. Clubb	Howard H. Hopkins	Francis G. Moses	Earle D. Thompson
Joseph B. Corman	William A. Houghman	John P. Neilson	Louis D. Thorson
George E. DeWitt, Jr.	George H. Inglin, Jr.	Joseph Nieradzick	Fred N. Vardon
William A. Drum	Hubert F. Jasper	Joseph A. Nieradzick, Jr.	Andrew C. Vekich
Gordon D. Duncan	Rollin H. Jasper	Henry W. Ostrom	Homer K. Warner
Joseph I. Edinger	Earl M. Jones	Henry R. Parker	Jack K. Wiley
Edgar M. Eldred	Paul S. Jones	William J. Rand	Earl W. Wright
Pete N. Eliolpoulos	Robert E. Kesterson		

BAND, 248TH COAST ARTILLERY (HARBOR DEFENSE) (Tacoma)

First Lieutenant Anderson R. Dunn, Jr.

TECHICAL SERGEANT

Andrew R. Diamond

STAFF SERGEANT

Charles J. Kramer

SERGEANTS

William D. Anderson Marshall L. Dowling John A. Newcum Wilford H. Smith

CORPORALS

William J. Gammon Richard J. L. Long

PRIVATES FIRST CLASS

Dean C. Daughtry	Phillip C. Meyer	Richard D. Palmer	William R. Stack
Robert A. Etherington	Warren M. McCleod	Theodore P. Picard	Richard C. Taylor
Charles C. Jones	Erick W. Nelson	Herman Schweizer	Rudy J. Talso
Richard W. Lang	Carl V. Nelson	Lloyd E. Scott	William E. Walker
Harold F. Meyer			

PRIVATES

Wyet J. Fogel Willard H. Mcmenhall

SEARCHLIGHT BATTERY, 248TH COAST ARTILLERY (HARBOR DEFENSE) (Tacoma)

Captain Neville R. Benoit

MASTER SERGEANT

James D. Farrell John M. Galloway Clarence J. Turner

FIRST SERGEANT

Cecil T. Sellinger

TECHICAL SERGEANT

Ruling F. Bowles

STAFF SERGEANTS

Richard D. Billings Clarence A. Gaisford Charles H. Tally Warren E. West
James F. Bryan Gerald R. Pease

SERGEANTS

Prentiss E. Bament Alexander N. Cootsona Robert H Palmatary Dale D. Whitney
Francis L. Bowers Robert J. Martin Raymond N Shropshire

CORPORALS

Roy S. Bowles Lee C. Langdon Gilbert A. Paul Eugene T. Tomasié
Halvard T. Hansen

PRIVATE FIRST CLASS

Melvin A. Aumann Paul L. Froman Robert J. Miller Foster B. Radcliffe
Richard W Bendickson Gerald A. Hewitt Robert C. Newton Louis J. Shaw
Edward C. Carr Conrad C. Holmstrom Jay A. Norton William L. Simpson
Myron L. Carr John L. Lockwood Herbert A. O'Keefe William W. Wischemann
Herbert L. Foster Michael J. McDaniel Roy C. Presler

PRIVATE

Henry C. Ausbun Leonard J. Espedal Sam L. Heritage Ivar E. Ostland
Harry E. Ball Lawrence M. Ganes Fred W. Kinsey Harry Palmer
Jack P. Bashey Albert C. Gentilli Charles B. Law Verne R. Pease
Gale E. Bennecker Darrell D. Graham James S. Lawton Sherman W. Pethley
Francis G. Bowers Geyer B. Graham James Lammer Duane M. Rogerson
Richard T. Browning Robert C. Green Fred W. Matthews Bob Seeder
William H. Clifton Jack G. Grylls Ray H. Mathcws Lucas H. Sprinker
Warren G. Currah Ole T. Gunderson Pat W. McDaniel Conner L. Stamey
Lee David Clarence J. Hagstrom Harry E. Merritt Leroy C. Starr
James Davis Carl E. Hanks Vernon D. Mills Robert Z. Sweet
Horton D. Dennis Jack E. Harrop* Harry A. Moe Newton J. West*
Caesar Q. DeVita Kenneth E. Haugland Claude J Obenhofer Bob F. Williams
Clyde R. Dyce Joseph T. Heddinge Harry L. Okey Claimont B. Young*

MEDICAL DEPARTMENT DETACHMENT,
248TH COAST ARTILLERY (HARBOR DEFENSE) (Tacoma)

Major Scott S. Jnnes

STAFF SERGEANT

Vernon C. Melvin

SERGEANTS

Dominick Cusato

Ernest L. Fuhrmecister

CORPORAL

Leo A. Williams

PRIVATES FIRST CLASS

Robert W. Bailie
Fred R. Fredrickson

William S. Gailbraith

Berger Hagan

Marvin W. Kassomeier

PRIVATES

John R. Bliss
Harold R Blackwell
Mel vyn J. Coffman
Fred A. Cozad
Carl J. Engfer

Robert D. Farmer
Harold A. Field
Mack J. Fisher
Richard E. George
Roy H. Hillman

Edward M. Hochel
George Howard
Wendell D. Keyes
Wendell E. Knapp
Carter F. Miller

William W. Petrie*
William A. Poole*
Walter Schmidt
Wayne J. Teague
Horace H. Young*

HEADQUARTERS BATTERY, 1ST BN., 248TH COAST ARTILLERY (HARBOR DEFENSE)
(Aberdeen)

First Lieutenant Donald O. Spoon

STAFF SERGEANT

Charles W. Strode

SERGEANT

Sigurd Martin

CORPORALS

Edward E. Argent

Francis L. Seyler

PRIVATE FIRST CLASS

Arthur J. Purcell

PRIVATES

Stewart W. Amour¹

Charles F. Clark

Robert R. Church

Theodore Hedges

Richard A. James

Donald M. Lyons

Lyonel D. Lyons

James E. McFeeley

Farrish W. McGuire

Robert A. Miller

Austin H. Muon

Harold H. Walker

¹Enroute to join from Hawaii

BATTERY A, 248TH COAST ARTILLERY (HARBOR DEFENSE) (Port Angeles)

Captain Walter F. Winters

FIRST SERGEANT

Lloyd T. Brown

SERGEANTS

Bernard F. Baugh	Richard J. Cummings	Sidney W. Kidd	Joe K. Pickering
Charles L. Beam	Renex G. Fint	Albert G. Levesque	Norman S. Sather

CORPORALS

Gilbert C. Gallagher	Russell W. Heuhslein	Luthur L. Stetson*	Arthur E. Waldron
Aaron A. Gebhardt	Paul E. Poulsen	Charles R. Thompson	John F. Waldron
Edwin P. Gillespie	Frederick L. Ranger		

PRIVATE FIRST CLASS

Donald R. Burdick	Stanley M. Gallagher	Noman C. O'Day	Robert D. Taylor
Orin V. Burgman	William B. Gellor	Kenneth O. Page	Thomas R. Thompson
Delbert K. Daugaard	Joe F. Hart	Inge A. Rasmussen	Gifford I. Tiller
Augustine A. DelGuzzie	Richard J. Jones	ames O. Sneddon	Arthur L. Tobias
Provino J. DiCola	Lawrence P. McGrew	James E. Taylor	Ralph K. Weber
John E. Eltridge	Willie J. Morrish		

PRIVATE

Donald H. Arnold	Max L. Egli	Grant W. Herrick	Kenneth E. Mickelson*
Douglas M. Billey	John I. Epperson	Leroy E. Huff	Alvin W. Paulstick
Charles K. Beaver	Joseph E. Faires	Ralph C. Hunt	James F. Reed
Richad F. Bennett	William J. Faires	Harvey Hussey, Jr.	Howard I. Rittenhouse
Charles A. Boyd	Allan J. Forrest	Edward L. Hutchinson	Roy L. Sage
George L. Burdick	Frank O. Fountain	Leroy H. Jagger	Alfred J. Schell
James A. Cahill	Arthur N. Franklin	Gordon C. Johnson	Charles R. Shepherd
Norman D. Cahill	Raymond D. Gastman	Max F. Johnson, Jr.	Donald R. Short
Robert F. Cahill*	Bob C. Glass	Robert C. Johnson	Richard N Sommers
Felix F. Church	Richard H. Goin	Milton E. Johnston	Roy J. Sullivan
Lawrence L. Clayton	Arnold J. Gulstad	Jack A. Lafeman	Norman C. Svela
Ralph K. Cleland	Vernon H. Hahn	Alfred Marsura	Eugene E. Waldron
Harold K. Coon	Joseph M. Harley, Jr.	Brian J. McDonald	Ralph A. Ward
Eldon L. Drako	Jack E. Hayne	Howard D. McDonald	

BATTERY B, 248TH COAST ARTILLERY (HARBOR DEFENSE) (Mt Vernon)

Captain Robert E L Knapp

FIRST SERGEANT

Robert J. Johnson

SERGEANTS

Warren H. Bell
Maurice N. Bowron

Richard L. Callahan

George W. McMillen

Laurence E. Randall

CORPORALS

William D. Bailey
Hugh C. Butler

Alva R. Gaddis
Harold J. Jensen

Robert L. Lockhart
Ben W. Perry

Donald R. Rohweder
George A. Wilson

PRIVATE FIRST CLASS

Curtis R. Bengé
Ralph W. Birchfield
Robert L. Broome
William J. Brown
Axel R. Carlson
Horace B. Christy

Everett C. Ellestad
Kendahl H. Ellestad
Clifford A. Flanary
Fred Haddad
Ralph A. Hamilton

Lester W. Hanvey
Frank E. Hayden
Chester H. Haynes
Leonard G. Hudson
Donald G. Johnson

Clifford E. Magnuson
Victor L. Neff
Jack E. Northcutt
Neil B. Olmstead
Everett G. Trefry

PRIVATE

Kenneth W. Allen
Wesley W. Alm
Douglas E Beauchemin*
Norman F. Bell
Richard G. Bratz
Carl L. Busch
Chester B. Caling
Hugh E. Clark
Orville E. Clough*
Floyd W. Cozad
George E. Eckenberg
Ralph T. Ellestad
Arvid E. Erlarrison
Richard T. Esary
Paul E. Hanson
Albert M. Hansen

Robert L. Hansen
Garth T. Harvey
Carl L. Hayes
Clyde M. Helstrom
Eugene Hopkins
Donald W. Johnson*
Wilber G. Hughes
Russell B. Juckett
Robert W. F. Knapp
Robert D. Knowlton
Clarence W. Lammers
Donald M. Linistrom
James E. Locken
John D. Locken
Kenneth H. Loving

Dave McIlraith
Roy J. McMillen
Jack W. Mires
Everett L. Morgan
Bruce V. Munro
Lewis F. Neff
Harold E. O' Brien
Leslie E. Peck
John J. Pennig
Jack E. Rarey
Milton L. Reed
William W. Schultz
Ernest M. Shoemaker
Verle T. Simkins
Floyd Skogmo

Claudius M. Snowden
James F. Snowden
Luther F. Stancliff
Monte E. Strohl
Donald F. Swanson
Herbert M. Thomas
Roland L. Thomas
Kenneth G. Thompson
Clyde L. Tippie
Ronald R. Vroman
Bill D. Walker
Donald M. Welch
Dick Wicke
Wallace G. Wilson
Pete Zonneveld

BATTERY C, 248TH COAST ARTILLERY (HARBOR DEFENSE) (Snohomish)

Captain Joe L. Aprill

FIRST SERGEANT

Albert S. Douglas

SERGEANTS

Arthur W. Blake Harold C. Cochran Richard E. Cranmor Emory A. Ferguson

CORPORALS

Jack R. Barker Morton W. Phillips Rufus Shelkey Arthur D. Wentworth
Bruca W. Chambers Stanley I. Roth Lelam L. Wallace Lawrence F. Wickstrom

PRIVATES FIRST CLASS

Charles M. Amberson Donald N. Duckering Carl T. Moser Robert H. Scharf
Ben Boach, Jr. James A. Erickson Don R. Moser Jack E. Stobb
Charles K. Brooks Elden C. Hereth Lewis A. Patrick, Jr. Ralph W. Temple
William O. Davis Forrest D. Johnson David H. Plank Wayne E. Wren
Elmer R. Dubuque Warren M. Lord

PRIVATES

Michael J. Ahern George E. Dougherty Paul S. McKinney Ben L. Roberts
Leonard R. Akins Jack F. Dunbar John E. McClennan Warren A. Roberts
Donald A. Allen Erwin D. Farrell Alex D. Menzes Ruel A. Russell
Don R. Anderson Charles A. Gemmer Jack H. Meyer Theodore A. Sandvig
Norman M. Barnes Thomas A. Hammons Carl H. Mitchell Harvey M. Scharf
Jack B. Berry John B. Hatfield Henry J. Moser Melvin W. Schott
Robert J. Bird Florian L. Haufle Howard S. Patrick Robert W. Sherwood
Samuel M. Bishop Paul W. Heckel Harold R. Neil Melvin R. Shresbury
Lyle E. Buchanan John W. Hedlund William N. Neuman LeMar E. Snyder
Donald D. Campbell Milton A. Heiland Gordon R. Newell Norman Stobb
George Canonioa Ian R. Holt Frank W. Perry Emery B. Thompson
Robert A. Carlyle Philip J. Kelleher Devern C. Poier Arthur R. Vogel
Stuart B. Carlyle Gail S. Kelley Dick T. Rasmussen George M. Wale
William J. Cherry Jack A. Kester* Arthur F. Reinke Hector M. Whyte
Errol G. Compton Jack K. LaPlant Harvey J. Reinke Reginald T. Williams
Leslie D. Crawford Harry A. Lloyd Walter H. Reinke Harvey E. Winoski
Theodore R. Dean William F. Matthies

HEADQUARTERS BATTERY, 2ND BN., 248TH COAST ARTILLERY (HARBOR DEFENSE)
(Tacoma)

Captain Sigurd Grondal

FIRST SERGEANT

Owen S. Richards (DS Camp Perry)

STAFF SERGEANT

Raymond R. Tobin (DS Camp Perry)

STAFF SERGEANT

Orville Skidmore

William G. Smalley

SERGEANTS

Frank R. Gates

Steven A. Moreland, Jr.

Marion C. O'Dell

CORPORALS

Edward J. Bone

Harold L. Bradbury

PRIVATES FIRST CLASS

Cecil M. Brown

William J. Burkhouse

George G. Coombs

Wesley A. Harding

Richard F. Hubmann

Clarence H. Milso

George G. Neumeyer

Wilburt E. Pavors

Howard L. Wilson

PRIVATES

Wallace W. Bentley

Jim W. Brokaw

Charlie T. Drown

Kenneth P. Cooke

Clifford M. Garrett

Raymond C. Harding

Bob S. Haugland

Rolly C. Johnson

Tom Julio

Jack R. Pautzke

Francis R. Redding

Don M. Reed

Willard Sanford

Jack H. Schrick

Wayne M. Whitefoot

Bob L. Zelinsky

Donald K. Zelinsky

BATTERY D, 248TH COAST ARTILLERY (HARBOR DEFENSE) (Tacoma)

Captain Myon L. Carr

FIRST SERGEANT

William M. Munro

STAFF SERGEANT

Bruce D. Raymond

SERGEANTS

Richard W. Baker
John G. Berringer

Chris R. Geick
Robert G. Hurlbut

Gerald K. McKenzie

Richard M. Zigler

CORPORALS

William C. Dyer
John M. Haas

Frank L. Herbison
Gus R. Hubbard

Robert J. Kreuger
Roy W. Loper, Jr.

Gordon R. Wroth

PRIVATES FIRST CLASS

Lewis D. Cole
Wallace A. Dalrymple
Douglas C. Elms
Wilford O. Gecke
William F. Hager

Ralph J. Holt
Robert D. Jones
Robert F. Kelley
Jack B. Mansfield

Forrest W. McKernan
John R. Nelson
Albert J. Nigro
Robert V. Northcutt

Allen V. Reesman
Clarence R. Schorer
James F. Schweikl
Dan B. Stedman

PRIVATES

Arthur W. Anderson
Marvin A. Barnes
Donald E. Beckstcad
Paul A. Boisture
Omar J. Brennan
Bob L. Cabage
Lawrence K. M. Campen
Gene F. Cascone
Emal W. Chasteen
Albert B. Connard
Donald A. Corcoran
Leonard R. Farron

Robert W. Flippin
Albert M. George
Jerry T. Goodell
Robert W. Gustafson
Ernest Hontos
Roger L. Huggins
Dexter L. Hutton
Earl K. Lanskof
Elmer A. Last
John E. Loper
Patrick L. Mansfield
Samuel L. McClain

Thomas M. McCoy
Thomas J. McNally
Richard F. Messing
Gilchrist J. Nelson
Paul W. Newton
Glenn H. Northcutt
Terry A. O'Brien
Frank J. Phillips
Floyd C. Reno
ohn M. Roske
Lewis E. Sanford

Richard D. Seaton
Lloyd H. Sehlback
John F. Shields
Robert G. Simmons
Thomas T. Smith¹
Lind O. Stone
Jerry A Wamboldt
Russell C. Weber
George F. West
Maurice L. Wilkins
Olan L. Wingard

¹ Enroute to join from California

BATTERY E, 248TH COAST ARTILLERY (HARBOR DEFENSE) (Tacoma)

Captain Miles A. Putnam

FIRST SERGEANT

Raymond B. Herzog

STAFF SERGEANT

James C. Sykora

SERGEANTS

Frank V. Francis
William J. Getty

Frank I. Hurley
Ralph F. Mareno

James A. O'brien
Fultin C Robinson

Joseph C. Rykken

CORPORALS

Harold W. Burke
Dallas E Duppenenthaler
Eugene F. Herzog

William O. Hill
Donald K. Jacobson

George O. Kline
Kimball F. Phillips

Donald R. St Thomas
Hugh M. Will

PRIVATE FIRST CLASS

John Allmon
Lloyd Bates, Jr.
James D. Bovins
Kenneth C. Dahlberg
Frank V. Foote

Dahrold L Frakes
William J. Heckari
Charles E. Hollinger
Joseph A. Kneip

Marino J. Lenzi
Elmer M. Murphy
Thomas E. Parker T
Clifford H Quaschnick

Donald C. Robertson
Vernon Trim
Thomas A. Weick
Joseph E. Wittman

PRIVATE

Delbert C. Adams
Harold A. Adams
Robert E. Arnold
Walter W. Austin
Robert R. Bennett
Glenn D. Bragg
Alton F. Bullard
Albert S. Ganedy
Clarence E. Carter
Vern N. Clarkson
William J. Dahl
Lee H. Fisk
Dennis D. Foley*
Richard M Gilbertson
Clifford H Hartle
Jerome J. Herzog
Melvin J. Herzog

George E. Hiscox*
William L. Holler
James A. Johnson*
Fred H. Keller
Jack C. Kerr
Clifford A Koons
James A. Ledlie
Howard G. Lichtenwalter
Carl W. Lindstrom
Calvin M. Litch*
George D. Locke
Ivan M. Locke
Robert G. Luce*
James L. Main
Dale W. Marshall
John M. Miller
David D. Molitor

Thomas G. Molitor
Edward T. Odegard
James A. Olson*
Henry Orton
Phillip R. Pierce
Jack N. Rasler
Clifford H. Raver
James J. Reeves
Tony L Riconosciuto
Robert R. Ringwood
Paul E. Robb
William B. Robinson
Charles R. Ross
Eugene W. Ross
Kenneth E. Ross
Arnold C. Sandvig

Carl R. Saunders*
Robert C. Schattilly
Clarence W. Smith*
William R. Swift
Ernest P. Thoron
Vincent D. Trudnich*
Herbert L. Tucker
John J. Urdea, Jr.
Robert D. Walker
Leslie J. Webb
Eldru R. Webster
James M. Whitlock
Arthur R. Withrow
Cecil C. Wittman
John Wittman
Palmer L. Wright

BATTERY F, 248TH COAST ARTILLERY (HARBOR DEFENSE) (Tacoma)

Captain John F. Pence

FIRST SERGEANT

Bernie E. Foot

STAFF SERGEANT

Gilbert L. Pralmer*

SERGEANTS

Samuel M. Cusato
Celotus Henninger

Max W. Fick

Bill T. Jones

George Reibold

CORPORALS

Walter A. Chavet
Wesley W. Chilson
Gordon L. Covert

Joseph A. Errigo
Louis G. Errigo

Kearn O. Lacy
John S. McElroy

Fay H. Roberts
Bob M. Webb

PRIVATES FIRST CLASS

Nichols S. Brown
Harry H. Carino
Allen E. Craig
Charles D. Darraugh

Michael deRafael
Lowell N. Forsythe
Wilbert W. Haire
Ralph P. Hegdal

Krist Huseby, Jr.
Alexander D. Johnson
Victor Martini
Robert A. Rix

William H. Schaefer
Elwood R. Smith
Donald A. Wells

PRIVATES

Richard R. Adamson
Clair M. Anderson*
Henry R. Anderson
John H. Berry
Bion L. Bierer
Raymond C. Bottke
Harold G. Cairns
Harold A. Caton*
Raymond R. Carver
Walter C. Dahl
Kenneth L. Davis
Lester E. Doeden
Leslie E. Doyle
Eugene E. Edris
Donald J. Eidson
Frank Errigo
Wayne M. Firth

Roger W. Fisher
Clifford C Goranson
Eugene G. Greeno
Glenn Grounds
Charles A Henrickson
Warren L. Hinton
William L. Holder
Andy Holt*
Ray W. Hudson
Parry Jessup
Keith E. Julian*
Dewey W. Kirkland
Vernon P. Kirklin
Willard M. Kirmse*
Walter L. Kovalski
Joe M. Lloyd
Marvin J. McCray

Stanley G. McKenney
Thomas S. Manning*
Frank G. Marzano
Pete A. Marzano
Lee W. Metcalf
Richard C. Mitchell
Eldred J. Omundson
Robert W. Owens
Frederick M. Peck
Richard E. Phelps
George G. Phillips
Leo C. Pittman
Clyde C. Porter*
Charles B. Potter
Edwin A. Randol
James J. Robinson
Bill P. Sabourin*

Grover C. Scotton*
Albert Shirrel
Edward L. Sittler
Paul D. Sittler
John V. Slack
Ira L. Slyter
John J. Stewart*
Leonard O. Stuefen*
Jack J. Tangorra
Darrell R. Talkington*
John T. Totten
Loran R. D. Trumble
Melvin S. Virgil*
Donald E. Wiles
Jack R. Wilson
Kenneth M. Wirfs
Kirk E Worthington

Following the muster of the foregoing units into active Federal service, the Military Department of Washington issued the following General Order establishing the Washington State Guard:

Camp Murray, Fort Lewis, Washington
October 25, 1940

GENERAL ORDERS NO. 26

ORGANIZATION OF WASHINGTON STATE GUARD

1. Pursuant to the authority of the Act of Congress approved October 21, 1940, and Section 8464, Remington's Revised Statutes (Laws of 1917, Page 355), there is established, effective November 1, 1940, as a part of the Organized Militia of Washington, a home defense force, officially designated as the Washington State Guard. The Washington State Guard will be governed by the provisions of the Military Code of Washington.

2. The initial force of the Washington State Guard will consist of one regiment of Infantry , officially designated as "The Home Defense Infantry Regiment " , three separate battalions which are officially designated respectively the Home Defense Engineer Battalion", the "Home Defense Antiaircraft Battalion" and the "Home Defense Antitank Battalion, a Radio Intelligence Company, and a troop of Cavalry.

3. The Home Defense Infantry Regiment will consist of a Regimental Headquarters, a Headquarters Detachment, a Medical Detachment, and three battalions.

4. Each battalion of the Home Defense Infantry Regiment will consist of a battalion headquarters, a combined battalion headquarters and medical detachment and four companies.

5. The headquarters of the Home Defense Infantry Regiment will consist of one colonel, Commanding the regiment; one lieutenant colonel, executive officer; one major, supply officer; one captain, adjutant, and one chaplain.

6. The Regimental Headquarters Detachment will consist of one first lieutenant, one second lieutenant, one master sergeant, one first sergeant, one technical sergeant, one supply sergeant, two sergeants, two corporals, six privates first class, and ten privates.

7. The Medical Department Detachment will consist of one major, Medical Corps; two captains, Medical Corps; one first sergeant; two sergeants; two corporals; four privates first class; and four privates, Medical Corps.

8. Each battalion headquarters will consist of one lieutenant colonel, commanding the battalion; one major, executive officer; one Major, Medical Corps; one Captain, Medical Corps; one first lieutenant, adjutant (commands battalion headquarters detachment).

9. Each battalion headquarters detachment will consist of one first lieutenant, adjutant; one second lieutenant, supply officer; one first sergeant, two sergeants, two corporals, four privates first class, eight privates, Infantry; one sergeant, two privates first class, and four privates, Medical Corps.

10. Each company in a battalion of the Home Defense Infantry Regiment will consist of a headquarters section, a rifle platoon, a demolition and rescue section, a fire control section, and a first aid section.

11. Each company headquarters section will consist of one captain, one first sergeant, one supply sergeant, and two clerks.

12. Each rifle platoon will consist of one first lieutenant, four sergeants, six corporals, eighteen privates first class and thirty privates.

13. Each demolition section will consist of one first lieutenant, one sergeant, two corporals, three privates first class and five privates.

14. Each fire control section will consist of one second lieutenant, one sergeant, two corporals, three privates first class and five privates.

15. Each first aid section will consist of one second lieutenant, one sergeant, two corporals, three privates first class and five privates.

16. The Engineer, Antiaircraft and Antitank Battalions of the Washington State Guard will be organized with the same officers, non-commissioned officers, and enlisted men as is authorized for a battalion of the Home Defense Infantry Regiment.

17. The plan for organization and the assignment of stations for regiment and battalion headquarters, and units of the Washington State Guard, will be announced in subsequent orders.

18. Upon termination or the present emergency, or upon the relief from federal service and the return to State status of the organizations and units of the Washington National Guard now or hereafter ordered into Federal service, the Washington State Guard will be disbanded, and all officers and enlisted men thereof honorably discharged, as provided by federal and state laws, and the regulations issued pursuant thereto.

BY ORDER OF CLARENCE D. MARTIN, Governor and Commander-in-Chief:

MAURICE THOMPSON
Brigadier General, W.N.G.,
The Adjutant General

In his Biennial Report to the Governor for the period 1939-40 the following report dated November 1, 1940 covered the construction program of Armories and read substantially as follows:

“The Armory construction program commenced in the previous biennial period was carried to a conclusion with the completion of the following listed projects, showing the dates of completion and the total cost:

Location	Completed	Total Cost
Seattle	August 1, 1940	\$981,916.36
Olympia	May 1, 1939	\$149,963.62
Tacoma (remodeling)	Sept. 26, 1939	\$163,476.14

The foregoing buildings were constructed with a 45% grant in aid funds by the Public Works Administration and the balance was appropriated by the State Legislature.

With the completion of the armory construction program, this increased the number of armories owned by the State of Washington to thirteen. In addition to the State owned buildings, this Department has five leased armories. The location of the armories are as follows:

STATE OWNED	STATE OWNED	LEASED
Aberdeen	Pullman	Kelso
Bellingham	Seattle (2)	Mount Vernon
Centralia	Spokane	Prosser
Everett	Tacoma	Snohomish
Felts Field, Parkwater	Walla Walla	Wenatchee
Olympia	Yakima	

Construction of a 10 target pistol and skeet range has been completed at Felts Field. \$476.00 was allotted by the National Guard Bureau and the labor was furnished by the Works Progress Administration.

A parking lot of approximately 50, 000 square feet has been developed by filling and construction of retaining walls on the Bellingham Armory property. The installation was made by the Public Works Administration.

The three Regimental recreation buildings at Camp Murray, on which construction was commenced near the close of the previous biennium, have been completed at a total cost of \$47,934.28.

The riding hall with club rooms has been completed at a total cost of \$24,592.61, \$6,275.61 of which was State and the balance Works Progress Administration funds.

An elevated steel water tank of 75,000 gallons capacity was constructed and put into service for the 1940 field training camp with funds allotted by the National Guard Bureau, at a total cost of \$9,310.00.

There were completed on August 5, 1940, seven company mess halls and kitchens, six dry pit latrines, and three bath houses constructed of concrete masonry units, the total cost of which was \$40,702.50, \$17,423.50 of which was National Guard Bureau funds and \$23,279.00 Public Works Administration funds.

The Camp Murray field training camp is now occupied by troops of the 41st National Guard Division which was ordered to active duty during the past month (September 16, 1940)

The following General Order completed the muster into active Federal service of the remaining units of the Washington National Guard:

General Orders
No. 1

Camp Murray, Fort Lewis, Washington
January 20, 1941

**INDUCTION OF THE 205TH COAST ARTILLERY (AA) AND 103RD ANTITANK
BATTALION NATIONAL GUARD OF WASHINGTON, INTO FEDERAL SERVICE**

1. a. Pursuant to and in compliance with the provisions of Executive Order No. 8633, January 14, 1941, ordering certain units and members of the National Guard of the United States into the active military service of the United States , announcement is hereby made of February 3, 1941, as the effective date of induction of the 205th Coast Artillery (AA) ***** and February 10, 1941, as the effective date of induction of the 103rd Antitank Battalion *** .

The following is a listing of these units so inducted:

205TH COAST ARTILLERY (AA) (Olympia)
ROSTER OF OFFICERS

Colonel Edward C. Dohm

LIEUTENANT COLONELS

William R. Carroll

Frank M. Stocking

Clarence M. Tuck

MAJORS

Neil R. McKay

Carlton J. Powers

CAPTAINS

Raymond C. Alexander
Robert G. Clem
George S. Cook

Dudley D. Dohm
Leslie O. Fowles
Robert G. Haines

Victor G. Hines
Carl W. Kruegal
Claude A. Kunz

Ensley M. Llewellyn
Cecil G. Remington
Maurice W. Williamson

FIRST LIEUTENANTS

Allen K. Bowlin
Moritz D Brakemeyer
James ?.Clark
Fredrick R. Convery
William F. Derrick
Karl W. Dittrich

John R. Donohoe
John T. Evans
Ervin Z. Fredricks
William S. Fu1tz
Arthur W. Hardy
George M. Haskett

Edward E. Llewellyn
Francis E. Martin
William C. McClure
Thomas C. Miller
Bernard T. Nacht
Nelson B. Neff

Walter W. Remy
Arthur W. Ries
Jack G. Sweek
Robert S. Wallace
Arthur G. Weisfield
John M. White, Jr.

SECOND LIEUTENANTS

Paul A. Anson
John F. Arthur, Jr.
Robert D. Baker
Albert S. Bothell
Charles K. Denton

Thomas J. Fleming
Carl K. Frost
Norton J. Gregory
Gerald J. McGuire
John K. McCormick

ohn H. Pindell
Robert D. Rutherford
Dan J. Selgwick
Hilton R. Tichenor
Harry L. Troutman

Howard R. Wall
Fred D. Walters
John Whitfield
Bert A. Williams, Jr.

MEDICAL DEPARTMENT DETACHMENT

Major Harold D. Lillibridge

CAPTAINS

Harvey D. Dingham

Maxwell R. Hunter

FIRST LIEUTENANT

Stuart R Groves

James H. Terry, Chaplain

WARRANT OFFICER

James F. Yenney

HEADQUARTERS BATTERY, 205TH COAST ARTILLERY (AA) (Olympia)

Captain Dudley D. Dohm

MASTER SERGEANTS

Edwin E. Davenport

Allan G. Fisher

Ted A. Randall

FIRST SERGEANT

Vern L. Dorsey

TECHNICAL SERGEANTS

Irwin W. Dorland

Reve D. Phillips

STAFF SERGEANTS

Cyrus A. Dimmick
George N. Eidemiller

Norman J. Kegley
Walter P. Miller

Malcolm E. Schoppe

Wesley R. Strange

SERGEANTS

Ray C. Brown
Charles Hedges

Lawrence J. Lothspeich
Charles E. MacCannell

Robert B. MacCannell
Robert J. Maynard

Willard E. Spencer, Jr.

CORPORAL

Max W. Bower
Merle G. Broyles

Richard A. Diamond
Douglas D. Giles

Cyril E. Hagerty
Murillo B. Nicholson

Arvid W. Shoblom
Robert G. Woodard

PRIVATES FIRST CLASS

Lyle K. Arney
Oscar J. Barclift
Wayne W. Bolton
Jack S. Boss
Edwin R. Dorsey

Albert Elhardt
Bob Finney
John D. Heimel
Robert D. Johnson
Melvin D. Long

James C. McGovern
Roy C. Petty
Theodore Roth
Clyde R. Schwartz
Robert H. Sherman

Roy D. Strange
Vern S. Thunberg
Floyd P. Torner
James H. Way
Floyd A. Winfield

PRIVATES

Robert L. Akers
Robert W. Baarstad
Erlward N. Bates
Robert O. Bennett
Albert F. Brucker
Wayne L. Bunce
Fred D. Chesnut
Fred F. Chitty, Jr.
Arthur A. Elhardt
Thomas C. Elwell
Robert A. Gilhus

Dick R. Goetsch
John A. Goudy
Edward L. Grayson
Lyle W. Hart
Arnold G. Horton
Wes B. Horton
Bob J. Hull
Kenneth W.
Ray L. Johnson
John J. Kellogg J
Eugene L. Moore

Harry E. Norman
Harold L. Osborne
Robert L. Petty
Charles W. Porter
Jerry F. Powe
Bert C. Pratt
Alton C. Ray
Jensen Lyle C. Ray
Walter Roth
ohn L. Sanders

Jules W. Seymour
Bob M. Shumate
Lyle V. Stedman
Harley C. Waldrick
Bob M. Way
Jerome D. Whalen
Sam H. Windust
John W. Winsborough
Don J. Young
William H. Youngblood

BAND, 205TH COAST ARTILLERY (AA) (Olympia)

Captain Cecil G. Remington

TECHNICAL SERGEANT

Stewart W. West

STAFF SERGEANTS

Warren A. Riggin

STAFF SERGEANTS

Walter E Chamberlain Carl B. Nommenson Raymond E. Simmons Cornelius Theriault

CORPORAL

Payton A. Laspa

PRIVATES FIRST CLASS

Gay R. Haskin Jess W. Linton George M. Maroe William H. Waisdepp
Robert J. Hess

PRIVATES

James B. Alvord Harold G. Bigelow Cyril W. Lane Clarence E. Sylvester
Robert L. Alvord David S. Hume Raymond W. Ovington, Jr. Lewis A. Williams
Lee J. Barstow Fred E. Jennings David A. Phillips Forest B. Willis
Wallace L. Barstow

HEADQUARTERS BATTERY & AMMUNITION TRAIN,
1ST BATTALION 205TH COAST ARTILLERY (AA) (Seattle)

Captain Claude A. Kunz

FIRST SERGEANT

George W. Barber

STAFF SERGEANTS

Tom E. Clarke Harris S. Yeates

SERGEANTS

Roy C. Fassler James J. Newman Gordon C. Young

CORPORALS

Claude T. Meredith Lyman L. Riley

PRIVATES FIRST CLASS

Robert E. Baker	William P. Brothers	Hughes L. Pritchard	Robert W. Young
William S. Barthrop	Frederick N. Mallett	Harold D. Wyborney	

PRIVATES

Edward W. Berg	Charles M. Garrett	Donald B. Nagle	Mihiel J. Thomson
Richard N. Caton*	John R. Hallstein	Glen E. Neal	Ray V. Vorhees
Robert E. Cavanaugh	John R. Hanifen	Robert E. Olney	Robert E. Waugh
William K. Curry	Charles B. Hanify	Gordon T. Robinson	Robert L. Whetsell
Bruce A. Ewalt	William N. Krause	Paul D. Scotford	Rex R. Wyborney
Franklin L. Fowler	Robert C. Livingstone	Edwin G. Thompson	

BATTERY A, 205TH COAST ARTILLERY (AA) (Seattle)

Captain George S. Cook

FIRST SERGEANT

Ellis A. Ream

TECHNICAL SERGEANT

John A. Edward

STAFF SERGEANTS

Dwight A. Miller

Clyde W. Woods

SERGEANTS

Albert Beal

Thomas C. Brattin

William J. Dapp

Howard E. Fawcett

John H. Haakenson

Laurence A. Hansen

Jack J. Mills

Robert C. Turpin

CORPORALS

Gaither E. Baker

William W. Burdette

Henry M. Nelson

Russell H. Nelson

Roland L. Stewart, Jr.

Clay O. Willcockson

PRIVATES FIRST CLASS

Robert R. Auld

Tom F. Barrett

Donald C. Bassett

Curtis L. Bilbrey

Kenneth J. Bryant

Robert C. Burton

Kenneth A. Etter

John J. Fiatti

Bob Gazay

Roger E. Gratias

William H. Hackett

Robert S. Lewis

Edward R. Martin

Ralph K. Mast

Kenneth G. Nordquist

John C. Parkhurst

Clyde D. Pheasant

Paul West

Dale S. Young

PRIVATES

Woodbury M. Abbey, Jr.

Archer V. Ackerman

Cecil Adams

Russell E. Alley

Harold M. Allison

Robert G. Almquist

Robert C. Bailey

Thomas R. Beagle

Ralph R. Beamer

Ray C. Berglund

Robert M. Bolman

Jack L. Bowner

Frederick R. Brinegan

Irving Broches

Frank Clay

Alfred B. Cratty

Clair E. Dearing

Mitchell M. DeFilippis

James A. Dentler

James G. Duffy

Terrence F. Duffy

John Y. Ellison

Earl W. Fisher, Jr.

Courtney W. Fleming

Orval C. Fleming

Frans Fransen

Justin E. Gardner

Richard B. Gaston

Thomas E. Glover

Marian H. Gower

Robert C. Graham

John R. Heathcote

Frank G. Hedington

Bert H. Hennagir

John H. Hesse

John W. Hopkins

Fred N. Horspool

Clifford H. Johnson

Ted D. Johnson

Glen A. Jones

Arlie G. Kerr

John H. Kinne

Alvin C. Klotz

Willie K. Knoepfle

Albert L. Kramer

Oliver T. Lawrence

Harvey O. Lightner

George W. Lindahl

Truman R. Lord

David H. Loves

James A. Malesky

Wallace E. Matheson

Lester R. Maxfield

Clarence F. McDonald*

Marvin M. McIntosh

Fred M. Mickley

Robert C. Morris, Jr.

Winton L. Myers, Jr.

Samuel E. Naslund

Francis R. Nelson, Jr.

Joseph F. Neukirchert, Jr.

George R. Nickell

Jack L. Nickell

James R. Norman

David R. Orme

William J. Otani

Leonard W. Pay

Victor P. Penski

Harold E. Pierce

Robert G. Pierce

Harry G. Poole

Floyd J. Pottenger

Miles J. Price

Douglas J. Ramsey

James J. Reilly

Herbert R. Robison, Jr.

John C. Ross

Phillip R. Rupprecht

Richard N. Schwenk

Harry D. Sellman

Arnold J. Shold

Ballard J. Smith

Herman A. Suess

Jack M. Tooker

Burke A. Towey

David E. Turner

Clyde E. Warren

William Weber

Norman H. Weinard

Donald K. White

Owen T. Williams

Van Williams

John K. Williamson

Charles E. Wyke

BATTERY B, 205TH COAST ARTILLERY (AA) (Seattle)

Captain Raymond C. Alexader

FIRST SERGEANT

Owen I. Powell

STAFF SERGEANTS

Russell F. MacDonald

SERGEANTS

James K. Amendo
John M. Britten, Jr.

Errol H. Buxton
Norland Cook

Arthur Hirst
Dick V. Johnson

Donald F. Lind

CORPORALS

Harold J. Bakken
Wayne E. Boutilier

Thomas P. Broderick, Jr.
Marvin P. Healy

Ronald R McFarland
George W. Murray

Robert H. Wandesforde

PRIVATE FIRST CLASS

John L Crosthwaite
Charles H. Dehring
Bruce D. Fowler
Bert H. Heinsch

Walter R. Johnson
Martin E. Lowe
George B. MacBride
Gordon D. Mann

Harry W. Marshall
Harold H. Olsen, Jr.
John N. Parker
Tonnis H. Prins

Harry W. Shaw
Robert L. Snellman
Robert C. Thompson

PRIVATEES

Robert F. Ashurst
Thomas H. Baker
Kasper G. Benson
Edmund R. Bowden
Richard P. Brattain
Martin Bredvik
Philip M. Carlson
Tom J. Carroll
Robert L. Chase
Robert N. Chommie
Eurgene A. Cole
Clifford E. Collier
Harold J. Conroy
Theodore E. Daniels
Lee A. Davies Jr.
James J. Davis,
John A. Decker

Andrew E. Dennis
Foster DeWitt
Dick M. Dickson
John W. Dunn
Doss B. Elliott, Jr.
Phillip R. Frye*
William S. Gaskill
William R. Harris
Clarence R. Henley
Howard L. Howard
Ernest L. Johnson
Fred A. Kammeyer
Robert E. Kavaney
Robert J. Kintzle
Herbert H. Krein
Larry V. Linnell

Robert P. Lockhart
Gordon C. MacPherson
Robert H. Madden
Dale W. Matthews
William E. Meenach
George M. Michael
Gerald D. Mjelde
Henry R. Morgan
Rudolph S. Nelson
Victor C. Nelson
Charles L. Neubert
Carl A. Newman
William D. O'Brien
Michael D. O'Leary
William J. Oliver
Charles E. Ostberg

Allen G. Ostrom
Robert G. Pechiney
Asa W. Pentecost
Carl W. Peterson
Earl A. Poirer
Eugene D. Rose
Marvin A. Saxwold
Frank E. Schatzer
Robert G. Shildmyer
Howard W. Stoefen
Melvin A. Stratisk
Roy E. Sutherland
Merle B. Williams
Richard E. Wilson
William J. Wirths
George W. Wood

BATTERY C, 205TH COAST ARTILLERY (AA) (Seattle)

Captain Maurice W. Williamson

FIRST SERGEANT

Henry A. Bertram

STAFF SERGEANT

Arthur Mousset

SERGEANTS

Arthur G. Duston	Kenneth J. Kerr	Donald C. McGuire	Donald C. McKean
Philip H. Elsberry	George F. LaMaine	Lawrence A. McGuire ¹	

CORPORALS

Vern C. Campbell	Donald L. Dunnett	Richard I. Herz	Sherman McLaughlin
Richard D. Davenny	William H Finigan	John R. Klabo	

PRIVATE FIRST CLASS

Robert W. Braas	Emil W. Heye	Stephan C. Paine	William D Sherwood
Gordon D. Christopher	John Jackson	Thomas A. Payne	George C. Smith
Robert Cowan	Edward L. Loomis	Edwin G. Primley	Donald A. Wells
James F. Foy	Denny A. Nixon	Russell W. Sebring	

PRIVATEES

Earl D. Ammerman	Charles X. Gagnon	Arthur J. Kerr	John F. Smith
Joseph Amundsen	Forest S. Gibson	Leonard D. Kolb	Ralph W. Smith
George C. Arness	Willard H. Goetz	Bernard J. Loomis	William L. Sovey
David L. Bloxham	George D. Greer	Harold K. Malcolm	Rolland C. Stephens
John E. Clark	Bertil G. Hallberg	Clifford F. McGhee	James B. Stjerne
John M. Clark	Earl C. Harris	Cecil G. McGuire	Vance W. Swanson
Thomas A. Coffey	Robert C. Hatch	Roger A. McGuire	Jack L. Sweet
Robert W. Daley	Richard D. Hatt	Robert F. Mulnix	Don W. Walker
Douglas S. Donaldson	Lawrence A. Herold	Lawrence R. Peterson	Frederick B. Watkins
Judson S. Engel	Danald F. Irvin	Tristram W. Phinney	John R. Watson
David D. Fisher	Gilbert A. Jarvela	Phillip E. Prince	Wallace D. Watson
Robert P. Frederickson	Phillip G. Kemp	Robert E. Sheelhan	David H. Williams
Austin W. Fury	William A. Kemp		

¹ DS Ft Monroe, Va., Attending Coast Artillery School.

BATTERY D, 205TH COAST ARTILLERY (AA) (Seattle)

Captain Victor G. Eines

FIRST SERGEANT

Robert C. Myers

STAFF SERGEANT

Milton S. Andrews

SERGEANTS

William D. Bair	Wilrord W. Failor	George E. Lough	Stanrod R. Schwartz
Jack H. Beam	Walter M. Joselyn	Fred M. Quistorff	

CORPORALS

Wilfred O. Boettiger, Jr.	Frank F. Dittrich	John W. Penix, Jr.	Carl I. Stokke
Marvin O. Bruton	Fred Forney	Vernon E. Sampson	

PRIVATE FIRST CLASS

Bill E. Brayton	Harold W. Hoskins	William A. Miller	Carl V. Shortridge
Grant M. Calhoun	Earl F. Lafine, Jr.	Stacy W. Pickering	Chet G. Tomkins
Virgil E. Elliott	Richard R. Mansfield	Harry C. Radosecich	Carl A. Walters
Richard O. Failor	Otto E. Mercklinghaus	George Safka	Kenneth G. Wright

PRIVATE

Carl G. Baker	Charles D. Fridlender	James F. McClenney, Jr.	Fred A. Singleton
Garfield L. Barnes	Joseph G. Garlock	William McGuire	Roy B. Smith
Fred R. Bertles	Bryan J. Gore, Jr.	Joseph B. Mesdag	George E. Stokes, Jr.
John A. Blethen	Richard E. Hanson	Jack P. Miller	Bill C. Stone
Walter L. Brooks	Albert L. Herrick	Charles B. Montgomery	Charles W. Stonestreet
Alex M. Brice, Jr.	Gilbert O. Hirzel	E. Peterson, Jr.	Edward M. Thornton
Yngve Englen	Ralph H. Hitchcock	John Quistorff	Peter Vachon
John W. Failor	Jack H. Hughes	Edward C. Raleigh	Robert D. Watson
Leslie R. Fillbrandt	Leonard S. Johnson	Melvin E. Ready	Bob K. Williams
Robert C. Finley	Ted H. Johnson	Maynard A. Rice	Carl L. Williams
Richard H. Fish	Charles L. Lee	Harold K. Riddell	Albert F. Wilson
Robert E. Flynn	John C. Lenzen	Ronald J. Robertson	George E. Wynne
Joel R. Foster	Edwin H. Lyle	Richard R. Roddick	

HEADQUARTERS BATTERY & AMMUNITION TRAIN,
2ND BATTALION 205TH COAST ARTILLERY (AA) (Olympia)

First Lieutenant William S. Fultz

FIRST SERGEANT

Vernon L. Alvestad

STAFF SERGEANTS

Rex G. Hayes

George L. Pifer

Ranger E. Travis

SERGEANTS

Joseph V. Spencer

Nelson J. Vaughn

Dennis J. Zeigler

PRIVATES FIRST CLASS

George R. Cowan
Don J. Jacobson

Jack W. Kreps
Louis M. Reder

Max H. Rich

Thomas E. Rosholt

PRIVATES

Robert W. Applin
George W. Bittman
Curtis E. Boone
Perry A. Bustrack
Donald J. Chum

John G. Curtindale
Charles K. Emerick
Everett J. Erickson
Benjamin H. Hamlin
Robert C. Jackson

Robert H. Johnson
Avery L. Knight
Raymond W. Martin
Stanley J. Mason
Westley R. Mohrmann

Robert P. Rockway
Leonard J. Schneider
James W. Sherfy
Preston O. Thomas
William G. VanWyck

BATTERY E, 205TH COAST ARTILLERY (AA) (Kelso)

Captain Robert G. Haines

FIRST SERGEANT

Wayne S. Aho

SERGEANTS

Thomas E. Amlong
Edward R. Bittner
Donald E. Cripe

Charles M. Day
Leonaed T. Hansen

Paul A. Jones
Leslie O. Johnson

Glen E. McCreary
Robert F. Pike

CORPORALS

Elmer W. Alter
William R. Alter

William C. Elder
George A. Lemiere

Virgil R. Mast
Jack V. McCutchan

Jack P. Mollohan

PRIVATES FIRST CLASS

Warren H. Alter
Charles H. Bovard
Maynard J. Bisson
Chesley M. Croco

Daniel G. Heckman
Mike Karlocich
James A. Minear
Forest W. Nye

Roger W. Poe
Gordon E. Richards
Vane F. Reid
LeRoy G. Schrack

Hilarion A. Seibert
Charles L. Underhill, Jr.
Donald S. Weber
Elmer L. Wright

PRIVATES

Dean R. Adams
Cleo C. Ammons
Leo L. Ammons
Lowell R. Arrington
Louis L. Belkely
Stanley R. Bodin
Robert B. Bornstedt
Theodore L. Bredt
Dale A. Cadwell
Arnold E. Canning
Hugh F. Canning
Frank V. Carroll
Arthur L. Clift
Herbert L. Copeland
John H. Couch
George D. Davis, Jr.

Richard A. Dietel
Gordon E. Deine
Martin A. Doyle
Ernest L. Dubke
Delbert A. Dukes
Harold L. Dutton
Harry B. Garnett
Bernard W. Gay
Roscoe H. Geiger
Sanford J. Grasseth
Roland K. Grecon
George L. Gregg
Edward R. Herbert
John W. Hobbs
John A. Hogarty
George W. Holt

James M. Holt
Charles E. Howe
Paul R. Ives
Keith G. Jacobs
Wyman A. Johnson
Oiva M. Kangas
Leonard V. Keller
Alfred Kelley
Robert C. Lewis
Robert W. Lovejoy
Stanley R. Lyon
Raymond J. Markovich
Edward A. Mitchell
Walter J. Mitchell
Harold B. Moore
William J. Nation

John E. Neely
Peter Niemi
Robert M. Peffley
George O. Perry
Rex C. Poe
Earl K. Reynolds, Jr.
Robert G. Shannon
Clarence R. Shepherd
Henry D. Smith
Anton Sudar
William L. Swetman
William P. Thread
Harry A. Troxel
Gerald V. VanHorn
Charley C. Whitney

BATTERY F, 205TH COAST ARTILLERY (AA) (Centralia)

Captain Robert G. Clem

FIRST SERGEANT

Oliver Perry

STAFF SERGEANT

Ernest L. Layton

SERGEANTS

Dee C. Deardorff
Charles C. Lawler

John L. Lawler
Herbert W. Mayhew

Vernon D. Throop

Clyde E. Wertz

CORPORALS

Clyde L. Ferrier
Jerry B. Kain

Thomas K. King
Jack A. Maybee

Howard J. Perry
Gus A. Peterson

Joseph B. Stoughton

PRIVATE FIRST CLASS

Manning J. Barber, Jr.
Milo R. Dawson
John E. Dugaw
Thomas J. Hallman
Murray A. Hill

Delbert L. Hoss
Danny E. Kain
Walter I. Larsen
Wilber E. Larsen

Bernard L. MacDonald
Harry D. Martin
Harold R. Pittenger
Ray O. Tibbs

John A. Venard
Guy L. Wilson
Kenneth L. Yates
Gerald A. Young

PRIVATE

Erskine E. Asher
Warren E. Bodda
Arthur F. Brown
James B. Browning
Earl R. Buck, Jr.
James E. Carey
Frank M. Cassidy
Gene K. Charles
Percy C. Connick
Warren E. Corp
Walter L. Czerwinski
Russell M. Dunn
Robert L. Early
Robert O. Eastman
Loren E. Fiscus
Simon H. Forinash
Douglas B. Fournier

Norwood A. Gallagher
Pat I. Gallagher
Lloyd E. Goff
Harold S. Hanson
James R. Harris
Albert E. Harrison
Richard R. Hearn
Dale D. Hill
Ralph W. Hogan
Russell L. Holmberg
Donald Hugh
Lawrence C. Johnson
John A. Jones
Charles C. Kain
George D. Kain, Jr.
Larry U. Kindle
Edwin M. Knoll

Alden H. Lightfoot
Milton S. Lightfoot
Harold N. Lockmiller
Ralph W. Lyons
George F. Mabary
Earl B. Mandery
John H. Mandery
Leonard C. McIntire
William C. Miner
Jay K. Moore
George J. Murphy
Ralph E. Myers
Theodore Rankin
Vaden F. Richards
Harlen H. Roberts
Ellsworth J. Robinson
Jerome J. Saubers

Joseph V. Sawina
Charles N. Searles
Kenneth E. Short
Paul A. Siefner
Alfred E. Smith
Robert L. Smith
Chester J. Snavely
Robert R. Sturdovant
Raymond J. Thayer
George H. Throop
John I. Throop, Jr.
Loyst M. Towner
Leon P. Tyres
Walter Urban
Tex B. Warren
Clarence E. Young
Edward M. Young

BATTERY G, 205TH COAST ARTILLERY (AA) (Tacoma)

Captain Ensley M. Llewellyn

FIRST SERGEANT

Owen W. Loinbach

STAFF SERGEANT

Ralph L. Baker

SERGEANTS

James J. Bruce
Manfred J. Manning

Donald P. Nolan
Ernest R. Slater

Thomas H. Vizzard

Richard J. Weber

CORPORALS

Carl A. Anderson
Richard M. Gilman

Clarence G. Hall
Robert D. Henry

Richard L. Metzger
Thomas H. Robbloe

Leonard L. Sass

PRIVATE FIRST CLASS

Paul A Aldrich
Sidney F. Castle
Charles W. Crosby
Louis D. French
Donald E. Gehri

Jordan R. Hungerford
Robert L. Kelchner
Lloyd M. Landwehr
Peter E. Leonard

William P. O'Rourke
Donald M. Palmer
Norman M. Sanders
George A. Schaller

Lorne A. Scoggin
Robert D. Stocking
Verne J. Wilkins
Theodore R. Wiswell

PRIVATE

Emmett J. Akers
Nick Ananias
John R. Anderson
Willard W. Anderson
Clark R. Bigelow
Charles W. Ducher
James E. Carlin
Wayne M. Carpenter
Stanley G. Cole
William F. Delan
Arthur P. Erdahl
Elmer O. Erickson
Robert S. Evans
John P. Farrell
Robert C. Frazer

Thomas J. Galloway
Pericles L Ginnis
William K. Glenn
Robert W. Glueck
Marshall P. Grassly
Ray C. Grilley
Berthel A Hammerstrom
Robert J. Hayes
Clarence J Hildebrant
William M. Hurfman
Howard O. Huggard
Erling S. Johnson
Leslie E. Johnson
Harry W. Jones
Larry J. Jones

Alba E. Lapham
Warren E. Lasley
Frederick F. Lee
Robert L. Lester
Louis R. Lindeman
Buster T. Longe
George F. Marchesini
William M. Mathias
James R. McClymont
Gerald S. Mobley
Cyril Nomec
Robert D. Oby
Albert S. Parker
Barnard M. Pedderson

Raymond R Rassmussen
Charles V. Richter
Harold C. Roney
Herbert C. Sather
Charlie L. Schell
Harold L. Snelson
Louis N. Stephenson
Everett F. Stimson
Henry E. Trusler
Willis G. Varner
Arnold P. Vitol
Eugene A. Wehrkamp
Charles F. Wieme
Raymond M Wolniewicz

BATTERY H, 205TH COAST ARTILLERY (AA) (Wenatchee)

Captain Karl W. Kruegel

FIRST SERGEANT

Phillip E. Murray

STAFF SERGEANT

Robert B. Sheppard

SERGEANTS

Buford B. Blankenship	James B. Kerstetter	Cecil A. Richardson	Wesley C. Straub
Everett C. Ganzman	Edwin V. Langdon		

CORPORALS

Donald E. Cusens	Eldene M. Ferguson	Daniel R. Linder	Fred Schille
Charles R. Dorn	William C. Lentz	Edwin M. Persall	

PRIVATES FIRST CLASS

Harold H. Bailey	Raymond C. Gullet	Clarence L. Salley	Gene Taylor
Spencer A. Blankenship	Norman H. June	Henry O. Sanford	Roy E. Taylor
Hoyt E. Calhoun	William E. Kozak	Gerald G. Simon	Robert L. Walker
Richard P. Cornell	Lindon Nolen	Howard W. Taber	Lloyd H. Wilhelm
Henry M. Galbraith			

PRIVATES

Arlen E. Babcock	Fredrick C. English	Jess M. Linkem, Jr.	Robert N. Russell
Cash C. Bailey	James S. Gibbs	J. B. G. Little John	R. E. Sandhop
Edgar Bailey	Charlie A. Gillespie	William H. Lull	Ansel F. Seaman
David E. Baird	Edward K. Godfrey	Archie R. Manson	Archibald Schille
Quentin C. Barnes	Belvin E. Gollaher	Delbert T. Manson	Horace P. Simmons
Osgood U. Barry	Harvey W. Green	Marcus M. Marcuson	Walter I. Simmons
Eustace J. Ballard	Harold K. Gregg	George G. McArthur	Floyd E. Smith
Norbert L. Benson	Joe E. Hartl	William R. McCoy	Lloyd O. Snyder
Frank E. Berdan	Fred N. Hathaway	Tom W. McDonald	Robert D. Snyder
John E. Bonwell	Richard Hauswirth	Walter W. McKee	Louis M. Spees
Everett W. Booth	Floyd M. Henderson	Glenn I. McLaughlin	Charles E. Spencer
John C. Braun	John T. Hoogterp, Jr.	Everett Morrow	Frederick A. Stehr
Lee A. Brooks	Duane L. Ireland	Hubert F. Murray	Clifford B. Strohm
Richard L. Brown	Arthur J. Ivey, Jr.	Gerald D. Newman	Orvis F. Swasey
Stewart A. Brumbaugh	John M. Jack, Jr.	Raphael L. Nichols	Victor M. Syring
Albert T. Carlson	LeLand R. James	Carl G. Obergh	Robert J. Umbarger, Jr.*
Fred Carpenter	John L. Jeffries	Grant Ogle	Robert O. Walker
Paul R. Certain	William A. Jeffries	James O. Palmer	Frank T. Walton
Joe E. Correy	Earl W. Jones	Palmer B. Pearson	Bernard J. Watson
Edwin H. Cook	Raymond E. Jergens	George H. Peters	Wesley G. Weide
Richard J. Courtway	Raymond F. Kelly	Lawrence E. Phillips	Roy O. Wenneberg
Ira L. Craig	Francis B. Kinnamon	Robert E. Rayborn	Delbert E. Whitehall
J. V. DeWalt, Jr.	Vincent J. Klansnic	Harold M. Ream	Merton E. Whitehall
Melvin G. Dick	Ora A. Lagwig, Jr.	Howard E. Richardson	Frank T. Wieshaupt
Clarence D. Dicken	Royal T. Lane	Lawrence B. Richmond	Conrad T. Winn
Norbert F. Discus	Oliver W. Larson	Aubrey L. Rook	Robert S. Winn
Lyle C. Dillon	James R. Lethcoe	Warren D. Rosekrans	John A. Wiren
Ivan R. Dinwiddie	Joe Lewis	Howard L. Roth	Carl F. Woolett

MEDICAL DEPARTMENT DETACHMENT, 205TH COAST ARTILLERY (AA) (Olympia)

Major Harold D. Lillibridge

STAFF SERGEANT

George I. Walters

SERGEANTS

Paul M. Levesque

Ronald C. Fowey

PRIVATES FIRST CLASS

Herbert W. Barber
Dick E. Cehlerich

Donald W. Tunison
Wayne E. Walker

Verrill E. Williams

Herschel L. Wright

PRIVATES

Alexander B. Armstrong
Lester M. Besse
Glenn O. June
Cliffrord L. Kellogg

George M. McCunn
Glenn R. McGee
Ralph V. Norman
Wallace M. Pierce

Bert Raymond
Donald L. Rahe
Jack A. Roberts
Paul E. Thurston

Warren E. Tunison
Ezra H. Vinson
Bryan E. White

HEADQUARTERS, 103RD ANTITANK BATTALION (Tacoma)
ROSTER OF OFFICERS

Lieutenant Colonel Charles W. Goodwin

CAPTAINS

Lilburn H. Stevens	Jesse L. Haire	Thomas H. St.Clair	Robert E Vandenberg
Mac B. Benjamin	Lawrence J. Nelson	Frank A. Lough	Lewis A. Convis

FIRST LIEUTENANTS

William M. Adams	Norman E. Goodman	Gordon McA Payne	William H. Stewart
Howard S. Kresky			

SECOND LIEUTENANTS

William A. Barner	Romain L. Hollis	Walter C. Olmstad	Charles A. Robbins, Jr.
Philip S. Dickey, III	Byron D. Keely	Arthur L. Poole	Robert E. Vollendorff
John B. Gerwig			

ATTACHED FOR DUTY

CAPTAINS

Harley W. Dryant

SECOND LIEUTENANTS

Donald T. Baker	Harold Buerstatte	William H. Nixon	Harold E. Townsan
Theodore A. Bordeaux	William K. Doherty	George F. Richard	Cecil L Vollendorff
Donald J. Browne	Edward J. Ellis	James E. Skewis	

HEADQUARTERS COMPANY, 103RD ANTITANK BATTALION (Tacoma)

Captain Thomas H. St.Clair

FIRST SERGEANT

Frank S. Aquino

TECHNICAL SERGEANTS

Thomas G Marzano, Jr. Harry Sellers Hugo E. Staake

STAFF SERGEANTS

George F. Maughan Norton H. Wells

SERGEANTS

Jack T. Cowan Ray J. Fiorino Daniel A. Kelly Carl H. Nelson
George E. Frank Benjamin F. Hall Fred C. Menicacci Gustave J. Witt

CORPORALS

William G. Ahearn Charles J. Colburn Will C. Kilde Carl J. Knecht
Augustus C. Barnett

PRIVATES FIRST CLASS

William T Armstrong Charles L. Hammesmith Donald D. Peterson David M Stokesberry
Edwin M. Balfour Lloyd M. Kvernivick Robert L. Robinson Ray A. Whiton
Robin T. Beardsley Fred L. Kolilis Otto C. Schenck Oriville P. Wick
Jack D. Boone len R. McCullogh Frank P. Stiltner Donald R. Wilhelm
Joseph G Fitzpatrick, Jr.

PRIVATES

Robert J. Addison Don L. Christilaw Raymond E. L. Landrath William V. Porter
Richard S. Beardsley James A. Clinton, Jr. George T. Loop Louis B. Riggio
Donald W. Bourgaize William F. Day William O. Martin Melvin W. Slyter
James A. Boyce Don L. Dumas John W. Merchant LeRoy R. Templeman
Glenn J. Brazil Frank H. Fuller Earl E. Michael Robert C. Thornburg
Lawrence K. Brown Morris P. Hals Ira E. Neitzel Peter F. Verene
James H. Butcher Robert J. Kelly Norman H. Neitzel John W. Vye
Everett L. Draden George E. Ketchum Leonard A Petersen James F. Wendt
William F. Colburn Edward L. Kreamer Odian A. Petersen

COMPANY A, 103RD ANTITANK BATTALION (Tacoma)

Captain Lawrence J. Nelson

FIRST SERGEANT

Leland M. Hebblethwaite

SERGEANTS

Thomas J. Bastrom	Joe Notaro	Robert M. Terrill	Kenneth R. Whitney
James V. Fox	Earle R. Sieber	Franklin K. Thomas	John R. Winslow

CORPORALS

Earl L. Breen	Vernon L. Frykholm	Charles E. Myrand	Philip B. Sulkosky
Robert D. Charlton	Houltan L. Hall	Joseph P. Rawlings	Kenneth S. Wickstrom
Harold A. Fisher	Arnold C. Jacobson	William C. Steiner	

PRIVATES FIRST CLASS

Wesley M. Beham	Oren T. Eikum	Carl J. Nosko	John F. Veitenheimer
Kenneth H. Blanchfield	James R. Fehey	Henry A. Peterson	William J. Wilkinson
Merle W. Bray	Harvey G. Johnson	Richard H. Ushur	

PRIVATES

William H. Barber	Arthur W. Erickson	Alton P. McAllister	Paul H. Schoeler
Elmer H. Bartlett	George A. Erickson	Paul H. McHugh	Julius Smeland
Charles O. Braman	Eugene E. Edwin	ack W. McClain	Stephen Strittmatter
Ray J. Brazil	Donald B. Hatch ¹	Melvin Moe	Leo E. Svoboda
Edwin E. Brenner	Earl W. Hendricks ²	Harvey D. Muir	Rudolph O. Thorsen
Walter H. Brock	Charles M. Hilton	Arthur E. Oen	Ellsworth W. Taylor
Arno R. Brosze	Emil A. Hilton	Wilber A. Oen	Frank T. Tratnik
John L. Brosze	Leonard Jackson	Raymond E. Otis	John M. Van Antwerp
John K. Clark	Ernest H. Jensen	Perry K. Pearson	Henry E Veitenheimer
Walter H. Cotter	Myrle R. Johnson	Frederick W. Peele	Leonard T. Wallin
Chester E. Dadisman	William H. Johnson	Miles K. Pond	Arthur I. Watt
Robert W. Davis	Herbert P. Latshaw	Melvin R. Sage	Eugene O. Wilson
Loren M. Dewey	Arnold R. Malde		

¹ AWOL since Feb 10, 1941

² Enroute to join

COMPANY B, 103RD ANTITANK BATTALION (Tacoma)

Captain Jesse L. Haire

FIRST SERGEANT

Orville R. Johns

SERGEANTS

Ervin W. Gust	Spencer M. Pitts	Edward W. Steele	Laurence E. Yeager
James R. Hays	Charles A Rosengren	Frank R. Strout	Robert C. Youngberg
Russell B. Hendricks			

CORPORALS

Frank A. Benedict	Ted A. Marker	Edwin F. Rohrbach	John P. Steele
Ralph J. Cowan	Arthur C. Morgan	Francis J. Rosengren	David E. Swanson
William D. Cowan	Robert R. Read	Gene H. Seaburg	Albert A. Zehnder
Joseph Lech			

PRIVATES FIRST CLASS

Arley M. Baker	Addison S. Hall	Orrin R. Larsen	Edward L. Preston
Donald C. Carroll	William C. Hawson	Claude McGlade	Robert T. Reeves
Harley L. Day	Fred D. Hollis	Donald L. Moak	Reay D. Richmond
Clifford C. Floberg	Melvin L. Johnson	Clare J. Normile	

PRIVATES

Leonard Bachman	George Kohut	Blois E. Prentice	Anthony Talik
Fred H Braithwaite	Paul Kohut	Elmer W. Rossback	Ralph H. Thomas
Lloyd M. Carpenter	Robert W. Kugel	Clyde E. Scharpf	Lowell Warren
Leonard Caskin	John B. Leaird	Anthony C. Sienkiowich	Joseph White
James A. Clifton, Jr.	Sidney L. Malen	Vernon L. Smith	Leon E. Wolf
Theodore W. Hendon	Ernest E. McKenzie	Walter H. Stephens	Herbert A. Young
Verdon L. Hollis	Donald W. Metzker	Walter Sucholas	

COMPANY C, 103RD ANTITANK BATTALION (Centralia)

Captain Lewis A. Convis

FIRST SERGEANT

George L. Swain

SERGEANTS

Garth D. Clisbe
Derrell M. Jenkins
Francis J. Paulus

Donald Peters
Richard H. Pratt

William M. Prunton
Victor A. Spurgeon

Donald W. Stringfellow
Victor R. Wyant

CORPORALS

Art B. Brock
Bob W. Davies
Russell B. Dean

William L. Denend
Arthur M. Gowin
Richard D. Harrison

Kenneth D. Hazelwood
Alvin L. Kellogg
Roy W. Misner

Roy W. Percy
Melvin J. Plumb
Clarence H. Sweuberg

PRIVATES FIRST CLASS

James K. Birk
Charles E. Chapman
Dennis D. Hogan
Roy H. Hosley

Dave R. Mathes
Milton G. McAtee
Alfred L. Morris
Bud L. Nelson

Keith L. Nordlum
Andrew E. Olson
Stanley R. Richardson

Ward D. Schmidt
William H. Springer
Robert C. Stork

PRIVATES

Albert L. Allen
Frank M. Ashbrook
Ernest R. Ayers
Joe F. Baxter
Albert E. Beebe
Robert P. Buchanan
Grant C. Buck
Louis W. Duke
Charles E. Ebby
William W. Edwards
Kenneth T. Gustin
Jesse G. Howard
Starling J. Jastram

Robert E. Johnson
William R. Johnson
Edward S. Johnstone
Clayton E. Klassy
Harold J. Knizek
Karl K. Konzen
Harold R. Labsch
Edward P. Lewis
Floyd Mars
Mervin E. McAtee
Robert H. Miller
Harold J. Misner
Milton S. Mizer

Vern T. Moravec
Wilbur F. Palmer
Edgar E. Payne
Ronald E. Peterson
Calvin Powell
James L. Pratt
Oliver A. Reppeto
Stanley A. Ryan
Donald E. Senter
Wilbur R. Smith
Clifford E. Spink
Leroy A. Stacey

Richard W. Stork
Clarence R. Sutherland
Clifford I. Sutherland
Gene H. Swasey
Jack P. Taylor
Francis E. Watson
Arthur L. Webster
Rolland J. Wegner
John A. Wilson
Bob S. Winter
John H. Wonderly
Robert R. Zorn

MEDICAL DEPARTMENT DETACHMENT, 103RD ANTITANK BATTALION (Tacoma)

Captain Mac B. Benjamin

TECHNICAL SERGEANT

Richard F. LaPore

SERGEANT

Will E. Bergman

PRIVATES FIRST CLASS

John C. Gordon

John L. Weibel

PRIVATES

Ted A. Bachman

Alvin S. Berg

Kenneth W Ingersoll

Sidney M Steele

In his report to the Governor and Commander-in-Chief, dated November 1, 1942, Adjutant General Walter J. DeLong (Brig. Gen., W.N.G.) stated as follows:

* * * * *

"At the close of the 1938-1940 biennium we found all divisional units of the National Guard the state, together with the state staff and detachment, inducted into federal service as a result of the so-called limited emergency proclaimed by the President leaving only the 205th Antiaircraft Regiment of Coast Artillery and the 103rd Antitank Battalion in state service. These latter organizations, however, soon followed the Antiaircraft regiment on February 3rd and the Antitank Battalion on February 10, 1941.

"Following the induction into federal service of these last remaining elements of the National Guard, there came a readjustment prior in which all federal property remaining in state control was transferred to army depots and all accounts with the federal government, both of property and finance, were balanced and audited. This period was also devoted to a systematic reorganization of The Adjutant General's Office and Armory personnel to conform to the changed conditions incident to a lessening of National Guard activities and the new duties imposed upon the Adjutant General's section by the establishment of state headquarters for Selective Service as the predominant activity.

"During this period of readjustment, however, it must not be assumed that departure of the state troops meant a complete cessation of National Guard clerical work. On the contrary, such work, and correspondence incident to the mobilization of more than 4,000 officers and enlisted men actually increased markedly during the following months and has continued actively up to the present time. It must be remembered that all officers and men so inducted remain members of the National Guard of the state and all changes in their status must be accurately recorded and transcribed to their master cards in the same manner as while they remained in the State service to which they revert upon termination of their tour of federal duty.

"The departure of our National Guard units left the state without any Military forces required by statutory law to be maintained as a safeguard against any contingency in which a military force under the Governor's sole control might become necessary to maintain or re-establish law and order, or to protect the persons and property of our citizens.

"The organization and activation of such a force now demanded early attention. Anticipating federalization of State National Guards, the Congress had already enacted a law authorizing the formation of State Guards. * * * .

"The increasing gravity of the international situation, however, made it too apparent that we could not hope for the early return of our National Guard to state control, and that the new state forces to be organized must be of a character to meet all possible demands of wartime conditions, if not indeed of actual invasion as well. * * * Accordingly, the force initially provided for (Gen. Orders No. 26, October 2, 1940, pages 166-167) was determined to be insufficient to meet the requirements and the orders were revoked. The new organization provided by General Orders No. 6, June 17, 1941 provided for one Provisional Regiment of Infantry to be known as the Fourth Washington Volunteer Infantry Regiment. * * * * On February 20, 1942, General Orders No. 5 was issued which established a Brigade Organization for the Washington State Guard and added the 5th Washington Volunteer Regiment to the State Guard. The total strength of this Brigade of Infantry was 150 officers and 4,000 enlisted men. Stations of the elements of these two regiments were as follows:

FOURTH WASHINGTON VOLUNTEER INFANTRY

Unit	Station	Unit	Station
Regimental Headquarters	Camp Murray	Company "F"	Tacoma
Service Company	Tacoma	Company "G"	Tacoma
1st Bn. Hq. Company	Seattle	Company "H"	Port Angeles
Company "A"	Seattle	3rd Bn. Hq. Company	Olympia
Company "B"	Seattle	Company "I"	Olympia
Company "C"	Seattle	Company "K"	Aberdeen
Company "D"	Seattle	Company "L"	Centralia
2nd Bn. Hq. Company	Tacoma	Company "M"	Kelso
Company "E"	Tacoma		

FIFTH WASHINGTON VOLUNTEER INFANTRY

Unit	Station	Unit	Station
Regimental Headquarters	Camp Murray	Company "F"	Walla Walla
Service Company	Unassigned	Company "G"	Unassigned
1st Bn. Hq. Company	Spokane	Company "H"	Yakima
Company "A"	Spokane	3rd Bn. Hq. Company	Everett
Company "B"	Spokane	Company "I"	Bellingham
Company "C"	Pullman	Company "K"	Mt Vernon
Company "D"	Mason City	Company "L"	Everett
2nd Bn. Hq. Company	Yakima	Company "M"	Snohomish
Company "E"	Wenatchee		

In addition to the foregoing units of the Washington State Guard, a State Guard Reserve was established by the following orders:

GENERAL ORDERS
NO. 7

Camp Murray, Fort Lewis, Washington
March 20, 1942

In order to afford the utmost protection to the State of Washington and to the persons and property of its citizens during the emergency that now confronts us, by providing a means of training for the Unorganized Militia, there is hereby organized under the provisions of Section 8470, Remington's Revised statutes, as a component of the Militia of the State of Washington, a force to be known as the "WASHINGTON STATE GUARD RESERVE" and which will be used to supplement and augment the State Guard now organized under Federal Statutory Law, but the strength and armament of which is restricted by the regulations which authorize its existence.

Units of the Washington State Guard Reserve may be organized in any city or community of the State not provided with a unit of the State Guard, provided that place of assembly and facilities for training such unit is provided by the community without expense to the State. They shall consist of "Companies" bearing the name of the city or community in which organized, and will closely follow the Tables of Organization prescribed for the Washington State Guard, except that the minimum size of each company will be governed by the number of citizens who enlist therein, but shall consist of not less than one platoon comprising of three squads of 12 men each, with a sergeant and corporal for each squad, the platoon to be commanded by a lieutenant, and each company of not more than three platoons to be commanded by a captain.

In each community for which the organization of a unit shall be authorized, there will be commissioned in the Washington State Guard Reserve, one or more officers who will be charged, under

the direction of the State Adjutant General, with the recruiting and instruction of the company. A form of enlistment contract will be furnished from this office, an accomplished copy of which will be returned together with such reports of company strength as may be required from time to time. The only qualifications for enlistment in this reserve component shall be that the applicant is a citizen of the United States; that he shall subscribe to the prescribed oath of enlistment; shall be of a mature age and physically qualified to perform the duties ordinarily required of a peace officer.

This force will not be uniformed or equipped, but each member thereof will be provided with a suitable distinguishing armband or brassard bearing the insignia of rank of the bearer. Existing Federal regulations make it impossible to supply this force with arms and ammunition other than those arms privately owned by members, or contributed by citizens of the community. The possession of suitable firearms and ammunition should be encouraged, and members so provided should be carefully trained in the safe handling and effective use thereof.

BY ORDER OF ARTHUR B. LANGLIE, GOVERNOR AND COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

WALTER J. DELONG

Brigadier General, W.N.G.,

The Adjutant General

In response to the foregoing, 51 such Reserve Companies were formed as follows:

LOCATION	OFFICERS	ENLISTED MEN	DATE ORGANIZED
Aloha	1	47	June 19, 1942
Arlington	1	44	May 4, 1942
Asotin	1	40	May 8, 1942
Auburn.....	1	52	June 11, 1942
Bremerton.....	4	127	May 7, 1942
Brewster.....	2	42	July 3, 1942
Burien	1	30	August 21, 1942
Camas	4	112	June 11, 1942
Cashmere	3	37	May 24, 1942
Castle Rock.....	2	42	August 17, 1942
Cathlamet	3	51	April 23, 1942
Chelan.....	1	40	Nov. 6, 1942
Chewelah	2	60	May 20, 1942
Cle Elum	3	58	April 15, 1942
Colville	1	46	May 9, 1942
Daytn	3	54	May 18, 1942
Eatonville	5	101	April 28, 1942
Edmonds	5	133	April 22, 1942
Ferndale	1	40	October 8, 1942
Garfield	1	40	July 8, 1942
Glenoma	2	60	April 16, 1942
Goldendale.....	1	40	April 10, 1942
Harrah	1	40	April 23, 1942
Kennewick.....	3	57	April 24, 1942
Kent	1	93	May 25, 1942
Kirkland.....	1	40	April 22, 1942
Long Beach Peninsula	1	40	June 11, 1942
Marysville	1	40	June 2, 1942
McCleary	2	86	June 29, 1942
Monroe	4	105	April 22, 1942
Montesano	3	52	July 8, 1942
North Bend	1	83	May 21, 1942
Okanogan	2	48	August 14, 1942
Omak	5	105	June 20, 1942
Orcas Island	1	56	August 8, 1942
Oroville.....	1	40	Nov. 10, 1942
Pasco	4	78	July 23, 1942
Port Orchard	4	63	August 18, 1942
Raymond	3	70	May 27, 1942
Renton	1	40	Sept. 23, 1942
Shelton	3	91	August 13, 1942
South Bend	1	52	August 22, 1942
Sunnyside	3	50	June 12, 1942
Tenino	3	42	June 11, 1942
Tonasket	3	62	May 15, 1942
Toppenish	1	40	May 11, 1942
Vancouver	1	40	Sept. 1, 1942
Vashon Island	1	40	April 10, 1942
Wapato.....	1	40	October 21, 1942
Washougal	3	60	June 2, 1942
West Klickitat.....	2	38	April 27, 1942
Total	109	2,987	

The Adjutant General, in commenting on the Civilian Defense Program for Washington, stated:
"In the interests of National and State defense, there was enacted by the 1941 session of the state legislature, an act establishing the "Washington State Defense Council", a body to be appointed by the Governor for the general purpose of "assisting in the coordination of the statewide and local activities related to National and State Defense".

"Because of this growing tenseness in our relations with the belligerent powers overseas, and which presaged the possible involvement of this country, the President had already created the "Office of Civilian Defense" with Headquarters in Washington, D.C. , and with the purpose of which we are all too familiar to require further comment. In conformity with the plan outlined by the National Headquarters, the Governor of Washington, by proclamation created a " STATE EMERGENCY COMMISSION FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE" the duties, which is here reproduced as a permanent record of the defense movement in this state:

STATE EMERGENCY COMMISSION FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE

"Responsible directly to the Governor, the Emergency Commission shall serve to augment the normal protective agencies already established in local and state government prepared to serve only in times or great emergency such as war or the threat of war, or the disasters of fire and flood. All recognized Veteran's organizations are requested by the Governor to coordinate their personnel and activities of similar nature to the end that the entire experienced personnel of men with civilian status, with military or naval background, will have made themselves available in a trained and organized basis for service to the people of the commonwealth of Washington in time of emergency.

"The Adjutant General of the State of Washington shall be the commanding officer of the Emergency Commission, and the State Emergency Commission will be composed of five men representing the accredited service men's organizations active in the State. The Governor shall appoint the Chairman and members of the State Emergency Commission, chairman and members of the District Emergency Commission, and the local Emergency Commissioner.

"The Emergency Commission shall cooperate with all community agencies and constituted authority in perfecting a program which will be prepared at all times for prompt action.

"The Emergency Commission shall cooperate in augmenting duly constituted authority of civil and military units with auxiliary units for the protection of life and property, traffic regulations, and the maintenance of law and order.

"When the occasion arises, the members of the Veteran's organizations, all other members of organizations coordinated in the Emergency Commission with all combined man power, will cooperate and serve all agencies best fitted for this program.

ORGANIZATION CHART EMERGENCY COMMISSION FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE

Governor
State Emergency Commission
District Emergency Commission
Local Emergency Commissioner

The following units will be organized:

Auxiliary Police	Medical Unit	Evacuation Unit
Auxiliary Firemen	Transportation	Unit Supply Unit
Air raid precaution	Unit Communication Unit	Americanism

THE AUXILIARY POLICE UNITS should be trained wherever possible local and state police in order to acquire proper knowledge of normal police routine, and basic police units so that cooperation with local and state police units may be accomplished.

AUXILIARY FIRE UNITS should be trained wherever possible by local and state fire units in order to acquire proper knowledge of normal fire routine and basic fire policies so that cooperation with local and state fire units may be accomplished.

THE AIR RAID PRECAUTION UNIT should take advantage of all citizens organized or unorganized to develop a program of aircraft warning and contact with the communication unit adequate to keep the population of the state forewarned in the event of any emergency.

THE MEDICAL UNITS should be trained independently through the Medical Association and shall be in full cooperation with local health units and the Ambulance Corps. They should be prepared to render first aid and all medical aid necessary and provide hospitals for the injured. A complete list of all physicians and nurses located in the local Emergency Relief Commission territories should be made, and those available for duty in case of emergency also listed. There should be a complete list of different hospitals in the community for emergency cases and plans completed for the establishment of emergency hospitals at different locations in the territory.

THE TRANSPORTATION UNITS should be prepared to mobilize and operate trucks, cars, and other vehicles necessary to meet the emergency. The head of the Transportation Units should have a list of the owners of automobiles who would be willing to donate their cars if it is necessary to expand the unit to a large fleet. He should also have a list of owners of trucks of different sizes that he can obtain trucks quickly.

THE COMMUNICATION UNIT should be trained independently through local telephone company and broadcast agencies. Cooperation with these agencies is of great importance. Contact should be made with all amateur operators (voice and flash) with a view to all such stations being included in the local emergency Relief Commission district emergency Relief Commission and State Emergency Commission communication units.

THE EVACUATION UNITS should be prepared to establish close contact with the other units and establish refugee camps with proper consideration for citizens. The evacuation units should provide cots, blankets, food and all other necessary supplies.

THE AMERICANISM UNIT shall have the responsibility of instilling in every man, woman and child in their locality an unreserved personal patriotism for the United States, a complete understanding of the National Defense program, and a will to contribute toward accomplishment. It shall give particular attention to cooperation with the regularly established Federal authorities in locating and dealing with those engaged in subversive activities. It shall ferret out and deal through the regular channels with those guilty of sabotage and espionage.

"The office of the Secretary of the STATE DEFENSE COUNCIL in Olympia was first chaired with the details of organizing this new agency for Civilian Defense, but the magnitude of the plan evolved by the National Headquarters of that organization soon made it apparent that a separate, active agency would have to be set up to organize and administer this activity which was growing by leaps and bounds because of the nation-wide publicity it was receiving, and to give it coordinated direction in all communities of the state.

"On June 1, 1941, the Governor designated the Adjutant General, Walter J. DeLong, as State Director for the movement, and the Adjutant General's Office at Camp Murray as State Headquarters. The State Emergency Commission referred to in the foregoing pronouncement, was at once called into session and, through the agency of the 10 district chairmen already appointed, the work of state-wide organization was commenced.

"This proved to be a stupendous task, involving as it did the canvassing of every incorporated city in the state and each community of upward 200 inhabitants; the selection of suitable coordinators in each such community who were willing and competent to initiate the proposed program, and the preparation

and distribution of instructional material and training programs to sustain local interest and insure the healthy growth of an effective Civilian Defense effort throughout the state.

"About this time, The National Headquarters of the Civilian Defense adopted the designation of "State Defense Council" for all state headquarters of this movement which in our state was operating as the "State Emergency Defense Commission" while our "State Defense Council" created by the state legislature enactment was engaged in other activities more closely allied with our industrial and economic participation in the defense effort. This confusion in titles resulted in annoying misdirection of communications and instructional matter sent out by National Headquarters for the Civilian Defense agencies, and emphasized the necessity for a consolidation of all correlated defense activities under one organization.

"By December 15, 1941, this office had, with the help of but two additional assistants and the close cooperation of the Washington Fire Chiefs Association and the Association of Washington Cities, completed the organization and provided for the training and effective functioning of the Civilian Defense in 156 cities and communities in the state. It had also prepared and distributed organizational charts and compiled and printed a comprehensive "Handbook for Civilian Defense" containing essential instructions covering the training and duties of each of the prescribed units of the Civilian Defense Program.

"The Adjutant General's Office, feeling that it had carried to successful completion the task of organization assigned to it by the Governor, and realizing that the Civilian Defense Program in the State was now an active, vital force whose future activities should be carried on under direction of the State Defense Council, recommendation was made to the State Emergency Commission that measures be at once taken to accomplish the transfer of control to that Council, with State Headquarters at Seattle.

As the result of the foregoing recommendation, the Chairman of the State Emergency Commission for National Defense, Mr. Rudy I. Nichols advised the Governor by letter that the Commission concurred. The Headquarters was established in the new Field Artillery Armory in Seattle on January 31, 1942.

CHAPTER IV WASHINGTON NATIONAL GUARD IN WORLD WAR II

To better understand the part played by units of the Washington National Guard in World War II, it is believed that a review of events on a National level would be in order. This can best be told through extracts of a book written in the Office of Military History, War Department, entitled "Command Decisions".

"American strategical planning in the period immediately following World War I was largely conditioned by the post-war political system and by the wide popular reaction against war. The Versailles Treaty, the Washington Treaties of 1921-1922, and the League of Nations (to which Germany was admitted in 1925) gave promise to the war-weary peoples of the world of an international order in which war would be forever banished. That promise seemed to many to have been fulfilled in 1928 when representatives from most of the nations met in Paris to sign the Kellogg-Briand Pact renouncing war as an instrument of national policy. Though the United States was not a member of the League, American policy was closely and consciously designed to support the actions of the League in its efforts to further world peace.

"During these years of disillusion with war, isolationism, and Congressional economy, military planning in the United States was largely theoretical. Germany had just been defeated and stripped of military power. Russia was preoccupied with internal problems and, though Communism was recognized as a menace, the Bolshevik regime was in no position to engage in military adventures. Neither France nor Italy had sufficient naval force to attempt any major operation in the Western Hemisphere and had no reason to do so in any case.

"Of all the powers in Europe, only Great Britain was theoretically in a position to engage the United States in war with any prospect of success. The British had extensive holdings in the Western Hemisphere from which to launch attacks on American Territory and they had enough dreadnoughts and battle cruisers to obtain Naval supremacy in the Atlantic. But the possibility of a contest with Britain was extremely remote, for there was no sentiment for war on either side of the Atlantic.

"In the Pacific and Far East, the situation was different. Between Japan and the United States there were a number of unresolved differences and a reservoir of misunderstanding and ill will that made the possibility of conflict much more likely in that area than in the Atlantic. Moreover, Japan's position had been greatly strengthened as a result of the war and the treaties that followed. In the view of the planners, the most probable enemy in the foreseeable future was Japan. Thus, United States strategic thoughts in the years from 1919 to 1938 were largely concentrated in the problems presented by a conflict arising out of Japanese aggression against American interests or territory in the Far East.

"The preparation of strategic war plans involving joint (i.e., Army & Navy) forces - and for all practicable purposes this meant most of the plans prepared by the American Staff - was the responsibility of the Joint Board, predecessor of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Reorganized in 1919 to correct defects that had become apparent since its establishment in 1903, the Board consisted of six members, the Army Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations, their deputies, and the Chiefs of the War Plans Divisions of each of the services. To it came all matters that required cooperation between the two services, either by referral or on the initiative of the Board itself. It had no executive functions or command authority and until 1939 reported to the War and Naval Secretaries. Its recommendations were purely advisory, and became effective only upon approval by both secretaries, and, in some cases, by the President himself.

"The most notable improvement of the 1919 reorganization was the formation of a Joint Planning Committee to assist the Board. Consisting of eight officers, four each from the War Plans Division of the Army and the Navy, this committee performed the detailed investigation and study required for policy decisions, preparation of war plans and all other matters involving joint actions of the Army and Navy. It was, in effect a working group for the Joint Board and made its reports and recommendations directly to that body.

“The problems considered by the Joint Board after World War I varied widely, but the development of joint war plans constituted, as it had from 1903 to 1913, the major work of the Board, with most attention being given to a possible war with Japan- called ORANGE in accordance with the system in effect between 1904 and 1939 of designating war plans by colors, each color corresponding to a specific situation or nation. The mandate to Japan of the German Islands in the Central Pacific had given that nation numerous bases astride the U. S. Fleet's line of communications and made American defense of the Philippines in event of war with Japan virtually impossible. Moreover, in the Five Power Naval Treaty of 1922, the United States, Great Britain, France and Italy had promised not to fortify their Far Eastern possessions in return for a pledge by the Japanese to restrain themselves similarly. By this agreement Japan was virtually assured that the Philippines, Guam and Hong Kong would not become formidable fortresses threatening the home islands. And although Japan had to accept British and American superiority in capital ships at the Washington conference in 1922, its naval position in the Pacific improved greatly as a result. In the years that followed, while the United States scrapped ships and Japan built them, the strength of the U. S. Fleet relative to that of Japan so declined that it is doubtful if during the 1920's and 1930's it could have met the latter on equal terms in the western Pacific.

“The first postwar plan for war in the Pacific, developed between 1921 and 1924, reviewed America's unfavorable strategic position and recognized Japan as the probable enemy. The strategic concept adopted by the planners in the event of hostilities was to fight “an offensive war”, primarily naval, with the objective of establishing “at the earliest date American sea power in the western Pacific in strength superior to that of Japan”. To do this, the United States would require a base in that area capable of serving the entire U. S. Fleet. Since the only base west of Pearl Harbor large enough for this purpose was in Manila Bay, it would be essential, said the planners, to hold the bay in case of war, and be ready to rush reinforcements, under naval protection, to the Philippines in time to prevent their capture. To the Army fell the vital task of holding the base in Manila Bay until the arrival of the Fleet, but the major role in any war with Japan would be played by the Navy, for success in the final analysis depended on sea power.

“War Plan ORANGE made no provision for a landing on the Japanese home islands. Japan was to be defeated by “isolation and harassment”, by the disruption of its vital sea communications, and by “offensive sea and air operations against her naval forces and economic life”. Presumably, it would not be necessary to invade Japan, but the planners recognized that if they could not bring Japan to her knees by these means they would have to take “such further action as may be required to win the war”.

“For about fifteen years the strategic concepts embodied in the ORANGE Plan formed the basis for most of American war planning. Variations of the plan were prepared and discussed at length. Every conceivable situation that might involve the United States in a war with Japan, including a surprise air attack on Pearl Harbor, was carefully considered and appropriate measures of defense adopted. At least half a dozen times between 1924 and 1938, the plan was revised, sometimes in response to military changes and sometimes as a result of Congressional sentiment, or because of the international situation. Each time, all the implementing plans had to be changed. The Army and Navy had their separate ORANGE Plans, based on the Joint Plans and complete with concentration tables, mobilization schedules, and the like. In addition U. S. Forces in the Philippines, Hawaii and Panama, and other overseas bases had their joint and service plans, as did the defense sectors and continental commands within the United States. Rarely have plans for a war been so comprehensive and detailed, so complete in every echelon, and so long in preparation.

“But the United States never fought this war, for ORANGE was based on a situation that never came to pass. The ORANGE, as envisaged by the planners, was a war between the United States and Japan alone. Neither side, it was assumed, would have allies or attack the territory of the third power. It was a war that was to be fought entirely in the Pacific, with the decisive action to take place in the waters off the Asiatic Coast.

“These assumptions by the military strategists of the Army and Navy were entirely justified by the international situation and reflected a reasonable estimate of the most probable threat to American

interests, an estimate that was shared by most responsible officials during these years. But the planners did not, indeed could not, ignore other possibilities, no matter how remote. Thus, during the same years in which they labored on ORANGE, the joint planners considered a variety of other contingencies that might require the use of American Military Forces. Among the most serious, though one of the most unlikely, of these was a war with Great Britain alone (RED), which in the planner's estimate could conceivably arise from commercial rivalry between the two nations, or with Great Britain and Japan (RED-ORANGE). The latter contingency was conceded by all to present the gravest threat to American security, one that would require a full-scale mobilization and the greatest military effort.

"In their study of these two contingencies the military planners came to grips with strategic problems quite different from those presented by ORANGE. A war with Japan would be primarily a naval war fought in the Pacific. So far as anyone could foresee, there would be no requirement for large ground armies. There was a possibility, of course, that Japan would attack the Panama Canal, Hawaii, and even the West Coast, but no real danger that Japan could seize and occupy any of these places. In the unlikely event of a conflict between Great Britain and the United States, there was a real possibility of invasion of the United States as well as attacks against the Canal and American interests in the Caribbean and Latin America. In such a war, the major threat clearly would lie in the Atlantic.

"Plans developed to meet the remote danger of a RED war, in contrast to ORANGE, called for immediate dispatch of the bulk of the U. S. Fleet to the Atlantic and large scale ground operations to deprive the enemy of bases in the Western Hemisphere. As in ORANGE, it was assumed that neither side would have Allies among the great powers of Europe and Asia, and no plans were made for an invasion of the enemy's home land by an American expeditionary force. This was to be a limited war in which the United States would adopt a strategic defensive with the object of frustrating the enemy's assumed objective in opening hostilities.

"The problems presented by a RED-ORANGE coalition, though highly theoretical, were more complicated. Here the American strategists had to face all the possibilities of an ORANGE and a RED war - seizure of American possessions in the Western Pacific, violation of the Monroe Doctrine, attacks on the Panama Canal, Hawaii, and other places, and, finally, the invasion of the United States itself. Basically, the problem was to prepare for a war in both oceans against the two great naval powers, Great Britain and Japan. .

"As the planners viewed this problem, the strategic choices open to the United States were limited. Certainly the United States did not have the naval strength to conduct offensive operations simultaneously in both the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans; she must adopt a strategic defensive on both fronts or else assume the strategic offensive in one theater while standing on the defensive in the other. The recommended solution to this problem - and it was only a recommended solution, for no joint war plan was ever adopted was "to concentrate on obtaining a favorable decision" in the Atlantic and to stand on the defensive in the Pacific with minimum forces. This solution was based on the assumption that since the Atlantic enemy was the stronger and since the vital areas of the United States were located in the northeast, the main effort of the hostile coalition would be made there. For this reason, the initial effort of the U. S. the planners argued, should be the Atlantic.

"A strategic offensive-defensive in a two-front war, American strategists recognized, entailed serious disadvantages. It gave the hostile coalition freedom of action to attack at points of its own choosing, compelled the United States to be prepared to meet attacks practically everywhere, exposed all U. S. overseas possessions to capture, and imposed on the American people a restraint inconsistent with their tradition and spirit. Also it involved serious and humiliating defeats in the Pacific during the first phase of the war and the almost certain loss of outlying possessions in that region.

"But the strategic offensive-defensive had definite advantages. It enabled the United States to conduct operations in close proximity to its home bases and to force the enemy to fight a great distance from his own home bases at the end of a long line of communications. Moreover, the forces raised in the process of producing a favorable decision in the Atlantic would give the United States such a superiority over Japan that the Japanese might well negotiate rather than fight the

United States alone. "It is not unreasonable to hope", the planners observed, "that the situation at the end of the struggle with RED may be such as to induce ORANGE to yield rather than face a war carried to the Western Pacific.

"This plan for RED-ORANGE war was admittedly unrealistic in terms of the international situation during the 1920's and 1930's. The military planners knew this as well and better than most and often noted this fact in the draft plans they wrote. But as a strategic exercise it was of great value, for it forced the military planners to consider seriously the problems presented by a war in which the United States would have to fight, simultaneously in the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. In an era when most war planning was focused on the Pacific and when Japan seemed the most likely enemy, this experience may have seemed irrelevant. But it was to prove immensely useful in the plans developed for World War II.

By late 1937 the assumptions that had given to ORANGE planning its prime importance during the past decade and a half had become of doubtful validity. International events had created a situation that made it increasingly unlikely that a war between the United States and Japan could be limited to these two nations. Germany, Italy, and Japan had joined hands in the Anti-Comintern Pact, and threats or direct acts of aggression were the order of the day in Europe and Asia. Great Britain and France, still suffering from the prolonged economic crisis of the early 1930's and weakened by domestic conflicts, remained passive in the face of this threat, seeking to avert armed conflict by a policy of appeasement.

"In the light of these developments, the Joint Board directed its planners to re-examine the ORANGE plan. In its view, the existing plan was now "unsound in general" and "wholly inapplicable to present conditions". The Planners were to develop a new plan which would provide, the Board specified, for an initial POSITION OF READINESS along the West Coast and the strategic triangle formed by Alaska, Hawaii and Panama. In addition, the planners were to make EXPLORATORY STUDIES AND ESTIMATES of the various courses of action to be followed after the position of readiness had been assumed. Clearly implied in these instructions was the injunction to consider the possibility that the United States might become involved in a European conflict while engaged in offensive operations in the Pacific.

"In less than two weeks, the Joint Planning Committee reported, its inability to reach an agreement. The Army members, viewing the uncertain situation in Europe, were reluctant to underwrite offensive operations in the Pacific beyond those essential to the security of the strategic triangle and the West Coast. With the European Axis in mind, they pointed out that political considerations might require limited action and purely defensive operations in the Pacific. To uncover vital areas in the Western Hemisphere for an offensive in the far Pacific seemed to the Army planners foolhardy indeed. Thus, their plan provided for purely defensive operations after the assumption by United States forces of a position of readiness.

To the Army planners, the primary problem was to determine the kind of war the United States should fight. Should the situation dictate operations designed only for the defense of the United States or of the Western Hemisphere, then the war in the Pacific might well take on a limited character. It was impossible to determine in advance just what the situation would be, whether the United States would be involved with one or more of the Axis Powers, or even what forces would be available. It might well be declared the Army planners, that national policy and public opinion would neither require nor support a plan for offensive operations in the Pacific.

"The Navy members of the Joint Planning Committee argued that American Strategy could not be limited to a purely defensive position in readiness but must aim at the defeat of the enemy. Once war began, production could be quickly increased to provide the means required both for the security of the continental United States and for offensive operations in the Pacific. Should the European Axis give aid to the enemy, the Navy planners assumed, with Great Britain clearly in mind, that the United States would have Allies who would provide the assistance needed by the United States Fleet to maintain naval superiority over Japan. "The character, amount, and location of Allied assistance, they hastened to add, cannot be predicted".

“The separate reports submitted by the Army and Navy members of the Joint Planning Committee put the choice between the opposing strategies squarely up to the Joint Board. The Board avoided the choice by issuing new instructions to the Planners on 7 December 1937. The new plan, it specified, should have as its basic objective the defeat of Japan and should provide for “an initial temporary position in readiness” for the Pacific Coast and the strategic triangle. This last was to be the Army's job; the Navy's task would consist of "offensive" operations against ORANGE armed forces and the interruption of ORANGE vital sea communications .

"Even under these revised instructions, the Planners were unable to agree on the best way to meet the Axis threat. Faced with another split report, the Joint board turned over the task of working out a compromise to the Deputy Chief of Staff and the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations. These two, after a month of discussion finally came up with a new ORANGE plan on 18 February 1938. This plan maintained the traditional offensive strategy in the Pacific, but it also took into account the danger of simultaneous conflict in the Atlantic - the first time this possibility was recognized in ORANGE planning. On the outbreak of a war with Japan, the U. S. would first assume a "position in readiness" and make preparations for the offensive against Japan. It would then be ready to meet any unexpected development that might arise, including an attack in the Atlantic. If none did, the Navy would then proceed to take the offensive against Japan with operations directed initially against the mandated islands and extending progressively westward across the Pacific. These operations combined with economic pressure (blockade) would, it was believed, result in the defeat of Japan and a settlement that would assure the peace and safeguard American interests in the Far East.

"The 1938 revision of ORANGE, with its emphasis on flexibility, represented an enormous advance in military planning. The Navy's single-minded insistence on an advance into the Western Pacific was still present but it was modified by an increased awareness of the uncertainties of a world threatened by the rising tide of axis aggression.

"For almost six months, the planners of the Joint Board considered the problem presented by simultaneous Axis aggression in the Atlantic and Pacific areas and finally in April, 1939, submitted their report. In it they reviewed the world situation, estimated the likelihood of war, calculated the probable objectives of the Axis in Europe and Japan in the Far East, discussed the effects of concerted action by these powers on the United States, and analyzed the strategic problems involved in the various situations that might result from such action. So comprehensive was the report, such a model of strategic analysis, that it was characterized by the Joint Board as "a monument" to its planning committee and became the basis for much of the strategic planning before Pearl Harbor.

“In their effort to arrive at a sound military strategy for the United States, the Joint Planners examined the various contingencies that might arise as a result of Axis aggression. On the basis of this examination, they concluded that:

“1. Germany and Italy Would take overt action in the Western Hemisphere only if Great Britain and France remained neutral or were defeated.

"2. Japan would continue to expand into China and Southeast Asia at the expense of Great Britain and the United States, by peaceful means if possible but by force if necessary.

"3. The three Axis Powers would, act together whenever the international situation seemed favorable. If other countries, including the United States, reacted promptly and vigorously to such action, then a general war might follow.

"It was perhaps as well that no firm answers were forthcoming in the spring of 1939, for the course of events was still far from clear. The Planners recognized this when they proposed that alternative plans be prepared to meet different situations in which the United States would have to meet the combined threat of Germany, Italy and Japan. The Joint Board, in approving the work of the Planners, - accepted this recommendation and in June, 1939, laid down the guide lines for the development of these war plans, aptly designated RAINBOW to distinguish them from the color plans.

“There were to be five RAINBOW plans in all, each of them based on a different situation. The objective of all was the same - to defend the United States and the Western Hemisphere from Axis

aggression and penetration, overt or concealed. In developing their plans, the five situations forming the basis of the five RAINBOW plans were defined by the Joint Board as follows:

“RAINBOW 1 assumed the United States to be at war without major allies. United States forces would act jointly to prevent the violation of the Monroe Doctrine by protecting the territory of the Western Hemisphere north of 10 degrees South Latitude, from which the vital interests of the United States might be threatened. The joint tasks of the Army and Navy included protection of the United States, its possessions and its sea-borne trade. A strategic defensive was to be maintained in the Pacific from behind the line Alaska, Hawaii, Panama, until developments in the Atlantic permitted concentration of the fleet in mid-Pacific for offensive action against Japan.

“RAINBOW 2 assumed that the United States, Great Britain and France would be acting in concert, with limited participation of U. S. forces in Continental Europe and in the Atlantic. The United States could, therefore, undertake immediate offensive operations across the Pacific to sustain the interests of democratic powers by the defeat of enemy forces.

"RAINBOW 3 assumed the United States to be at war without major allies. Hemisphere defense was to be assured, as in RAINBOW 1, but with early projection of U. S. forces from Hawaii into the Western Pacific.

“RAINBOW 4 assumed the United States to be at war without major allies, employing its forces in defense of the whole of the Western Hemisphere, but also with the provision for United States Army forces to be sent to the Southern part of South America, and to be used in joint operations in eastern Atlantic areas. A strategic defensive, as in RAINBOW I, was to be maintained in the Pacific until the situation in the Atlantic permitted transfer of major naval forces for the offensive against Japan.


"RAINBOW 5 assumed the United States, Great Britain and France to be acting in concert; hemisphere defense was to be assured as in RAINBOW 1, with early projection of U. S. forces to the eastern Atlantic, and to either or both the African and European continents; offensive operations were to be conducted, in concert with British and Allied forces, to effect the defeat of Germany and Italy. A strategic defensive was to be maintained in the Pacific until success against the European Axis powers permitted transfer of major forces to the Pacific for an offensive against Japan.

“The outbreak of war in Europe early in September 1939 gave a fresh urgency to RAINBOW planning. RAINBOW 2 seemed to fit the situation of the moment best and while work went forward on the development of plans, the President took measures to strengthen the national defenses and to keep the United States out of the war by keeping war away from America. An American security zone was proclaimed in the Western Atlantic, and plans made to patrol the zone to keep war away from the Americas.

"The Planners were still trying to solve the problems posed by RAINBOW when, in the spring of 1940, the nature of the war in Europe changed abruptly. Early in April, German forces invaded Denmark and Norway and by the end of the month had occupied both countries. On 10 May the German campaign against France opened with the attack on the Netherlands and Belgium, and four days later German armor broke through the French defenses in the Ardennes. At the end of the month the British began the evacuation from Dunkerque, and on 10 June Italy declared war. A week later, the beaten and disorganized French government sued for peace. With France defeated and England open to attack and invasion, the threat from the Atlantic looked real indeed.

“During the dramatic weeks of May and June, 1940, the President met with his military advisors almost daily and discussed with them every major development of the war. On 13 June, shortly before the fall of France, he called in the intelligence chiefs of the Army and Navy and asked for an evaluation of the situation, nosing a number of specific questions. This request precipitated an interim review of the various courses of action opened to the United States in the light of the rapidly changing situation. As the

CHART 1 - CHIEF OF STAFF RESPONSIBILITIES: 1 DECEMBER 1941 (a)



(a) A simplified chart, necessarily incomplete, for graphic representation of major relationships. More detailed relationships are shown variously in charts 2, 3, and 4. See also Greenfield, Palmer, and Wiley, The Army Ground Forces: Organization of Ground Combat Troops, charts Pages 14, 18, 118, 120, and Otto L. Nelson, Jr., National Security and General Staff (Washington 1946), Charts 7, 8ff.

(b) Included under Secretary and Associate Secretaries.

(c) Included three deputy Chiefs of Staff, as follows:
 1. For administrative matters and ground element (less Armored Force)
 2. For Supply matters and Armored Force.
 3. For air elements. Deputy Chief of Staff for Air was also Chief of Army Air Forces, co-operation with British Mission, Lend-Lease, and other agencies.


(d) Included agencies of War Department reporting to the Chief of Staff directly or through the General Staff on administrative, supply, and service matters.

(e) The Chief of Staff was also Commanding General of the Field Forces. He exercised this command through GHQ, and, in the case of Hawaiian and Philippine Departments, through the respective Department Commanders.

(f) Included administrative and supply elements and elements of the field forces, air and ground, assigned as protective garrisons.


(g) The Corps of Engineers and the Signal Corps were also classified as arms as well as services.

CHART 2 --- CHIEF OF STAFF COMMAND OF THE FIELD FORCES AS EXERCISED THROUGH GHQ: 1 DECEMBER 1941




*Not included. This chart shows major overseas commands and included Hawaiian Department, US Army Forces, Far East, Atlantic Bases, Caribbean Defense Command, Panama Department Puerto Rico Department and Caribbean Bases

CHART 3 --- EXERCISE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF'S COMMAND OF THE ARMY AIR FORCES: 1 DECEMBER 1941(a)



LOGISTICS OF HEMISPHERE DEFENSE, 1941



Planners saw it, there were three alternative courses open:

- "1. To maintain a strong position in the Pacific and to avoid commitment everywhere else.
- "2. To make every effort, including belligerent participation, to sustain Great Britain and France.
- "3. To take whatever measures were required to prevent Axis penetration into the Western Hemisphere.

"Events in Europe after June, 1940, gave hope to a brighter future than had seemed possible after the German offensives in April and May. The success of the British in beating off the attacks of the Luftwaffe and the reports of the special observers led to a more favorable program of support for the British war effort and to other measures of aid such as the transfer of fifty old destroyers in return for a lease on air and naval base sites in British possessions in the Western Atlantic. For the moment, the axis threat in Europe seemed to be blunted and the way opened for cooperation with the British in the Far East. But the summer calm gave way to the storms of September. On the 22nd of the month, Japanese troops entered Northern Indochina, and five days later the Japanese Government announced its adherence to the Rome-Berlin Axis.

"Following this the Joint Board directed new plans be prepared under RAINBOW 5. By April of 1941, the Army and Navy had agreed. For the purposes of this plan, the Allies - Associated Powers, they were called - were assumed to be the United States, the British Commonwealth (less Eire), the Netherlands Indies, Greece, Yugoslavia, China, the Governments-in-Exile, and the Free French; the Axis nations, Germany, Italy, Rumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, and possibly Japan and Thailand.

"RAINBOW 5 was neither a blueprint for victory nor a plan of operations. It merely outlined the objectives and missions of American forces in case of WAR on the basis of assumptions that seemed sound at the time. Specific plans to achieve these objectives were still to be made. The first step to proceed, was approval by the President, which never materialized. However, when the war opened on that fateful day of 7 December 1941, his stamp of approval was forthcoming and during the conference held in Washington, D. C., in December 1941-January-1942, he stood by RAINBOW 5 to defeat the Axis first and not once during the course of the War was the decision successfully challenged. SEE ORGANIZATIONAL AND LOGISTICAL CHARTS OPPOSITE)

"Following the attack on Pearl Harbor, one of the Army's largest undertakings in the name of defense was the mass evacuation of persons of Japanese ancestry from the Pacific Coast states - from all of California and from the Western halves of Oregon and Washington. The "COMMAND DECISION" to evacuate the Japanese was one made at the highest level - by the President of the United States, acting as Commander-in-Chief.

"Initial plans for evacuation of suspected persons from strategic areas along the Pacific Coast concerned enemy aliens of all three Axis nations - Germany, Italy and Japan - rather than persons of Japanese ancestry alone. Of the latter, the census of 1940 showed that, out of a total of 126,947 in the continental United States, 112,353 were living in the three Pacific states. California had 93,717 Japanese or nearly three-fourths of the national total. Of the west coast Japanese, 40,869 were aliens (called issei) ineligible for citizenship through naturalization proceedings and 71,484 were American born (called nisei) and therefore American citizens. In early 1942 there were about 58,000 Italians and 22,000 German aliens in the Pacific states. A good many of the German aliens were recent refugees from Nazi Germany. Most of the Germans and a large proportion of the Japanese and Italians lived in or near the principal cities and adjacent strategic areas. For several decades the Japanese population had been the target of hostility and restrictive action, a situation that unquestionably colored the measures taken against these people after Pearl Harbor.

"An agreement of 18 July 1941 between the War and Justice Departments gave Justice responsibility for controlling enemy aliens in the continental United States in event of war. Before Pearl Harbor both Justice (primarily through the Federal Bureau of Investigation) and the armed services had closely scrutinized the records of prospective enemy aliens and compiled lists of those against whom there were grounds for suspicion of disloyalty. Presidential proclamations of 7 and 8 December, 1941, dealing with the control of Japanese and German and Italian aliens, respectively, provided the basis for

immediate and subsequent action against enemy aliens suspected of hostile intent or of action against the national security. On 7 December, President Roosevelt authorized the Army to cooperate with the FBI in rounding up individual enemy aliens considered actually or potentially dangerous. By 13 December the Department of Justice had interned a total of 831 alien residents of the Pacific States, including 595 Japanese and 187 Germans; by 16 February 1942 the number of Japanese apprehended had increased to 1,266.

“During the first few days after Pearl Harbor attack, the West coast was alarmed by a number of reports - all false - of enemy ships offshore. It was in the midst of this atmosphere that the first proposal for mass evacuation of the Japanese developed. On 10 December a Treasury agent reported to Army authorities that an estimated 20,000 Japanese in San Francisco metropolitan area were ready for "organized action". Without checking the authenticity of the report, the Ninth Corps Area Staff worked late that night on a plan for evacuation, which was then approved by the Corps Area Commander, The next morning the Army called the local FBI Chief, who "scoffed at the whole affair as the wild imaginations of a discharged FBI man". This stopped any local action for the moment, but the Corps Area Commander duly reported the incident to Washington and expressed the hope that "it may have the effect of arousing the War Department to some action looking to the establishment of an area for the detention of aliens.

On 19 December, and apparently as one consequence of this initial flurry, the Western Defense Command sent the following recommendations to its Washington Command Post, at that time General Headquarters (GHQ):

“1. In view of the fact that the West Coast of the United States has now been designated and is functioning as an active Theater of Operations, it is recommended that action be initiated at the earliest practicable date to collect all alien subjects fourteen years of age and over, of enemy nations and remove them to the Zone of the Interior.

"2. It is also recommended that these individuals be held under restraint after removal from the Theater of Operations in order to preclude their surreptitious return.

“3. Records indicate that there are approximately 40,000 of such enemy aliens and it is believed that they constitute an immediate and potential menace to vital measures of Defense”.

“In making his recommendations, the Army Commander on the Pacific Coast, Lt. Gen. John L. DeWitt, was acting not only as Commanding General of the Fourth Army and Western Defense Command but also as Commander of the Western Theater of Operations, established on 11 December 1941 with the same territorial limits as those of the Defense Command. However General DeWitt may have felt during December about the treatment of enemy aliens, he was then firmly opposed to an evacuation of citizens as evidenced by the following telephone conversation with the Provost Marshal General, Major General Allen W. Gullion, on 26 December 1941:

"I thought that thing out to my satisfaction. If we go ahead and arrest the 93,000 Japanese, native born and foreign born, we are going to have an awful job on our hands and are very liable to alienate the loyal Japanese from the disloyal. ... I'm very doubtful that it would be common sense procedure to try and intern or to intern 117,000 Japanese in this theater. I told the Governors of all states that these people should be watched better if they were watched by the police and people of the community in which they live and have been living for years. ... and then inform the FBI or the military authorities of any suspicious action so we could take necessary steps to handle it. ... rather than try to intern all those people, men, women and children and hold them under military control and under guard. I don't think it is a sensible thing to do. I'd rather go along the way we are now. ... rather than attempt any such wholesale interment. ... An American citizen, after all, is an American citizen. And while they all may not be loyal, I think we can weed the disloyal out of the loyal and lock them up if necessary"

“In a conference held in San Francisco on 4 and 5 January 1942, the War Department representative, Major Karl L. Bendetsen, Chief of the Aliens Division, Provost Marshal General's Office, insisted that there be a new and complete registration of enemy aliens and a "pass and permit" system similar to the one prevalent in pre-war Europe.

"This arrangement which was agreed upon at this meeting took much longer to implement than had been anticipated. The registration of enemy aliens was finally undertaken between 2 and 9 February 1942 and the large-scale "spot raids" that General DeWitt was especially anxious to have launched did not get under way until the same week; thus both operations took place in the period when agitation against the Japanese was rapidly mounting..."

"General DeWitt's recommendation of 21 January dealing with California called for the evacuation of enemy aliens from eighty-six "Category "A" restricted zones and their close control by pass and permit system in eight "Category "B" zones. Many of the "Category "A" areas, in the vicinity of strategic installations, were uninhabited or had no alien population, but the execution of the recommendations, never-the-less, would have required the evacuation of more than 7,000 persons. Only 40 per cent of these would have been Japanese aliens; the majority would have been Italians.

"The following letter drafted in the office of the Provost Marshal General to the Secretary of the Army had the following comments:

"In recent conferences with General DeWitt, he has expressed great apprehension because of the presence on the Pacific Coast of many thousand enemy aliens. As late as yesterday, 24 January, he stated over the telephone that shore-to-ship and ship-to-shore radio communications, undoubtedly coordinated by intelligent enemy control were continually operating. A few days ago it was reported by military observers on the Pacific Coast that not a single ship had sailed from our Pacific ports without being subsequently attacked. General DeWitt's apprehensions have been confirmed by recent visits of military observers from the War Department to the Pacific Coast.

"The alarming and dangerous situation just described, in my opinion, calls for immediate and stringent action".

"According to the Federal Communications Chairman, "there had been no Japanese submarine or surface vessels anywhere near the West Coast during the preceding month and careful investigation subsequently indicated that all claims of hostile shore-to-ship and ship-to-shore communications lacked any foundation whatsoever."

"Agitation for a mass evacuation of the Japanese did not reach significant dimensions until more than a month after the outbreak of war. Then, beginning in mid-January 1942, public and private demands for federal and state action increased rapidly in tempo and volume. Behind these demands lay a profound suspicion of the Japanese population, fanned, of course, by the nature and scope of Japan's early successes in the Pacific. Army estimates of the situation reflected this suspicion. An intelligence bulletin of 21 January 1942 concluded that there was an "espionage net containing Japanese aliens, first and second generation Japanese and other nationals thoroughly organized and working underground. In conversations with Brig. Gen. Mark W. Clark of GHQ on 20 and 21 January, General DeWitt stated what was to become one of the principal arguments for evacuation the fact that nothing has happened so far is more or less... ominous, he said, "in that I feel that in view of the fact that we have had no sporadic attempts at sabotage there is control being exercised and when we have it, it will be on a mass basis". But in this same conversation he also said that he was still opposed to any move to transfer authority from Justice Department to the War Department because he thought there was "every indication" that the arrangements made with the Department of Justice and its FBI were going to prove satisfactory.

"The publication of the report of the Roberts Commission, which had investigated the Pearl Harbor attack, on 25 January 1942 had a large and immediate effect on both public opinion and government action. The report concluded that there had been widespread espionage in Hawaii before Pearl Harbor, both by the Japanese consular agents and by Japanese residents of Oahu who had "no open relations with the Japanese foreign service". The latter charge, though proved false after the war was over, was especially inflammatory at the time it was made. On 27 January 1942 General DeWitt had a long talk with Governor Culbert L. Olson of California and afterward reported:

"There's a tremendous volume of public opinion now developing against the Japanese of all classes, that is aliens and non-aliens, to get them off the land, and in Southern California around Los Angeles - in that area too - they want and they are bringing pressure on the government to move all

Japanese out. As a matter of fact, it's not being instigated or developed by people who are not thinking, but the best people of California. Since the publication of the Roberts Report they feel that they are living in the midst of a lot of enemies. They don't trust the Japanese, none of them".

"During a discussion with the Secretary of War, Mr. Stimson was handed a record of a telephone conversation between General George Marshall, Chief of Staff and General DeWitt, who had called just as the Secretary of War's meeting was getting under way. In it, General DeWitt said:

"I had a conference yesterday with the Governor and several representatives from the Department of Justice and Department of Agriculture, with a view to removal of the Japanese from where they are now living to other portions of the State. And the Governor thinks it can be satisfactorily handled without having a resettlement somewhere in the central part of the United States and removing them entirely from the State of California. As you know the people out here are very much disturbed over these aliens, the Japanese being among them, and want to get them out of the several communities. And have agreed that if they can solve the problem by getting them out of the areas limited as the combat zone, that it would be satisfactory. That would take them 100 to 150 miles from the coast, and they're working on it. The Department of Justice has a representative here and the Department of Agriculture, and they think the plan is an excellent one. I'm only concerned with getting them away from around these aircraft factories and other places.

"In the meantime officials in Washington, D.C. took a position of opposing any mass evacuation of the Japanese. On February 4th in a telephone conversation between General DeWitt and a representative of the Provost Marshal General's Office, General DeWitt stated:

"You see, the situation is this: I have never on my own initiative recommended a mass evacuation, or the removal of any man, any Jap, other than an alien. In other words, I have made no distinction between an alien as to whether he is a Jap, Italian or German - that they must all get out of "Area "A", that is the Category "A" area. The agitation to move all the Japanese away from the Coast, and some suggestions, out of California entirely - is within the State - the population of the State - which has been espoused by the Governor. I have never been a party to that, but I have said, if you do that, and can solve that problem, it will be a positive step toward the protection of the coast But I have never said you've got to do it, in order to protect the coast I can take such measures as are necessary from a military standpoint to control the American Jap if he is going to cause trouble within those restricted areas".

"Three days earlier, on 2 February, members of Congress from all three Pacific states had organized informally under the leadership of their senior senator Hiram Johnson. He had appointed two subcommittees, one headed by Senator Rufus C. Holman of Oregon to consider plans for increased military strength along the Pacific Coast, and the other by Senator Mon C. Wallgren of Washington to deal with the question of enemy aliens and the prevention of sabotage. On 4 February, General Clark of GHQ and Admiral Harold R. Stark, the Chief of Naval Operations, were asked to testify on the West Coast military outlook at a meeting of the first of these subcommittees. Before they spoke, Senator Holman summed up the situation by saying that the people on the West Coast were alarmed and horrified as to their persons, their employment, and their homes. General Clark said he thought the Pacific States were unduly alarmed. While both he and Admiral Stark agreed that the West Coast defenses were not adequate to prevent the enemy attacking, they also agreed that the chance of any sustained attack or an invasion was - as General Clark put it - NIL. They believed that sporadic air raids on key installations were a distinct possibility, but they also held that the West Coast military defenses were considerable and in fairly good shape; and as Admiral Stark said, from the military point of view the Pacific Coast necessarily had a low priority as compared with Hawaii and the far Pacific.

"In a letter to the Secretary of War on 9 February, Attorney General Biddle formally agreed to announce the Category "A" areas initially recommended for Arizona, California, Oregon and Washington as prohibited to enemy aliens by 15 or 24 February - applying the latter date to those areas that had considerable alien population. Mr. Biddle questioned the necessity of forcibly excluding German and Italian aliens from all these areas and wondered why whole cities had been included in Washington and Oregon and none in California. He added that if, as he, had been informally advised, all of Los Angeles

County was going to be recommended as a Category "A" area, the Department of Justice would have to step out of; the picture because it did not have the physical means to carry out a mass evacuation of such scope .

"The Attorney General's stand led naturally to the drafting of a War Department memorandum summarizing the "questions to be determined re Japanese exclusion" that needed to be presented to President Roosevelt for decision,. These questions were:

- "(1) Is the President willing to authorize us to move Japanese citizens as well as aliens from restricted areas?
- "(2) Should we undertake withdrawal from the entire strip General DeWitt originally recommended, which involves a number of over 100,000 people, if we included both alien and Japanese citizens?
- "(3) Should we undertake the intermediate step involving, say, 70,000, which includes large communities such as Los Angeles, San Diego, and Seattle?
- "(4) Should we take lesser steps such as the establishment of restricted areas around airplane plants and critical installations, even though General DeWitt states that in several, at least, of the large communities this would be wasteful, involve difficult administrative problems, and might be a source of more continuous irritation and trouble than 100 percent withdrawal from the area?

"On 11 February, the Secretary of War, Mr. Simpson, accompanied by Mr. McCloy presented the matter to President Roosevelt who stated that they could go ahead and do anything they thought necessary. Mr. McCloy (Under Secretary of War) later stated to the Provost Marshal General's representative that "We have carte blanche to do that we want to as far as the President was concerned, although the President did say "Be as reasonable as you can".

"In the meantime the Pacific Coast Congressional subcommittee on aliens and sabotage had adopted the following recommendations:

"We recommend the immediate evacuation of all persons of Japanese lineage and all others, alien and citizen alike, whose presence shall be deemed dangerous or inimical to the defense of the United States from all strategic areas.

"In defining said strategic areas we recommend that such areas include all military installations, war industries, water and power installations, oil fields, and refineries, transportation and other essential facilities as well as adequate protective areas adjacent thereto.

"We further recommend that such areas be enlarged as expeditiously as possible until they shall encompass the entire strategic area of the states of California, Oregon and Washington, and Territory of Alaska".

On 17 February 1942, the following message was sent out to Corps Area Commanders:

"PROBABLE THAT ORDERS FOR A VERY LARGE EVACUATION OF ENEMY ALIENS OF ALL NATIONALITIES PREDOMINATELY JAPANESE FROM PACIFIC COAST WILL ISSUE WITHIN 48 HOURS. INTERNMENT FACILITIES WILL BE TAXED TO THE UTMOST. REPORT AT ONCE MAXIMUM YOU CAN CARE FOR, INCLUDING HOUSING, FEEDING, MEDICAL CARE, AND SUPPLY. YOUR BREAKDOWN SHOULD INCLUDE NUMBER OF MEN, WOMEN AND CHILDREN VERY IMPORTANT TO KEEP THIS A CLOSELY GUARDED SECRET. "

"A follow-up letter explained that 100,000 enemy aliens would be involved, 60,000 of whom would be women and children, and that all were to be interned east of the Western Defense Command, 50% in the Eighth Corps Area, 30% in the Seventh Corps Area, and 10% in the Fourth and Sixth Corps Areas.

"That the action taken by General DeWitt to evacuate some 110,000 aliens from the West Coast was legal as well as constitutional is evidence by a decision of the Supreme Court some three years later in test case of KOREMATSU V UNITED STATES which read as follows:

“KOREMATSU WAS NOT EXCLUDED FROM THE MILITARY AREA BECAUSE OF HOSTILITY TO HIM OR HIS RACE. HE WAS EXCLUDED BECAUSE WE ARE AT WAR WITH THE JAPANESE EMPIRE, BECAUSE THE PROPERLY CONSTITUTED MILITARY AUTHORITIES FEARED AN INVASION OF OUR WEST COAST AND FELT CONSTRAINED TO TAKE PROPER SECURITY MEASURES, BECAUSE THEY DECIDED THAT THE MILITARY URGENCY OF THE SITUATION DEMANDED THAT ALL CITIZENS OF JAPANESE ANCESTRY BE SEGREGATED FROM THE WEST COAST TEMPORARILY, AND FINALLY, BECAUSE CONGRESS, REPOSING ITS CONFIDENCE IN THIS TIME OF WAR IN OUR MILITARY LEADERS - AS INEVITABLY IT MUST - DETERMINED THAT THEY SHOULD HAVE THE POWER TO DO THIS. THERE WAS EVIDENCE OF DISLOYALTY ON THE PART OF SOME, THE MILITARY AUTHORITIES CONSIDERED THAT THE NEED FOR ACTION WAS GREAT, AND TIME WAS SHORT. WE CANNOT - BY AVAILING OURSELVES OF THE CALM PERSPECTIVE OF HINDSIGHT - NOW SAY THAT THESE ACTIONS WERE UNJUSTIFIED.”

“In the meantime, following the induction of elements of the 41st Infantry Division in September 1940, at their home stations, the orderly process of moving to Camp Murray and vicinity began. By 23 September, the entire 41st Infantry Division had arrived. Strength of the division at that time was approximately 14,000.

The initial efforts of this command was the building of a livable winter training camp at Camp Murray and the adjacent areas of the Fort Lewis Reservation. The Artillery of the Division were housed on or near the Camp Murray Reservation, while the infantry of the 81st and 82nd Brigades, were scattered on both sides of Highway 99. All units were initially housed in pyramidal tents. By the time the bad winter weather had set in, the troops had settled down in at least partial comfort with mess halls and showers in temporary wooden structures.

Training of the 41st began in earnest on the 1st of October, 1940, and continued on through the winter with training in field problems, including overnight bivouacs.

As a reward for their diligent and efficient training, almost the entire Division were granted eleven days leave for the Christmas Holidays. Following, their return, the Division was brought up to war strength by the assignment of some 7,000 selective service men. With a strength now of some 21,000, the problem faced by the Division was the basic training of these new men and at the same time continue the advanced training of the Guardsmen. To accomplish this, Major General George A. White, the Division Commander, selected 3,000 of his best officers and men to form a cadre to get the newly arrived recruits into shape.

In the meantime, the permanent quarters being built at North Fort Lewis had progressed to a point where some of them were ready for occupancy by early February. By the end of February, most of the units were comfortably housed in their new barracks, although General White and his staff continued to occupy the tent camp at Camp Murray.

Spring and early summer training continued on the Fort Lewis Reservation and rumors began to fly that the Division was headed for further training on the Hunter Liggett Military Reservation in California. Beginning on 19 May 1941, the Division started its 1100 mile march by truck convoys for Jolon, California, where some 65, 000 troops of the Fourth Army were to be assembled for extensive and realistic war games for a period of two months.

Motor convoys of the initial increment camped the first night at Vancouver Barracks; the 2nd night at Bend, Oregon; the 3rd night at Klamath Falls, Oregon; the 4th night at Red Bluff, California; the 5th night at Marysville, California; the 6th night at Modesto, California; and reached Jolon on the 7th day. By 28 May 1941, all elements of the 41st Division had arrived at the Hunter Liggett Reservation, with only one minor motor vehicle accident, and no injuries.

Both the 3rd Infantry Division and troops of the IX Corps moved to these maneuvers over the same route beginning on 22 May 1941.

Following these maneuvers, the 41st Division began its journey back to Camp Murray and Fort Lewis in the first week in July and by the 13th of July all units were back, where they enjoyed a short furlough and then back for further training in preparation for a large scale Fourth Army maneuver on the Olympic Peninsula to be held in the latter part of August and early September. The troops returned from these maneuvers hopeful of being released from further active duty at the end of the one year period, only to find that The Congress had decided to retain them for at least another winter and spring.

On 23 November 1941, members of the Division received the sad news of the death of their beloved commander General White, at his home in Clackamas, Oregon. His efficiency as a Division commander was evidenced by the posthumous presentation of the Distinguished Service Medal to his next of kin.

On December 2, 1941, Brigadier General Horace W. Fuller, was assigned to the Division as General White's successor. He had commanded the 3rd Division Artillery prior to this assignment. At about the same time, the 218th Field Artillery (155mm), less one Battalion, left Fort Lewis for San Francisco, bound for the Philippines.

World War II began that Sunday morning on December 7, 1941, which found most of the members of the 41st on pass in surrounding communities or at their homes. Within a week following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the Division was scattered thinly along the Washington Coast from the Canadian Border to the Columbia River and beyond in anticipation of a Japanese invasion which never materialized. By Christmas, some units had returned, but over half of the Division remained in their positions over the Christmas holidays.

The 218th Field Artillery (155mm) less one battalion, was in a convoy about 1,000 miles at sea on Dec. 7th and was immediately ordered back to San Francisco, and thence back to Fort Lewis in January.

In January and February of 1942, the 41st Infantry Division was reorganized from a so-called "square" (four infantry regiments) to a "triangular" one (three regiments of Infantry). In this streamlining, the 161st Infantry, "Washington's own" was released from the 41st Division and subsequently become a part of the 25th Infantry Division, then being activated in Hawaii. The 81st and 82nd Brigades (Hq & Hq. Batteries) were eliminated and their personnel used to form the 41st Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop.

The 66th Field Artillery Brigade was disbanded and the original three artillery regiments were reorganized into four field artillery battalions. The Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, 66th F. A. Brigade was formed into a Division, Headquarters Artillery Section. The 218th Field Artillery (155mm) regiment was split into two battalions, the 218th F. A. Battalion, which remained assigned to the Division and the 902nd F. A. Battalion, which was assigned to IX Corps. The 146th Field Artillery Regiment was split into the 146th F. A. Battalion and the 167th F. A. Battalions, both of which remained with the Division. The 148th F. A. Regiment (formerly of Washington, but reassigned to Idaho) was also split forming the 205th F. A. Battalion which remained with the Division and the 148th F. A. Battalion becoming a part of the I Corps artillery in the South Pacific.

From excess personnel of the field artillery and one company of the 116th Engineers, the 641st Tank Destroyer Battalion was formed. The 116th Engineer Regiment became the 116th Engineer Battalion; the 116th Medical Regiment the 116th Medical Battalion; and the 116th Quartermaster Regiment the 116th QM Battalion. Excess personnel of these units were used to organize, other elements of the IX Corps at Fort Lewis.

Following the reorganization, elements of the 41st Division were:

- 162nd Infantry Regiment
- 163rd Infantry Regiment
- 186th Infantry Regiment
- 146th F. A. Battalion (75mm)
- 167th F. A. Battalion (75mm)
- 205th F. A. Battalion (75mm)
- 218th F. A. Battalion (105mm)
- 641st Tank Destroyer Battalion
- 41st Reconnaissance Troop
- 116th Engineer Battalion
- 116th Medical Battalion
- 116th Quartermaster Battalion
- 41st Signal Company
- 741st Ordnance Company

In February 1942, Lt. Gen. Sir Archibald Wavell Allied Commander of the Australian-British-Dutch-American (ABDA) forces in the Southwest Pacific returned from Burma after the fall of Singapore and indicated he was withdrawing one or two Australian Divisions and send one or both back to Australia. He further stated:

"Immediate problem is destination of Australian Corps. If there seemed good chance of establishing corps in island and fighting Japanese on favorable terms I should unhesitatingly recommend risk should be taken as I did in matter of aid to Greece a year ago. I thought then that we had good fighting chance of checking German invasion and in spite results still consider risk was justifiable. In present instance I must recommend that I consider unjustifiable from tactical and strategical point of view. I fully recognize political considerations involved."

Wavell then recommended that the 7th Australian Division, which was approaching Ceylon, and also, if possible, the 6th, should be diverted to Burma rather than to Australia, on the following ground:


"Presence of this force in Burma threatening invasion of Thailand and Indo-China must have very great effect on Japanese strategy and heartening effect on China and India. It is only theater in which offensive land operations against Japan are possible in near future. It should be possible for American troops to provide reinforcement of Australia if required".

"Sending American ground forces to Australia, as General Wavell suggested, would serve much the same purpose as sending American Ground forces to the British Isles. The arrival of the first American ground forces in Australia, as in the British Isles would be reassuring, and would have the same practical effect of releasing Imperial ground forces for combat or police duty in the Middle East and India, to which it was inexpedient to assign American ground forces.

"The policy of the War Department during and after ARCADIA Conference, had been to postpone decisions on the commitment of Army ground forces to Australia. The planners, trying to anticipate the disposition of Army divisions during 1942, had concluded that two infantry divisions would probably be sent to the Southwest Pacific. But in the opinion of the senior plans and operations officer for the area, General Eisenhower, this development would be contrary to War Department policy:

"The War Department concept of present and future Army participation in the ABDA Theater involves an Air Corps operation, exclusively. All other types of forces, auxiliary services and supplies dispatched to the area have as their sole purpose the support of the Air contingent. We should resist any expansion of this concept, regardless of the size the air operation may eventually assume or of the number and types of supporting troops."

"On 14 February, the day after Wavell's warning message, came an abrupt change in War Department policy - a decision to send reinforcements of ground and service troops to Australia. The original troop list, presented by General Eisenhower and orally approved by General Marshall, called for



one reinforced infantry brigade and 10,000 service troops. The staff soon revised the list and proposed, instead, to send to Australia 8,000 service troops, one tank destroyer battalion of 800 men, and one triangular division (15,000 troops). General Marshall agreed, and selected the 41st Division, under Major General Horace H. Fuller. The first movement orders were issued at once. As a result of this decision secret orders followed soon send- in the 41st Division to the Southwest Pacific Theater of Operations at a new base in Australia. .

Preparation for the movement was immediately begun. Late in February, the 162nd Infantry, the 641st Tank Destroyer Battalion and the 41st Reconnaissance Troop left Fort Lewis by train, bound for Fort Dix, New Jersey, where they boarded the SS Santa Paula and the US Uruguay. Leaving Brooklyn on the 3rd day of March they left for Boro Boro in the Society Islands via the Panama Canal. From there they proceeded to the International Date Line where a part of the convoy went to Auckland, New Zealand and the balance on to Melbourne, where they arrived on 9 April 1942.

SEE MAP OF PACIFIC AREAS (OPPOSITE)

In the meantime on 19 March, the 163rd Infantry regiment, the 167th Field Artillery Battalion, and other Divisional Units left San Francisco and arrived at Melbourne on 6 April 1942. On April 25th, the balance of the Division (186th Infantry; 218th F. A. and 205th F. A.) left San Francisco and arrived at Melbourne on 13 May 1942. The 41st was concentrated in the vicinity of Seymour, Australia, about 60 miles north and inland from Melbourne, where they continued their training, finally moving to Rockhampton on the North Coast by 19 July 1942.

According to the "JUNGALEER", the history of the 41st, prepared by the Division Association in 1948, the arrival at Seymour was a shock, especially the first meal, i.e., "The Aussies had prepared it. They had two oil drums made into cookers. One held mutton stew while the other had the Australian version of coffee. Shortly thereafter American Mess Sergeants, using American methods, went to work. Men gulped the second day as they watched two dirty militiamen haul in a load of bread on a flat bed truck, much like we haul cordwood. As soon as the bread was unloaded, garbage was put on the trucks. After two days of this procedure some changes were made and the Aussies contended that the "Yanks" were too fussy.

Further comments from the "JUNGALEER " regarding their stay in the Semour area were as follows:

"The entire Division was now in the vicinity of Seymour. The surrounding country became the site of hard, extremely thorough training. The countryside was bare. Although the hills looked green, when one set foot on them he found patches of grass as big as a hand with coarse gravel dirt between them. Thousands of grazing sheep kept the hills that way. Few trees were evident and these were eucalyptus, or gum trees, as the Aussies called them. It rained almost constantly and, keeping dry became a major problem to all.

"By the end of May the Division was busily engaged in training and continuing to build the cold, muddy camp. Training was hard. Thirty-mile-a-day marches were made and these were carried out for three consecutive days. Everything in the book was practiced as the men slogged through muddy days and nights. The artillery began firing at Pucapunial, but in the latter part of May began moving to Rockhampton, Queensland, where it trained through the next four months.

"Newspapers of Melbourne and Sydney daily followed the unrelenting enemy advance down the coast of New Guinea, and the battle of the Coral Sea was to the men of the 41st the only bright spot in the darkening lining of the military cloud. Melbourne became a week-end haven and shopping day stomping grounds for the Yanks. It was a blue-law town. Trains jammed with American soldiers arrived Saturday night and everything was closed on Sunday. There were no movies, and even a suitable eating

establishment was hard to find. However, the people were friendly and any man wishing to do so could week-end with an Australian family.

"Scotch whiskey sold for eighteen shillings, which was about three dollars in American money. The beer was deceptive. Although some brands were as good as anything produced in the States, the stuff was quite potent as many men learned in a short time. The Yank soldiers were popular with the Australian girls and, the high regard shown women astonished the Australian women. In this land the women let the men have the spotlight. The man is the important person in any couple. One Australian girl explained the comparison when she said:

"An American, if he is taking a girl out, will probably send flowers first. He will take the girl to a good dinner. He will ask her where she wants to go and what she wants to drink, if anything. An Aussie will come up to your house for the evening and bring a bottle of beer, which he will probably drink himself".

"It was generally conceded that Master Sergeant Chester E. Wallace of the Division Artillery Headquarters was the first man to carry a swagger stick, which was the latest vogue. Saturday nights found the men relaxing; on Sundays the high and low churches were filled to capacity. Collins Street was famous for its hundreds of milk bars. On Little Collins Street one found Burlesque and itinerant offerings of stock "Mikados" and "Pinafores". The men smoked Craven-A's and drank hock, went boating on the St. Kilda, night clubbed at a dozen lavish places, and took communion in St. James. "One Dozen Roses" was topping the Hit Parade back home and this catchy tune was fast becoming the favorite with the men overseas. To the men of the 41st, in those first two months, Australia was Melbourne, Melbourne was heaven, and heaven was theirs, for the taking.

"But all of this came to an end on 19 July 1942, when the Division closed in on Rockhampton (North coast of Australia), where it found a semi-tropical climate and better training country. The arduous rail trip from Seymour to Rockhampton meant unloading and reloading at every State line as track gauges changed. For several days the Division monopolized Australian trains over two thousand miles. The Aussies themselves tell jokes about their trains, but like the weather, nobody seems to do anything about it. One time the Queensland railways lost an entire string of cars somewhere on the 400-mile single track between Rockhampton and Brisbane. The trip was not invigorating but certainly was enlightening. From New South Wales to Queensland was a jump of a thousand miles and the change from wet chill of Melbourne to the dry heat of Rockhampton was an acclimatical problem. Olive drabs were shed for the first time and the men blossomed forth in the Khaki that was to be the official uniform from Queensland to the Golden Gate, via the Southwest Pacific.

"At Rockhampton the battle training became realistic as the men readied themselves for jungle and amphibious warfare. Queensland was hot and the troops spent week-ends rushing for buses to the beaches at Yeppoon and Rockhampton. The 163rd, 186th and 162nd Infantry regiments, respectively, went down to Toorbul (Terrible) Point on the coast north of Brisbane, a battalion at a time for amphibious training under the Australian Army. Each battalion trained on the Fitzroy River prior to training at Toorbul Point.

"When the men were not working they were turned loose to blow off pent-up steam. Rockhampton and Yeppoon were the two towns which bore the brunt of the "attack" on week ends and occasional three day passes, and they always were filled Long remembered will be such names as the Bluebird Club, the Golden Gate Cafe, Earl's Court Theater, the Red Cross Club, the Catholic Club, the Botanical Gardens and the ancient bridge that was like some carousel ride in an amusement park except that the speed limit across its arched crumbling bed was eight miles per hour. And who will forget Yeppoon, the blue-surfed vacation spot with its golden sandy beaches and milk bars that ran out of everything except sarsaparilla by 1500 hours each Saturday afternoon.

The 163rd Infantry (Montana) was the first unit of the 41st Division to enter the War against Japan. It did so during the struggle for the defense of Port Moresby, New Guinea at Dodadure on 2 January 1943 where they relieved an Australian combat team. They fought continuously along the Sanananda track until January 22. A period of patrolling and training followed while elements of the regiment advanced against stiff resistance to the Kumisi River in February. They were relieved by the 162nd Infantry Regiment (Oregon) in the Sanananda-Killerton-Goan River and returned to Australia on

July 15, 1943. The 162nd Combat team leap-frogged along the coast in the Morobe area, and fought the long Salamaua campaign from 29 June to 12 September, 1943.

On 22 April 1944, the 163rd Regiment landed at Aitape while the remainder of the 41st Division came ashore at Humboldt Bay near Hollandia. Hollandia and the Cyclops and Sentani Airdromes fell after ineffectual resistance, and the Division patrolled and mopped up until relieved on 4 May 1944.

On 17 May 1944, the 163rd Combat Team landed at Arara against slight opposition and consolidated the Arara and Toem area. Wakde Island was taken 18-20 May. Biak Island was invaded 27 May and a period of harsh jungle fighting followed until 27 June when the Division was ordered back to Hollandia with the I Corps in preparation for the Invasion of the Philippines.

On 8 February 1945, elements of the Division landed at Mindoro. On 28 February the 186th Combat Team (Oregon) landed on Palawan Island, completing the occupation by the 8th of March. The rest of the Division landed at Zamboanga on 10 March against light resistance. However, the enemy fought furiously until early April when their efforts dissipated. Elements of the Division took Basilap Island unopposed, 16 to 30 March; Sanga Sanga on 2 April; and Jolo on 9 April. While elements fought northwest of Davao, the rest of the Division continued patrolling and mopping up activities in the Southern Philippines until VJ day. At a press conference on 10 September 1945, General McArthur announced that the 41st Infantry Division would occupy the Kure-Hiroshima area. For this operation the division was relieved from attachment to I Corps and assigned to X Corps.

"Preliminary preparations for the movement were begun immediately upon the receipt of the X Corps field order dated 10 September. This order directed that the troops would go ashore on a "peaceful invasion but would be fully prepared for combat in the event there was a resumption of hostilities, treachery or sabotage.

"Loading began on 15 September, and four days later the 41st Division ceased operations at Zamboanga, Mindanao, Philippine Islands, and the last elements of the first echelon boarded the ships. The Division moved in two echelons, the first embarking during the period 15 to 19 September while the second echelon, which was composed of thirteen LST's, got under way from Zamboanga on 14 October.

"The first convoy, fourteen APAVs and five AKA'S, lifted anchor and sailed from Zamboanga at 1400 on 19 September, and arrived at Bugo, Macajalar Bay the following morning. Here elements of X Corps joined the convoy. The ships depart from Bugo that same day and arrived at Leyte on 21 September. Here fresh stores were taken aboard, and the following day the convoy proceeded to Okinawa, arriving in Buckner Bay during the late afternoon hours of 25 September. An advance party left the convoy at Okinawa on 26 September with the mission of proceeding to Japan to locate and arrange bivouac areas for the Division and Corps troops. This party spent the night of 27 September at Wakayama, Honshu, and about mid afternoon the following day left for Hiro, arriving there during the morning of 29 September.

"Weather reports indicated that a typhoon was moving in a southerly direction toward Okinawa and the convoy pulled out of Buckner Bay on 28 September and headed for the open sea in a typhoon retirement formation. The flotilla sailed due west toward Fuichow, China, but after going 250 miles it returned to Okinawa, arriving there on 30 September.

"A second departure was made from Okinawa that same day but word was received that the typhoon had hindered the progress of mine-sweeping activities in the In-land Sea, so, once again the ships returned to Buckner Bay, arriving on 1 October. The final take-off from Okinawa was made on 3 October. Two days later the ships arrived at Matsuyama, Shikoku, where elements of the advance party came aboard to report to the Commanding General on the conditions in the area to be occupied. The convoy continued on its way on 6 October and as the ships passed through the channel the Americans had an opportunity to get a close view of the land which they were to occupy. On all sides the lofty mountains appeared to rise from beneath the sea and there was very little flat land. Fishing villages were scattered along the shore line and from these rose ladders of terraces which comprised hillside farms. Every inch of land appeared to be utilized, and once the men went ashore this conception was confirmed. The ships

arrived in the Kure area during the afternoon of 6 October. The 2nd Battalion, 163rd Infantry, landed immediately on the beach adjoining the airstrip at Hiro where it fulfilled the duties of a shore battalion. Kure had an excellent harbor and some docking facilities but the "Jungaleers" went ashore onto the airstrip at Hiro, four miles east of Kure.

The unloading of supplies and equipment continued throughout the night. As the first traces of dawn appeared on the horizon, the main body of troops prepared for the peaceful invasion of the NIP homeland. By 0640, 7 October 1945, the remainder of the 163rd Regiment had come ashore and immediately proceeded to its area about one mile east of Hiro. Division Artillery (Washington) went into bivouac in the barracks near the Hiro airstrip, while the 186th Infantry (Oregon) moved to Kaidaichi on the eastern outskirts of the atom-bombed city of Hiroshima. The 162nd Infantry (Oregon) moved into Kure and garrisoned in the submarine base about two miles west of the main navy yard while Division Headquarters, Division Artillery Headquarters and Special Troops units were established about a half mile west of Hiro in the Japanese Naval School buildings and barracks. The entire unloading procedure, which consumed fifty-four hours from start to finish, was made without incident.

"As the troops poured ashore and boarded vehicles to move to their respective areas, there were very few Japs moving in the streets. Buildings bordering on the streets were boarded up and occasionally one could catch sight of natives peering through cracks and holes in the hurriedly constructed fences, obviously intent upon catching a glimpse of these alleged looters, rapists and bloody butchers who had played such an important role in bringing their war lords of Japan to their knees. Those Japs who were on hand to aid the American forces, did so with the utmost cooperation and, in general, the attitude of the Japanese populace throughout the early stages of the occupation ranged from extreme fear and skepticism to an unpredicted degree of apparent friendliness and cooperation. Policemen, dressed in neat, dark blue uniforms and wearing small, shining swords which dangled at their sides, were standing at uniform distances along the highway, facing away from the Americans. This was in accordance with the Japanese custom that the greatest honor and respect which can be paid a person is not to look upon him.

"As the units arrived in their respective areas, details were formed to handle the many odd jobs which confronted the "Jungaleers". Warehouses were manned and supplies unloaded and stored. Temporary kitchens and living quarters were established. For the most part the men found their new quarters partially roofless and completely flea-ridden. As the day wore on a light drizzle began to fall and this soon developed into a steady rain which poured for five days, transforming the surrounding countryside into a sea of mud.

"The period from 9 to 16 October was devoted to camp improvement and local patrolling. The task of prime importance was the conversion of the barracks into livable quarters. Some of the areas were so dirty that medical authorities advised the men to live in tents until the proper cleaning could be completed. Rotten, shaky floors were replaced, glass was inserted in the windows and shingles and tarpaulins were used temporarily on unserviceable roofs, these being replaced later with sheet iron as it became available. Almost all of the floors were covered with thick flea-infested straw mats. These were removed and burned, and the barracks saturated with a solution of DDT. Wiring was inspected and repaired, latrines were constructed, and heating and shower facilities were installed. The buildings were constructed of highly combustible material and the fire hazards were recognized immediately. The necessary precautions were taken in accordance with directives from higher headquarters. Fire marshals were designated and fire-fighting crews were formed and instructed in the use of fire-fighting equipment which had been salvaged and repaired. Buckets of sand and barrels of water were placed at strategic locations throughout the area while most barrack areas had small reservoirs of water nearby. While the garrison areas were being improved the 116th Engineers were busy opening water points, constructing mess halls and repairing bridges and roads. The sudden change in the climate already was noticeable and the 41st Q. M. Company issued winter clothing as rapidly as it was received by early November fresh meat, and occasionally fresh vegetables, had made an appearance on the menu.

"A field order published on 16 October designated the infantry regimental and field artillery battalion zones of responsibility for the protection, assembly, destruction and the turning over of Japanese Army, Navy and Air Corps supplies and equipment to the Japanese Home Ministry. There was much shuffling of troops during this period. On 28 October units of the 162nd Infantry left their submarine base garrison at Kure and moved to Onomichi, Fukuyama and Matsue where occupation, reconnaissance and destruction of material was to be conducted. Company B of the 116th Engineers, the 181st Bomb Disposal Squad and the 58th Chemical General Service Company were attached to the regiment for this mission. The movement was completed by 5 November and the Cannon Company assumed the military police duties in the new regimental area. The 1st Battalion established its headquarters in the Matsue sector; the 3rd Battalion located at Fukuyama; the headquarters group set up at Onomichi; and the 58th Chemical General Service Company took over the Tadanoumi area, where there were large stores of toxic gas to handle. The 167th Field Artillery Battalion became responsible for reconnaissance of a group of islands southeast of Kure and moved detachments to these islands while the 218th Field Artillery Battalion was responsible for a series of islands south of Hiroshima and to the west of Kure. Battery "A" of the 218th Battalion moved to Eta Jima on 27 October and three days later was followed by the remainder of the battalion. Meanwhile, the second echelon of 41st Division troops had arrived from Zamboanga on 23 October and had finished unloading by the following afternoon.

"Road reconnaissance and the checking of Japanese warehouses and dumps was progressing at an ever increasing tempo. Destruction work had already been started and was being conducted at a vigorous pace. However, there seemed little possibility of meeting the deadlines established by higher headquarters. The Japanese, except in rare instances, were most cooperative. For stores which were to be turned over to the Home Ministry the figures furnished by the Japanese were accepted but new inventories were compiled for all other items. Such articles as pistols, revolvers, sabers, swords and binoculars were declared controlled items. Disposal of the materiel was accomplished by the following methods: (1) destruction and scrapping; (2) using it for operations; (3) returning it for use by the Japanese; (4) issuing it to troops as war trophies; (5) Shipping it to the United States for training purposes; (6) shipping it to the United States for War Trophies. Methods by which destruction was accomplished varied according to the facilities and transportation available and the nature of the items to be destroyed.

"The forces carrying out this program did a miraculous job considering the many obstacles they encountered. Much difficulty arose because of the difference in the Japanese Army classification of supplies as compared with the system used by the United States Army. Too, as the American noose became ever tighter and tighter around the neck of the Empire as the war progressed, the Japs dispersed their supplies over wide-spread areas to avoid destruction by allied bombings. All inland roads and bridges had been washed out by a flood caused by recent typhoon, making many of the dump areas inaccessible. Furthermore, there always was an acute shortage of interpreters. Lack of Acetylene, insufficient number of boats, a shortage of technical advisors and the slowness of the minesweeping activities were other factors which greatly hindered the destruction operations.

"The destruction of the Japanese means of waging war was of the highest priority for the Occupation Forces. However, from the viewpoint of the Japanese Home Ministry the release of Japanese Army Food and clothing for distribution to the civilian populace was of primary importance. Local civilian manufacturers, who had recently been involved in large-scale war production for the Japanese forces, were eager to procure scrap metals and construction supplies to reconvert their plants to civilian production. Lack of transportation and the equipment for reducing Japanese war materiel to scrap handicapped the efforts of these manufacturers.

"One incident of an unusual nature occurred on 23 October when the 186th Infantry Regiment assumed responsibility for the control of approximately three hundred Chinese laborers, located at Kake, north of Juroshima. The laborers were short of food and clothing and had revolted during July. They were reportedly planning another outbreak. However, a six man patrol from the 186th Regiment maintained control until late November when roads became passable and adequate housing was secured in Hiro. These Chinese laborers were later repatriated, to their native land.

"Vast stores of chemical warfare items were discovered in the 41st Division area. More than 3,200 metric tons of bulk toxic chemical agents were found on Okuno Shima, off the coast of Tadanoumi, and 536,400 toxic smoke candles were located at Tadanoumi. Another 6,382 tons of toxic gas were found in the Hachinomatza area. The bulk chemicals had to be carried out to sea, ten miles from any land, and dumped in fifty fathoms of water. The Inland Sea was found unsatisfactory for this operation because of the peculiarities of the current which would have carried the chemicals shoreward. The gas was stored in containers with capacities ranging from forty-five to ninety tons, thus necessitating the draining of the gas into smaller containers. This job was given a high priority and was carried out under the supervision of the 273rd Chemical Service Platoon, the 58th Chemical General service Company, the 41st Division Chemical Office and the Chemical Office of X Corps. Cold weather set in before the job had progressed very far and the bulk chemicals became frozen in the large containers, halting all work until the advent of spring and warm weather.

"Other items of importance which were destroyed in large quantities included signal equipment, airplanes and airplane parts, coast-defense, and anti-aircraft guns, artillery pieces, ammunition, powder, small arms, and tools and dies used for the manufacture of war materiel.

"A serious tie-up occurred at collection points in mid-November when higher headquarters prohibited the use of American craft for carrying Jap war materiel out to sea in waters which still contained mines. However, as channels were cleared through the mined-waters more Jap barges and tugs became available and were pressed into service, although there never were enough to meet the demands.

"Among the items found in the 41st Division sector were 24 midget submarines. Another highlight of the destruction and reconnaissance program was the discovery of 759,376 grams of silver, 318 grams of diamonds and 2,522 grams of platinum, which were found in the 146th Field Artillery Battalion area. Fourteen bars of silver were discovered accidentally when a Jap Naval officer made an effort to pass off some lead ingots as silver. This precious loot was turned over to the Division Finance Office for disposition.

"There was a premature explosion of two hundred tons of black powder on Eta Jim in the 218th Field Artillery Battalion area on 23 November 1945. There were no American casualties. Further reconnaissance revealed that there were three caves of picric acid on the island. Imminent danger of another premature explosion existed since the acid was subjected to pressure of rotting timbers on the ceilings of the caves. Numerous underground magazines and warehouses of ammunition were in the vicinity, adding further hazard. Evacuation of all personnel from the island was begun immediately and plans were initiated to blow up the caves, this being accomplished early in December without further mishaps. Meanwhile, several smelters were put into operation throughout the Division area and were used to melt down guns and other metal objects or warfare.

"Besides rendering the Japanese war machine ineffective by the destruction of its weapons and materiel for waging war, the Jungaleers were charged with the task of demobilizing Japan's armed forces. Approximately eighty-nine per cent of the 166,987 Army, Navy and Air Force personnel, garrisoned in the Hiroshima-Kure area at the conclusion of hostilities, had been demobilized by the time the Division landed in the objective area. The remaining 17,762 were demobilized during the period from 6 October to 1 December as the job of destruction of materiel slackened. Many of the Japs who still were on foreign soil were repatriated through the ports in the 41st Division zone and some four thousand Jap soldiers were kept on hand to aid in this project. By 1 December an estimated 300,000 persons passed through the Hiroshima ports of Ujina and Otake. This figure included some 100,000 Chinese and Koreans who left Japan for their native lands via these ports.

"The attitude of the Japanese people was observed very closely throughout the occupation and strict surveillance was maintained over all newspapers in the area. The attitude of the populace, in general, went to two extremes - from that of outright fear and skepticism to an uneasy and unpredicted degree of friendliness. The first of these attitudes was traceable to the Japanese system of education, training, psychology and military background. It was the result of propaganda which portrayed the Americans as robbers, rapists and downright devils from the very depths of hell. Much of the fear came

from the belief that any occupying force would use the same brutal methods which the Japanese had employed during their own occupations of foreign lands.

"A marked difference in attitude was noticeable according to geographical regions. Those natives of metropolitan areas such as Kure, Hiro and Hiroshima - particularly the latter - were openly fearful and presented a more reserved and bitter attitude.

"The obvious mis-education of the Japanese people with regard to American soldiers and their behavior plus the excellent discipline and conduct of troops and the American generosity soon dispelled the Jap's notions that all Americans were plundering barbarians. As this attitude was dispelled there was in its wake a surprised and grateful feeling.

"As time passed, however, the Japanese came to recognize the occupation in its true light. They learned that it was neither a cruel hardship, nor a great deliverance, but a victorious army pursuing a policy which might benefit Japan's future but would still impose some difficulties in the immediate future. For a short period as was evident from the press and statements of the people the Japanese had the feeling that the American would "fix" Japan without the natives having to do anything except follow orders. Soon, however, it became apparent that this new era for Japan would require some work and self-sacrifice on the part of the people.

"The return of men to the United States via the point system really rolled into high gear in November and December of 1945. The point system and the impending return to home and civilian life dominated every conversation and each day there would be a new directive or a dozen new rumors. And each day would see another group of men packing equipment, bidding good-bye to their buddies and heading for Nagoya, the Sixth Army Disposition Center, a ship and eventually home. Units now were operating far below their T/O strength because the replacements were trickling in while those eligible for return to the States were pouring out. This placed additional burdens upon the shoulders of those left behind to fulfill occupation duties, but they continued carrying out their task and dreaming and talking of the day when they too would leave for home.

"Thanksgiving Day arrived and the men were treated to a real old-fashioned turkey dinner with all the trimmings. It was a day of rest and relaxation for all and for the privates it was really a holiday since all details, including KP, were pulled by the highest-ranking noncoms.

"With the arrival of the Christmas season the weather in Japan became more like that to which many of the men had been accustomed at home. Christmas on Biak the previous year had been sweltering, but in Japan the climate was more temperate and there was more of the Yuletide atmosphere. Much time was spent in decorating barracks, mess halls and recreation rooms and, for a change, the men had real Christmas trees. Japan, prior to the war, manufactured and sold to the United States the bulk of the Christmas ornaments used in America and with this in mind the men scoured the shops in every nearby town and village and purchased all available Christmas supplies and decorations. Religious services, a well planned dinner, special entertainment, rest and relaxation were the order of the day for all.

"Once the job of destroying the enemy's war materiel and demobilizing his war machine was pretty well in hand, much attention was directed to an athletic and recreation program for personnel of the Division. Basketball and badminton courts, baseball and softball diamonds and boxing rings were constructed throughout the Division area and games and matches were scheduled. There also was a basketball and football team composed of personnel from Division units to represent the Jungaleers in the Pacific Theater Olympics.

"The 41st Division boasted particularly outstanding basketball and football teams, the former crowned champion of the Occupation Forces and later king of the entire Pacific Theater, while the latter advanced to the semi-finals in the race for the Occupation Forces title and then bowed to the 11th Airborne Division, which later copped the Pacific Theater Crown.

"The basketball team, under the tutelage of Lieutenant Gerald Tucker, a former All-American from Oklahoma University and a member of the 41st Division Artillery, first commanded the attention of the Occupation forces when it journeyed north, covering most of the Sixth Army area and winning games by lopsided scores from teams representing I Corps, the 98th and 33rd Divisions. Then came the

Occupation Forces playoffs in Tokyo where a champion was to be crowned and later pitted against teams from other sections of the Pacific Theater for the Theater title. In its quest for the Occupation Forces' championship the Jungaleer aggregation took easy wins over the 7th Division, 33rd Division, and 11th Airborne Division, the latter victory advancing the Sunset five to the finals where it met the 77th Division, winning 48-38, to cop the championship of the Occupation Forces. Further laurels were added by the Jungaleers as they beat the Showa Base Fifth Air Force Flyers of Okinawa, 52-33 and 44-43, to earn the privilege of going to Manila, to compete for the Theater Championship. The Pacific Theater finals were held in Rizal Coliseum, in Manila, and here the 41st Division copped two decisions over an all-star team from Hawaii to reign supreme on the basketball courts in the Pacific Theater. The Jungaleers went the distance with an unblemished record.

"The 41st Division football team was coached by Captain Jack Faubian, former Oklahoma A and M star, and Lieutenant Colonel Fred Thompson, former Arkansas coach. The team played three games, the first being played at Nagoya where the Jungaleers white-washed the Nagoya Base eleven 20-0. This earned them a spot in the Christmas Day contest staged in Kyoto Stadium where the 41st Division trounced USASCOM-C, 27-20. This victory took the Jungaleers to the semi-finals for the Occupation Forces championship and in a New Year's Day Tokyo Bowl game the 41st Division suffered its first defeat, 25-12, at the hands of the 11th Airborne Division.

"There were other phases of this occupation program besides the athletic program. The G-3 section of the Division instituted a broad and intensive Information and Education program which trained men for Army technical and specialist jobs or provided them with courses which would aid them in civilian life. Four small schools were established, designed to offer courses in algebra, bookkeeping, accounting, crop- management, education, Bible study, mechanics, small business, electrical wiring, English grammar, general science, American history, elementary Japanese, photography, psychology, radio, Spanish, German, plane trigonometry and heavy road equipment operation. Where possible the courses included practical work. To fill the many vacancies being caused by the rotation program the Division also operated the following schools: cook's and baker's, mechanics, bugler's, radio code, message center, rifle marksmanship, typing, shorthand, and military correspondence and records. In line with this program all men were provided the opportunity to visit Hiroshima and the shrine island of Itsuku Shima.

"The Army was formulating its post-war policy and setting up a program of occupation for the conquered countries. Under these plans some divisions were being returned to the United States where they were inactivated while many more were being inactivated on foreign soil. The latter was to apply to the 41st Division. Shortly after Christmas, replacements were coming into the Division in smaller and smaller lots, and some units of the Division were ordered to transfer men to other units in Japan. It seemed an established fact that the Division was going to cease operations, yet there was no official word on the matter. Finally at noon on 30 December came a message from Sixth Army Headquarters stating that as of 2400 hours, 31 December 1945, the 41st Division would be inactivated. Men pitched in and began the long tedious process of completing the necessary papers to put the Division out of business. Finally after a week of almost ceaseless toil the 41st Division wrote "Finis" to its deeds in World War II and the 24th Infantry Division took over what had been the Jungaleer occupation zone.

The 41st Division participated in the New Guinea, Southern Philippine - and Papuan campaigns. Elements of the Division received three Distinguished Unit citations and its personnel were awarded 2 Distinguished Service Crosses; 3 Distinguished Service Medals; 540 Silver Stars; 14 Legions of Merit; 60 Soldier's Medals; 1,572 Bronze Stars and 73 Air Medals.

THE 161ST INFANTRY IN WORLD WAR II

When the 41st Infantry Division was called to active duty on 16 September 1940 it was still configured as a square division with two brigades of four infantry regiments, of which one was the 161st Infantry. Initially ordered to Camp Murray, Washington on 20 September 1940, the Division was transferred to Fort Lewis, Washington on 20 March 1941. Between 5 June and 2 July 1941 the 41st participated in the IX Corps maneuvers at Hunter Leggett Military Reservation, California. Returning to Washington State,

the Division next participated in the Fourth Army maneuvers at Fort Lewis from 15 through 30 August 1940.

With the 41st Division being reconfigured to the new triangular division, the 161st was considered excess. The War Department ordered the 161st Infantry to the Philippine Islands to reinforce American forces there in anticipation of a possible Japanese invasion. The Japanese attacked Hawaii and the Philippines before the 161st was to depart San Francisco. In reaction the War Department directed the 161st to Hawaii to reinforce the defenses there. The Regiment sailed from San Francisco on 16 December 1941, arriving in Hawaii on 21 December 1941. On 17 February 1942 the 161st Infantry was reassigned from the 41st Division to the Hawaiian Department. On 23 July 1942 the War Department reassigned the 298th Infantry Regiment of the Hawaiian National Guard, which had been assigned to the 25th since the Division's activation on 1 October 1941, to the 24th Infantry Division and replaced it on 3 August 1942 with the 161st Infantry.

The 161st, along with the rest of the 25th Infantry Division, was alerted for shipment to Guadalcanal to reinforce the American forces already there and to provide sufficient combat strength to allow the US XIV Corps to launch offensive operations to destroy the Japanese forces on the island. The 25th was reconfigured into three regimental combat teams (RCT). The 161st RCT was composed of the 161st Infantry, the 89th Field Artillery Battalion and other combat support units under the command of Colonel Clarence A. Orndorff. The 25th departed Hawaii at the end of November 1942.

The 35th RCT arrived at Guadalcanal on 17 December 1942, followed by the 27th RCT on 1 January 1943, with the 161st RCT arriving on 4 January 1943. The 25th Division was assigned to the XIV Corps composed of the 25th, the Americal Division and the 2nd Marine Division. Chosen to lead the first offensive actions were the 35th RCT against the Mt. Austin area and the 27th RCT against a series of hills called Galloping Horse. The 161st was placed in division reserve minus the 1st Battalion, which was attached to the 27th as a reserve. (Division personnel strength reports for that period show the 161st Infantry Regiment to be seriously under-strength, being short close to 1300 personnel). While in reserve manning defensive positions around the airstrip, named Henderson Airfield, the 161st was also handed the assignment of eliminating a concentration of Japanese troops in what became known as the Matanikau River Pocket. The Pocket, estimated to hold 500 enemy troops, was a dense jungle redoubt positioned between a steep hillside and a high cliff over the Matanikau River. The heavy undergrowth masked the well-camouflaged Japanese positions, both on the ground and high in the trees, and made dislodging them a slow, grim task. The combination, though, of frequent patrols, heavy artillery bombardment, and starvation served to eliminate this strongpoint in the end. On 10 January 1943 the offensive was launched and successfully completed by 21 January with the seizure of Galloping Horse by the 27th Infantry and Mount Austin and the Gifu strongpoint by the 35th Infantry.

On 7 February 1943 Colonel Clarence A. Orndorff, the Regimental Commander, received orders of transfer to the states and was replaced by Lt Col James L Dalton II, the Executive officer of the 35th Infantry.

The second phase of the Corps offensive was to drive to the Poha River. The 161st Infantry was designated to lead the Division attack. The 27th Infantry was to conduct a holding attack on Hill 87 to tie down the Japanese units while the 161st flanked the Japanese positions from the southwest. However the 27th found that the Japanese had withdrawn, thus negating the 161st flanking attack. Because of a feared reinforcement of Japanese forces on Guadalcanal, which never came, the 25th Division was ordered to guard the airfields while the 161st Infantry was placed under Corps control and ordered to continue the drive north. On 6 February two battalions of the 161st reached the Umasani River and then crossed the Tambalego River. On 8 February they met light Japanese resistance prior to seizing Doma Cove. The next day the 1st Battalion of the 161st linked up with a battalion of the Americal Division at the village of Tenaro effectively ending organized Japanese resistance on Guadalcanal.

The 25th Division remained on Guadalcanal to defend against any Japanese attempts to recapture the island. The 161st along with the rest of the Division spent the spring and summer of 1943 training and recuperating.

With Guadalcanal secured, attention turned to recapturing the remaining Solomon Islands, particularly the island of New Georgia where the Japanese had built a key airfield at Munda. Initially the 25th Division, now known as the Tropic Lightning Division for its swift combat actions on Guadalcanal, was not included in the invasion plans for New Georgia as resistance was anticipated to be light. However once US forces landed on New Georgia, Japanese resistance stiffened and Corps requested a regiment from the 25th Division. The 161st was selected, and landing on New Georgia on 22 July 1943, was attached to the 37th Division.

The mission of the 37th Division was to take Bibelot Hill. As the attack commenced the 3rd Battalion of the 161st ran into stiff resistance while approaching the line of departure for the attack, coming under heavy fire from a ridgeline later called Bartley's Ridge. This ridgeline contained numerous pillboxes which were well hidden and mutually supporting.

On 25 July the attack on Bartley's Ridge commenced. While the 3rd Battalion attacked the ridgeline frontally, the 1st Battalion flanked the position. While partially successful the attack stalled. Resuming the attack on 28 July, the 161st was successful in clearing the ridgeline. The Regiment then moved on to attack Horseshoe Hill, which had the same type of defenses as Bartley's Ridge. By 1 August, using every weapon available, including flamethrowers, the 161st cleared the hill, pillbox by pillbox and closed on Bibelot Hill.

The XIV Corps ordered the remainder of the 25th Division to New Georgia on 2 August. The 161st, back under 25th control, along with the 27th Infantry was ordered to attack north from Bibilo Hill and clear the Japanese between them and the sea. The 27th Infantry overcame stiff resistance in their drive to the north. The 161st, probing west of the Bairoko River and on to Bairoko Harbor, found the Japanese had fled before them. On 25 August, the 161st and the 27th linked up and fighting on New Georgia ended.

With the battle for the Solomon Islands over, the Tropic Lightning Division returned to Guadalcanal in early November 1943 and then moved on to New Zealand. Here the Division was brought back to full strength and in February 1944 it sailed to New Caledonia for intensive training. Throughout the summer the 25th trained hard from squad level up to division, with the 35th Infantry serving as an opposing force. In the fall the Division became proficient in conducting amphibious landings in preparation for its participation in the liberation of the Philippine Islands.

On 9 January 1945 the Sixth Army landed at Lingayen Gulf, Luzon. The 25th Division was held as Army reserve and was not committed to the fighting until 17 January when the 25th Division was assigned to I Corps. Significantly the commitment of the 25th Division brought the return to Luzon after a 46-year absence, of the 1st Washington Volunteer Infantry, now the 161st Infantry, not to fight the Filipinos as their grandfathers had done but to liberate them from their Japanese conquerors.

The 27th and 161st Infantry were given the mission of liberating three villages. Both regiments were entering combat for the first time in over a year. The 27th Infantry encountered only light resistance in taking their objective but the 161st ran into stiff resistance as they attacked the village of Binalonan. The 161st turned back counterattacking Japanese tanks and infantry as they secured the village on 18 January.

After the Binalonan fight the GI's of "Charlie" Company of the 161st Infantry Regiment found themselves speaking with awe about the bravery of their company aid man T/4 Lavern Parrish, a Montana boy. Two wounded riflemen were pinned down under a merciless hail of enemy fire. Parrish went to their rescue, reached the first man and pulled him back under cover. Then he went back to get the other. He had to go through a 25-yard area in which there was no protection at all from flying lead, he made it and thus heroically saved two lives.

The 161st was next given the mission of clearing the town of San Manuel of Japanese forces. The Japanese forces were well dug in and determined to hold San Manuel. Seizing the high ground northwest of the town on 22 January, the Regiment found itself in a fierce fight with a determined foe. The Japanese force consisted of some 1,000 troops supported by approximately forty tanks. In the early hours the 161st's "Charlie" Company encountered heavy enemy crossfire in attempting to attack over an open field

on the approach to San Manuel. The Company fell back to the shelter of the ditch. Medic Parrish caught sight of two wounded men out beyond the ditch in full view of the enemy. Instantly the heroic aid man left his sheltered position and started to work himself across the field. He managed to bring both men in, but on his second trip he realized that many more wounded were still out in the open field. He went right back, snaking from one casualty to another until he had treated 12 men. Three of the more seriously wounded he carried back with him to the ditch. He made the others as comfortable as possible under the circumstances and hurried back to tend the 37 casualties in his company. As he moved down the line of wounded men, Parrish talked soothingly to them, boosting their confidence. Then a Jap mortar shell landed in their midst, and when the smoke cleared away, the men of "Charlie" Company saw the medic's shattered body on the ground. In a few minutes he was dead. For his heroism, the MEDAL OF HONOR was awarded to his next of kin posthumously.

The Medal of Honor citation reads:

***PARRISH, LAVERNE**

Rank and organization: Technician 4th Grade, U.S. Army, Medical Detachment, 161st Infantry, 25th Infantry Division. Place and date: Binalonan, Luzon, Philippine Islands, 18-24 January 1945. Entered service at: Ronan, Mont. Birth: Knox City, Mo. G.O. No.: 55, 13 July 1945. Citation: He was medical aid man with Company C during the fighting in Binalonan, Luzon, Philippine Islands. On the 18th, he observed 2 wounded men under enemy fire and immediately went to their rescue. After moving 1 to cover, he crossed 25 yards of open ground to administer aid to the second. In the early hours of the 24th, his company, crossing an open field near San Manuel, encountered intense enemy fire and was ordered to withdraw to the cover of a ditch. While treating the casualties, Technician Parrish observed 2 wounded still in the field. Without hesitation he left the ditch, crawled forward under enemy fire, and in 2 successive trips brought both men to safety. He next administered aid to 12 casualties in the same field, crossing and re-crossing the open area raked by hostile fire. Making successive trips, he then brought 3 wounded in to cover. After treating nearly all of the 37 casualties suffered by his company, he was mortally wounded by mortar fire, and shortly after was killed. The indomitable spirit, intrepidity, and gallantry of Technician Parrish saved many lives at the cost of his own.

As the 2nd Battalion, 161st Infantry supported by Cannon Company, 161st Infantry advanced to the edge of the town, the Japanese counterattacked. In extreme close combat the brunt of the attack fell on Company E supported by Cannon Company equipped with self-propelled direct-fire 105mm howitzers. In the two hour battle Cannon Company destroyed nine enemy tanks as Company E, while sustaining fifty percent casualties in close combat, turned back the Japanese attack. On 25 January the 2nd Battalion resumed its advance into the town led by Cannon Company which destroyed some twenty dug-in enemy tanks and four artillery pieces and some 150 enemy soldiers while the 2nd Battalion inflicted additional heavy casualties on the retreating Japanese forces as the 161st completed the liberation of San Manuel by 28 January. For their extreme gallantry both Company E and Cannon Company were each awarded a Presidential Unit Citation.

On January 26th, the 161st Infantry Regiment finally crashed through San Manuel by sheer force of arms. Thirteen soldiers of the 161st gathered after the battle at regimental headquarters for a sort of unofficial celebration, and a group picture was taken. Although there were thirteen, they jokingly called themselves the "DIRTY DOZEN". They were the last of the 161st Infantry's Old Guard remaining on the roster of the Regiment.

The 161st next occupied the recently abandoned village of San Isidro on 6 February. By this date the operation to secure the central plains of Luzon was complete. The I Corps was directed to turn north into the mountains of northern Luzon to attack the main Japanese stronghold.

The 25th Division was given the mission of clearing Highway 5 from San Jose north to the village of Digdig. The 161st cleared the ridges west of the road and the 27th Infantry cleared on the east while the 35th Infantry conducted a flanking movement to the enemy rear. The Japanese put up only minimal resistance and Highway 5 to Digdig was secure by 5 March 1945.

The 25th was directed by I Corps to continue the advance north on Highway 5. The Division maintained the same formation with the 161st west of the road, the 27th on the east side and the 35th leading the attack with an enveloping maneuver to take the town of Putlan. The 35th reached the town on 8 March but was halted when the Japanese destroyed the bridge over the Putlan River and put up a fierce defense of the town. The advance was stalled until 10 March when the 27th and 161st relieved the 35th and cleared the Japanese from the area.

On 13 March, I Corps ordered the Tropic Lightning to continue its successful advance up Highway 5 to seize the town of Kapintalan, then attack through Balete Pass to the town of Santa Fe. The area was a series of rugged ridges and thick forests, making progress against a determined, well fortified enemy extremely difficult. The Battle of Belete Pass was to prove to be one of the toughest fights the 25th Division faced in WW II, with all three regimental combat teams seeing heavy combat.

The 1st Battalion of the 161st assaulted Norton's Knob, west of Highway 5 on 15 March 1945. The battalion met heavy opposition from well dug-in Japanese forces. For ten days the battle raged, with the 1st Battalion finally seizing the ridge on 26 March.

At the same time the 3rd Battalion of the 161st attacked Highley Ridge north of Norton Ridge. A heavily defended Japanese position dug into caves on Crump's Hill stopped the battalion's advance. The battle for the hill was stalemated until the battalion captured the west side of Crump's Hill on 8 April. Reinforced by the 2nd Battalion, the 3rd Battalion then eliminated the last Japanese resistance.

Meanwhile, the 35th and 27th Infantry battled to clear Mount Myoko, Kapintalin and Balete Pass. After clearing Crump's Hill the 161st Infantry assaulted the Kembu Plateau west of Balete Pass in support of the overall drive to seize the pass. By 6 May, the 161st secured the plateau. Three days later, on 9 May, the 161st linked up with the 27th Infantry at Balete Pass, opening the pass for the advance to the town of Santa Fe.

Col Dalton was promoted to Brigadier General in 1945 to the position of Assistant Division Commander of the 25th Division. Sadly on May 16th, he was killed by a Japanese Sniper at Balete Pass.

On 19 May the 25th resumed its drive along Highway 5. The 35th attacked astride the highway with the 27th on the right flank and the 161st advancing on the west side of the highway. On 22 May the 161st turned west to clear the Japanese off of Mount Haruna and then continued north over the Haruna ridge to reach the Villa Verde Trail, west of Santa Fe. Except for mopping up actions in support of the clearing of the Old Spanish Trail by the 27th and 35th Infantry, there were no further major combat actions conducted by the 161st Infantry before the campaign for Luzon was officially declared ended on 4 July 1945.

The 25th Infantry Division then went into rest and recuperation. It had served in continuous combat longer than any division in the Sixth Army. Plans called for the Division to take part in the invasion of Japan and exercises for the assault landings were undertaken. But with the dropping of the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki the war ended, and soldiers of the 25th could thankfully land on Japanese soil without taking casualties.

The 161st Infantry entered Japan peacefully, as the regiment had done as the 1st Washington Volunteers after the Philippine Insurrection. The stay of the 161st in Japan, however, would only be slightly longer than its stay in 1899. On 1 November 1945, the 161st Infantry Regiment was inactivated and replaced on that date by the 4th Infantry Regiment.

The 25th Division suffered 1,134 combat deaths, more than any other Division in World War II. 3,271 men were wounded and one man reported missing in action. Six of its units received the Distinguished Unit Citation. Men of the division were awarded 6 MEDALS OF HONOR; 72 Distinguished Service Crosses; 3 Distinguished Service Medals; 622 Silver Stars; 100 Legions of Merit; 1 Distinguished Flying Cross; 40 Soldier's Medals; 1,394 Bronze Star Medals; and 147 Air Medals. The 161st Infantry won streamers for the NORTHERN SOLOMONS, GUADALCANAL and LUZON Campaigns. In addition the Regiment received the Philippine PRESIDENTIAL UNIT CITATION embroidered 17 OCTOBER 1944 TO 4 JULY 1945. The Heavy Mortar Company received the Distinguished Unit Citation embroidered "LUZON". The same award was also made to Company E of the 161st Infantry. The 161st Infantry performed Occupation duty in Nagoya, Japan until it was relieved from further active duty on 1 Nov 1945. Its 39 months in the 25th Division included the roughest days of World War II.

Following the mobilization of units of the 248th Coast Artillery (HD) at home stations on 16 September 1940, immediate action was taken by the Commander, Colonel Alfred W. McMorris to prepare the regiment for concentration at Fort Worden. Colonel McMorris first entered the service in the Washington National Guard on December 19, 1911 when he enlisted in Company F, 2nd Infantry in Seattle. He reenlisted as a Sergeant on December 5, 1914 and later resigned to accept an appointment as First Lieutenant. He served as a First Lieutenant in both the Mexican Border Incident and in World War I, being discharged from the latter on 27 February 1919. He was appointed Captain, QMC on October 16, 1920; to Major, QMC, August 30, 1921 and to Lieutenant Colonel, QMC on April 1, 1927. On July 3, 1934 he was appointed a Colonel of Field Artillery. Transferred in grade to the Coast Artillery on September 1940 he was mustered in with that Regiment on 16 September 1940. He was promoted to Brig. Gen. of the Line on 30 December 1950 and transferred to the Retired List on 1 Jan 51.

Special Orders No. 54, Hq. 248th C.A. dated 20 September 1940 separated some 34 men because of physical disability, while subsequent Special Orders discharged 51 more for physical disability; 19 for minority; and 43 for dependency. Special Orders 55, Hq. 248th C.A. directed the movement of officers and men of the regiment beginning 21 September and to be completed by 23 September. Accordingly, Hq. of the Regiment closed on 23 Sept. 1940 at Tacoma and opened at Fort Worden the same date.

The Harbor Defenses of Puget Sound, with Headquarters at Fort Worden, was then commanded by Colonel James H. Cunningham, who also commanded the, 14th Coast Artillery Regiment (HD). He was a West Pointer of the Class of 1908. The overhead of this post was provided by the Corps Area Service Command (CASC) Unit No. 1914.

On Friday, April 25, 1941 "THE SALVO", a mimeographed 14 page paper was published for the first time. It was a joint enterprise of the 14th and 248th Coast Artillery Regiments. The following are extracts of news on the units of the 248th Coast Artillery:

248th Band: "Fishing seems to have caught the interest of bandsmen as a hobby during spare time. Enthusiasts in particular are Sgt Long; and Pvts Stack, Palmer, Garrett and Walker.

"Symphony calls on the local boys The Port Angeles symphony, under the direction of W. O. Dahlquist, is utilizing the talents of Long, Dowling, Etherrington, Phil Meyer, Picard, and Walker. As well as furthering their knowledge musically the P.A. girls seem to have been getting a treat in these Wednesday night rehearsals. Take it easy, boys:

"WHO'S BEEN SLEEPING IN MY BED" Army Regulations say two men will not occupy one bunk. But does not cover the case of a man and an OCTOPUS in a bunk. Thats one off the books. Imagine finding a seven foot octopus for a bed partner: Playful fellows, those bandsmen. Pvt Talso hooked the "Ugly" fellow while fishing off the QMC dock with Pvt. Stack. It was pulled in with a single perch hook and line. The mass of slithering, slimy protoplasm had a seven foot spread and weighed about forty pounds. And that's no fish story. "Oscar" as he was later christened found his way to Corporal Nelson's punk through the playful efforts of Sgt. Long and Pvts Talso, Stack, Schweizer, Lang, Ostlund and Scott. .They had quite a time as well as their hands full in getting "Oscar" to bed for he was quite

alive and in no mood for jesting. But, alas, poor "Oscar" passed away at 5 A. M. Monday. And for those who wonder what become of him, "Oscar" was sold. .

Regtl Hq Btry: SEEN AND HEARD HERE AND THERE - The first sergeant's walk to town for exercise. The trainees still asking questions. Mess better than ever Hq. Btry supporting the spit bar and NCO – Club. All the old timers wishing they were still in a firing battery. A lot of attractions in Port Angeles. Those most welcome letters from home not coming through. Sgt. Cheney's engagement a surprise to everyone, especially Sgt. Cheney. Why the sudden trend toward the regular army? "Horizontal" Napper with his car and female troubles.

"The practice firing of the batteries last week fascinated the group of Trainees of Headquarters Battery. This being their "Baptism of Fire" it is of, course natural. It was interesting to note their different reactions. Some tried to act indifferently unsuccessfully, others outwardly showed their interest, while one of two were actually afraid. Many questions were asked and answers gratefully received.

Hq Btry. 1st Bn. "Two weeks ago, PFC Robert Church, Don Lyons, and Noel Poundstone were assigned to the "COLONEL CHARLES L. WILLARD" Fort Worden's new boat, as seaman.

"As for people being busy, our Lieut. Wicke Seems to be kept on the run between his recreation job and the management of the barber shop in the C. C. C. area"

Battery "A". "Captain Uhler and Lt. Howard, it is rumored, are the most important people in Battery A this week because Mrs. Uhler and Mrs. Howard sewed new curtains for the Dining and Recreation Halls.

"Present at the Noon Mess, Wednesday, April 16th, were Mr. and Mrs. Corey, parents of the notorious "Don", who as a trainee "recruit" wrote the letter that has made his life pretty miserable since. The letter, sent to a Seattle newspaper, contained a few errors, notably, the information that Seattle was now safe since "Don" was on the job protecting it".

"To Civilian Life, Private "Missouri" Ontis, with an honorable discharge procured because of "unregimental feet".

"A trip to Fort Flagler Friday afternoon on the "Virginia V", to unload lumber reminded me forcibly that we had visitors, for there were two hundred members of the 148th on board. Others visited the guns, and the invasion was quite a novelty for all concerned.

"Captain Link's daily personal inspection review at the expense of Battery A drew to a welcome close Monday. Fifth columnists, "Mumps", was the object. He had apparently made his get-away after sabotaging "Tank" Taylor, who rejoined the Battery Tuesday morning.

Battery "B". "With Lieut. Col. Forbes as honored guest, we had a "24 Round" Supper Wednesday, April 9th, consisting of Southern fried chicken with all the trimmings, plus three kegs of refreshments donated by the worthy officers of the battery in tribute to the number of rounds we fired at "Tolles "A ". Lieut. Rustad was Toastmaster. Lt Col Forbes gave a short and snappy talk followed by a few words from Captain Knapp and the other officers. Corporal Kenny Ellestad presented a program of music and short stories. Corporal Chet Haines would make a good fireman. He's been Charge of Quarters twice, and both times two alarm clocks and the guard house phone have failed to awaken him. Maybe if "Kinzie" were fired early in the morning, it could awaken him. Because some of the men went home without a pass, they are still \$21 a month soldiers. Fair warning to save and extra \$9 or \$15 a month".

Battery "C". "Sgt Richard R. Cranmer, Snohomish, who has served 9 years in the National Guard, has also put in a hitch in the Coast Guard. He was a seaman 1st Class on the 250 Foot U. S. HAIDA", a steam electric cutter operating in Alaskan waters from Juneau to Unalaska enforcing the fishing laws. She carried a crew of 100 and had a speed of 14 knots. Sgt. Crammer was a 1st Class gun-pointer." Battery C men who assisted in entertaining members of the 148th Field Artillery at the Post Chapel and Auditorium were Sgt Howell and Pvts Paul Cerf, Tony Ercig, Tony Zambas, Mack Whyte, Ralph Sheppard and Frank Anderson." The variety program was under the direction of Pvt Frank Anderson, actor and radio announcer." "The boys helped entertain at Fort Flagler and next Thursday are scheduled to appear at the Port Townsend Elk's Club".

Hq Btry, 2nd Bn. "In a thrilling nine inning game which was packed with surprises, the Second Battalion Headquarters were narrowly beaten by "G" Battery, 248th C.A. to the slim score of 17 to 21.

The score at the 8th inning was strangely enough in favor of the Headquarters team by one point, 16 to 15, but with hard playing, their opponents finally won out and scored six runs in the last inning. However, we must give the boys a lot of credit for playing a truly exciting game. Hats off to PFC Bob S. Haugland, the star of short center field. Orchids to PFC Tom Julio, and just a "Grape-Nut" to 1st Sgt Owen S. Richards. All in all the game was a lot of fun for everyone.

Battery "D". "The open house held by Battery D on Sunday, April 20, was a huge success as approximately 150 guests and relatives of the men were present. A sumptuous meal was prepared by cooks Barnes, Chasteen and Lawrence under the able guidance of Mess Sgt Daniel Stedman. Guests included: Col. McMorris and family; Captain and Mrs. Carr, Lieut. and Mrs. Aufang and Lieut. Maxwell and wife. "Five very beautiful young ladies, members of the American Dietetic Association, from the University of Washington were the guests of PFC Fred Moore. They commented favorably on the dinner. (Freddie sure can pick 'em!)" Lieut. Solie, who managed the affair, was the Toastmaster at the dinner and welcomed the guests of Battery D and Fort Worden.

Battery "E". 1 Lt. Keys of this Battery will marry the daughter of Major Pence, the Battalion Commander." "During the visit of the 148th Field Artillery, the noncoms of Battery "E" entertained their visiting compatriots from "E" of the 148th with a feed and a feud. Most of the noncoms in "E", 248th have manned the 75's of the Field Artillery before they were moved to the Coast Artillery." "Service practice for Battery "E" has been postponed." "Private Waldo Koo has been transferred to the 15th Infantry at Fort Lewis".

Battery "F". "Privates Max E. Karr and William G. Frothinger: have bade a fond farewell and gone to take their place in civilian society again. (Reason: "unregimental tootsies") "The boys wait anxiously for the regimental dance to roll around every other week. All we hear the day after a dance is, "That li'l number I danced with." "I know how you feel fellows." "The boys from Lewis lamenting over the fact that they can't stay here steady-green grass and beautiful flowers. They can't understand how we are lucky enough to have leave any evening we wish; they get out two nights a week".

Battery "G". Corporal Carl Currah making plans for his coming marriage. Sgt Raymond Shropshire boxing Eugene Tomasié Harry Moe climbing the telephone pole Sgt Cecil T. Sellinger being discharged, ETS (Expiration of Service). "Wilfred C. Emery, Louis Gooch, "Slim" Rogerson and Tom Hedding skidding into a ditch on their way to Tacoma Caesar DeVita cooking his favorite dish --spaghetti. Jim Van Slyke telling of his experiences in Yakima recently . . . Don Carter and Darrell Graham "thanking their luck stars" that they entered the baseball pools Lyle Smith, no relation to Marvin Q and William L. Smith, showing the fellows why he won the Golden Gloves tournament in Idaho."

"900 MEN OF 148TH FIELD ARTILLERY FROM FORT LEWIS AND CAMP MURRAY VISIT FORT WORDEN ON OVERNIGHT ROAD MARCH AND RECREATION TRIP"

"A regiment of motorized field artillery traveling in army trucks from the prairies of one of America's largest training grounds at Fort Lewis-Camp Murray rolled into Fort Worden at noon last Friday without their field pieces but with plenty of enthusiasm because of the opportunity to visit old friends and the chance to see the beautiful panorama of salt water, snow-capped mountains and forests visible from our strategic position here.

"They pitched their pup tents in the park in front of the balloon hangar and established their motor pool (auto parking space) on the C C C area. From then on the men and officers were busy sight-seeing and being entertained.

"These troops of the 41st Division were commanded by Lt Col James C. Patterson, who renewed an old friendship with Lt Col Franklin. Both had previously served together.

"Colonel and Mrs. McMorris entertained Lt Col Patterson and his regimental staff at dinner in the evening at Colonel McMorris' quarters. There were 14 from the 148. Assisting Mrs. McMorris were Mrs. R. W. Forbes, Mrs. Scott S. Jones, and Mrs. Howard Wright. Guests from the Post were Colonel James H. Cunningham, Lieut. Col. E. A. Franklin and Lieut. Col. Philip F. Biehl.

"At 9 P.M. there was an informal reception at the officers club for the visiting officers. Coffee and sandwiches were served.

"In the early afternoon two sightseeing groups were organized. One unit visited the seacoast guns while another took the Virginia V boat to Fort Casey and Fort Flagler.

"Later a baseball game between the 148th and the 248th ended in a 19 to 1 score in favor of the 248th. Some of the visitors played in their bare feet, which caused such heckling from the bleachers as "Look at those bare-footwonders from Idaho", and "Now I know how Huckleberry Finn felt".

"At 7 P.M. a two hour professional vaudeville show was put on at the Post Recreation Building under the direction of Chaplain Schock, Chaplain Carberry and Private Frank Anderson, Battery "C". The visiting audience of some 200 thoroughly-enjoyed the entertainment and they joined with the musicians in singing old time favorites such as "There's a Long, Long Trail a Winding".

"At 4:30 in the morning the order to strike tents was given and by reveille (6 o'clock AM) the long caravan had passed through the Fort Worden west gate headed for home.

"Who is that man who never seems to rest, always in a hurry, yet never seems to worry? Why that's Master Sergeant Clarence J. Turner, the Regimental Sergeant Major. Yes, Sergeant Turner, the Regimental Sergeant Major is a busy man. To the casual eye he is just another worker with nothing to do but answer the phone and write a few letters, but this is wrong. Each and every morning at 7:30 he goes to work and doesn't, quit many times until the last note of "Taps" has faded away. When you want a pass to go on the Virginia V, when you want to get transferred, and when you get promoted, Sergeant Turner is the man who sees that action is taken, yes and he does it cheerfully too. So let's give him: a great big hand, fellows:

Although the 248th Coast Artillery (HD) appeared to be firmly settled within the limits of the Harbor Defenses of Puget Sound for the duration of the War, all was not so, for on the 12th of April 1944, they were needed elsewhere. On that date, the Western Defense Command issued General Orders No. 51, transferring the 248th to Camp Barkeley, Texas. Based upon this order, the Harbor Defenses of Puget Sound issued Movement Orders, dated 21 April 1944 directing their movement by rail from Seattle between 2030 and 2230 hours on 25 April 1944. Upon their arrival they were relieved from the Western Defense Command and assigned to the XXIII Corps, Fourth United States Army. In the meantime an advance detachment of 28 officers and men under the command of Captain Paul C. James moved by rail on 23 April 1944 to Camp Barkeley to make plans for the regiment upon its arrival.

On 8 May 1944, pursuant to General Orders No. 2, Headquarters, 418th Field Artillery Group, 29 men of Headquarters Units of the 248th C. A. were transferred to Headquarters and Headquarters Battery of the 418th F. A. Group; 71 more men from Headquarters units of the 248th were transferred to Hq. Battery, 768th Field Artillery Battalion and 76 others to the Service Battery of this Battalion; Battery "A", 248th C. A. became Battery "A", 768th F. A. Battalion and 107 men were transferred thereto; 107 men of Battery "B", 248th were transferred to Battery "B" of the 768th F. A. Battalion; with the transfer of 107 men from Battery "C" 248th they became Battery "C" of the 768th F. A. Battalion. 76 men of Hq. Battery and other units of the 248th made up Hq. Battery of the 769th F. A. Battalion; also 90 men from units of the 248th made up Service Battery of the 769th F. A. Battalion; 104 men of Battery D, 248th made up Battery A of the 769th F. A. Battalion; 108 men of Battery "E", 248th C.A. became Battery B of the 769th; and 103 men of Battery "F" became Battery C of the 769th F. A. Battalion. 3 men of the 248th were transferred to Hq. Battery, 803rd F. A. Battalion as were 2 men to Service Battery of this Battalion; 39 men of Hq. Battery, 248th were transferred to Hq. Battery of the 804th F. A. Battalion and 11 to Service Battery of the 804th; 37 men of the 248th were reassigned to the 805th F. A. Battalion (Hq. Battery) and 3 men to Service Battery of the same Battalion.

In addition to the foregoing 29 men were discharged at Camp Barkeley for physical reasons and 46 reassigned out of the Artillery in accordance with their primary Military Occupational Specialty.

The foregoing Battalions were activated to participate in the Normandy landings and served in Europe until the close of the War. Thus came the end of an era for Coast Artillery units in the Washington

National Guard. The 248th regiment is one of the Combat Arms Regiments assigned to the Washington National Guard in the Pentomic reorganization of 1959. It is currently represented by the 1st Battalion, 248th Artillery (Howitzer) with Headquarters, Headquarters Battery and Battery "A" stationed at Aberdeen and Battery "B" at Shelton.

The Band, 248th Coast Artillery (CD) was reorganized and redesignated the 91st Army Ground Forces Band on 26 May 1944, and was transferred from Camp Berkeley to Fort Bliss, Texas on 12-13 September 1944. On 15 December, the 91st Band was moved to Kennedy General Hospital, Memphis, Tennessee on a permanent change of station, under the 4th Service Command. On 25 January 1945 the 91st Band was redesignated the 444th Army Services Forces Band. The 444th ASF Band was inactivated at Kennedy General Hospital, Memphis, Tennessee on 9 March 1946, per General Orders No. 10, 4th Service Command.

On 16 September 1940, the 116th Observation Squadron, with a strength of 30 officers and 149 enlisted men, was inducted into Federal Service at its home station, Felts Field, Parkwater (Spokane) Washington and was attached to the 41st Infantry Division. Felts Field was named for Lieutenant Buell Felts, a Spokane man, who was killed in a crash near this early airport. 1st Lieutenant Buell J. Felts joined the 116th Observation Squadron on June 5th, 1926. He was commissioned a Second Lieutenant just 10 days later. He was promoted to First Lieutenant on April 12, 1927 and was killed in an airplane crash on May 29, 1927.

On 1 September 1941, the 116th Observation Squadron was relieved from attachment to the 41st Infantry Division and was assigned to the 70th Observation Group, 4th Air Support Command, 2nd Air Force. However, the Squadron continued to remain attached to the IX Army Corps, with station at Gray Field. On 5 January 1942, the Squadron was relieved from the 4th Air Support Command and was assigned to the Western Theater of Operations, with continued assignment to the 2nd Air Force.

Although Gray Field was listed as the Squadron's permanent station it appears that it was moved frequently in the performance of its observation duties. It was stationed in Yakima from 16 March to 1 May 1942 and at Moon Island, Hoquiam, from 5 May to 16 June 1942. On 25 January 1943, the 116th Observation Squadron was relieved from assignment to the 2nd Air Force and was assigned to the 3rd Air Force. On 9 March 1943, the Squadron was relieved from assignment to Gray Field and was assigned to Corvallis Army Airfield, Corvallis, Oregon. On 9 April 1943, the Squadron was redesignated as the 116th Reconnaissance Squadron, following which it took temporary station at Redmond, Oregon. On 11 August 1943, the Squadron was redesignated as the 116th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron, effective 15 August 1943 and directed to return to Corvallis Field, Oregon. This move was accomplished on 16 August 1943. The Squadron later participated in IV Army Corps Maneuvers in the vicinity of Redmond, Oregon and returned to Corvallis on 30 October 1943, following which the Squadron received orders to move to Will Rogers Field, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. The Squadron departed Corvallis Airfield on 10 November 1943, and was disbanded at that Station on 30 November 1943 and its personnel reassigned to other units of the 3rd Air Force. Of interest, because the question has been asked many times, is the reason for the stationing of this squadron in Spokane. In a speech over the radio Adjutant General Thompson stated as follows:

"In the spring of 1924 I was addressing a group of Spokane business men and concluded my remarks by saying Washington has been offered one of the 19 National Guard Observation Squadrons authorized by the National Guard Bureau. I've offered it to Seattle and Tacoma, but Spokane has an equal opportunity to get it. Whichever city can raise \$10,000 first for the erection of hangars is going to get the squadron". The General boarded a train for Washington, D. C., after his address and upon his arrival there he received a wire that the "\$10,000" had been raised by a group of business men in Spokane and they want the "Squadron". They got it.

Following the induction of the 205th Coast Artillery Regiment (Antiaircraft) (Mobile) on 3 February 1941, the units were assembled in the North Fort Lewis area for training. The strength at the time of organization of the regiment in November of 1939, was 48 officers and 1,187 enlisted men. When the regiment was inducted the strength of the officers had increased to 67, while the strength of the

enlisted men had shrunk to 1,040. This was no doubt due to enlistment of members in the regular army and the weeding out of the unqualified, including those with physical disabilities.

On 11 June 1941, the Commanding General, Fourth Army was directed to organize one (1) Battery of Coast Artillery (AA) (Automatic Weapons) with a strength of 5 officers and 136 enlisted men for movement to Seward, Alaska on the United States Army Transport "Grant" sailing on about 15 June 1941. Based upon this directive, Battery "E" was selected and sailed from Seattle on 25 June 1941 and arrived at Seward on 30 June 1941.

On 24 July 1941, two (2) batteries (Gun) of the 205th with one (1) Searchlight Platoon attached to each and one (1) Battery (Automatic Weapons) were directed to move from Fort Lewis to Alaska. Detachment, Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, 205th; 1 Platoon (SL) Battery A; Batteries C, D and H, departed Fort Lewis and arrived at Camp Murray (Alaskan Staging Area) on 6 August 1941. One (1) Platoon (SL) Battery A, Battery D and Battery H, 205th departed Seattle on board USAT "GRANT" on 15 August 1941 and arrived at Sitka, Alaska on 18 August 1941. Detachment, Hq & Hq Battery, 205th departed Seattle on board the USAT "CLEVEDON" on 19 August 1941 and arrived Seward, Alaska on 22 August 1941. One (1) Platoon (SL) Battery A, and Battery C, 205th departed Seattle on board USAT "PRESIDENT TAFT" on 30 August 1941 and arrived at Seward, Alaska on 4 September 1941.

Letter from the War Department dated 29 October 1941 directed the movement of the 205th, less elements in Alaska from Fort Lewis to Camp Haan (Los Angeles) Calif. The regiment, less units in Alaska, departed Fort Lewis on 14 November 1941 and arrived at Camp Haan on 22 November 1941 where it was assigned to the 37th Coast Artillery Brigade (AA).

Based upon orders of the Alaskan Defense Command, dated 8 March 1942, and effective 17 April 1942, personnel and equipment of elements of the 205th in Alaska were transferred to units in Alaska as follows: Detachment, Hq & Hq Battery, 205th to Hq & Hq Battery, 420th Coast Artillery Battalion (Comp) (AA); 1st and 2nd Platoons (SL) of Battery A, 205th to 1st and 2nd Platoons, Battery A, 420th; Batteries C, D, E and H to Batteries C, B, E and D, 420th; Concurrently, with the completion of this transfer, the elements of the 205th, less personnel and equipment, were transferred to Camp Haan. Similar action was taken with Battery G, 205th which was ordered to Alaska with its personnel, was transferred to the 420th; and released back to the 205th CA, less personnel and equipment. This unit arrived from Camp Haan at Camp Murray on 17 May 1942; departed from Seattle on 24 May and arrived at Fort Glenn on 4 June 1942. The release back to the 205th was effective 6 June 1942. In May of 1942, the Commanding General, Western Defense Command was directed to reorganize elements of the 205th into a semi-mobile regiment and bring the regiment up to a full strength of three battalions. This action, except for Battery G, was completed 19 June 1942 and the regiment redesignated as the 205th Coast Artillery Regiment (Antiaircraft) (Semi-mobile). Organization of Battery G was completed on 3 July 1942. In the meantime the 205th was ordered to Los Angeles on temporary duty. On January 15, 1943, this was made the regiment's permanent station.

On 10 September 1943, Hq & Hq Battery, 205th CA (AA) (SM) was redesignated Hq. & Hq. Battery, 205th Antiaircraft Group; 1st Battalion, 205th was redesignated the 770th Antiaircraft Gun Battalion; 2nd Battalion, 205th became the 530th Antiaircraft Automatic Weapons Battalion; and the 3rd Battalion, 205th was redesignated as the 240th Antiaircraft Artillery Searchlight Battalion. The 205th CA Band was redesignated as the 262nd Army Band, effective 10 December 1943.

On 15 April 1944, all antiaircraft artillery and searchlight units in the Western Defense Command were reassigned to the Fourth Air Force for complete and integrated combined air defense training and for air defense of the West Coast.

In a letter dated 30 July 1944, Hq & Hq Battery, 205th AAA Group was directed to move from Santa Monica (Los Angeles) California to Camp Bowie, Texas. The Group departed on 18 August 1944 and arrived at Camp Bowie, Texas on 21 August 1944, where the unit was inactivated on 24 August 1944 and its personnel reassigned to the XXIII Corps of the Fourth Army.

On 10 February 1944, the 770th Gun Battalion was inactivated at Los Angeles by the Commanding General, IV Antiaircraft Command, concurrently with the activation of the 164th, 165th and

166th AAA Operations Detachments. Excess personnel of the Battalion were reassigned within the IV AAA Command.

At the same time the 530th AAA AW Battalion was directed to move to Camp Hulen, Texas where it arrived on 6 March 1944. It was reorganized on 1 April 1944 as the 530th Antiaircraft Artillery Automatic Weapons Battalion (Mobile). The Battalion departed Camp Hulen, Texas and arrived at Esler Field, Louisiana on 12 September 1944. Reassigned for an overseas shipment, the battalion left Esler Field and moved to Camp Polk, Louisiana on 10 October 1944. The battalion was then given a readiness date of 1 December 1944 for shipment overseas. This was later changed to 17 November and New York designated as Port of Embarkation. The advance detachment departed Camp Polk on 9 November and arrived at Fort Hamilton on 11 November 1944. The Battalion departed Camp Polk on 1 December 1944 and arrived at Camp Shanks, New York on 3 December where it boarded the "Queen Elizabeth" on 16 December 1944 and arrived at Greenock, Scotland 21 December 1944. Upon its arrival in England, the battalion was assigned to the 111th AAA Group, 15th U S Army. On 13 April 1945, the battalion was in Germany; In Austria 15 May 1945; back in Germany 14 June 1945 from where it was ordered back to the United States. The 530th sailed from LeHavre, France on board the "Lacrosse Victory" 23 October 1945 and arrived at New York Port of Embarkation on 31 October 1945. Unit was inactivated at Camp Shanks on 3 Nov 45. This Battalion was awarded battle participation credits for CAMPAIGN CENTRAL EUROPE and RHINELAND CAMPAIGN.

The 240th AAA Searchlight Battalion was also assigned to the IV Antiaircraft Command until mid-July, 1944 when it was ordered to proceed to Fort Bliss, Texas. The Battalion departed Los Angeles on 2-August 1945 and arrived at Fort Bliss on 3 August 1945 where it was inactivated on 5 September 1945.

The 262nd Army Band (formerly the 205th CA Band) moved from Camp Haan on 4 April 1944 and arrived at Camp Fannin, Texas on 7 April 1944. On 23 May, 1944, it was redesignated as the 262nd Army Ground Forces Band. On 5 January 1946 it was redesignated as the 488th Army Service Forces Band and assigned to the 8th Service Command. The 488th ASF Band was inactivated at Camp Fannin, Texas on 1 March 1946.

The 103rd Anti-Tank Battalion was inducted into Federal Service on 10 February 1941 at its home station, Tacoma, Washington. Headquarters, Medical Detachment and Companies A and B of this Battalion were new units. Headquarters Company was formerly Troop B, 58th Machine Gun Squadron (Old Troop B, Cavalry) and Company C was the old 41st Tank Company from Centralia. 35 officers and 311 enlisted men comprised the Battalion at that time.

On 24 July 1941 this Battalion was redesignated the 103rd Infantry Battalion Anti-Tank and on 15 December 1941 was again redesignated as the 803rd Tank Destroyer Battalion (H) (SP) and was attached to Fourth Army effective 30 January 1942.

On 1 May 1942, the 803rd was relieved from assignment to Fourth Army and was attached to the IX Corps at Fort Lewis. On 17 July 1942, the Battalion received orders for temporary duty at Camp Hood, Texas, effective 1 August 1942, where, upon its arrival on that date it was attached to the Tank Destroyer Center at Camp Hood.

On 19 December 1942, the Battalion received orders to proceed to New York Port of embarkation. Leaving Camp Hood on 24 December 1942, the Battalion arrived at Fort Dix, New Jersey on 27 December 1942. From there the Battalion was ordered to Camp Atterbury, Indiana, but before the Battalion could depart, these orders were rescinded. From there the Battalion moved to Pine Camp, New York for temporary station and arrived there on 30 March 1943. From there the Battalion moved to the New York Port of Embarkation, arriving at Camp Kilmer on 5 June 1943. The 803rd sailed from New York Port of Embarkation on the "Queen Mary" on 24 June 1943 and arrived in England on 6 July 1943. On 15 August 1943 the Battalion was reported as being in Chisleton, England. On 6 September 1944, the Battalion was reported in France.

On 15 September 1944, the Battalion was reorganized with a strength of 35 officers, 2 warrant officers and 607 enlisted men and at that time was reported in Holland. On 2 November 1944 the

ACTIVATION AND COMBAT PARTICIPATION OF US DIVISIONS

DIVISION	DATE ACTIVATED	COMBAT PARTICIPATION	LOCATION 30 SEP 1944
Philippine	June 1921	Philippines-Lost in Combat 1942	Captured
24th	Oct 1941	Central Pacific -New Guinea	New Guinea
25th	Oct 1941	Cen Pac, Guad., No. Solomons	New Caledonia
34th	Feb 1941	Tunisia, Naples, Rome, Anzio etc	Italy
Americal	May 1942	Guadalcanal, Northern Solomons	Bougainville
27th	Oct 1940	Western Pacific	Espiritu Santo
41st	Sep 1940	Papua, New Guinea	New Guinea
32nd	Oct 1940	Papua, New Guinea	New Guinea
5th	Oct 1939	Normandy, No. France, Rhineland	France
1st Armored	Jul 1940	Tunisia, Naples, Rome, Anzio etc	Italy
37th	Oct 1940	Northern Solomons	Bougainville
18th	May 1917	Algeria, Naples, Rome, So. France	Belgium
40th	Mar 1941	Bismarck Archipelago	New Britain
43rd	Feb 1941	Guado., No. Solomons, New Guinea	New Guinea
29th	Feb 1941	Normandy, No. France, Rhineland	Netherlands
3rd	Nov 1917	Algeria, Sicily, Naples, Anzio. etc	France
2nd Armored	Jul 1940	Sicily, Normandy, France, Rhineland	Netherlands
9th	Aug 1940	Tunisia, Sicily. Normandy , etc	Germany
36th	Nov 1941	Naples. Rome, Anzio, So. France, etc	France
7th	Jul 1940	Aleutians, Eastern, Mandates	Cen. Pacific
82nd Airborne	Mar 1942	Sicily, Naples. Normandy .etc	Netherlands
45th	Sep 1940	Sicily, Naples. Normandy .etc	France
18th Cavalry	Sep 1921	New Guinea. Bismarck Archipelago	Admiralties
33rd	Mar 1941	New Guinea	New Guinea
6th	Oct 1939	New Guinea	New Guinea
3rd Armored	Aug 1941	Normandy .No. France. Rhineland	Germany
101st Airborne	Aug 1942	Normandy, Rhineland	Netherlands
2nd	Sep 1917	Normandy, No. France, Rhineland	Belgium
28th	Feb 1941	Normandy, No. France, Rhineland	Luxembourg
8th	Jul 1940	Normandy, No. France, Rhineland	Luxembourg
88th	Jul 1942	Rome-Arno, No. Apennines	Italy
85th	May 1942	Rome-Arno, No. Apennines	Italy
4th Armored	Apr 1941	Normandy, No. France, Rhineland	France
38th	Jan 1941	New Guinea	New Guinea
93rd	May 1942	New Guinea, No. Solomons	Treasury Isl.
4th	Jm 1940	Normandy,. No. France, Rhineland	Belgium
2nd Cavalry	Feb 1943	Partially disbanded (1942)	(Inactivated)
30th	Sep 1940	Normandy, No. France. Rhineland	Netherlands
5th Armored	Oct 1941	Normandy, No. France, Rhineland	Luxembourg
6th Armored	Feb 1942	Normandy, No. France. Rhineland	France
31st	Nov 1940	New Guinea	Morotai
90th	Mar 1942	Normandy, No. France, Rhineland	France
77th	Mar 1942	Western Pacific	Guam
91st	Aug 1942	Rome-Arno. No. Apennines	Italy
83rd	Aug 1942	Normandy, No. France. Rhineland	Luxembourg
79th	Jun 1942	Normandy, No. France, Rhineland	France
98th	Sep 1942	(None)	Hawaii
11th Airborne	Feb 1943	New Guinea	New Guinea
35th	Dec 1940	Normandy, No. France, Rhineland	France
7th Armored	Mar 1942	No. France, Rhineland	Belgium
80th	Jul 1942	No. France, Rhineland	France
81st	Jun 1942	Western Pacific	Palaus
96th	Aug 1942	(None)	Central Pacific
94th	Sep 1942	Northern France	France
95th	Jul 1942	Northern France	France
17th Airborne	Apr 1943	(None)	United Kingdom
26th	Jan 1941	Northern France	France
104th	Sep 1942	Northern France	France

NOTE 9th Armored, 44th, 102nd, 10th Armored, 12th Armored, 84th, 92nd, 11th Armored and 99th had not been in combat as of 30 Sep 1944.

Battalion was reported in Belgium and was awarded battle credit for the NORMANDY CAMPAIGN. In February 1945, its station was in (Luxemburg and in April Germany, for which the Battalion was given battle credit for GERMANY. In May the Battalion was in Czechoslovakia where it received orders to return to the United States. The Battalion departed France aboard the USS PHILADELPHIA on 23 November 1945 with expected time of arrival (ETA) 29 November 1945, where it was inactivated upon arrival thereat.

In addition to the NORMANDY CAMPAIGN the Battalion was awarded battle credits for the NORTHERN FRANCE CAMPAIGN, THE ARDENNES-ALSACE CAMPAIGN, THE CENTRAL EUROPEAN CAMPAIGN and the RHINELAND CAMPAIGN.

Company C, 803rd Tank Destroyer Battalion was awarded battle honors in the name of the President of the United States as public evidence of deserved honor and distinction for extraordinary heroism and outstanding performance of duty in its determined drive to overcome bitter opposition in the HURTGEN FOREST. For this, Company C was entitled to a Distinguished Unit Citation Streamer embroidered HURTGEN FOREST. This Battalion was subsequently redesignated the 803rd Tank Battalion and is now the 1st Medium Tank Battalion, 303rd Armor Regiment.

See Chart opposite for information on World War II Divisions.

With the induction of the 103rd Anti-Tank Battalion on 10 February 1941, the entire Washington National Guard was serving on active duty, with a strength of 417 officers, 4 warrant officers and 5703 enlisted men for a grand total of 6124.

Under the plans of the National Guard Bureau, units of the National Guard of the United States were inducted in twenty-three increments, beginning with the first increment on 16 September 1940 and concluding with the twenty-third increment on 17 May 1941. The first increment included the 30th, 41st, 44th and 45th Infantry Divisions; the 197th, 198th, 202nd, 203rd, 211th, 213th, 244th, 250th, 251st, 252nd, 240th, 241st, 242nd, 243rd, 245th, 246th, 248th and 249th Coast Artillery Regiments; and the 105th, 119th, 154th and 116th Observation Squadrons. Strength of this increment was 3921 officers, 49 warrant officers and 59676 enlisted men.

The 2nd increment was inducted on 15 October 1940 and included the 27th, 37th and 32nd Infantry Divisions; the 102nd, 153rd and 107th Observation Squadrons; the 295th, 296th, 298th and 299th Infantry Regiments; and other miscellaneous units for a total of 2,393 officers, 30 warrant officers and 36166 enlisted men.

The 3rd increment on 18 November 1940 was the 56th Cavalry Brigade from Texas with a strength of 149 officers, 2 warrant officers and 2413 enlisted men.

The 4th increment on 25 November 1940 included the 31st and 36th Infantry Divisions; 101st, 152nd, 106th, 111th and 112th Observation Squadrons; 128th Field Artillery regiment; 106th Cavalry regiment; and the 147th and 214th Coast Artillery regiments for a total of 1939 officers, 20 warrant officers and 28799 enlisted men.

The 5th increment on 23 December 1940 included the 35th Infantry Division, the 153rd Infantry regiment and the 110th Observation Squadron with a strength of 873 officers, 9 warrant officers and 13172 enlisted men.

The 6th increment was inducted on 6 January 1941 with 21 regiments of Coast Artillery, Field Artillery, Cavalry and an Anti-Tank Battalion with a strength of 1037 officers, 10 warrant officers and 14970 enlisted men.

The 7th increment on 13 January 1941 contained 11 units of the various arms and totaled 472 officers, 7 warrant officers and 6960 enlisted men.

The 26th Infantry Division was the eighth increment inducted on 16 January 1941, and had a strength of 798 officers, 9 warrant officers and 8274 enlisted men.

The 9th increment included the 38th Infantry Division and the 113th Observation Squadron with a combined strength of 769 officers, 7 warrant officers and 8423 enlisted men. Inducted on 17 January 1941.

The 10th increment on 22 January 1941 covered 4 units of the 28th Infantry Division with a strength of 13 officers and 168 enlisted men.

The 11th increment on 27 January 1941 comprised 8 miscellaneous regiments with a strength of 427 officers, 5 warrant officers and 5532 enlisted men.

The 12th increment was inducted on) February 1941 and included the 191st Tank Battalion; 71st, 144th, 187th and 258th Field Artillery regiments; the 29th Infantry Division; 105th Anti-Tank Battalion; 104th and 108th Observation Squadron and the 205th Coast Artillery Regiment with a combined strength of 1292 officers, 14 warrant officers and 14257 enlisted men.

The 13th increment on 10 February 1941 included the 34th Infantry Division; 8 Coast Artillery regiments; the 109th Observation Squadron; 194th Tank Battalion; and the 103rd Anti-Tank Battalion with a strength of 1290 officers, 11 warrant officers and 19265 enlisted men.

The 14th increment on 17 February 1941 included the balance of the 28th Infantry Division; the 104th Cavalry regiment; and the 103rd Observation Squadron with a strength of 822 officers, 9 warrant officers and 11709 enlisted men.

The 15th increment on 24 February 1941 included the 43rd Infantry Division; 115th Cavalry regiment; 74th, 75th, 168th, 172nd, 179th, 181st and 191st Field Artillery regiments; the 210th Coast Artillery regiment, the 103rd Coast Artillery battalion; and the 118th Observation Squadron with a strength of 1359 officers, 10 warrant officers and 18330 enlisted men.

The 16th increment on 3 March 1941 was composed of the 40th Infantry Division and the 115th Observation Squadron with a combined strength of 796 officers, 7 warrant officers and 10234 enlisted men.

The 17th increment on 5 March 1941; comprised the 33rd Infantry Division and the 107th Cavalry regiment with a strength of 958 officers, 10 warrant officers and 11949 enlisted men.

The 18th increment on 10 March 1941 was composed of the 101st Military Police battalion and the 372nd Infantry regiment with a combined strength of 112 officers, 1 warrant officer, and 2076 enlisted men.

The 19th increment on 1 April 1941 was composed of the 183rd and 188th Field Artillery regiments and Brigade Headquarters Battery of the 76th Field Artillery Brigade with a combined strength of 132 officers, 2 warrant officers and 2183 enlisted men.

The 20th increment on 7 April 1941 included Hq. Battery, 72nd Field Artillery Brigade and the 182nd, 177th and 119th Field Artillery regiments with a combined strength of 182 officers. 1 warrant officers and 2725 enlisted men.

The 21st increment on 2 June was the 126th Observation Squadron with a strength of 22 officers and 144 enlisted men.

The 22nd increment on 23 June 1941 was the 121st Coast Artillery Battalion with a strength of 38 officers and 324 enlisted men.

The 23rd increment comprised the 1st Battalion, 297th Infantry (Alaska) and the 121st, 122nd, 123rd, 124th, 125th, 127th and 128th Observation squadrons with a combined strength of 157 officers and 832 enlisted men.

The foregoing strengths, with the addition of 504 officers and 788 enlisted men of the State Staffs and Detachments provided a grand total of 20455 officers, 221 warrant officers and 279358 enlisted men for a grand aggregate of 300034.

Inducted units included 15 Infantry Divisions; 31 Coast Artillery regiments; 7 Coast Artillery Battalions; 26 Field Artillery regiments; 21 Observation Squadrons; 6 separate regiments of Infantry; 1 Cavalry Brigade and 7 Cavalry regiments; 1 Military Police Battalion and 5 Anti-Tank Battalions. In concluding this Chapter of the History of the Washington National Guard, your author will bring to a close his labors which have covered some six years of research and writing, much of which has been accomplished on his own time. However, the writing of history is never ending and my successor or successors at some future date can take up where I have left off and write the story of the Post World War

II reorganization period, the Korean Police Action and the Washington National Guard in the Pentomic Era.

See Chart opposite for U.S. & British strengths, WWII.

STAFF SUMMARY OF CURRENT AND PROJECTED DEPLOYMENT OF AMERICAN
VERSUS BRITISH FORCES .PREPARED FOR THE CAIRO CONFERENCE

23 November 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

At our last meeting on the IOWA you asked for the figures on deployment of U. S. forces (Army, Navy, Marines) and of British forces. These figures follow. The U. S. figures are accurate; the British figures are an ESTIMATE made by us. If more accurate figures on the British become available, they will be furnished to you.

	AT PRESENT	JAN 1, 1944	MAY 1, 1944	JUL 1, 1944
OVERSEAS	3,631,000	3,961,000	4,936,000	5,523,000
AT HOME	6,497,000	6,567,000	5,791,000	5,399,000
TOTAL PERSONNEL.....	10,128,000	10,529,000	10,727,000	10,823,000
 BRITISH & DOMINIONS	 4,412,000	 4,412,000	 4,490,000	 4,510,000
(Approximately 2,200,000 of above are in U. K. Total does not include 480,000 Dominion and Colonial forces estimated as in Home Areas for defense)				
COMBAT AIRPLANES.....	8,500	9,000	9,300	9,600

DEPLOYMENT OF U. S. FORCES

<u>PERSONNEL</u>	<u>22 NOV 43</u>	<u>1 JAN 44</u>	<u>1 MAY 44</u>	<u>1 JUL 44</u>
OVERSEAS				
U. S. ARMY	2,320,000	2,550,000	3,303,000	3,679,500
U. S. NAVY	1,136,300	1,229,600	1,428,300	1,527,900
U. S. MARINES	175,000	182,200	205,000	216,400
TOTAL	3,631,000	3,961,800	4,936,300	5,523,800
 CONT. U. S. (TRAINING)				
U. S. ARMY	5,130,000	5,150,000	4,397,000	4,020,500
U. S. NAVY	1,160,000	1,205,400	1,177,500	1,159,100
U. S. MARINES	270,000	212,200	217,000	219,600
TOTAL.....	6,497,000	6,567,600	5,791,500	5,399,200
 TOTAL STRENGTH				
U. S. ARMY	7,450,000	7,700,000	7,700,000	7,700,000
U. S. NAVY	2,296,300	2,435,000	2,605,800	2,687,000
U. S. MARINES	182,000	194,400	422,000	436,000
TOTAL.....	10,128,300	10,529,400	10,727,800	10,823,000

DEPLOYMENT OF BRITISH FORCES

PERSONNEL	22 NOV 43	1 JAN 44	1 MAY 44	1 JUL 44
OVERSEAS				
BRITISH ARMY	900,000	900,000	900,000	900,000
ROYAL NAVY	522,000	522,000	600,000	620,000
ROYAL AIR FORCE	400,000	400,000	400,000	400,000
TOTAL	1,822,000	1,822,000	1,900,000	1,920,000
UNITED KINGDOM				
BRITISH ARMY	1,200,000	1,200,000	1,200,000	1,200,000
ROYAL NAVY	200,000	200,000	200,000	200,000
ROYAL AIR FORCE	620,000	600,000	600,000	600,000
TOTAL	2,000,000	2,000,000	2,000,000	2,000,000
GRAND TOTALS	3,822,000	3,822,000	3,900,000	3,920,000
(BRITISH FORCES)				

GEORGE C. MARSHALL
Chief of Staff

In the meantime the recording of history must go on. Likewise, it must be constantly revised in order to record new discoveries, omissions, etc. The old adage that you cannot change history is no doubt correct. However, written history when determined incorrect, must be corrected. Since the beginning of Volume 1, "Heritage", information has been discovered which, if proven correct, could extend the beginning of the military man or "Warrior" back some 5,000 years. It may be recalled that the "Warrior" mentioned in Volume 1 existed about 3,000 years B.C. It is possible that he existed some 9,600 years B.C. While the book which tells us this is still disputed by the historian, especially the early historian, one cannot but feel that it is possibly true.

This book, written by Ignatius Donnelly and published by Harper and Sons, before the turn of the Century, is entitled "ATLANTIS, THE ANTEDILUVIAN WORLD"

It is described as a very large continent approximately 11,000 years old and situated in the Atlantic Ocean before the "Deluge". According to the Encyclopedia Britannica, "ATLANTIS" sank into the Atlantic Ocean during a great earthquake. According to legend, survivors of Atlantis escaped to other continents such as Africa, Europe, North and South America, etc.

Based upon the story told by "Donnelly", information was handed down to "Plato" by his ancestor "Solon" regarding the military Leaders of "ATLANTIS". He describes such leaders as being heads of certain groups of dwellings and villages. Each of these areas were some ten miles square, with a total of about sixty thousand such areas. The leader of an "Area" was required to furnish the "KING" for "WAR" the sixth portion of a "WAR CHARIOT", so as to make up a total of ten thousand chariots also two horses and riders upon them; and a light chariot without a seat, accompanied by a fighting man on foot carrying a small shield, and having a charioteer mounted to guide the horses. Also he was bound to furnish two heavily armed men, two archers, two slingers, three stone shooters, and three javelin men who were skirmishers, and four sailors to make up a complement of twelve hundred ships. Such was the order of War in the "Royal City", of which there were ten on "ATLANTIS", each commanded by a "KING" who had absolute control of the citizens, and in many cases the laws, punishing and slaying whomsoever he would. WAS THIS THE BEGINNING OF CIVILIZATION AND THE "WARRIOR"?

If so, it will remain for the future historians to tell us!

V. F. FIELD
Colonel, US Army, Retired
Historian

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES

Major General George M. Haskett
The Adjutant General, State of Wash.

Washington's 25th Adjutant General was born in Kerrobert, Saskatchewan, Canada on 2 October 1914. He moved to the United States with his parents in 1925 and became a naturalized citizen of the United States in 1932. He graduated from Olympia High School in 1933; from St. Martin's Junior College, Olympia, in 1936; and from the University of Washington, Seattle, in 1939 with a BA degree.

General Haskett began his career in the Washington National Guard by enlisting in Battery D, 248th Coast Artillery in Olympia on 6 November 1939. He served in this Battery until 14 December 1939, being promoted to Corporal and Sergeant on 22 Sept 1934 and 12 July 1935, respectively. He was transferred in grade of private to Hq. Battery, 1st Battalion, 205th Coast Artillery on December 14, 1939 and promoted back to sergeant the following day. He was honorably discharged on 31 July 1940 to accept a commission as Second Lieutenant on the following day. On 4 December 1940 he was promoted to 1st Lieutenant and on 3 February 1941 was inducted into Federal Service along with other members of the 205th Coast Artillery Regiment.

During World War II he served successively as Commanding Officer, Hq. Battery, 1st Bn., 205th C.A.; Commanding Officer, Battery F, 205th C.A.; Executive Officer, 2nd Bn., 205th C.A.; Executive Officer, 782nd AAA AW Bn.; Liaison Officer, 453rd AAA AW Bn.; AA Training Officer, Hq. XI Corps, Hq. XVI Corps and Hq. XXXVI Corps; and Assistant G-3, Hq. VII Corps. While he was serving in these positions of responsibility he was promoted to Captain on 8 April 1942; to Major on 17 November 1942 and to Lieutenant Colonel on 3 August 1946. Upon return to State Control on 28 October 1946 he was attached to State Detachment, Washington National Guard and remained thus assigned until 20 February 1947 when he was assigned to command the 115th AAA Operations Detachment, Olympia, in the grade of Major. He was promoted to Lieut. Colonel, Artillery; on 5 May 1948 without Change of status. He continued to serve with the 115th AAA Brigade and in 1955 was employed by the State of Washington as AAA Site Supervisor. He was promoted to Colonel on 5 January 1956. He was detailed as The Adjutant General, State of Washington on 16 November 1957 and concurrently commissioned as Major General, Adjutant General's Corps, Washington National Guard. During his active service, General Haskett was awarded four service medals with two attachments.

During his service, General Haskett has attended the following service schools: AAA Refresher Course, AA School, Camp Davis, N.C. (1943); AAA Staff Course, AA School, Camp Davis, N.C. (.1943); AAF Applied Tactics, Orlando, Florida (1943); Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas (1946); Guided Missile Orientation Course, Fort Bliss, Texas {1948); and Special Weapons and Guided Missile Course, Ft. Bliss, Texas (1955).

VIRGIL F. FIELD, COLONEL, U. S. ARMY
(RETIRED)

VIRGIL FORMAN FIELD was born on 20 April 1902 at Park City, Utah. Both of his grandfathers, Virgil Field and William Forman settled in Utah in the 1850's. His grandfather Field and his father, Virgil William Field were prominent in the mining industry of early Utah.

His early schooling was in the schools of Salt Lake City. Too young to enter the service in World War I, he worked in the Hercules Powder Plant in Nitro, West Virginia. Following the trade of a carpenter for several years, he joined the regular army in California on 8 September 1927. Following a short tour of duty at Fort McArthur he came to Camp Lewis in October of 1927. He was promoted up through the various ranks to Master Sergeant in July of 1939. After a short tour of duty of Chief Clerk of the G-2 Section, IX Corps, he was transferred to Headquarters, Fort Lewis where he served as Chief Clerk of Fort Lewis. His Executive Officer at that time was Lieutenant Colonel Dwight P. Eisenhower. Following the outbreak of World War II, he received an original appointment as First Lieutenant, Adjutant General's Corps, effective as of 20 May 1942. After a short tour of duty at Camp Murray as Adjutant of the Alaskan Staging Area, he was ordered to the Advance Course of the Adjutant General's School at Fort Washington, Maryland. Prior to the normal graduation date he was selected as an Instructor for the Women's Army Auxiliary Corps at Fort Des Moines, Iowa. He served as Chief of the Academic Course of the Officer Candidate School until 1 December 1942, following which he was reassigned to the Operations Division of the General Staff of the War Department in Washington, D.C. He was assigned to the Strategy and Policy Group of the Division as Assistant Executive Officer and Top Secret Control Officer to Brigadier General Albert C. Wedemeyer. During his assignment to this position he was responsible for maintaining in a current status the Data Books used by General Marshall and others at World-Wide Allied conferences. For this service, Captain Field was awarded the Commendation Ribbon with Metal Pendant.

In December 1944, Field, then a Major was reassigned for duty with the State Department to serve as Executive Secretary of a newly created Committee, known as the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee. Members of this Committee were the under-Secretaries of the three departments. This Committee also served as the Informal Policy Committee for Germany and later, with the addition of the Air Force Under-Secretary served as advisors to the United States Member of the Far Eastern Commission. In general this Committee (SWNCC or SANAC) was responsible for coordinating matters of a common interest to the participating Departments, including surrender documents for Germany and Japan, and other Post-War Policies toward the defeated allies. For his efficiency and meritorious achievement while serving in the position of Executive Secretary and later as Senior Army and Air Force member of the Secretariat, Lieutenant Colonel Field was awarded the Legion of Merit by the Under-Secretary of War, the Honorable John J. McCloy.

In September 1948, after some six years in Washington, D.C., he was selected for an assignment to the Secretariat of the United States Mission to China at Nanking. He arrived at San Francisco after the evacuation of Nanking had commenced and was reassigned to the Occupation forces in Japan. Arriving in Japan in early January, 1949 he served in that Theater until 30 June 1952. Initially assigned as Chief of the Personnel Division, G-1, Eighth U. S. Army, he was later transferred to the Second Transportation Major Port in Yokohama. Due to shortage of officers brought on by the conflict in Korea he served as both Director of Administration and Adjutant General of the Port. In this position he had general supervision over some 2,000 American personnel and about 10,000 Japanese employees. Upon his departure from Japan he was awarded the Bronze Star for the highly efficient manner in which he performed his dual tasks. In addition to the foregoing awards, he is also, entitled to wear nine (9) other ribbons.

His final assignment was Fort Lee, Virginia where he served as Adjutant General of the Quartermaster Training Command and Headquarters, Fort Lee. He was retired on 30 April 1955 in the grade of Colonel after twenty-eight years of service.

CHAPTER V

WASHINGTON NATIONAL GUARD CASUALTIES IN WORLD WAR II

After the original publishing and distribution of Volume 6, rosters of both the Army and Navy casualties in World War II were located. These rosters were originally distributed in Volume 7 as an addendum to this volume have been appropriately added herein.

The Navy casualties were 1451 in combat and 54 in Prison Camps. 1300 were wounded and 158 released from Prison Camps. Army and Army Air Force casualties in World War II amounted to 3941 - 2084 killed in action, 292 died of wounds, 15 of injuries, 1239 non-battle, 294 declared dead and 17 missing. The following is a list of 152 men from Washington who entered the conflict with the Washington National Guard:

NAME AND ORGANIZATION	AUS RANK	TYPE OF CASUALTY
Hq Det, Special Troops, 41st Div		
Pvt Joe J. Turner	PFC	Killed in action
Hq Co, 81st Inf Brigade		
1 Sgt Wayne R. Reeder	MSgt	Died in service, non-battle
Hq Co, 161st Infantry		
PFC Edward C. Mescher	SSgt	Killed in action
Pvt James C. Ellis	2Lt	Killed in action
Pvt Alred K. Fields	SSgt	Killed in action
Serv. Co, 161st Infantry		
Cpl William E. Gulliford	T/5	Died of wounds, non-battle
PFC Alvin W. Diehl	WOJG	Died in service, non-battle
Pvt Walter R. Hahn	Cpl.	Killed in action
Pvt Eba F. Nagle	2Lt	Died of wounds
Hq Co., 1st Bn. 161st Infantry		
Pvt Walter I. Cook	SSgt	Killed in action
Pvt Buell F. Payne	F1/O	Killed in action
Co A, 161st Infantry		
PFC Owen D. Gaskell	Sgt	Killed in action
Pvt Cliff M. Jungers	Sgt	Killed in action
Co B, 161st Infantry		
Pvt Lindsay J. Kralmon	PFC	Killed in action
Pvt Frank C. Pickell	PFC	Killed in action
Pvt Howard A. Reightley	Sgt	Killed in action
Pvt Melvin W. Roth	Pvt	Killed in action
Pvt Eugene J. Schmidt	PFC	Died in service, non-battle
Co C, 161st Infantry		
PFC Claire A. Pickel	PFC	Died in service, non-battle
Pvt John Ferraro	PFC	Died in service, non-battle
Pvt Edward H. Hahn	PFC	Killed in action
Pvt Naurice L. Patterson	Pvt	Died in service, non-battle
Pvt Bob F. Payne	Pvt	Died in service, non-battle
Co D, 161st Infantry		
Cpl Edgar L. Miller	Cpl	Died in service, non-battle
Pvt John J. Disotell	PFC	Died in service, non-battle

NAME AND ORGANIZATION	AUS RANK	TYPE OF CASUALTY
Co E, 161st Infantry		
Sgt Kenneth P. French	1Lt	Killed in action
Sgt Robert W. McCalder	LtCol	Died of wounds
PFC Robert C. Barton	2Lt	Died in service, non-battle
Pvt Darwin J. Carroll	2Lt	Killed in action
Pvt Forrest E. Meyer	2Lt	Killed in action
Pvt Wilbur K. Smawley	T/4	Died in service, non-battle
Co F, 161st Infantry		
Pvt Lloyd J. Akins	1Sgt	Killed in action
Pvt Armond W. Connery	SSgt	Killed in action
Pvt Johnny W. Gordon	Pvt	Killed in action
Pvt Harry G. Heft	SSgt	Killed in action
Pvt Charles M. Weaver	F1/O	Finding of death
Pvt Glenn L. Williams	SSgt	Killed in action
Co G, 161st Infantry		
Pvt Homer L. Butler	SSgt	Killed in action
Pvt Frank Church	Cpl	Died in service, self infl.
Pvt Kermit U. Cole	PFC	Killed in action
Pvt Norman E. Collins	SSgt	Killed in action
Pvt Joseph O. Deatherage	PFC	Died in service, non-battle
Co H, 161st Infantry		
PFC William H. Cooper	2Lt	Died in service, non-battle
PFC Richard D. Plette	Cpl	Died in service, non-battle
PFC Charles R. Purdon	SSgt	Killed in action
PFC Howard D. Rinehart	2Lt	Killed in action
Pvt Dolph Barnett, Jr.	1Lt	Killed in action
Pvt Martin E. Bartley	2Lt	Killed in action
Pvt Herbert E. Lane	1Lt	Died of wounds
Hq Det 3rd Bn, 161st Infantry		
Pvt Floyd B. Tallman	1Sgt	Killed in action
Co I, 161st Infantry		
Cpl Ernest G. Schenck	SSgt	Killed in action
PFC John N. Van Horn	F1/O	Died in service, non-battle
Pvt Arthur S. Toothman	SSgt	Killed in action
Co K, 161st Infantry		
PFC George R. Barnett	F1/O	Killed in action
PFC Kenneth M. Smithey	PFC	Killed in action
Pvt Palmer H. Carlson	PFC	Killed in action
Pvt David W. Carpenter	Sgt	Killed in action
Pvt Clarence E. Roedell	PFC	Died in service, non-battle
Co L, 161st Infantry		
Cpl John F. Lee	TSgt	Killed in action
Cpl Duane L. Pepple	Capt	Killed in action
Cpl David B. Ritchie	Capt	Died of wounds
Pvt Earl E. Aney	Pvt	Killed in action
Pvt Mervin E. Bailey	PFC	Died of wounds
Pvt Robert L. Mathias	1Lt	Died in service, non-battle

NAME AND ORGANIZATION	AUS RANK	TYPE OF CASUALTY
Co M, 161st Infantry		
Sgt John L. White	TSgt	Died of wounds
Cpl John R. Hewitt	1Lt	Died of wounds
PFC Patrick E. Pilon	2Lt	Died in service, non-battle
Pvt George Heichel	PFC	Died of wounds
Pvt Mickey L. McGuire	Cpl	Died in service, non-battle
Pvt Edward A. Taylor	TSgt	Killed in action
Med Dept Det, 161st Infantry		
PFC Cecil F. Klise	T/5	Killed in action
Hq Btry, 146th Field Artillery		
Pvt Victor P. Pedersen	Sgt	Killed in action
Band, 146th Field Artillery		
Pvt Robert W. Freund	PFC	Died in service, non-battle
Btry A, 146th Field Artillery		
Cpl Duke R. Boyett	Cpl	Killed in action
Btry B, 146th Field Artillery		
Pvt Morris B. Cook	F1/O	Killed in action
Pvt Eddie M. King	Cpl	Died in service, non-battle
Btry C, 146th Field Artillery		
Pvt Garald P. Shapley	Pvt	Died in service, non-battle
Hq Btry, 2nd Bn, 146th Field Artillery		
Sgt David F. Buchholz	Cpl	Died in service, non-battle
Btry D, 146th Field Artillery		
Pvt Wayne A. Guinn	Pvt	Died in service, non-battle
Btry E, 146th Field Artillery		
Cpl Harold E. Springer	Pvt	Killed in action
Pvt Thomas M. Caffee	PFC	Died in service, non-battle
Pvt Glen E. Tollenaar	T/5	Died in service, non-battle
Btry F, 146th Field Artillery		
Pvt George J. Hill	1Lt	Died in service, non-battle
Hq Btry, 205th Coast Artillery		
Pvt Jerome D. Whalen	Pvt	Died in service, non-battle
Btry A, 205th Coast Artillery		
PFC Paul West	F1/O	Died in service, non-battle
Btry B, 205th Coast Artillery		
Cpl Ronald R. McFarland	SSgt	Died in service, non-battle
Btry C, 205th Coast Artillery		
Sgt Philip H. Elsberry	2Lt	Killed in action
Pvt David D. Fisher	2Lt	Killed in action
Pvt Roger A. McGuire	2Lt	Killed in action
Btry D, 205th Coast Artillery		
Sgt Walter M. Joselyn	2Lt	Killed in action
Pvt Donald F. Hensey	Pvt	Died in service, non-battle
Hq Btry, 2nd Bn, 205th Coast Artillery		
Pvt Robert C. Jackson	2Lt	Died of wounds
Btry E, 205th Coast Artillery		
Sgt Robert F. Pike	T/Sgt	Died in service, non-battle

NAME AND ORGANIZATION	AUS RANK	TYPE OF CASUALTY
Btry F, 205th Coast Artillery		
Cpl Howard J. Perry	2Lt	Killed in action
PFC Kenneth L. Yates	S/Sgt	Died of wounds
Pvt Alden H. Lightfoot	S/Sgt	Killed in action
Pvt Loyst M. Towner	2Lt	Finding of death
Hq Btry, 248th Coast Artillery		
Sgt Beauford C. Johnson	T/Sgt	Killed in action
Sgt Robert W. Waterston Jr.	S/Sgt	Died in service, non-battle
PFC Theodore D. Nielsen	1Lt	Finding of death
Pvt John D. Chemeres	Pvt	Killed in action
Pvt Robert E. Kesterson	2Lt	Killed in action
Btry A, 248th Coast Artillery		
Sgt Bernard F. Baugh	1Lt	Killed in action
Sgt Richard J. Cummings	1Lt	Killed in action
PFC Orin V. Burgman	S/Sgt	Finding of death
Pvt Joseph M. Harley, Jr	S/Sgt	Died in service, non-battle
Btry C, 248th Coast Artillery		
Pvt Harvey E. Winoski	1Lt	Killed in action
Btry D, 248th Coast Artillery		
Pvt Ernest Hontos	Cpl	Died in service, non-battle
Pvt John F. Shields	2Lt	Killed in action
Btry F, 248th Coast Artillery		
PFC Charles D. Darragh	S/Sgt	Killed in action
Pvt Raymond R. Calver	T/5	Died in service, non-battle
Pvt Robert W. Owens	Pvt	Killed in action
Med Dept Det, 248th Coast Artillery		
PFC William S. Galbraith	Pvt	Killed in action
Service Co, 116th QM Regiment		
PFC Leslie D. Martin	Pvt	Died in service, non-battle
Pvt Eff C. Walker	Cpl	Died in service, non-battle
Co A, 116th QM Regiment		
Cpl Brooks U. Atchison	S/Sgt	Killed in action
Pvt Richard A. Kessler	PFC	Killed in action
Pvt James K. Robinson	Pvt	Died in service, non-battle
Hq Det, 3d Bn, 116th QM Regt		
Sgt Jack C. Burdick	2Lt	Finding of death
Co F, 116th QM Regt		
Pvt Theodore J. Soderback	PFC	Died in service, non-battle
Co A, 116th Medical Regt		
PFC Samuel A. Sather	S/Sgt	Killed in action
Pvt Neil A. Golberg	2Lt	Died in service, non-battle
Co B, 116th Medical Regt		
Pvt Thomas L. Eddy	T/5	Died in service, non-battle
Pvt Herbert Larson	PFC	Killed in action
Pvt Paul A. MacWilliams	2Lt	Killed in action

NAME AND ORGANIZATION	AUS RANK	TYPE OF CASUALTY
116th Observation Squadron		
Pvt John C. McKinney	T/Sgt	Died in service, non-battle
PFC Stanley L. Seehorn	S/Sgt	Killed in action
Pvt Wesley Calkins	S/Sgt	Killed in action
Pvt Gordon W. Chapman	2Lt	Died in service, non-battle
Pvt Tom K. Foster	2Lt	Killed in action
Pvt Boyd H. Gallaher, Jr	Capt	Missing in action
Pvt Raymond Y. Irby	M/Sgt	Died in service, non-battle
Pvt Roger C. Larson	S/Sgt	Died in service, non-battle
Pvt Amos H. McKee	1Lt	Finding of death
Pvt Victor H. Westrand	T/Sgt	Died in service, non-battle
Hq Co, 103rd Antitank Battalion		
Pvt George T. Loop	Pvt	Killed in action
Pvt Odian A. Peterson	Pvt	Died in service, non-battle
Pvt William V. Porter	Pvt	Died in service, non-battle
Pvt John W. Vye	Sgt	Killed in action
Company B, 103rd Anti tank Company		
PFC William C. Hawson	Pvt	Died in service, non-battle
PFC Reay D. Richmond	Sgt	Killed in action
Pvt Leonard Caskin	Sgt	Killed in action
Pvt Theodore W. Hensen	Pvt	Died in service, non-battle
Pvt George Kohut	T/4	Died in service, non-battle
Pvt Paul Kohut	PFC	Died in service, non-battle
Pvt Elmer W. Rossback	T/5	Killed in action
Pvt Vernon L. Smith	T/5	Killed in action
Company C, 103rd Anti tank Company		
Cpl Arthur M. Gowin	S/Sgt	Killed in action
PFC Milton G. McAtee	2Lt	Killed in action
Pvt Marvin E. McAtee	Pvt	Killed in action
Pvt Richard W. Stork	Cpl	Killed in action
State Detachment, Wash. N.G.		
Pvt Delmar T. Hutchins, Inf.	2Lt	Killed in action